A POPULAR HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR

A Popular History of The Great War

SIR JOHN FRENCH ARRIVES AT BOULOGNE. The commander of the British Expeditionary Force—he can be identified behind the officer in the centre of this photograph—landed with his staff at the French port on August 14, 1914, and proceeded at once to the headquarters of the French armies.

A POPULAR HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR

Edited by SIR J. A. HAMMERTON

Complete in six volumes with
about 1000 maps & illustrations

Volume I

THE FIRST PHASE: 1914

London
THE FLEETWAY HOUSE

Printed in Great Britain by The Amalgamated Press, Ltd., London.

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

THROUGHOUT the years 1914-1919 the present Editor, in association with Mr. H. W. Wilson, the eminent authority on naval and military subjects, was responsible for the compilation of the most extensive body of contemporary annals of the war that has been published in this country. The work in question contained no fewer than 7,000,000 words and some 12,000 pictorial documents. Although it remains a storehouse of information for future students of the period, "The Great War," as that set of thirteen massive volumes was called, would now require to be largely re-written in the light of later knowledge: a task beyond the means of private enterprise and of doubtful value to the ordinary reader today.

But a real need exists for a new history of the war embodying the gist of post-war revelations and official documents, and sufficiently detailed to provide accurate information on any aspect, and almost on any point, of the war concerning which the present-day reader might desire to be informed.

The six volumes comprising this new work are designed to meet that want, which is felt especially by two classes of the reading public. One consists of those, now in middle life or rapidly approaching it, who played a personal part, were "on active service," to use the official and suggestive phrase, in that tremendous struggle and who, after the lapse of some fifteen years, would like to refresh their memories about the events in which they took part, on land, on the sea, or in the air. The second class comprises those who were schoolboys and schoolgirls when the world-wide conflict began and whose knowledge of it is for the most part fragmentary, disjointed, and impersonal, much as it is of the American Civil, or the Franco-Prussian War.

In planning and preparing this work the Editor has made some use of the abundant literary material existing in the monumental work above mentioned, but this POPULAR HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR is to be regarded as an original narrative of the most astounding events in the history of the modern world, newly compiled and written by a large staff of expert contributors fully conversant with all the post-war revelations and rectifications of war-time opinion. No efforts have been spared to ensure the accuracy of the many thousands of statements made in these volumes, and throughout the compilation of the work our

constant and careful consultation of dispatches and official documents has not been confined to those of Great Britain only. Mention should also be made here of the Editor's great indebtedness to the Official Histories of the War, especially the volumes of "Military Operations, France and Flanders," edited by Brigadier General Sir James E. Edmonds and published by Macmillan & Co., Ltd., and of "Naval Operations," edited by Sir Julian Corbett and published by Longmans, Green & Co., Ltd.

Our six volumes are divided into clearly cut periods, and the chapters carry the story forward, as far as possible, in chronological order, so that the reader can turn readily to any part of the narrative in which he may be particularly interested. For textual reference to the numerous events, places, and personalities a complete index is provided at the end of the work.

The point of view taken throughout the work is frankly that of Great Britain, in which are included the Dominions and other overseas parts of the Empire, whose contributions to the common cause are duly recorded in their proper places. The Editor has not thought it necessary to assume that Great Britain was always in the wrong, or to minimize in any way the wonderful heroism shown by her fighting men in the three arms, although he has tried to avoid the somewhat overheated rhetoric in which many of the early descriptions of the events of the war were expressed. He is equally anxious to be fair to the enemy, whose bravery, at all events, was unquestioned, but he has been unable to accept the view that all the warring nations were equally responsible for the conflict, or that the Germans, having lost the war, should escape the just penalty of their folly or their crime.

One or two features of these volumes may be noted. They contain 3,840 pages of text, and something like 1,500,000 words. Over 100 maps and diagrams are provided to help the reader to follow the various naval and military operations, and in addition there are some 800 photographic illustrations of places and persons mentioned in our HISTORY. A diary of events of the period is appended to each volume, which also contains biographical particulars of those in the various countries who figured prominently in the struggle.

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Volume I

CHAPTER 1

The World Drift to War

EVERY war, like everything that happens, is but the outcome of something that has happened before: the result of preceding causes. For the real origins of the vast upheaval that broke upon the world in 1914 we should have to dig very deeply into the past if we wished to arrive at a proper understanding of what took place; but it may suffice for our present purpose if we go no farther back than the events of 1870-71, when the seeds of the war of 1914-18 and its almost equally calamitous aftermath were sown with so prodigal a hand.

In 1870 the rivalry of France and Germany had been for over 1,000 years a main issue in European politics, and historians have traced it step by step from the 9th century—when the empire of Charlemagne broke into pieces and Lorraine, though not as yet Alsace, became a debatable land—until the present day. The cleavage between the East Franks, soon to be known as Germans, and the West Franks, who, in the form of France, kept the name hitherto common to both, is usually dated from 842 when the two Frankish rulers, on taking an oath of peace at Strasbourg, found it necessary to prepare the formula in two languages, so different had the speech of the two branches of the Franks become. Throughout the later Middle Ages the rivalry continued, though the French kings found their main occupation in

consolidating their kingdom, a task which Germany postponed for some 500 years. It became more intense when Bourbon and Hapsburg ruled the two realms, and the aggrandisement of France during the reign of Louis XIV was largely at the expense of Germany, which about the time of his birth had suffered terribly during the Thirty Years' War.

In the 18th century a Hohenzollern, Frederick the Great, took the place of Louis in the centre of the European stage and, in spite of his admiration for French literature and his association with French scholars, spent much of his time in fighting France. Napoleon made Germany a battleground and then carved it up just as it suited his imperious will; but his mosaic did not last, although its memories did. Germany regained the upper hand in 1814, and the settlement of Europe in 1815, largely made by German statesmen, prepared the way for the transformation of the king of Prussia into the German emperor. For fifty-five years Prussian statesmen worked steadily at their task and when, in 1866, their armies had crushed Austria, their only rival within the German orbit, William I and Bismarck were prepared, even anxious, to face the anger of an alarmed and bellicose French emperor, the third Napoleon.

As in the Great War, the immediate cause of the Franco-Prussian struggle of 1870-71 was a comparatively unimportant event, in this case the succession to the throne of Spain. In 1868 the plight of that country under Isabella had become so unhappy that General Prim headed a revolution; the queen fled and the general set up a provisional government which decided to offer the crown to a foreign prince, its own royal family having become impossible. After the consideration and rejection of various candidatures, the crown was accepted in 1870 by the duke of Aosta, the younger son of the king of Italy, who had already declined it once. But one of the princes whose candidature had been tentatively invited was Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, a kinsman of the king of Prussia. William I did not countenance, but quite unmistakably discouraged, the candidature, though Bismarck secretly encouraged it; France's hostility to it was not disguised, and Bismarck was defeated. Leopold definitely refused the offer (July 12, 1870), but William had not definitely vetoed it. For a moment Bismarck believed that his own public career was at an end. But on July 14 he had the game in his hands.

Napoleon's position in France was critical. His successes, such as they were, in Italy and the Crimea could hardly be regarded as brilliant. He had been palpably out-manœuvred by Bismarck in 1866; he had intervened in troubles in Mexico, and his intervention had been a disastrous failure. The palpable clerical influence in his counsels was a weakness rather than a strength in France and had driven him to maintain the Papacy in Rome, while the sympathies of the country were with the republicans. He had lived on the Napoleonic idea, and the idea would be exploded unless he did something worthy of his mighty uncle's name. France believed fervently that the French army could repeat its triumphs under the first Napoleon, whereas her ruler knew that the army organization was honeycombed with corruption; but there was a gambler's chance of success, and the probable alternative was the collapse of the Third empire. He did not want war, but he dared not exercise the necessary restraining influence. Yet the announcement of Leopold's refusal of the Spanish crown was, on the face of it, an immense diplomatic victory.

His minister, Grammont, threw the victory away. The French ambassador was instructed on July 13 to demand from William, who was at Ems, a pledge that he would in no circumstances support Leopold's candidature. William replied with perfect truth that he never had supported it, that Leopold's refusal was final, but that to give pledges was out of the question. There, he supposed, the matter was ended, and he telegraphed a report of the interview to Bismarck at Berlin. Late that night the telegram appeared in a condensed form in the Norddeutsche Zeitung. The condensed telegram conveyed to all Germany the impression that an outrageous demand had been answered with firmness but without discourtesy; to all France that an entirely justifiable demand had been met with insolent defiance. Twenty-four hours later Napoleon declared war and the French armies began to mass on the German frontier.

The first collision was at Saarbrücken on August 2, where a German army was driven out of an advanced post it had occupied. But in the course of the month a succession of German victories at Wörth (August 6), Colombières (August 14), Mars-la-Tour and Gravelotte (August 16 and 17) shut up Bazaine in Metz with 170,000 men, and drove MacMahon to join the emperor at Sedan, where, after a hot resistance, Napoleon was

compelled to surrender with his whole force on September 1. The emperor would of necessity have accepted any terms, but the empire ended at Sedan. His ministry had already been swept away, and Paris for the third time proclaimed the French republic, with a "government of national defence." The empress with her son had taken flight to England, where she was ultimately joined by her husband. The republic wished for peace, but not at Bismarck's price, which included the cession of Alsace and Lorraine with Metz and Strasbourg. On September 19 the Prussian crown prince's army was at the gates of Paris, which prepared itself as best it might for a long siege.

On September 27 Strasbourg fell. The government shut up in Paris could do nothing outside the city; on October 7 Gambetta escaped in a balloon to Tours, where he became in effect the French government and the inspiration of the French defiance. He raised new armies in the provinces, but on October 27 Bazaine and his great host in Metz surrendered. Gambetta proclaimed a levée en masse. The raw troops fought with heroic devotion, but the desperate successes they won were counterbalanced by far more crushing defeats; while Paris held out grimly till sheer starvation forced her to capitulate on January 28, 1871.

The Germans dictated their own terms to the French government, to the head of which the veteran Thiers was called. The terms were crushing. The preliminaries were signed on February 26, and the definite treaty of Frankfort on May 10. Alsace and most of Lorraine, with Metz and Strasbourg, were ceded; and an enormous indemnity was extracted.

Bismarck's grand object was achieved. He had created a German empire with the king of Prussia as hereditary emperor. While the war was in progress, one after another of the South German states had been admitted to the Confederation of which Prussia was the head. Bismarck had gradually overcome the opposition of the monarchs, including William himself, to the imperial project; and on January 18, ten days before the capitulation of Paris, William I was acclaimed German emperor by the assembled princes in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles.

Incidentally the withdrawal of the French troops from Rome, necessitated by the war, enabled Victor Emmanuel, immediately after Sedan, to capture Rome and incorporate it with the Italian kingdom, and to make it the national capital, while the pope

remained in the Vatican deprived of all temporal power: also Russia, supported by Bismarck, was able to procure the virtual abrogation of the Black Sea treaty of 1856 by the treaty of London of 1871. The results of the Crimean War were washed out. A burning hostility to Germany had been implanted in the soul of every Frenchman, and England was more convinced than ever that her own Indian empire was Russia's objective.

In the Turkish empire diverse Christian populations were still under the Ottoman sovereignty. Germany had for the first time in her history become united, and united with her own assent, under an organized central government, which controlled an army incomparably the most powerful in Europe. France, shorn of her Rhine provinces and exhausted by a crushing war, had for the third time set up, though she had not yet established, a republic; she had still a crowd of difficulties to surmount before her old power could be restored—and it was the interest of her victorious neighbour to foster those difficulties.

Bismarck had no desire for German expansion. What he did want was to secure the friendship of Austria, now that she could no longer be Prussia's rival in Germany, and to prevent the hostility of Russia, and so avoid setting an enemy on either flank of the new empire. When in 1872 he had established the unwritten "league of the three emperors," there was nothing immediately to be feared. But the danger point for the permanence of the new league lay in the Balkans, to which the eyes of Austria, now shut out from Germany, were more persistently turned. Austro-Russian rivalry for ascendancy in the Balkans might produce a breach, and Germany might be reduced to the painful necessity of taking a side. If she were, she would take Austria's—but such a contingency must not arise if it could be prevented. Russia must be encouraged to find in Asia the field for the development of her ambitions. If that brought her into collision with the British, Germany would lose nothing. From this point of view Russia's progress in Turkistan during the last decade was quite promising. But the Balkans were uncontrollable.

Serbia, Rumania and Montenegro had all attained a degree of autonomy, though remaining nominally in the Turkish empire. But in 1875 the peasants of Herzegovina revolted against their Moslem masters. All their Slavonic neighbours actively sympathised with them. Both Russia and Austria had some title to

pose as the natural protectors of the Slavs, Orthodox and Catholic respectively. The insurgents appealed not to one or the other, but to the Powers generally. The Porte had given effect to none of its promised reforms; it was reasonable that the Powers should insist upon them—the insurgents demanded no more, but they would remain in arms till they got something more substantial than promises on paper. The Porte had no sort of objection to making any number of promises, but an ineradicable objection to fulfilling them.

In May, 1876, the three emperors issued a memorandum to which they invited the assent of the other three Powers. Disraeli, the British prime minister, declined; Turkey was not to be coerced—if the Turkish sovereignty were allowed to go, Russian ascendancy would take its place, and that was a thing Great Britain could in no wise permit. The memorandum programme was strangled at birth. At the same time the Bulgarians rose, and the atrocities with which the suppression of the revolt was accomplished stirred up a fiery anti-Turkish political campaign in England, though in parliament Disraeli's ascendancy was complete. The new sultan, Abdul Hamid, who succeeded in June, was defiant. In July, Serbia and Montenegro declared war on Turkey.

If a frank and cordial understanding between Russia and Great Britain had been possible, the Eastern question might conceivably have been settled. Mutual mistrust made it quite impossible. The British cabinet was divided on the question of armed intervention on behalf of Turkey. When Great Britain herself demanded from Turkey an armistice and a conference of the Powers to be held at Constantinople (Istanbul) in December, Abdul Hamid dared not refuse. But when the conference met he laid before it a full-blown scheme of reforms which he proposed to carry out—as a sovereign who would submit to no external control over his actions. The meaning was obvious. Diplomacy failed to find a way out of the deadlock; and in April Russian forces, having been granted free passage through Rumania, crossed the Pruth.

Austria had made a private compact of neutrality; Germany had no motive for intervention; Great Britain was satisfied to wait and watch. Three months passed before the Russians could effect their passage of the Danube; for the next month they advanced rapidly; then suddenly they found themselves held up

by the Turks under Osman, who had seized and entrenched a flanking position at Plevna, whence the most desperate efforts, culminating in a grand attack on September 11, failed to dislodge him. Assault was then abandoned for investment; three months later, after a desperate attempt to cut his way out, Osman was compelled to surrender (December 10). In the East, also, the Russian advance through the Caucasus had been held up in the first months; but there, too, the tide had turned decisively before December. After the fall of Plevna the Turkish resistance began to crumble; on January 20, 1878, the Russian forces were in Adrianople (Edirne), where on January 31 peace preliminaries were signed. On March 3, the Adrianople convention became the treaty of San Stefano.

Meanwhile, however, the fall of Plevna had set the governments of the other Powers in motion. A sweeping triumph might enable Russia to dictate terms destructive both of Austrian and of British interests—regardless of the conditions on which those Powers had observed neutrality. Neither Russia nor Britain wanted war, but the British government felt it necessary to demonstrate its readiness for that alternative, and through the first months of the war the tension was extreme. Austria proposed a conference, which ultimately took shape as the Congress of Berlin, since the terms of the treaty of San Stefano intensified instead of allaying the perturbation of Austria as well as of Great Britain. The fundamental disagreement between the Powers was on the question: how far had Russia the right to dictate her own terms to Turkey, and how far had the Powers concerned in the previous treaties the right to insist upon modifications of those terms?

The congress met in June at Berlin under the presidency of Bismarck as the representative of Germany in the character of the sincere friend of all parties, having no interests of her own at stake and desiring only to induce them all to accept equitable adjustments of their divergent or antagonistic interests. The result was the treaty of Berlin, generally regarded as a triumph for Disraeli's diplomacy, since at the end of it very little was left of the San Stefano treaty; while it was accompanied by independent pacts, on the one hand between Great Britain and Turkey and on the other between Austria and Russia, which left the whole Eastern question on a footing new but scarcely more harmonious than before.

TERRITORIAL CHANGES IN THE BALKANS BETWEEN 1878 AND 1914

The map on the left shows the boundaries of the various Balkan states after the treaty signed at San Stefano in 1878. The one on the right shows how these boundaries appeared after the Balkan Wars of 1912-13.

The ostensible effect of the Turco-Russian War, followed by the San Stefano treaty and the Berlin Congress, was the establishment or the strengthening of sundry independent principalities in the Balkan peninsula, and the re-assertion of the principle that the concert of Europe, not the particular interests of a successful military power, must have the deciding voice in material redistributions of European territory, which necessarily have their repercussions upon Europe generally. But in actual fact the episode had another effect quite as far-reaching though not so superficially obvious. It had brought about the thing which the most powerful statesman in Europe was most anxious to avert, a rupture in the relations subsisting between Germany, Austria and Russia. For in Bismarck's view there were three European Powers which counted for Germany, since Britain's non-intervention could generally be ensured, though definitely to alienate her would be inadvisable: Russia, Austria and France. French hostility to Germany was a matter of course. Austrian hostility had melted away under tactful management; Austrian and Prussian interests no longer clashed since Germany had identified itself with Prussia; Austrian friendship was the best security available for Germany. But Russia remained.

Germany had a hostile France, which might again become powerful, on one flank. A hostile Russia on the other flank would be a serious menace, especially in conjunction with a recovered France. It was therefore essential for Germany to preserve friendly relations with Russia, only in less degree than with Austria. If Germany should ever be forced to choose between Russia and Austria, she must choose Austria. Since the French war it had been a main object with Bismarck to maintain the friendliness of the three Powers and to avert any complications which would drive Germany into siding with one against the other. But the antagonistic interests of Russia and Austria in the Balkans had been too much even for Bismarck. However skilfully he might pose as the "honest broker," the fundamental fact remained that by the Berlin Congress the ambitions of Russia in the Balkans suffered a set-back, those of Austria were advanced, and Germany had done nothing to forward Russian interests, though it was at the hands of Great Britain that Russia had most conspicuously suffered diplomatic defeat. There was no open breach between Germany and Russia; but the rift was there.

The trouble that Bismarck had been so anxious to guard against developed by degrees, and the rift between Russia and the Central empires gradually widened. France, already convalescent, grew stronger as the years passed. The gulf between the autocratic tsardom in the east and the democratic republic in the west proved no insuperable barrier. The perpetual sources of friction between Great Britain and France on the one hand and Russia on the other proved capable of accommodation. So that at last all Germany convinced itself that those three Powers were joint conspirators whose common aim was her own destruction. And the outcome of that conviction was—Armageddon. These developments, however, were not immediate. For a quarter of a century the British empire remained in splendid isolation, and France hardly less than Great Britain, though after a long interval the beginnings of amity sprang up between her and Russia; while the effect of the Berlin treaties was at first to intensify the established antagonism between Russia and Great Britain.

Great Britain had made a private bargain with the Porte guaranteeing the Asiatic possessions of the Turks—other than those ceded to Russia under the treaties—conditionally upon the carrying out of reforms, and upon the British occupation and administration of the island of Cyprus, which would provide her with a naval station of considerable value in the eastern Mediterranean.

Nor was Russia's policy in Bulgaria successful in furthering her own projects. The prince nominated for Bulgaria was the tsar's nephew, Alexander of Battenberg. At the outset, Russian influences predominated, arousing patriotic antagonism to foreign control. But the prince established his own despotic authority by a coup d'état setting aside the theoretically admirable but practically paralytic constitution which had been bestowed on the principality. Russia applauded, but when he turned his powers to account, assumed the championship of Bulgarian independence, and dismissed the Russian counsellors, Russia was wroth. He could and did gain popularity by restoring the constitution (1883) without loss of authority.

In 1885 Eastern Rumelia ejected its Turkish governors and proclaimed its own union with Bulgaria. Alexander hastened to assume the proffered sovereignty. Serbia took alarm—she must be compensated for this Bulgarian expansion. Compensation

was not forthcoming, so she declared war, and was badly beaten at Slivnitza. Austria intervened and stopped the fighting. The Porte saved its face by appointing Alexander governor of Rumelia, a practical acceptance of the fact that he had got it and meant to keep it. Only a threatened blockade by a British squadron restrained Greece from attempting to snatch compensation for herself.

But Alexander's triumph wrought his fall. The tsar's indignation was high; Russian conspirators kidnapped the Bulgarian king, forced him to sign his abdication and carried him over the border. But the national government carried on under his indomitable minister Stambulov; Alexander, less courageous, threw up the struggle in the face of the tsar's implacable hostility, and resigned the crown which the Bulgarians would have restored. Stambulov, fervidly anti-Russian, remained dictator until in 1887 a new prince was found—ready to take the risks and play a waiting game—in Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg. Meantime, the Balkan states continued to seethe.

As concerned the Balkans, then, the actual outcome was that Russia lost ground, since she succeeded in alienating both Rumania and Bulgaria without definitely attracting Serbia or Greece under her influence. Austria had gained by establishing herself in Bosnia and giving to that region an administration better than it had ever known before. Great Britain had acquired a dominating influence at the Porte, though she was too unsympathetic to Turkish methods for the satisfaction of the Turkish government, which continued in its old ways, but with a much smaller Christian population under its rule than of yore. And between the several Balkan states there was no love to lose, while none of them was conscious of a deep debt to any European Power for disinterested services rendered.

Bismarck's position as the dominating factor in international politics was unchanged. From France in isolation there could be nothing to fear for a long time to come, and to keep her isolated was no very difficult task. A republic which could set up no administration of tolerably convincing stability could hardly be attracted by, or attractive to, the iron despotism of Russia. Between her and Great Britain Egypt provided a constant source of friction; and an opportunity occurred for providing another between her and Italy, incidentally attracting the latter to the Central Powers.

France had effected an amazing economic recovery since the war, but in 1878 it was still uncertain whether monarchism might yet take the place of the republic. The resignation of MacMahon marked the turning point; Bonapartism disappeared with the death of the Prince Imperial in Zululand, in 1879; the legitimism which clung to the house of Bourbon was paralysed in the country by the firmness or obstinacy with which the Bourbon princes, like the exiled Stuarts, clung to their religious and political convictions or prejudices. From that time monarchism was merely a pious opinion, and the continuity of the republic grew more secure.

At this time France found herself encouraged to develop her aspirations in Africa by taking possession of Tunis, for which she found a pretext in 1881. Great Britain had no objection, as it might make France less irritable on the subject of Egypt. Germany had no objection, having no African interests and a perception that Tunis might bring to France more trouble than profit; for Italy, with her own eyes on Tunis, would certainly regard the annexation of Tunis by France as an unfriendly act towards herself. She did, and her annoyance made it comparatively easy for Bismarck to draw her into a somewhat non-committal alliance in 1882 with Germany and her former enemy, Austria. If trouble with France should arise, Italy would be on Germany's side.

France's acquisition of Tunis did nothing to mitigate her jealousy of British influence in Egypt, which she had never ceased to covet since the days of the first Napoleon. In the successive complications of the Eastern question she had kept that objective before her throughout the Bourbon and Orleanist monarchies; while Palmerston, with preservation of the integrity of the Turkish empire as a fundamental aim of his policy, had been a constant obstacle. But the maintenance of French influence there had remained a constant aim, furthered by the construction of the Suez Canal, a French project in which Palmerston had no share, though Disraeli had more than made up for the oversight by his dramatic purchase from Khedive Ismail of the bulk of the company's shares in 1875, virtually placing control of the canal in the hands of the British government.

At the same time the khedive's extravagance, and his huge debts to British and French financiers, had forced him to place the

Egyptian finances in the hands of a dual board of control, British and French, with the inevitable result that the board became in effect, though not in form, largely responsible for the government; a state of things by no means to the liking of the officials, drawn for the most part from other parts of the Turkish empire, who had hitherto battened according to custom upon the khedive's helpless subjects and the revenues, of which latter only a fraction reached the treasury.

It was not difficult, in the circumstances, to raise the cry of Egypt for the Egyptians, or to draw an army colonel, Arabi Pasha, into the rôle of patriot leader and champion of the anti-foreign sentiment. Ismail's successor, Tewfik, found himself powerless; the anti-foreign agitation became a grave danger to the very considerable European population in Alexandria and elsewhere. The Porte (the suzerain) would not and the khedive could not do anything. The French and British governments offered Tewfik their support at the beginning of 1882, and sent naval squadrons; the only effect was to produce riots. A European conference was called to deal judicially with the problem, but the position at Alexandria and the menace to the Europeans there from Arabi's troops were too critical for delay. The British admiral took the responsibility, which the French admiral declined to share, of sending an ultimatum to Arabi, and, when it was ignored, of opening a bombardment and occupying Alexandria, while the French retired.

The force at the admiral's disposal was obviously inadequate for the restoration of order and security. With due notification to the sultan, troops were dispatched to Egypt from England and India. Arabi's army was shattered in a brief and decisive campaign, and he himself was deported. But the whole situation had been changed. The khedive's government—anything that could be called a government—could be restored only by the British. In the public interest the British on their own sole responsibility had taken upon themselves to do the thing that was admittedly necessary, but which no one else had been ready or willing to undertake either alone or in conjunction with them; the French had had the opportunity to take part in the operation, but had deliberately rejected it.

The British thereupon occupied Egypt as the Austrians had occupied Bosnia, on the theory that they would evacuate it as soon as a government had been established which could stand securely

upon its own feet. And in the meanwhile the government continued to be the khedive's, but the reorganization of an Egyptian army was in the hands of British officers, and the administration was in the hands of British officials in the service of the khedive. There was no room for French ambitions in Egypt, and though France was thoroughly conscious that she had no one but herself to thank for the fact, that made her none the less resentful.

Italy had attained her unity under Victor Emmanuel, but half the country had not yet been accustomed to the idea that governments exist for some other purpose than the oppression of the people. Economic stability was still distant, and, if she ranked as a great Power, it was still only by courtesy, eager though she was to assert herself. The almost simultaneous deaths of Victor Emmanuel and Pius IX did not heal the breach between the crown and the Papacy.

Spain on the other hand was entering upon an era of recuperation after her prolonged sufferings. The king, Amadeo of Savoy, who had accepted her crown when it was refused by Leopold of Hohenzollern, resigned it again in disgust in 1873; but after a year of dictatorship in the guise of a republic Spain recalled Alfonso XII, the son of the formerly expelled queen Isabella. There was a brief struggle before the old Carlist party was finally broken up; the young king set himself seriously to the task of government; and when he died prematurely in 1885 his widow, Maria Christina, discharged the duties of regent on behalf of her infant Alfonso XIII, until he reached man's estate.

Russia as we saw lost ground in Europe. Alexander II had striven or rather groped after ideals, while lacking the resolution and the insight without which it was impossible to bring them to realization. He had liberated the serfs without restoring to them what they regarded as their own rights in the soil. He had encouraged Western education, but it had fallen upon ground in which it was only the seed of passionate revolt, and government terrorism was faced by the black spectre of nihilism. The tsar himself was no enemy of reform, but even at the moment when an effort was being made in that direction the world was shocked by his murder at the hands of the nihilists (1882). All thought of reforms vanished, and under the dead tsar's son, Alexander III, the tyranny became if possible more rigid and more merciless than before.

There was at this period a general European movement towards expansion. France had turned her eyes once more to the East; if India was unattainable, there were still lands beyond India where a footing might be established; though it was not without many troubles that she acquired from China the protectorate of Annam by the treaty of Tientsin in 1885. Her activities in Indo-China were probably the real though not the ostensible warrant for the British annexation of Upper Burma in 1887. European interests in the Farthest East were developing. But it was the scramble for Africa that set in most vigorously in the years immediately following the conclusion of the Congress of Berlin.

Expansion manifestly could take place only in lands—whether densely or sparsely populated—where the civilization in general and the community organization in particular were on a lower plane than those of Europe. America was already occupied by Europeans; so was most of Australasia and the islands of the Pacific. Western Asia was not an open field; northern and central Asia were out of reach except for Russia. In the farthest east of Asia there were perhaps possibilities, but there was the Chinese empire to be reckoned with. But the whole African interior was an almost unknown region, scarcely penetrated except by an occasional adventurous missionary, peopled by negro races whose culture was primitive and barbaric. The coastal districts on the Mediterranean were provinces in which such governments as existed might fairly be classed as barbaric. The Atlantic seaboard was dotted with European colonies which were little more than very unhealthy trading depots. The south was occupied by the British, the Boers and the Portuguese. Farther north, on the east, Zanzibar and Abyssinia, like Morocco on the north-west coast, and to some extent the island of Madagascar, claimed a doubtful recognition of independent states. But the rest of Africa was open to any Europeans who could take effective possession.

The British, then, as we have seen, established a temporary protectorate in Egypt, to which other Powers could hardly refuse assent; France had established her own protectorate in Tunis, not only with assent but with positive encouragement from Great Britain and Germany, though very much to the annoyance of Italy, who could only hope to find compensation on the north of Abyssinia and ultimately in Tripoli. In 1885 France without

European intervention set up a protectorate in Madagascar, which island was later annexed. But all the various European Powers, including Germany, who had hitherto felt no call to colonial expansion, had suddenly realized that Africa was the only division of the earth's surface still open to appropriation, and that the British, with a northern base in Egypt, a southern base in Cape Colony and sundry starting points on the western and eastern coasts, would by mere force of circumstances absorb the interior and leave nothing for anyone else to appropriate unless they made haste to anticipate her.

The precedents of the 18th century, when France and Great Britain had fought each other to a finish for America and India on the hypothesis that there was not room for both, were not promising. In Africa after all there was room for everyone; and so between 1880 and 1890 a series of treaties or compacts was entered upon, partitioning the Dark Continent into protectorates or spheres of influence appropriated to one or another of the European states, though not without leaving occasions for acute controversy in the future.

In 1888 the emperor William I died at the age of ninety; three months later his son Frederick I followed him, and his grandson William II became the German kaiser. The German empire had been achieved through the never-failing loyalty of the old man and his great chancellor to each other. What might have befallen if Frederick had not been already a dying man when he succeeded to the imperial crown none can say, for it was notorious that there were many points on which emperor and chancellor did not see eye to eye; but during those months there was no breach between them. On Frederick's death it seemed at first that Bismarck's ascendancy would be unimpaired, but the new kaiser believed implicitly in himself; he had ideas of his own which were not Bismarck's, and in 1890 William "dropped the pilot," and took the management of affairs into his own hands. The world did not know what to make of Germany's new master and his passion for unexpected activities and startling pronouncements, which were occasionally somewhat nerve-racking; but it was, on the whole, inclined to regard them as temperamental eccentricities which must not be taken too seriously.

One thing, however, was clear. Bismarck had striven to the last to placate Russia and prevent any rapprochement between

her and France. That a rapprochement was taking place became more apparent every day. In 1891 the French channel fleet visited Kronstadt, where it received an ovation; two years later a Russian squadron paid a return visit to Toulon, where its reception was even more enthusiastic. Alexander III died in 1894, when he was succeeded by the third of the tsar-idealists, Nicholas II; next year an alliance between France and Russia became an accomplished though not a published fact, the existence of which was acknowledged and even emphasised by somewhat ostentatious displays of mutual good will in the two following years. Germany can hardly be reproached if the conviction was implanted, and grew ever stronger, that hostility to her was the bond between the two Powers, otherwise so inappropriately yoked together, which lay on her western and eastern marches.

There could be no question about the solidarity of the interests of the two Central Powers, Germany and Austria. If they broke with each other, neither would be secure against attack by one, or, more probably, two hostile Powers; while they stood together, holding strategically the interior lines, the risk of attacking them would be too great to be undertaken lightly. And at the same time they had no clashing interests, and no material divergencies of political sentiment such as those which made a firmly rooted friendship so difficult between a typically autocratic and a typically democratic state. By attaching Italy to themselves they had gained an additional security in relation at least to France. On the other hand, concord between Russia and France gave to each security against aggression by the Central Powers. An equilibrium was established simply because the issue of an armed conflict would be too doubtful—the more because no one was able to gauge the real strength of Russia.

At the same time the isolation of Great Britain was complete, nor had she any desire that it should be otherwise. She was in possession or occupation of the greater and better part of so much of the world as had not been occupied by Europeans before the middle of the 18th century, a position from which no one could hope to oust her while her fleets commanded the ocean highways; those fleets were an impassable bulwark except where their place was taken by the all but impassable mountains of the Indian frontier, or where her only neighbour was the

United States. She was hardly conscious of a challenge to her commercial and manufacturing supremacy, which she had learned to regard as a matter of course. So long as she kept her navy up to standard she had nothing to fear from Powers whose resources were under the perpetual strain of maintaining huge armies, while she could content herself with one comparatively insignificant in size.

She could see no cause of quarrel with any of her neighbours save Russia, except what she felt to be their rather unreasonable jealousy; she had no sense of hostility to any of them—with the same exception, Russia. Consequently she had no desire for alliances which might prove embarrassing, but if she should incline to one scale or other in the European balances it would fairly certainly not be the Russian scale. Though French and English had fought each other often enough in the past, they had also occasionally fought side by side, and towards France Great Britain had no sort of ill will; France might persist in her annoyance about Egypt, but common sense would forbid her to manufacture a casus belli; while, if at times the British relations with Austria and Prussia had not been over cordial, they had not fought each other for more than a century, nor was there any apparent reason why they should wish to fight each other now.

Britain was hardly alive, however, to the fact that jealousy was growing in Germany, who had embarked on an active career of trade expansion, was pushing her way into markets which the British had hitherto monopolised, and was ill satisfied with the bargains struck over the partition of Africa—though the British expansionists were no less displeased by the "graceful concessions" of Lord Salisbury's diplomacy. The German commercial community felt more and more that British rivalry and British intrigues were barricading her out of her rightful "place in the sun." On the other hand, the kaiser had realized the fundamental fact that "peaceful penetration" was the only useful weapon that could be employed until there was a German navy which could hold its own against the British navy.

No one then was disposed to interfere in the troubles of minor states or nationalities. No one was concerned if Norway wanted the separation from Sweden which she achieved, by strictly constitutional methods, at the opening of the 20th century. The oppression of the Poles by Russia might demand

sympathy, but certainly not intervention. The absorption of Finland into the Russian system disturbed no one but the Swedes. The subordination of the Slavs within the Austrian empire to Austrian or Magyar domination made Slavs everywhere look to Slavonic Russia, developing the race hostility between Slav and Teuton; but the time was not ripe for a duel —and the astute sultan was very well aware that all the Powers would fight shy of active interference with his doings, lest they should thereby be brought into active collision with each other. The inflammability of the Balkan peninsula was the standing menace to that general peace which the concert of Europe was most anxious to preserve, while that same desire paralysed the concert itself for drastic action. Incidentally, since Germany had no territorial interests of her own in the Turkish empire, Abdul Hamid, having nothing to fear from her "friendship" and possibly much to gain, was ready enough to cultivate it, while the kaiser was thoroughly alive to the advantages that might accrue therefrom.

In the Balkan storm centre, Serbia was too much torn by domestic troubles to endanger the peace of her neighbours, though a period of reconstruction was promised by the fall of the Obrenovitch dynasty and the accession of a prince of the former rival house of Karageorgevitch in 1903; though the consequent development of pan-Slav doctrines was ominous from the Austrian point of view.

In Bulgaria, Ferdinand watched and waited while Stambulov ruled, till the chance came in 1894 for accepting the minister's resignation—much to the surprise of Stambulov himself, who was assassinated not long afterwards. Ferdinand was far too wary to commit himself to provocative action in any direction, while he was especially careful to cultivate the good will of the Porte on one side and Germany on the other. With a Hohenzollern reigning in Rumania and a Coburg in Bulgaria—both states which declined to regard themselves as Slavonic, and both having very definite grudges against Russia—the gravitation of both towards the Central empires was inevitable.

When definite trouble arose, it was within the Turkish dominions. It appeared in 1894 that there was a revolutionary movement in Armenia which needed repressing. The Turk repressed it, finding himself under the unhappy necessity of massacring some 50,000 of the population before the European

concert was in tune for intervention, though, as a matter of course, he then accepted the paper scheme of reforms submitted by the Powers, which as usual failed to materialise. Next came the revolt of Crete, bent on escaping from Moslem sovereignty and on joining herself to the Greek kingdom. Greece answered the call of Crete and sent a force to the island. The concert intervened. A joint squadron arrived at Canea, bringing peremptory orders that the fighting was to stop, that the Greeks were to withdraw and no more Turkish troops were to be landed, and the orders were perforce obeyed. But the Greeks lost their heads and invaded Thessaly, whence they were decisively ejected by the Turkish troops.

To deny the right of the Turks, in the circumstances, to demand rectifications of the Thessaly frontier was impossible; but the Powers—without Germany and Austria, who refused to cooperate—required from Turkey autonomy for Crete under their joint supervision, with a Greek prince as governor. In Crete, Greek patriotism centred in the future minister, Venizelos. But with Abdul Hamid German influence was supreme, though a Young Turk party, a Turkish nationalist party, was now coming into being with a programme of its own which was not favourable to the khalif, who in the last twenty years had lost for Islam effective sovereignty in Cyprus, Egypt, Rumelia, Bosnia and finally Crete. The party's existence, however, was as yet unsuspected. The accord of Germany and the Porte bore significant fruit in 1902, in the authorisation of a German railway to Basra and Bagdad, which would give the Germans their first foothold in the Middle East.

In the Far East Japan had passed through a period of thorough reorganization on western models, and the scramble for penetration bases in China had begun after a quarrel over Korea had shown how powerless China was to stand up to the growing might of Japan.

The war between China and Japan took place in 1894-95, and when it was over Europe intervened, forbade Japan to reap the fruits of her victory, and the Powers were duly rewarded by China for their intervention; Russia in concessions for the railway she was carrying across Serbia to Vladivostok, France in the neighbourhood of Tonkin, Germany at Tientsin—arrangements which made an ultimate collision between Russia and Japan certain, unless Japan should give way to Russia. Germany,

whatever her ultimate aim may have been, ranged herself along with Russia and France, and Great Britain could not encourage Japan to defy that combination. Japan submitted with dignity, and bided her time.

China, however, did not love the foreign devils. A year later (1897) two German missionaries were murdered. Germany demanded compensation, and got it in Kiao-chau. France and Russia demanded equivalents for the concessions to Germany, and got them; on the same principle, Weihaiwei was leased to Great Britain. The concessions intensified the popular Chinese hostility to the foreigners, and to the emperor Kuang Hsü, who was deposed next year by the dowager-empress, Tzu Hsi, the incarnation of the anti-foreign reaction; while north China was seething with the Boxer rebellion.

All the foreign Powers had legations at Peking (Peiping), and in 1900 came the news that the legations were either in the hands of the Peking mob or were on the point of falling into them. All the Powers, Japan and the United States included, took joint action, and dispatched to China contingents which marched on Peking, where they found that the legations had, after all, held out successfully. The Chinese government submitted, with professions that it had done its best but had been unable to control the rebels. The allies refrained from demanding further concessions, though insisting on effective guarantees for security in the future; and in the following years it appeared that the progressive or westernising element predominated in the Chinese government, though Tzu Hsi continued to reign.

The conduct of Japan throughout had more than established her right to recognition on an equal footing with the Western Powers, which was sealed by a treaty of alliance with Great Britain in 1902. The treaty meant that, if and when Russia and Japan should come into armed collision, Great Britain would not join Japan against Russia by herself, but would intervene if anyone else joined Russia against Japan.

The collision was not long postponed. Russia wanted both Manchuria, where she had established herself, and Korea, where Japan had established herself. Japan proposed mutual accommodations; but Russia claimed that the compromises should not be reciprocal. Japan proposed control for Russia in Manchuria and for Japan in Korea. Russia returned no answer, and in February, 1904, Japan declared war. She had only the

resources of her own islands to draw upon, while Russia's resources in men at least were incalculably greater. But she could bring her whole force to bear at once; of Russia's naval squadrons one was icebound at Vladivostok, while she could reinforce her armies in Manchuria only by way of the single-line trans-Siberian railway, which was still far short of completion.

On February 9 Japan broke up the second Russian fleet from Port Arthur, whither she drove it back and which she proceeded to blockade. A little later she was able to invest it on the land side also, while the Russian commander Kuropatkin was endeavouring not to overwhelm but to hold back her main army on the Yalu till he should be adequately reinforced. Port Arthur held out stubbornly, and in spite of heavy fighting the Japanese commander could make no impression until a desperate effort was put forth at the end of the year in order to anticipate the expected arrival of a new Russian fleet, the Port Arthur squadron having sallied forth in August, only to be annihilated by Admiral Togo.

Kuropatkin had been pushed back from the Yalu in May; he was again pushed back upon Mukden in August, as the result of the nine days' battle of Liao-yang, in which the Japanese actually suffered more heavily than the Russians. Being at last reinforced in October, he resumed the offensive, but was again compelled to retire upon Mukden after a fifteen days' battle on the Sha-ho, which left both armies so exhausted that neither could take the offensive. Port Arthur, however, was so hard pressed by Nogi's final onslaught that it was forced to surrender on January 1, 1905.

Nogi was thus released to reinforce the main army, after which another prolonged and exhausting struggle drove Kuropatkin from Mukden at the end of February back to the lines which he was able to hold for the remainder of the war, since there was no more heavy fighting on land. The sea, however, provided one more episode. Rozhdestvensky's fleet arrived in May, only to be obliterated by Togo in the battle of Tsushima. The war was ended by the treaty of Portsmouth, U.S.A., in August, 1905; Russia evacuating Manchuria, while Japan retained Korea and also the Liau-tung peninsula.

As concerned Europe, no change in the isolation of Great Britain had taken place when the 20th century opened. It was a moment when every country on the European continent was sympathising

not with her but with her stubborn antagonists in the South African War, under the curious conviction that all the dominions of the British empire were craving to be free from a bondage which had no existence. In actual fact, for fifty years past Great Britain had consistently fostered autonomy in her colonies, which were aware of no bondage except when the exigencies of international relations made the imperial government actually or apparently neglectful of the interests of particular colonies. Regarding themselves and being regarded as partners in the empire, and not as subordinates, they had no desire for separation, however jealous they might be in regard to their own rights and privileges; and the sense of imperial solidarity was growing, not diminishing. South Africa was on a different footing from the rest, for the simple reason that the Dutch element there declined to regard itself as British, looked upon the British as interlopers, and resented the British claim to sovereignty in territories which the Dutch, who had been there long before them, regarded as being rightfully their own. And that sentiment among the Boers had been intensified by the retrocession of the Transvaal's independence in 1881.

When this antagonism issued in the South African War in 1899, the popularity of Great Britain in Europe had not been increasing. Her prospective evacuation of Egypt seemed to grow more remote; it could not come till the Egyptians could be trusted to govern themselves, and she was not teaching them the art of self-government. She was showing them how the thing ought to be done, giving them stable rule, developing their resources, bringing to the fellaheen an unprecedented prosperity; but the men who were doing it all, holding all the responsible posts, were not Egyptians but Britons—after the Indian precedent, and for the same reasons.

In 1896 Britain made the first open move towards the reconquest of the Sudan by pushing the Egyptian frontier defences up to Dongola. The business was done in the single campaign of 1898. The fanatical hordes of the Khalifa, the Mahdi's successor, were completely shattered at the battle of Omdurman. The Sudan became what it had been before in theory, but never in fact, a province of Egypt, and virtually a British protectorate. But the concentration of the Khalifa's forces against the British advance had enabled a small expeditionary party from the French Congo to reach Fashoda

unharmed and hoist the French flag there ; and French susceptibilities were painfully irritated when Sir Herbert Kitchener, the conqueror of the Khalifa, declined to recognize the validity of the French occupation. The French government acknowledged the British claim, but French sentiment cherished yet another grievance against what it regarded as British aggression.

Two years after the reconquest of the Sudan, the antagonism of the Dutch to the British in South Africa resulted in the outbreak of the South African War. In the first months the British troops met with a series of reverses, but by the following midsummer they were in occupation of the two capitals, Bloemfontein and Pretoria. In September the annexation of the Boer states was proclaimed. Nevertheless the Boers refused to submit, maintaining a persistent guerilla warfare until so many of them had been rounded up that the remnant could no longer keep the field; and in May, 1902, the peace of Vereeniging terminated the war.

The republics were annexed, to be administered temporarily as crown colonies, but instead of exacting indemnities the victors provided large sums for the reinstatement of the farms which had suffered in the war. There had certainly been on the continent a strong inclination to intervene, but though the kaiser's attitude in the preceding years had caused some resentment in England, during the war his influence was certainly exerted to discourage intervention. It may be that he realized the practical futility of attempting, as matters stood, to challenge the British fleet; for it was while the war was in progress that he developed an unprecedented naval programme for Germany which was difficult to dissociate from the idea of rivalry with the leading maritime Power.

The South African War had not long been ended when new factors began to influence European relations. In Great Britain, where for half a century free trade had been the accepted theory and practice on all hands, a new propaganda was vigorously pushed and in some quarters enthusiastically adopted, but it had a political effect which could hardly have been anticipated; it was interpreted in Germany as being malevolently directed against German commerce and German prosperity. That conception was unaffected by the defeat of the tariff reformers at the general election of 1906, and the conviction was thoroughly established in the popular mind that the



Photo, E. H. Mills

EDWARD THE PEACEMAKER. The entente cordiale between Britain and France, culminating in the alliance of 1914, was greatly influenced by Edward VII (1841–1910), whose unfailing industry and acute understanding of men were characteristic. Throughout his reign he exerted his great diplomatic gifts to maintain the peace of the world.

Downey

KING GEORGE AND THE WORLD WAR. At no time did King George more clearly prove his devotion to the welfare of his country than during the Great War. At the outset he set himself by his example of sincere sympathy, zeal and self-sacrifice to keep the nation cheerful. The king went to France on various occasions to encourage his army and also visited the Grand Fleet. In numerous other ways the king and the queen gave practical proof of their solicitude for the welfare of the sick and wounded.

THE KING'S CALL TO ARMS. Advertising played an important part in the nation's appeal for men to meet the German challenge. The poster shown here on a pillar-box was displayed all over Great Britain in the first week of the war. Men were asked to enlist in the army for the duration of hostilities, and a notice regarding demobilization can be read near the foot of the bill.



Drawing by Cyrus Cuneo for "Illustrated London News"

WARNING TO GERMANY. General uneasiness was caused throughout Europe by Germany's action in the matter of the Agadir incident. On November 27, 1911, Sir Edward Grey, who was foreign secretary at the time, made a speech in the House of Commons which demonstrated that the pacific intentions of the government must not be misinterpreted as indicating weakness or diffidence in regard to matters of principle.

British were saturated with jealousy of Germany's commercial progress.

It befell, moreover, that at the moment when the propaganda was in full swing Great Britain and France discovered that their outstanding differences were capable of reasonable adjustment and that living on terms of mutual good will was much more satisfactory than the perpetuation of needless friction. The long reign of Queen Victoria had just ended; the new king, Edward VII, had the gift of popularity, and a visit to France facilitated the development of the new spirit of friendliness. The position of the monarch in England is not readily grasped in other countries, and it was not difficult to imagine that a Machiavellian diplomacy was at work. Coupled with the supposed anti-German tariff agitation, the new accord between Great Britain and France was doubly ominous, and the belief in England's sinister designs gained ground.

Nor was this all. France had already established friendly relations with Russia, and the accommodation of interests between France and Great Britain was soon followed by similar accommodation between Great Britain and Russia, made possible as it had never been before by the effects upon Russia of the disastrous Japanese war. It had been a fundamental part of Bismarck's policy to keep those three Powers at arm's length from each other. Those who carried on this tradition believed that there were plenty of motives holding them apart; there could be only one for their reconciliation—their common desire for the destruction of Germany. The development of this idea was at least a fundamental factor in the complicated story of the ensuing years, and its catastrophic climax in August, 1914.

It is curious to observe that the most idealistic if not the most successful efforts to design an organ for the preservation of the world's peace have emanated from Russian tsars, Alexander I and Nicholas II. In the last thirty years of the 19th century international disputes had with increasing frequency been referred for decision to a neutral arbitrator, Great Britain and the United States having practically led the way by referring their own dispute over the Alabama claim to a neutral court of arbitration.

In 1898 Nicholas invited the Powers to send delegates to a conference to be held at The Hague to discuss ways and means for the reduction of armaments by consent, the common adoption

of what may be called humanitarian regulations in warfare, and the establishment of a permanent court of international arbitration to which nations might, if so minded, refer their disputes. As a result the Hague Tribunal was actually set up. No agreement could be reached as to reduction of armaments, because no scheme was in the German view compatible with Germany's security. Regulations were generally though not universally accepted later for the humanising of warfare, and these were loyally observed by the belligerents both in the South African and the Russo-Japanese wars; but in them there was the grave defect that no sanction existed for their enforcement if any belligerent chose to ignore them, just as it was open to any nation to refuse the appeal to arbitration.

Great Britain and France reached their mutual understanding, their entente, in 1904. Both Powers had interests in Morocco, both had interests in Egypt; each recognized in effect that the other should have a free hand in the country where her interests were paramount. Their agreement, which was not an alliance, was laid before the Triple Alliance, and no objections to it were raised. But the kaiser had for some time been posing as the friend of Moslem peoples in general—both Russia and Great Britain had a vast number of Mahomedan subjects. In 1905 it became apparent to Germany that the interests of the sultan of Morocco as well as those of Germany in Morocco required protection from France's peaceful penetration. Incidentally, Russia was having a bad time in her struggle with Japan, and France could not count upon effective support from that quarter. Unless Great Britain supported her she would have to give way.

When it became apparent that Great Britain would stand loyal, Germany proposed that the question should be dealt with by a conference. The proposal was accepted, though it involved the resignation of the French foreign minister, Théodore Delcassé. The conference of Algeciras was held in 1906, all the Powers, including the United States, participating. Germany's demands were supported by Austria alone. It appeared, however, that she was satisfied with the result, while no one suggested that she had met with a rebuff, though for practical purposes the position of the French in Morocco was confirmed. The conference was preluded by the sanctioning in Germany of a huge programme of naval construction; on the other hand,

only a year later, the entente between Great Britain and France was supplemented by the entente between Great Britain and Russia, already the ally of France; while at the conference Italy had rather significantly affirmed the identity of her interests with those of Britain. It was not clear how far Italy regarded herself as committed to support the policy of her imperial allies.

Thus the grouping of the Powers and their attitudes towards each other had changed materially in the four years 1903-7. At the beginning Germany and Austria were balanced against France and Russia; while the security of the central alliance against Franco-Russian aggression was guaranteed by the actual adherence of Italy, and by the constant friction between the Dual Alliance and Great Britain. At the end Russian prestige and self-confidence had suffered a shattering blow, in itself a sufficient guarantee against aggressive action on her part; but the friction with Great Britain had passed, while between Great Britain and Germany friction had undoubtedly set in. The expectation, little short of certainty, that the greatest maritime Power would operate against Franco-Russian aggression had given place to the still more confident expectation that it would operate against Teutonic aggression, while little but neutrality could be looked for from Italy if the Central Powers should be the aggressors. That was the lesson of the Algeciras episode.

Europe, then, in 1908 was staging for a new drama, in which the first act was unexpectedly opened by the Young Turks. Their organization had secured the support of the army at Salonica; in July they suddenly demanded the long-promised constitution which had never materialised. The sultan promptly acceded. The Powers hopefully withdrew their supervisors from Macedonia, to give the reformers free play. Consequently, in October, Ferdinand of Bulgaria judged that his time had come; he proclaimed the complete independence of Bulgaria, and assumed the ancient title of tsar. Two days later Austria announced the annexation of her protectorate in Bosnia, in defiance of the undertakings under which the protectorate had been established. This was very definitely the concern of Russia. But beside Austria, in the kaiser's significant phrase, stood Germany "in shining armour"; after a brief hesitation, Russia acquiesced.

If the Central Powers had been checked at Algeciras, they recovered now more than they had lost then. But the price

was the intensification of Slavonic hostility to the German-Magyar domination over the Slavs in the Austrian empire. It was generally believed that the Austrian heir presumptive—Francis Ferdinand, a nephew of the aged emperor Francis Joseph—favoured a constitutional reconstruction which would have placed the three races on an equal footing; but the ascendancy party was too strong to allow such a solution to be attempted; the racial antipathy was fostered by pan-Slavism within and without the empire, and the fruit thereof was bitter.

For two years there was no further move. Each of the Entente Powers had its own domestic troubles. England was in the thick of a prolonged constitutional crisis, in the course of which Edward VII died and was succeeded by George V; conflict raged round the powers of the House of Lords, arising from the unexpected exercise of their technical right to reject the financial proposals of the Liberal government, which were carried in the Commons by the support of the Irish parliamentary party. The strife was marked by exceptional bitterness, which increased in virulence when, after two general elections in twelve months, which proved the parties within Great Britain to be of all but equal strength, the Irish group obviously held the scale; and the Liberals held that their pledge in 1905 to suspend their avowed Home Rule policy was no longer valid.

At the same time one section of the British press was crying aloud that the British navy was no match for the German navy, while another section was proclaiming with equal fervour that expenditure on naval construction was blatant folly. Also in India the Morley-Minto scheme was introduced, admitting Indians to the enlarged provincial councils, exciting lively opposition among British officials and residents in India; while it was accompanied by a highly seditious agitation in the vernacular press, which was treated by the Indian government with what was zealously denounced as pusillanimous leniency or intolerable tyranny according to the predilections of the critic.

Between factions at home and Indian unrest, it did not appear that any formidable intervention in European affairs on England's part was to be looked for, whatever her commitments to the other Entente Powers might be. Russia's weakness had been manifested by the Bosnian affair. In 1911 Germany made the real testing move. France's paramount

interest in Morocco had been recognized at Algeciras and later by separate agreements both with Spain and with Germany. But the sultan of Morocco was totally incapable of controlling his turbulent subjects; anarchy in Morocco had its repercussions upon the tribesmen of Algeria, and in the spring of that year France marched troops to the capital for the defence of the sultan and the restoration of order. On the assumption that this was merely a preliminary to the partition of Morocco between France and Spain, Germany dispatched the corvette Panther to Agadir in July, an unmistakable threat of war.

It appeared, however, very shortly that this was by no means what Germany intended. In the interval D. Lloyd George, the British minister who was at that time credited with being the most zealous of pacifists, made a speech which in the view of pacifists was almost truculent. Thereupon the Agadir incident was explained away. Germany was only anxious lest her commercial interests in Morocco should be prejudiced by the French domination, for which fears a portion of the French Congo territory would be adequate compensation. The agreement was duly signed in November, and harmony was officially restored.

Meanwhile, however, war had broken out in another quarter—war with which neither the Central Powers nor the Entente could claim to be directly concerned. When France occupied Tunis, Italy had been in some degree placated by the recognition of her own paramount interests in Tripoli. But this did not prevent peaceful penetration by German commerce and the development of German influence, which threatened to supersede that of Italy, which could only be saved by the declaration of a formal protectorate. The Young Turks, moreover, were doing their best to undermine all infidel influences. Italy demanded from the Porte, the nominal suzerain of Tripoli, the recognition of her own protectorate; acquiescence was not immediately following, and she declared war on Turkey in September, 1911.

Twelve months of desultory maritime warfare followed. Italy occupied the Tripolitan coast towns, and seized islands in the Aegean, whereby she annoyed the Greeks, in whose eyes Aegean islands were "Hellas irrendenta." Austria would not allow her to seize territory on the Balkan mainland, the war was expensive and unprofitable, and in October, 1912, peace was made

which left her in possession of Tripoli and her captures in the Aegean, while the doubtful bonds which held her to the Triple Alliance had been loosened.

Almost at the moment when Turkey and Italy were signing the peace, four Balkan states were declaring war on Turkey, where the Young Turks had thoroughly established their ascendancy, exiled Abdul Hamid and set in his place his feeble-minded brother Mohammed V, but had by no means dissolved the amity with Germany. Their rule in Macedonia was no more to the liking of the independent Balkan states than that of Abdul Hamid. The Cretan leader, Venizelos, had now become the trusted minister of the king of the Hellenes. Mainly through his diplomacy, Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro reconciled their differences and united in the Balkan League with a view to the liberation and absorption of Macedonia upon agreed lines, as an alternative to its erection into an independent state; the various negotiations between state and state having been conducted separately without any of the Powers being privy thereto. This point was reached before midsummer in 1912.

At that moment the Albanians, whom no one, Mahomedan or Christian, had ever been able to rule except by sheer force of a dominating personality like Skanderbeg, revolted against the Turkish governors, whose troops mutinied and either joined the rebels or broke before them, and the Albanians began to invade Macedonia. At Constantinople the Young Turks, who were held responsible, were turned out of office. In September the new league appealed to the Powers to intervene; the Powers remonstrated, but forbade the league to move, but by the middle of October war had been declared between Turkey and all the states of the league.

There followed, before the concert could recover from its astonishment, an amazing débâcle. The old Turkish army had been broken up, and a new one was in course of organization under German officers—but it was not yet organized. Each of the league states had its allotted task. The Greek fleet swept the seas; in the western area the Serbs routed the Turks in one battle after another; in the eastern the Bulgars were threatening Constantinople and investing Adrianople. Before the end of November the Greeks only just anticipated the Bulgars in capturing and occupying Salonica. Then the Powers stepped

in: there was a brief armistice; a conference in London was apparently on the point of achieving a settlement, when the Young Turks suddenly recovered control at Constantinople and rejected the peace terms. The fighting started again in February. Janina, Adrianople, Scutari fell in rapid succession. The Powers stepped in again, the armistice was renewed, the London conference was reopened, and at the end of May, 1913, the treaty of London was signed.

Much as after Japan's triumphant victory over China, the Powers which had merely looked on and written notes arranged matters according to their own ideas, to the unmitigated dissatisfaction of every one of the states which had shared the triumphs of the war. But the most—and most justly—dissatisfied was Bulgaria, which had been allotted the hardest task, achieved the most striking victories and got next to nothing for her pains. In an evil hour Bulgaria resolved to remedy the injustice by a sudden attack (June 29) on Serbia, to which had been allotted portions of Macedonia that she regarded as rightfully her own. The Serbs defeated the Bulgars, the Greeks came in to the support of the Serbs, Rumania joined in on her own account, and the last state of Bulgaria was worse than the first. In August she was compelled to accept the treaty of Bukarest, whereby she lost territory to Rumania, to Serbia, to Greece and finally to Turkey. Before, if she had not the spoils she had at least the honours. Her tragic blunder had lost her the honours, and subjected her to actual spoliation; but it had done more. It had shattered the new accord among the Balkan states, and brought back the old atmosphere of brooding and vindictive suspicion.

The Central Powers would have profited by Bulgaria's victory over the other members of the now shattered league, of which, on the other hand, the consolidation would have been particularly inconvenient for Austria. As matters stood, the state which gained most by the war was the one whose depression she most desired—Serbia. But Serbia had failed to gain access to either the Adriatic or the Aegean sea; her want of a seaboard made it the easier to bring a strangling economic pressure to bear on her, and she had been deprived of Monastir, which she had captured, and on the acquisition of which she and Greece and Bulgaria were all set. Monastir would be a bone of contention calculated to keep alive the mutual jealousies and suspicions of

the Balkan states, which was all to Austria's advantage, since it had been her purpose to open for herself the way to the Aegean, which would be blocked to her as long as they remained even superficially united. And while Bulgaria, and possibly Greece, might be won over, Serbia was at once the main obstacle to the Austrian expansion, and the external focus of Slavonic sentiment which was the most disintegrating influence within the heterogeneous Austrian empire.

The motives which actuate governments and those which actuate their peoples at moments of crisis are not necessarily the same, though the peoples may be unconscious of the difference—the more in those countries where the governments do not derive their authority directly from the people. It is not difficult to believe in the conviction of the German people that the entente between Great Britain and France was a grand conspiracy, born of political vindictiveness and begotten of commercial jealousy, for the overthrow of Germany; that the organization of the nation for war was only the necessary preparation for self-defence, and that when the Central Powers flung down the challenge it was because no other course was open to them. But it is not possible to credit the German government with the same belief, or to doubt that it chose its own moment under the impression that it would have only France and Russia to fight and would be able to wipe France off the board before Russia could come into action effectively. The kaiser and his entourage were aiming at a world domination; Algeciras, Bosnia, and Agadir were all moves intended to test the strength of the opposing combination, and the mastery of the Near East was regarded as the key to the situation.

In the affairs of Algeciras and Agadir the British attitude had been disturbing; Britain, without acknowledging the existence of any formal alliance, had manifested a determination to stand by France if she were made the definite object of aggression. Britain had indeed professed her own warm desire for such a mutual understanding with Germany as she had already reached with France and Russia, her readiness to do her best to facilitate a similar understanding between the two empires and the other Entente Powers, and even to pledge herself to neutrality should the latter take aggressive action against the Central Powers; but she had firmly declined to pledge herself to neutrality should the Central Powers be the aggressors.

But in 1914 a change had apparently befallen. England was paralysed. The Irish question had reached such a pitch of intensity that Ulster was proclaiming her right to resist in arms her subordination to an Irish national parliament and executive, half England was declaring that Ulster was in the right, and officers of high standing in the army were openly asserting that they would refuse to act against Ulster. Civil war was in the air. A Liberal government was in office, and it was the established belief of European chancelleries that Liberal governments were peace-at-any-price governments. All the circumstances being taken into consideration, the risk of England being drawn into a European war was small, and if she did come in, her army was small and apparently mutinous, her fleet, according to her own vociferous publicists, was inefficient, either Nationalist Ireland or Ulster would seize the opportunity to revolt.

The hour, then, had come for striking. The Bismarck tradition required that an occasion should be manufactured, and that the occasion should have at least the appearance of being an unwarrantable aggression by the party that was in fact being attacked. The occasion rose in June, 1914. On the 28th of that month the archduke Francis Ferdinand, the prince who was generally believed to be Slavophil, was assassinated in the streets of the Bosnian city of Serajevo. The assassins were Austrian subjects—but they were Serbs. The murder, then, must be a Serbian plot fostered by the Serbian government. It was indeed not difficult to suggest an entirely different origin for the crime, since it could in no conceivable manner further Serbian or Slavonic interests; but the Austrian government had no doubts about the matter. Even at the best, the intolerable Slavonic propaganda emanating from Serbia must be at the bottom of the outrage, and events moved fast.

CHAPTER 2

The Fateful Thirteen Days

As already stated, the archduke Francis Ferdinand and his morganatic wife, the duchess of Hohenberg, were murdered at Serajevo on June 28, but it was almost a month before the attention of Europe was turned to this crime. The crisis which it provoked really began on July 23 when the Austrian government, having learned that it could count upon support from Berlin, sent a peremptory note to Serbia. This lengthy document contained a number of requests intended partly as reparations for the crime at Serajevo and partly as safeguards against further outrages. The 23rd was a Thursday, and a reply was requested within 48 hours, i.e. before Saturday, the 25th, was out.

The Serbian ministers took counsel with Russia, and, having done so, returned their answer. It was thoroughly conciliatory. All the Austrian demands save two were conceded, and with sound reason the Serbian government asserted that to accept these two would be to infringe the sovereignty of the country and to violate its constitution. The two clauses to which exception was taken were the one in which Serbia was asked "to accept the collaboration in Serbia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian government in the repression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy," and the other in which Austria-Hungary demanded that delegates from that country should take part in the judicial proceedings against the accessories to the plot at Serajevo. On these two points Serbia suggested reference to the international court at The Hague. Short of abject submission, the Serbian government could hardly have gone further, but her enemies were in no mood for discussion or delay. At ten o'clock on the evening of Saturday, the 25th, the Austrian minister in Belgrade, having stated that the Serbian reply was unacceptable, asked for his passports and left the city. The formal declaration of war followed in three days.

The British government, which had been carefully watching the march of events, was foremost in seeking to keep the peace, or at least to localise the dispute. Sir Edward Grey, then foreign minister, proposed to Germany, France and Italy that a conference should be held, but Germany refused on the ground that Russia and Austria were intending to negotiate. Thus two precious days, the 26th and 27th, passed. On the 29th Austrian troops began to bombard Belgrade, and on the 30th the position was definitely worse. Russia and Belgium started to mobilize their armies; Britain and Germany took steps to have their fleets in readiness for action. Negotiations went on during the day, but the results were negative. Britain refused to consider the informal German proposal that she should remain neutral on condition that, a successful war being assumed, Germany made no conquests in Europe at the expense of France, and undertook to respect Belgian integrity if she did not side against Germany. Equally Britain refused to give the French ambassador in London a definite understanding to fight for France and Russia.

The position on the morning of July 31 was summarised in a telegram sent by Sir Edward Grey to Sir Edward Goschen, the British ambassador in Berlin. This diplomatic extract, like several others that are mentioned in this chapter, is taken from the official white paper.

> I hope that the conversations which are now proceeding between Austria and Russia may lead to a satisfactory result. The stumbling block hitherto has been Austrian mistrust of Servian assurances, and Russian mistrust of Austrian intentions with regard to the independence and integrity of Servia. It has occurred to me that, in the event of this mistrust preventing a solution being found by Vienna and St. Petersburg, Germany might sound Vienna, and I would undertake to sound St. Petersburg, whether it would be possible for the four disinterested Powers to offer to Austria that they would undertake to see that she obtained full satisfaction of her demands on Servia, provided that they did not impair Servian sovereignty and the integrity of Servian territory. As your Excellency is aware, Austria has already declared her willingness to respect them. Russia might be informed by the four Powers that they would undertake to prevent Austrian demands going the length of impairing Servian sovereignty and integrity. All Powers would, of course, suspend further military operations or preparations. You may sound the secretary of state about this proposal.

I said to German ambasssador this morning that if Germany could get a reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to preserve European peace, and that Russia and France would be unreasonable if they rejected it, I would support it at St. Petersburg and Paris, and go the length of saying that if Russia and France would not accept it, His Majesty's Government would have nothing more to do with the consequences; but, otherwise, I told German ambassador that if France became involved we should be drawn in. You can add this when sounding chancellor or secretary of state as to proposal above.

Sir E. Goschen's reply received early on the following day (August 1) was as follows:

I spent an hour with secretary of state urging him most earnestly to accept your proposal and make another effort to prevent terrible catastrophe of a European war. He expressed himself very sympathetically towards your proposal, and appreciated your continued efforts to maintain peace, but said it was impossible for the Imperial Government to consider any proposal until they had received an answer from Russia to their communication of to-day; this communication, which he admitted had the form of an ultimatum, being that, unless Russia could inform the Imperial Government within twelve hours that she would immediately countermand her mobilization against Germany and Austria, Germany would be obliged on her side to mobilize at once.

I asked his Excellency why they had made their demand even more difficult for Russia to accept by asking them to demobilize in south as well. He replied that it was in order to prevent Russia from saying all her mobilization was only directed against Austria. His Excellency said that if the answer from Russia was satisfactory he thought personally that your proposal merited favourable consideration, and in any case he would lay it before the emperor and chancellor, but he repeated that it was no use discussing it until the Russian Government had sent in their answer to the German demand. He again assured me that both the emperor William, at the request of the emperor of Russia, and the German foreign office had even up till last night been urging Austria to show willingness to continue discussions—and telegraphic and telephonic communications from Vienna had been of a promising nature—but Russia's mobilization had spoilt everything.

Sir E. Goschen's reply contains a reference to the most momentous happening of the 31st, the first of the five days of excitement and anxiety more intense than anything that living generations had experienced—the German ultimatum to Russia.

Sent off during the day this demanded that Russia should at once demobilize her forces, and gave her only twelve hours in which to reply.

Almost at the same hour, fully aware of the Franco-Russian alliance, Germany turned to the other partner. France was asked by the German ambassador in Paris what would be her attitude in the event of war between Germany and Russia. The answer was that "France would act as her own interests required." Only one interpretation could be placed upon this reply which followed a message sent by the president to Russia stating that France would fulfil her obligations under the alliance."

Meanwhile troops were being moved, and the neutrality of Belgium was clearly in danger. Britain was not pledged, as many believed, to go to war in defence of Belgium's neutrality, but the matter concerned her both for sentimental and for practical reasons. Before the day was out, therefore, Sir E. Grey sent notes, identical in form, to the German and French governments asking that the neutrality of the little kingdom should be respected. He also acquainted Sir F. Villiers, the British ambassador in Brussels, with what he had done. The two documents were worded as follows:

I still trust that the situation is not irretrievable, but in view of prospect of mobilization in Germany it becomes essential to His Majesty's Government, in view of the existing treaties, to ask whether French (German) Government are prepared to engage to respect neutrality of Belgium so long as no other Power violates it. A similar request is being addressed to German (French) Government. It is important to have an early answer.

In view of existing treaties, you should inform minister for foreign affairs that, in consideration of the possibility of a European war, I have asked French and German Governments whether each is prepared to respect the neutrality of Belgium provided it is violated by no other Power. You should say that I assume that the Belgian Government will maintain to the utmost of their power their neutrality, which I desire and expect other Powers to uphold and observe. You should inform the Belgian Government that an early reply is desired.

France gave a ready and affirmative reply. The nature of the German answer will be seen from the following telegram sent by Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey.

Neutrality of Belgium, referred to in your telegram of 31st July to Sir F. Bertie. I have seen secretary of state, who informs me that he must consult the emperor and the chancellor before he could possibly answer. I gathered from what he said that he thought any reply they might give could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event of war ensuing, and he was therefore very doubtful whether they would return any answer at all. His Excellency, nevertheless, took note of your request. It appears from what he said that German Government consider that certain hostile acts have already been committed by Belgium. As an instance of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany had been placed under an embargo already. I hope to see his Excellency again to-morrow to discuss the matter further, but the prospect of obtaining a definite answer seems to me remote. In speaking to me to-day the chancellor made it clear that Germany would in any case desire to know the reply returned to you by the French Government.

The matter was also discussed between Sir E. Grey and the German ambassador in London, Prince Lichnowsky, and the nature of this conversation will be seen from Sir E. Grey's telegram of August 1 to Sir E. Goschen.

I told the German ambassador to-day that the reply of the German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium was a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in this country. If Germany could see her way to give the same assurance as that which had been given by France it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here. On the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country. I said that we had been discussing the question at a Cabinet meeting, and as I was authorised to tell him this I gave him a memorandum of it. He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality, we would engage to remain neutral. I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here. I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone.

The ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed. I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely

any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free.

A day later, on August 2, came Sir E. Goschen's reply:

I have communicated the substance of the above telegram to the secretary of state, and spent a long time arguing with him that the chief dispute was between Austria and Russia, and that Germany was only drawn in as Austria's ally. If, therefore, Austria and Russia were, as was evident, ready to discuss matters and Germany did not desire war on her own account, it seemed to me only logical that Germany should hold her hand and continue to work for a peaceful settlement. Secretary of state said that Austria's readiness to discuss was the result of German influence at Vienna, and, had not Russia mobilized against Germany, all would have been well. But Russia, by abstaining from answering Germany's demand that she should demobilize, had caused Germany to mobilize also. Russia had said that her mobilization did not necessarily imply war, and that she could perfectly well remain mobilized for months without making war. This was not the case with Germany. She had the speed and Russia had the numbers, and the safety of the German Empire forbade that Germany should allow Russia time to bring up masses of troops from all parts of her wide dominions. The situation now was that, though the Imperial Government had allowed her several hours beyond the specified time, Russia had sent no answer. Germany had therefore ordered mobilization, and the German representative at St. Petersburg had been instructed within a certain time to inform the Russian Government that the Imperial Government must regard their refusal to answer as creating a state of war.

In his telegram Sir E. Goschen reported the German case with regard to Russia, whose hasty mobilization, so Germany's leaders believed, was a main cause of the trouble. Her refusal to demobilize had aggravated it, and before the telegram reached London, perhaps before it was dispatched, Germany had carried out her threat, and about five o'clock on Saturday, August 1, had declared war on an empire with which she had been at peace for almost exactly 100 years.

On the same evening France and Germany issued orders for a general mobilization, and so ended a week of alternate hopes and fears. Sunday, August 2, with Germany and Russia at war and France and Germany hurrying soldiers to the frontiers, was an eventful day all over Europe, not least so in London. Ministers, who were in consultation almost continuously, decided to mobilize the fleet and call out the naval reserves, while Sir John Jellicoe,

with sealed orders, was sent to take command in place of Sir George Callaghan. During the morning Sir Edward Grey saw the French ambassador and gave him the following undertaking:

> I am authorised to give the assurance that if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against the French coast or shipping the British fleet will give all the protection in its power.

Immediately afterwards Mr. Churchill and the French naval attaché in London prepared a plan for the mutual cooperation of the two navies.

The effect of these anxious hours on the mind is well described by Sir Edward Grey in his book, "Twenty Five Years."

> The strain for every member of the Cabinet must have been intense. In addition to Cabinets, I had the strain of holding conversations of great moment with ambassadors, of dictating after each the summary of it that appeared eventually as a telegram or dispatch to the British ambassador at Berlin or Paris or elsewhere. Some telegrams were not dictated, but were written with my own hand. Communications vitally important at this moment were daily being received through foreign ambassadors in London, verbally, or through British ambassadors abroad by telegram. These, however critical, had to be considered and dealt with promptly, for every hour mattered.

Equally exciting was the day in Paris, where ministers had just informed Russia that France was prepared to fulfil her obligations under the alliance. During the night or early in the morning German soldiers entered French territory and French airmen flew over German and Belgian soil, at least so it was asserted. A French corporal was killed by a German, and there were other incidents. The German chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, made the most of these happenings, and describing them as "the most serious violation of neutrality imaginable," he prepared, between one and two p.m., a declaration of war which was delivered in Paris at six p.m., and was couched in the following terms:

> The German administrative and military authorities have established a number of flagrantly hostile acts committed on German territory by French military aviators. Several of these have openly violated the neutrality of Belgium by flying over the territory of that country. One has attempted to destroy buildings near Wesel; others have been seen in the district of the Eifel, one has thrown bombs on the railway near Karlsruhe and Nuremberg. I am instructed, and I have the honour to inform your Excellency that, in the presence of these

acts of aggression, the German empire considers itself in a state of war with France in consequence of the acts of this latter Power.

On this Sunday, in preparation for what was now regarded in Germany as inevitable, German troops entered the grand duchy of Luxemburg. Belgium was treated with slightly more ceremony. This took the form of a request for permission to march troops through that country, adding that dire consequences would follow a refusal. Twelve hours were given for the reply, which came with promptitude in the form of an emphatic negative. Thereupon German troops, in pursuance of the plan of campaign, entered Belgian territory, while the king of the Belgians made a dignified appeal to Great Britain for diplomatic intervention. The facts are set out in the following dispatch (dated August 4) from Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen:

> The King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His Majesty the King for diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium in the following terms: "Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870 and the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium."
>
> His Majesty's Government are also informed that the German Government have delivered to the Belgian Government a note proposing friendly neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territory, and promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the Kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested within twelve hours. We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused this as a flagrant violation of the law of nations.
>
> His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against this violation of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and must request an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium will not be proceeded with and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany. You should ask for an immediate reply.

On the same day, Tuesday, August 4, Great Britain took the decisive step. Following diplomatic usage her final communication to Germany was in the form of a note to her ambassador in Berlin, who was instructed to convey its purport to the German chancellor. Its gravity was evidenced from the statement therein that if a satisfactory reply was not received within a

stated time the ambassador must ask for his passports. The hour mentioned for the reply was 12 o'clock at night, but owing to the difference in time this was equivalent to 11 o'clock in London. When that hour struck neither the satisfactory reply nor indeed any reply had been received, and consequently Great Britain and Germany were at war.

The exact text of the ultimatum, for so it may be called, was:

We hear that Germany has addressed note to Belgian minister for foreign affairs stating that German Government will be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable. We are also informed that Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich.

In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany declined to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France gave last week in reply to our request made simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, we must repeat that request, and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram of this morning be received here by twelve o'clock to-night. If not, you are instructed to ask for your passports, and to say that His Majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves.

On that memorable summer evening it was only known that Sir E. Goschen had delivered his fateful message. A little later the British public were informed of the way in which he had discharged his momentous task and the incidents connected therewith. The ambassador's dispatch to Sir Edward Grey giving an account of the interviews with the chancellor and his subordinates and his departure from Berlin, although long, is well worthy of reproduction; indeed it could hardly be omitted from any reliable history of the Great War. Furthermore it sets forth the German case for violating the neutrality of Belgium.

In accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram of the 4th inst. I called upon the secretary of state that afternoon and enquired, in the name of His Majesty's Government, whether the Imperial Government would refrain from violating Belgian neutrality. Herr von Jagow at once replied that he was very sorry to say that his answer must be "No" as, in consequence of the German troops having crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had already been violated.

Herr von Jagow again went into the reasons why the Imperial Government had been obliged to take this step, namely, that they had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their

operations and endeavour to strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It was a matter of life and death for them, as if they had gone by the more southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of time. This loss of time would have meant time gained by the Russians for bringing up their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops. I pointed out to Herr von Jagow that this *fait accompli* of the violation of the Belgian frontier rendered, as he would readily understand, the situation exceedingly grave, and I asked him whether there was not still time to draw back and avoid possible consequences which both he and I would deplore. He replied that, for the reasons he had given me, it was now impossible for them to draw back.

During the afternoon I received your further telegram of the same date and, in compliance with the instructions therein contained, I again proceeded to the Imperial Foreign Office and informed the secretary of state that unless the Imperial Government could give the assurance by twelve o'clock that night that they would proceed no further with their violation of the Belgian frontier and stop their advance, I had been instructed to demand my passports and inform the Imperial Government that His Majesty's Government would have to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany was as much a party as themselves.

Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could give no other answer than that which he had given me earlier in the day, namely that the safety of the Empire rendered it absolutely necessary that the Imperial troops should advance through Belgium. I gave his Excellency a written summary of your telegram and, pointing out that you had mentioned twelve o'clock as the time when His Majesty's Government would expect an answer, asked him whether, in view of the terrible consequences which would necessarily ensue, it were not possible even at the last moment that their answer should be reconsidered. He replied that if the time given were even twenty-four hours or more, his answer must be the same. I said that in that case I should have to demand my passports. This interview took place at about seven o'clock. In a short conversation which ensued Herr von Jagow expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the chancellor, which had been to make friends with Great Britain, and then, through Great Britain, to get closer to France. I said that this sudden end to my work in Berlin was to me also a matter of deep regret and disappointment, but that he must understand that under the circumstances

and in view of our engagements, His Majesty's Government could not possibly have acted otherwise than they had done.

I then said that I should like to go and see the chancellor, as it might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of seeing him. He begged me to do so. I found the chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree; just for a word—"neutrality," a word which in war time had so often been disregarded—just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable; it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen.

I protested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of "life and death" for the honour of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future? The Chancellor said: "But at what price will that compact have been kept. Has the British Government thought of that?" I hinted to his Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but his Excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to hear reason that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further argument.

As I was leaving he said that the blow of Great Britain joining Germany's enemies was all the greater, that almost up to the last moment he and his Government had been working with us and supporting our efforts to maintain peace between Austria and Russia. I said that this was part of the tragedy which saw the two nations fall apart just at the moment when relations between them had been more friendly and cordial than they had been for years. Unfortunately, notwithstanding our efforts to maintain peace between Russia and Austria, the war had spread and had brought us face to face with a situation which, if we held to our engagements, we could not possibly avoid, and which unfortunately entailed our separation from

our late fellow-workers. He would readily understand that no one regretted this more than I.

After this somewhat painful interview I returned to the embassy and drew up a telegraphic report of what had passed. This telegram was handed in at the Central Telegraph Office a little before 9 p.m. It was accepted by that office but apparently never dispatched.

At about 9.30 p.m. Herr von Zimmermann, the under-secretary of state, came to see me. After expressing his deep regret that the very friendly official and personal relations between us were about to cease, he asked me casually whether a demand for passports was equivalent to a declaration of war. I said that such an authority on international law as he was known to be must know as well or better than I what was usual in such cases. I added that there were many cases where diplomatic relations had been broken off, and, nevertheless, war had not ensued; but that in this case he would have seen from my instructions, of which I had given Herr von Jagow a written summary, that His Majesty's Government expected an answer to a definite question by twelve o'clock that night and that in default of a satisfactory answer they would be forced to take such steps as their engagements required. Herr Zimmermann said that that was, in fact, a declaration of war, as the Imperial Government could not possibly give the assurance required either that night or any other night.

In the meantime, after Herr Zimmermann left me, a flying sheet issued by the *Berliner Tageblatt* was circulated stating that Great Britain had declared war against Germany. The immediate result of this news was the assemblage of an exceedingly excited and unruly mob before His Majesty's Embassy. The small force of police which had been sent to guard the Embassy was soon overpowered, and the attitude of the mob became more threatening. We took no notice of this demonstration as long as it was confined to noise, but when the crash of glass and the landing of cobblestones into the drawing-room, where we were all sitting, warned us that the situation was getting unpleasant, I telephoned to the Foreign Office an account of what was happening. Herr von Jagow at once informed the chief of police, and an adequate force of mounted police, sent with great promptness, very soon cleared the street. From that moment on we were well guarded, and no more direct unpleasantness occurred.

After order had been restored Herr von Jagow came to see me and expressed his most heartfelt regrets at what had occurred. He said that the behaviour of his countrymen had made him feel more ashamed than he had words to express. It was an indelible stain on the reputation of Berlin. He said that the flying sheet circulated in the streets had not been

authorised by the Government; in fact, the chancellor had asked him by telephone whether he thought that such a statement should be issued, and he had replied: "Certainly not until the morning." It was in consequence of his decision to that effect that only a small force of police had been sent to the neighbourhood of the Embassy, as he had thought that the presence of a large force would inevitably attract attention and perhaps lead to disturbances. It was the "pestilential Tageblatt," which had somehow got hold of the news, that had upset his calculations. He had heard rumours that the mob had been excited to violence by gestures made and missiles thrown from the Embassy, but he felt sure that that was not true (I was able soon to assure him that the report had no foundation whatever), and even if it was, it was no excuse for the disgraceful scenes which had taken place. He feared that I would take home with me a sorry impression of Berlin manners in moments of excitement. In fact, no apology could have been more full and complete.

On the following morning, the 5th August, the emperor sent one of his Majesty's aides-de-camp to me with the following message: "The emperor has charged me to express to your Excellency his regret for the occurrences of last night, but to tell you at the same time that you will gather from those occurrences an idea of the feelings of his people respecting the action of Great Britain in joining with other nations against her old allies of Waterloo. His Majesty also begs that you will tell the king that he has been proud of the titles of British Field Marshal and British Admiral, but that in consequence of what has occurred he must now at once divest himself of those titles." I would add that the above message lost none of its acerbity by the manner of its delivery.

On the other hand, I should like to state that I received all through this trying time nothing but courtesy at the hands of Herr von Jagow and the officials of the Imperial Foreign Office. At 11 o'clock on the same morning Count Wedel handed me my passports which I had earlier in the day demanded in writing—and told me that he had been instructed to confer with me as to the route which I should follow for my return to England. He said that he had understood that I preferred the route via the Hook of Holland to that via Copenhagen; they had therefore arranged that I should go by the former route, only I should have to wait till the following morning. I agreed to this, and he said that I might be quite assured that there would be no repetition of the disgraceful scenes of the preceding night as full precautions would be taken. He added that they were doing all in their power to have a restaurant car attached to the train, but it was rather a difficult matter. He also brought me a charming letter from Herr von Jagow couched in the most friendly terms. The day

was passed in packing up such articles as time allowed. The night passed quietly without incident. In the morning a strong force of police was posted along the usual route to the Lehrter Station, while the Embassy was smuggled away in taxi-cabs to the station by side streets. We there suffered no molestation whatever, and avoided the treatment meted out by the crowd to my Russian and French colleagues. Count Wedel met us at the station to say good-bye on behalf of Herr von Jagow and to see that all the arrangements ordered for our comfort had been properly carried out. A retired colonel of the guards accompanied the train to the Dutch frontier and was exceedingly kind in his efforts to prevent the great crowds which thronged the platforms at every station where we stopped from insulting us; but beyond the yelling of patriotic songs and a few jeers and insulting gestures we had really nothing to complain of during our tedious journey to the Dutch frontier.

If the participation of Great Britain in the Great War can be attributed to a single cause, that cause was the violation by Germany of Belgian neutrality. In his War Memoirs, published in The Daily Telegraph in 1933, Mr. Lloyd George asserts that in this matter the British people were united, and that a more resolute attitude on the part of Sir Edward Grey might have averted, or at least localised, the struggle. He thinks that if, in July, Sir Edward had made it quite clear to Germany that Great Britain would regard any violation of Belgium's neutrality as a *casus belli,* the kaiser and his advisers would have paused to consider the consequences of the policy they were carrying out.

To pursue this surmise would be unprofitable, but it will be far from unprofitable to examine the nature of the British guarantee to Belgium. On April 19, 1839, a treaty was signed in London between Belgium and five Powers: Great Britain, France, Prussia, Russia, and Austria. A similar treaty was signed by the same five Powers and the Netherlands. In article one of the treaties the five Powers guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium. The guarantee was a collective one, and from time to time the question of Great Britain's individual liability under it was considered. In 1870, for instance, during the Franco-Prussian War, when the neutrality was in jeopardy, the law officers of the crown were asked for an opinion. After examining the facts they replied in the following words:

Whether, in the event of none of the guaranteeing Powers choosing to cooperate with us, Belgium could reasonably expect Great Britain to undertake single-handed a war against

great continental Powers is a question into which other elements enter than the strict construction of the treaty and on which we shall not presume to give an opinion.

During the progress of this war Great Britain signed a treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium, but this was only for a limited period, and when it expired the position became the "as you were" one of 1839.

The events of the period between the Franco-Prussian and the Great Wars did not make the position of Great Britain any clearer. Had any of these happenings affected in any way the liability incurred under the treaty of 1839? Was Great Britain, or any other signatory Power, obliged singly to take up arms to avert or avenge the violation of Belgium's neutrality? From time to time these and other points were raised, and in 1908, when the entente with France was in being, Sir Edward Grey, the secretary for foreign affairs, asked his advisers to give him an opinion on the following questions:

How far would England's liability under the treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium be affected if: 1, Belgium acquiesced in the violation of her neutrality; 2, if the other guaranteeing Powers, or some of them, acquiesced?

The answer was that "Great Britain was liable for the maintenance of Belgian neutrality whenever Belgium or any of the guaranteeing Powers are in need of, and demand, assistance in opposing its violation."

Such was the view of the high officials of the foreign office, but it was not universally accepted. In his book, "A Short History of the Great War," Professor A. F. Pollard states that "the treaty of 1839 which regulated the international situation of Belgium merely bound the five great signatory Powers not to violate Belgian neutrality without obliging them individually or collectively to resist its violation." Other historians held the same view, but it did not pass without challenge. With some show of reason its opponents asked what a guarantee of this kind was worth. If the Powers who signed the treaty of 1839 had intended nothing more than this it was hardly worth their while to put their signatures to the document. Surely they understood that guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium meant using their utmost might to resist its violation, nothing more or nothing less. The underlying assumption, however, of this opinion was that the Powers acted in concert, but in 1914 they

were ranged into two hostile camps, and a different set of circumstances had arisen. How did this affect the position of Great Britain. Had the country in 1839 given a collective or an individual guarantee to Belgium? The terms of the treaty mentioned above seem to indicate that the guarantee was a collective one, but the earl of Clarendon, who as foreign secretary examined the question in 1867, expressed the opinion that it was an individual one. But if the civil law has any bearing on the matter, his point is of little moment. A collective guarantee does not cease to be binding upon a particular signatory because one or more of the other signatories decline to meet their liability.

These varied opinions may be said to cancel each other out, leaving the issue one of practical politics, and as such it was treated by Sir Edward Grey in his memorable speech in the House of Commons on the afternoon of Monday, August 3. He said:

I ask the House from the point of view of British interests to consider what may be at stake. If France is beaten in a struggle of life and death, beaten to her knees, loses her position as a great Power, and becomes subordinate to the will and power of one greater than herself—consequences which I do not anticipate, because I am sure that France has the power to defend herself with all the energy and ability and patriotism which she has shown so often—still, if that were to happen, and if Belgium fell under the same dominating influence, and then Holland, and then Denmark, then would not Mr. Gladstone's words come true, that just opposite to us there would be a "common interest against the unmeasured aggrandisement of any Power?" And that Power would be opposite to us. It may be said, I suppose, that we might stand aside, husband our strength, and, whatever happened in the course of this war, at the end of it intervene, with effect, to put things right and to adjust them to our own point of view. If in a crisis like this we run away from those obligations of honour and interests as regards the Belgian treaty, I doubt whether, whatever material force we might have at the end, it would be of very much value in face of the respect that we should have lost.

And I do not believe, whether a great Power stands outside this war or not, it is going to be in a position at the end of this war to exert its superior strength. For us, with a powerful fleet, which we believe able to protect our commerce, to protect our shores, and to protect our interests if we are engaged in war, we shall suffer but little more than we shall suffer if we stand aside. We are going to suffer, I am afraid, terribly in this war, whether we are in it or whether we stand aside. Foreign trade is going to stop, not because

the trade routes are closed, but because there is no other trade at the other end. Continental nations engaged in war, all their populations, all their energies, all their wealth, engaged in a desperate struggle, cannot carry on the trade with us that they are carrying on in times of peace, whether we are parties to the war or whether we are not. I do not believe for a moment that at the end of this war, even if we stood aside and remained aside, we should be in a position, a material position, to use our force decisively to undo what had happened in the course of the war, to prevent the whole of the west of Europe opposite to us—if that had been the result of the war—falling under the domination of a single Power, and I am quite sure that our moral position would be such as to have lost us all respect.

Germany had also violated the neutrality of Luxemburg, which was guaranteed by a treaty signed in 1867. On or about August 1 the British liability under this guarantee was examined at the request of Sir Edward Grey, and the conclusions reached can be stated in his own words:

It was thus made clear that what Luxemburg had was a collective guarantee; that no one of the signatory Powers had an obligation to defend Luxemburg, unless all the signatory Powers did so; that no other Power had an obligation to act separately and without the others. This made our position quite clear; the violation of Luxemburg entailed no obligation upon us to take action.

Luxemburg was therefore in a different position in this respect from Belgium, and this difference is explained in a speech made in the House of Lords by the earl of Clarendon on June 20, 1867.

With regard to the guarantee, I will go somewhat further than the noble earl at the head of the Government, and say that if we had undertaken the same guarantee in the case of Luxemburg as we did in the case of Belgium, we should, in my opinion, have incurred an additional and very serious responsibility. I look upon our guarantee in the case of Belgium as an individual guarantee, and have always so regarded it; but this is a collective guarantee. No one of the Powers, therefore, can be called upon to take single action, even in the improbable case of any difficulty arising.

CHAPTER 3

The Outbreak of War

By a strange irony of fate the outbreak of the Great War came at the moment when the thoughts of many British people were concentrated upon the pleasures associated with summer weather. They had heard of the assassination of the Austrian archduke Francis Ferdinand and the duchess of Hohenberg at Serajevo with that degree of sympathy and horror which is evoked by such a crime in a distant land. They had read with a little uneasiness, but perhaps without fully realizing its significance, of Austria's ultimatum to Serbia. But the last public holiday of the year was approaching; a fortnight or a month at the seaside for the more fortunate, a day there or in the country for those whose means would run to no more, were the things that mattered. Storm clouds might be gathering over Europe, but they had gathered before and had been dispersed. At any rate, it seemed inconceivable that Britain should be involved in a dispute which, after all, was only one of those recrudescences of "trouble in the Balkans," which in the past had perhaps perturbed the Foreign Office, but had never concerned the man in the street.

Yet as the last week in July wore on it became evident that more than a local war was possible, even probable. In addition to Austria and Serbia, France, Germany and Russia might be involved. Still there appeared to be no reason why Great Britain should not maintain her neutrality without sacrificing her honour. It still seemed inconceivable that some way of avoiding a continental war would not be found. No one could believe that the resources of diplomacy had been exhausted. It would be foolish to cancel holiday plans because the chancelleries of Europe were for the moment at loggerheads. So Britain went on with her pleasure making. Trains from London and other great centres went off, north, south, east and west, carrying their usual crowds of passengers. The more optimistic started off gaily for the continent. The momentous news in the papers damped no one's spirits; it rather added to the general exuberance, for it gave everyone a topic of conversation.

But by the middle of the last week of July excitement began to give place to anxiety. It became clear that even if Great Britain were not actually drawn into the fighting, war on the continent would have serious repercussions in this country. The first signs of the gravity of the situation were seen in the money markets. The stock exchanges of Europe began to face ruin. Everyone wanted to sell, none to buy. Prices fell to what a week before would have seemed impossible figures. On Wednesday, July 29, on the London Stock Exchange, seven firms, unable to meet their obligations, were hammered. Foreign houses, particularly German and Austrian, were pouring securities on London, and selling them for whatever they would fetch. On Friday, July 31, public confidence received a two-fold shock. The bank rate was raised from 4 per cent to 8 per cent, the highest figure recorded since 1873. The second shock concerned the stock exchange. At ten o'clock in the morning a notice was posted on the door of the house to the effect that the committee, acting upon representations from leading members, had decided upon closing until further notice. There followed within a few hours a conference of the leading bankers with the government, the result of which was officially intimated as follows:

> Interviews have taken place to-day between the prime minister, the chancellor of the exchequer, and representatives of the Bank of England and the leading joint-stock banks in regard to the financial situation. It is understood to have been decided that the situation is not at present such as to justify any emergency action in regard to the supply of legal tender currency, but in the event of further developments taking place necessitating government action, the treasury will be prepared to take such action immediately.

On Saturday, August 1, the bank rate was raised to 10 per cent. At the same time the banks began to guard their gold. The Bank of England took steps to protect itself, and banks generally met demands on them with bank notes in place of sterling. These notes were exchangeable into gold at the Bank of England on demand, and on Friday and Saturday that week London witnessed the extraordinary spectacle of people waiting outside the Bank of England to obtain gold for paper. The nation was face to face with the possibility of the entire overthrow of its credit system and of a general run upon its banks.

Panic is not a fair word to describe the effect of these events on the vast numbers who understood little of their technical

bearing, but there was acute anxiety. Men and women dimly understood that securities would be for a time unsaleable, that money would be scarce, and that the prices of the necessities of life might consequently rise. They had wider visions of a serious decline in trade and a consequent lack of employment. For the first time that week they ceased to ask: "What has Serbia to do with us?" They no longer shrugged their shoulders at the mention of war, but turned feverishly to the newspapers in the attempt to elicit from conflicting messages from foreign capitals what the issue was to be.

It was fortunate that the first Monday in August is a Bank Holiday. This pause gave the authorities time to prepare to meet the unprecedented situation. Mr. Lloyd George, the chancellor of the exchequer, called the financial magnates into conference on that memorable first Sunday in August. He and Lord Rothschild sank their former enmity and with the heads of the great banks laid common plans to meet the crisis. The Bank Holiday was extended to August 7. A moratorium was proclaimed on Monday, August 3, and was subsequently extended to November 4, with an extension for a month for bills that fell due up to that date. To meet the shortage of gold, Treasury notes for £1 and 10/- were put into circulation. Steps were taken to prevent people from withdrawing their deposits from banks through panic and for the purpose of hoarding.

> Nobody should be so foolish and indeed wicked as to add to the difficulties of the financial and commercial situation by selfishly drawing out unnecessary amounts of money in groundless apprehension that it is advisable to hoard it during the crisis. If a man's credit is good there is no advantage to be gained by keeping more money in hand now than at any other time.

This quotation is typical of the exhortations that appeared in all the newspapers about this time.

Under these conditions quite a number of people in Britain were faced with a real shortage of money. On the Saturday the banks had paid cheques in notes instead of in gold, and then they had closed for the longest bank holiday on record. Restaurants, shops, even clubs refused to cash these notes, declaring that they were stocked up with them. The result was that many usually affluent people could not find sufficient money to pay their current expenses. This, however, was a very temporary trouble. During the days of suspense people had thought over the



THE ALINEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES IN THE GREAT WAR

This map shows how the continent was divided into two hostile and warring groups after the Allies had been joined by Italy, Portugal and Rumania, and the Central Powers by Turkey and Bulgaria.

situation. Almost every man decided in his own mind that it would be not only a disloyal but an absurd thing to doubt the nation's financial stability. He would leave his money in the bank, and go on as usual.

Sunday, August 2, was a day of intense excitement. Week-day daily papers made an unusual Sabbath appearance, and in such London centres as Charing Cross and Piccadilly Circus were literally torn from the hands of shouting newsvendors. A meeting held in Trafalgar Square on Sunday to protest against war, resolved itself into another meeting under the Admiralty Arch, where a resolution to support the authorities in all circumstances was passed with acclamation. And later in the day, inspired in the hour of national danger by a realization of all that the crown stood for, a crowd of several thousands marched to Buckingham Palace singing the British and French national anthems. Out on to the balcony came the King and Queen, to be received with wildly enthusiastic cheers. And yet another symptom of the growing feeling was the letter of Bonar Law, the opposition leader, to the government, which, setting aside the bitter political feuds that had separated the two parties, assured the Liberal ministers of "our unhesitating support of the government in any measure they may consider necessary"—to assist France and Russia at the present juncture.

The world was making holiday when on Monday, August 3, members of parliament gathered at Westminster. With grave, set face, Sir Edward Grey advanced to the table and in slow and deliberate tones reviewed the history of the past few years. He showed how France had become involved in the conflict because of an obligation of honour under a definite alliance with Russia. We were not partners to that alliance, of which we did not even know the terms. Our friendship with France, however, arising out of the Entente Cordiale, had engendered a feeling of security in the republic. So he approached the first issue, which required the approval of the House.

On behalf of the opposition Mr. Bonar Law renewed his written promise to support the government in whatever steps they might think it necessary to take for the honour and security of the country. During the debate Mr. John Redmond made a remarkable declaration of Irish loyalty. On the day after Austria had shown her hand towards Serbia, a collision between Nationalist gun runners and the Dublin police had resulted in bloodshed.

Coming as it did at the end of the abortive Buckingham Palace conference between the Ulster and Nationalist leaders, the foreign ill-wishers of Great Britain regarded this catastrophe as the outbreak of the long-promised civil war. Without a doubt Germany was counting on such a development. In her eyes, Great Britain, on the brink of armed conflict within her own islands, was a negligible quantity. Mr. Redmond's speech gave Berlin her answer. In words which at the time raised a hope, unfortunately not to be fulfilled, that the long quarrel between Ireland and Great Britain was at last to be ended, he declared:

> I say that the coasts of Ireland will be defended from foreign invasion by her armed sons, and for this purpose armed Nationalist Catholics in the south will be only too glad to join arms with the armed Protestant Ulstermen in the north. Is it too much to hope that out of this situation there may spring a result which will be good, not merely for the empire, but good for the future welfare and integrity of the Irish nation? . . . If the dire necessity is forced upon this country, we offer to the government of the day that they may take their troops away, and that if it is allowed to us, in comradeship with our brethren in the north, we will ourselves defend the coasts of our country.

There seemed only one dissentient voice. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald maintained that the country was not in danger; that if it were, all parties and all classes would stand shoulder to shoulder behind the government. Immediately after he had spoken, the sitting was suspended for two hours. Before the House assembled again news, vital alike to Great Britain's security and her honour, had reached the government. Once more going to the table the foreign secretary read a document which decided Great Britain's participation in the world war. It was the message from the Belgian legation in London, stating that Belgium had refused to allow German troops a free passage through her territory and was resolved to repel aggression by all possible means. There was no mistaking the sentiments of the House, though two Quaker members urged a final effort for peace. There was no need for any Cabinet decisions. The first lord had on his own authority completed the mobilization of the fleet, feeling that the security of the state overrode all other considerations, and now the military defences were taken in hand.

That strange Bank Holiday of August 3 came to an end. Tuesday, August 4, dawned. All through that long summer day the people waited as if holding their breath. The navy was

Wide World Photo

CRIME THAT PRECIPITATED THE GREAT WAR. Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the Austrian imperial throne, accompanied by his morganatic wife, paid a visit to Serajevo, the chief town of Bosnia, on June 28, 1914. When they had left the town hall, only two or three minutes after this photograph was taken, a Bosnian high-school student fired two shots at the pair, instantly killing them both.

Emperor William II. From his accession German emperor on this throne until his abdication, November 9, 1918. William II was a restless and disturbing figure in Europe owing to his military preparations and ambitions. This photograph was taken in 1913.

Emperor Francis Joseph. Owner of, and by reason the Austrian throne. He was during his reign, during the troubles in Europe [illegible] the Hapsburg princes. The aged [illegible] who took no active part in the war, died in 1916.

RULERS OF THE CENTRAL EMPIRES AT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

CROWD CHEERING THE KING AT BUCKINGHAM PALACE ON THE OUTBREAK OF WAR, AUGUST 4, 1914

Russell

Swaine

Russell

Above : Sir John French. The moment it became evident that war was inevitable Field Marshal Sir John French was selected for the command of the British Expeditionary Force, a position he retained until December, 1915. Bottom, right : Sir Douglas Haig. Commander of the 1st corps, and later of the 1st army, he succeeded French as commander-in-chief of the British forces in France in December, 1915. Top, right : Sir H. Smith-Dorrien. He led the 2nd corps in France, fighting the battle of Le Cateau. In 1915 he went out to command the troops in East Africa.

THE BRITISH COMMANDER AND HIS TWO CHIEF LIEUTENANTS

ready, every ship at her station, warned and watchful. Only a final message, when Britain's ultimatum to Germany expired at eleven o'clock that night, was required to open the thunder of their guns. The sun sank. The night came, a night that throbbed and pulsed with deep emotion. In the hearts of the waiting multitudes in the London streets there was no divided feeling, no shrinking from the tragic price to be paid by the blood of the nation's manhood. Eleven o'clock struck. Instantly to every ship and establishment under the white ensign all over the world, there was swept through the ether the message that meant "Commence hostilities against Germany." . . . Great Britain had taken the plunge into the World War.

The banks reopened on Friday, August 7, in order that wages might be paid. There was no fresh run upon them. Here and there super-nervous individuals tried to withdraw large sums, but the banks had now the power to refuse payment in such cases and they used it resolutely.

The threatened panic was stayed, but the financial and industrial situation in Britain during the first week in August was anything but promising. When the average merchant or manufacturer returned to his desk after the holiday he found himself face to face with very gloomy prospects. His investments were not now immediately available. He could not sell them even at a ruinous sacrifice, for the stock exchanges closed. He could not borrow on them, for the banks were chary in making loans. Foreign payments had ceased to arrive, and debts on the continent of Europe could not be collected. Business men who had been able a month before to command scores of thousands of pounds now found themselves hard pressed to raise enough money to pay their weekly wages. Debts owing by them could not, it is true, be enforced under the moratorium proclamation, but the British business man did not want to damage his own credit by pleading the moratorium.

Business was immediately curtailed. A large part of British trade had been with foreign countries. Most of this ceased immediately, especially so far as the continent of Europe was concerned. Home buying dropped. The wholesaler would not lay in further supplies which he might not be able to sell; the retailer would not accept extra stocks. Thus day by day during that first week in August the manufacturers found their mail composed of little more than letters cancelling orders.

Articles of luxury, pictures, and the like became suddenly unsaleable. The fashionable dressmaker found that her best customers were no longer thinking of fresh stocks of costly and beautiful attire, but were absorbed in work for the sick or in preparations for the wounded. Entertaining ceased, and the army of caterers for the luxurious found themselves idle. This condition of things naturally told on employment. Thousands of young women, shorthand typists and general assistants, were thrown out of work by the closing down of offices. Some factories ran on half time, and some shut altogether. Here and there patriotic business men, possessed of unusual resources, did not permit their people to suffer. "You have stood by us in good times. We will stand by you in bad," they said; and they paid wages in full and kept their staffs unbroken.

Employers in some cases met their men and discussed the situation with them. Here and there the workers took the initiative. "We recognize that there is not enough business coming in to keep all of us employed," the workers in one large house wrote to their chief. "We know that some readjustment must be made. We should be glad if, in place of discharging part of the staff, you would allow us to keep together, to share the loss in common, and to have wages reduced all round rather than some be discharged and others kept on at full wages."

Holiday makers returned home as soon as war was declared, and the thousands of lodging-house keepers and hotel keepers at the seaside and in the country found their living gone. The plight of those people who had gone abroad and had deferred their return too long was serious. Many of them underwent extreme hardships and a considerable number only managed to get home after long delay and after overcoming many difficulties. In those days passports were not necessary for travel on the continent and in many cases people had difficulty in proving their nationality; they had still greater difficulty in obtaining money.

As soon as it became apparent that Germany would pass through Belgium by force of arms if necessary, a great change came over Great Britain. Plans for home defence, which had been carefully worked out by the War Office, came into effect. Railway stations, bridges, and water and lighting works were placed under military guard. A large number of special constables was enrolled to assist the regular police in the many new

duties thrust upon them. News came up from a hundred points around the coast of the digging of trenches, and the like. At first people refused to take these measures seriously, and laughingly declared that it might be imagined the authorities thought the Germans would invade us. The note of good-humoured banter soon changed to a more serious tone. A number of Germans suspected of espionage were suddenly arrested, and it is said that a very carefully planned German scheme was thus crushed. A bill enabling the authorities to move or restrain the movements of undesirable aliens was passed through the Commons on the day war was announced. The navigation of aircraft of every kind, over the whole of the United Kingdom, was prohibited. Shipping was placed at the disposal of the authorities, who were given power to commandeer what boats they required for the service of the government. Two of the most important measures carried out in the first week for the nationalisation of the country's resources were the taking over of the railways by the state and the establishment of a government scheme for the insurance of shipping against war risks.

The state control of railways was announced on Tuesday night, August 4, and it at once came into force. Under an Act of Parliament passed in 1871 the government possessed power to assume supreme control over the railways of the United Kingdom, in order that the lines, locomotives, rolling stock and staff might be used as one complete unit in the service of the state for the movement of troops, stores, and food supplies. The order-in-council, announcing that this power was to be used, stated:

> It is expedient that the government should have control over the railroads of Great Britain. . . Although the railway facilities for other than naval and military purposes may for a time be somewhat restricted, the effect of the use of the powers under this Act will be to co-ordinate the demands on the railways of the civil community with those necessary to meet the special requirements of the naval and military authorities. More normal conditions will in due course be restored, and it is hoped the public will recognize the necessity for the special conditions, and will in the general interest accommodate themselves to the inconvenience involved.

Unsuspected by the country at large, this step had been fully prepared for long before war began. For this we have to thank the War Office. A war railway council was in existence, under

the direction of the army, and included representatives of the Admiralty and the Board of Trade. The work of this council was to lay down general schemes of what the railways were required to do in the way of moving troops and supplies. The actual executive administration of the lines was placed in the hands of the railway executive committee, a board composed of the general managers of the railways. Behind it was an organization, the engineer and railway staff corps, consisting of the very pick of the railway world, whose members were at once placed in high administrative transportation posts, not only at home but on the continent. The government guaranteed that during the time of official control the receipts of the railways should equal those they had recently been earning. The result of this guarantee was far-reaching. From now on it was no longer the aim of the railways to attract traffic by special means to their lines, but to meet the government needs.

All the advertising campaigns, canvassing for passengers, and the like, were cut off in a day. Trains were held up or lines closed whenever necessary. In the following months excursion facilities gradually lessened until it was announced that on account of the military requirements cheap fares and excursion rates would be cancelled altogether. The private traveller suffered to some extent, although not so much as might have been expected. But the work for the army was done with splendid efficiency. The way in which the first Expeditionary Force was carried to the south coast ports and embarked secretly will go down in history among the greatest of railway feats.

Still more important, if anything, than the conveyance of the Expeditionary Force southwards was the constant preparation to keep the lines ready day and night so that at any moment a defence army of, maybe, 200,000 men, drawn from many centres, could be concentrated on one spot to resist an attempt at invasion. When it is borne in mind that the railways were very short-handed, a large number of their men being in the army, that they had lost some of their chief organizers for administrative work on the continent, and that they were primarily, from August onwards, working for the government, it will be realized that the way in which they still catered for the civilian element stands to their great credit.

The scheme for insuring British shipping against war risks was necessary if the shipping was to continue its work freely. Every-

one assumed before war began that Germany would have a large number of armed cruisers scattered over the seas, and that, before these could be hunted, they would destroy an appreciable percentage of British ships. The Germans, it turned out, were not so well prepared with their cruisers as had been expected. But the fear of them alone was enough to force insurance to an impossible figure, so a state insurance office was started in London, and the state announced that it was prepared to insure 80 per cent of the risks on ships and to insure cargoes at moderate fixed rates.

The result of this state guarantee, and of the protection afforded to shipping by the fleet, was soon made manifest. A number of merchant vessels were taken over by the government for transport work. The others were insufficient for the work awaiting them. The great German mercantile fleets had been driven from the seas by the British navy. France had no ships to spare. Japan, with her growing shipping, gained enormously. But the main benefit fell to the British shipowners. There came the greatest boom shipping had ever known. Rates doubled, trebled, and quadrupled in a very short time. Old ships almost derelict, which a few weeks before had been unsaleable, now fetched more than they had cost when new. Shipowners who had struggled along with small fleets of tramp boats now found that every boat left to them by the government was a little gold mine. Sailors and officers demanded much higher wages, and got them. This represented a very small share of the gains. Many men made fortunes from their ships in the early months of the war.

The steadily growing activities of the state revealed themselves in another direction. Immediately war became probable, a number of people began hastily to buy large supplies of foodstuffs. In some cases they laid in fantastic quantities of preserved foods, more than they would consume in a year in the normal course of things. Some shopkeepers tried to meet this rush by refusing to supply anyone except their regular customers, only selling them their usual quantities. Others, including some great wholesale houses, quickly raised prices. This rise fell most heavily on small and struggling retailers in poor districts, who could not afford to keep large stocks. As a result they had to increase prices for their customers, and the poorer classes were made to pay. The Cabinet formed a committee on food supplies,

which met the representatives of the multiple grocery firms and of the Grocers' Federation, and it was decided to set up a maximum retail figure announced by the government for certain staple foods, such as sugar, butter, cheese, lard, bacon, and margarine. The government went farther. The price of sugar had been forced up to, in some instances, as much as 7d. a pound. The state purchased an immense quantity of sugar, sufficient for the national supply for many months, and arranged its distribution through the wholesale trade at a much more reasonable price.

The problem of the anticipated winter distress and unemployment among the working classes engaged widespread attention during August and September. The Prince of Wales' Fund was established to meet the distress—a fund that within nine months was to exceed £5,000,000. The Board of Trade established a new department for the promotion of fresh industrial enterprises, and this brought all manner of fresh enterprises to the attention of manufacturers. The chairmakers of Luton were lacking work; a Board of Trade official showed them how to make bentwood furniture so as to capture the Austrian trade. Nottingham factories were given samples of fresh lines wanted abroad. Dundee was put in touch with new continental buyers. The little master in the east end of London was shown how to make fasteners or bag frames, and where to sell them when made.

There was much talk of a business war against Germany. While our soldiers were fighting the German armies in the field, our merchants and manufacturers were to establish British trade in localities where Germans had hitherto been dominant. Britain was to reconquer the South American market, to make an end of German manufactures in Canada, to do the business formerly done by Germany in China, and to have Australian trade once more. This talk was very popular for a time. Then it died away, as people came to realize that there was something very much more important to do than to make fresh trade conquests. The business in hand was to beat Germany in the field of war. People felt that there was something a little paltry in so much talk of trade benefits at this crisis. Hence various campaigns, such as the " business as usual " campaign, faded out of sight as the serious purpose of the war loomed larger and larger.

When arrangements began to be made for the arming, clothing, and equipping of Lord Kitchener's new army of a million

men, it was found that it was hardly possible for the Yorkshire mills to turn out all the khaki, for Sheffield to produce all the guns required, or for Birmingham to find all the small arms. Every firm which catered for the soldier in any way was quickly overwhelmed with orders. Firms that had never done military work before transformed their plant. The Birmingham steel pen maker turned to the manufacture of buttons by the million, and cartridge cases by the ten million. The Hawick manufacturer of fine tartans began to make khaki. At first traders sought for government work. After a time the government came to them, with directions that they were to turn out certain amounts in a given time, and with the stern intimation that if they did not do so they might expect military representatives to take control of their mills. This threat was rendered possible by a remarkable measure, passed in the early days of the war, the Defence of the Realm Act.

The Defence of the Realm Act was in many ways one of the most extraordinary legislative measures ever passed by the British Parliament. It specified a number of acts for which civilians could be tried by court martial. These included communicating with the enemy, spreading false reports or reports likely to cause disaffection, giving assistance to the enemy or endangering the successful prosecution of the war. The person deemed by the military authorities guilty of any of these offences could be arrested and tried just as if subject to military law, and as if he or she had, on active service, committed an offence under the Army Act. In other words, the military authorities could arrest any persons they pleased and, after court martial, inflict any sentence on them short of death. In addition, the military authorities were allowed to demand the whole or part of the output of any factory or workshop dealing with military supplies, and to take possession of any factory or workshop they required. They were also allowed to take any land they needed. This, in effect, made the civil administration of the country entirely subservient to the military administration.

The Act created surprise, and while the majority of people were willing to accept it, believing that the powers under it would not be abused, a number of eminent peers, including several famous judges, among them such men as Lord Halsbury, Lord Parmoor, Lord Loreburn, and Lord Bryce, objected. Lord Halsbury declared that he saw no necessity to get rid of the fabric of

personal liberty that had been built up for many generations. "I do not think that the liberty of the subject is so trifling a matter that it can be swept away in a moment because some of us are in a panic."

The Act, nevertheless, passed into law, and the military authorities, as expected, used their great powers prudently. But the feeling grew that it was not right that all the ancient limitations on the supreme authority should go, and when the House of Lords met on January 7, 1915, Lord Parmoor introduced an amending Bill, to restore to citizens their right to be tried by the ordinary courts. The government promised, if this was withdrawn, to bring in a similar measure itself. It did so, and a new law was passed, giving any accused civilian the right to choose whether he should be tried by civil court or court martial. It was provided, however, that in case of special emergency, such as invasion, this choice would be withdrawn. The effect of this law, however, even as amended, was to vest in the government such powers as it had never enjoyed before. The civilian was no longer free to go where he pleased, should the military authorities desire to stop him. The task of leaving or entering a country was made one of great difficulty by severe passport regulations. The visitor to a strange place had to fill up a form declaring his identity, hotel guests had to be registered in the same way as had long prevailed on the continent. Great Britain was fighting for her life, and her people knew that, faced with this supreme issue, the rights and privileges of ordinary times must of necessity go.

The government at the outbreak of the war was called upon to decide what should be done with the very large number of enemy subjects in Britain. For years Germans had come and settled there in growing hosts. German financiers were among the leaders in the banking world; German stockbrokers formed a section of their own on the stock exchange; German importers and exporters dominated branch after branch of commerce in London and in great provincial cities. It was notorious that the young German clerk, speaking three languages and requiring little wage, had ousted young Britons from thousands of offices. Most of the great hotels were run by Germans or Austrians, while as waiters the only serious competitors of the Germans were the Italians and the Swiss. Germans had captured the greater part of the baking trade of London, and their food stores were

scattered over the city and the west end. Many people with German names and of German descent were naturalised ; very many more were not.

What was to be done with these people? The problem was admittedly not easy. Among the German and Austrian subjects were some, like the Czechs, who hated Germanism, and who had fled to Britain as a refuge against its tyrannous rule. There were others who had lived in the country for many years, had married English wives, and had sons serving in the British army and navy, and who were passionately English in sentiment. But these were the exceptions. The vast majority of the Germans here were, as might be expected, devoted to the fatherland. Tens of thousands of the young men were army reservists, eager to return to their regiments.

The government hesitated to employ its authority against these people. Even when it was seen that British subjects caught in Germany at the beginning of the war were to be treated in the harshest possible fashion, they still held their hand. Known spies were arrested, and some 200 suspected spies were kept under watch. A few hours after war broke out the home secretary issued a notice allowing Germans to leave this country during the subsequent six days. Thanks to this extraordinary permission, young German reservists, amounting in numbers to a division of the army, were enabled to return home, rejoin their colours, and fight. Some precautions were taken, but they were inadequate. German financial undertakings were placed under special supervision, and a series of minor checks on alien enemies were instituted. Espionage was made a military offence, punishable with death. Alien enemies were not allowed to keep carrier pigeons, photographic apparatus, or arms. The houses of Germans and Austrians were searched. Later on a certain number of Germans and Austrians of military age—at first 9,000, rising afterwards to 19,000—were arrested and confined in detention camps as prisoners of war. A number of Germans and Austrians attempted to change their names in order to pass as British. This was forbidden by a special order-in-council. Germans and Austrians remaining in Britain were ordered to register, and to submit to certain regulations which were intended to limit their right to travel over the country.

It soon became evident, however, that these measures were utterly insufficient to counteract the activity of German secret

agents. There was a certain number of outrages, particularly in government works, unexplainable except as the deliberate work of active enemies. Some of these—as, for example, the series of fires that took place in Portsmouth dockyard—were not allowed to be reported at the time. Cases that came before the courts increased the public uneasiness. Two of the most noted cases were that of Karl Lody, a German naval lieutenant, who was shot after trial at the Tower of London for espionage, and of Karl Ernst, a naturalised British subject, a hairdresser in North London, who was sentenced to seven years' penal servitude for acting as distributor of letters for one of the German spy organizers.

Germans settled on the east coast, a number of them at possible invasion points. Some were found in possession of wireless apparatus. It was quite evident after the war broke out that German agents were succeeding, by some means or another, in communicating valuable information to Britain's enemies. The authorities tried to check such leakages by making it more difficult for people to leave the country and by subjecting travellers to minute search and investigation. But every official step against the Germans themselves in Britain was taken with evident reluctance, and many of the aliens who were first interned were gradually released. Attacks on this leniency met with the reply that everything was done with the approval, if not at the direction of, the military authorities.

The country was very willing at this time to believe the most absurd rumours. The most remarkable was the one that a large Russian army had been seen passing through Great Britain on its way to the western front. Others concerned mysterious lights seen on the coast, bases and fuel for submarines, emplacements for heavy guns in private gardens, and there were many others.

CHAPTER 4

The Opposing Forces

By the evening of August 4 seven European nations were at war. Germany and Austria, known as the Central Powers, formed one group. The others, called usually the Allies, consisted of Great Britain, France, Russia, Belgium, and Serbia. Later others were to join in the fray, but before their participation is recorded it will be well to say something about the strength of the forces, on land, on sea, and in the air, that were ranged against each other when hostilities began.

Of the combatants Great Britain alone had no form of compulsory military service. The wisdom of depending entirely upon a voluntary army had been hotly disputed. The advantage of voluntary service for a long term of years is that greater professional ability is obtained, and that, as all who join do so willingly, there are likely to be fewer shirkers. The superiority over a compulsory service army due to this cause has been calculated by authorities at 30 per cent. That is to say, a voluntary service army of 100,000 men should be equal to a compulsory service army of 130,000 men. As against these advantages there are signal defects. A long service voluntarily recruited force is very costly. It will be small in numbers and will have no large reserves. It is apt to become a class apart from the population. The officers, because they have not constantly to strain all their faculties in teaching a continual succession of short-service men, are liable to deteriorate, though it must be said that the British officer in the Great War showed that to this rule there are marked exceptions.

For many years before the war Earl Roberts, in speeches and in writing, had urged upon his fellow countrymen the need of accepting some form of compulsory service for home defence. Almost alone, he foresaw the German menace, but when he pointed to General von Bernhardi's book, "Germany and the Next War," which proclaimed the necessity of humbling Great Britain, he was accused of libelling Germany, and was denounced in certain sections of the press and by a few politicians

as a militarist endeavouring to stampede the country into conscription. The majority of the British people were unable to imagine what a European war would mean; they trusted implicitly in the navy to shield the country from invasion, and they comforted themselves with the belief that anyhow war would not come in their time.

Before the outbreak of the Great War the British army was organized in accordance with the scheme of 1907, the work of Lord Haldane. This remodelled the old system and created the so-called Territorial Force. Britain's military forces were divided into two main branches, the army proper, i.e. the regular troops with their reserves, and the Territorial Force, the volunteers of old. In 1914 the strength of the regular army in Great Britain and the colonies was 156,110 officers and men, 12,000 short of the establishment or nominal strength. There were, in addition, 78,400 British troops serving in India, making with miscellaneous units something over 250,000 men. The regular reserve, all trained men, numbered 146,000 and the special reserve, consisting of partially trained men, numbered 63,000. All these were liable to foreign service. From this host of men, however, important deductions had to be made. About 30,000 of the regular army were under 20 years of age and unfit for foreign service. Another 10,000 must be subtracted for men of military age in hospital or incapable of taking the field. At the same time, all the units — regiments, squadrons, and batteries — required further complements of reservists to bring them up to war strength; and these reservists, joining from civil life, needed some days or weeks of training before they could support the trials and privations which fall upon the soldier in time of war.

Behind the regular army was the Territorial Force, which had replaced the volunteers of the Victorian age. The force had a nominal strength of 313,000 officers and men. It differed from the old volunteers in that it was organized in brigades and divisions, which were composed of all arms, i.e. of infantry, cavalry or yeomanry, artillery, and engineers. This organization was a real gain from the military standpoint. But the force lacked training. The men serving in it passed at most 15 days in camp each year and attended a certain number of drills. As it was recruited voluntarily, from men employed in industry and business, a longer and more arduous training was impracticable. On the eve of the war the force was about 63,000 men

short of its proper strength. That is to say, it numbered about 250,000 men instead of 313,000, and of those in the ranks nearly 17,000 were in 1913 under 18 years of age. Its weapons, too, were not of the latest patterns; and though the physique, morale and patriotism of its members were beyond praise, its units were not, without further training, fit to meet a highly trained army in the field.

The nucleus of the regular army was the infantry, divided into Guards, four regiments or nine battalions, and infantry of the line, 69 regiments or 148 battalions. The latter were organized on a territorial basis, i.e., the country was mapped out into military districts, a regiment being allotted to each. These regiments consisted of a number of battalions, usually two of regular troops and others of special reservists and territorials.

The other arms of the service consisted of cavalry organized in 31 regiments, which, however, resembled the battalions rather than the regiments of infantry; and artillery, divided into field and garrison, and the former further into horse and foot, i.e. for service with cavalry and infantry respectively. Its strength in 1913 was 25 battalions of horse, 135 of field and nine of mountain artillery, as well as 98 companies of garrison artillery. Other branches of the army included the Army Service Corps; the Army Medical Corps; the Army Pay Corps; and the Army Ordnance Corps. The engineers were a separate unit, and there was also a department for chaplains. The Royal Flying Corps had just been formed, while another new department was the Army Signal Service.

Until the formation of the army corps the largest unit was the division. This consisted of three brigades of infantry, altogether about 12,000 men, with the necessary artillery, cavalry, engineers, etc. Its total strength was about 18,000, and it was really an army in miniature. Below the divisions were the brigades, each of four battalions of infantry, or of three regiments of cavalry. The artillery was also organized in brigades. An Imperial General Staff co-ordinated the fighting activities and provided the brains of the army. Its head, the chief of the general staff, was a member of the army council.

The highest rank was that of field marshal. General, lieutenant general, and major general came next. Brigadier general was only a temporary title, bestowed for the time being upon colonels or others commanding brigades. Colonel was the

next rank, and then lieutenant colonel, who was usually in charge of a battalion of infantry or a regiment of cavalry; major, captain, usually the company leader, lieutenant, and second lieutenant completed the list of commissioned officers. The non commissioned officers were sergeant major, sergeant, corporal, and lance corporal. The adjutant acted as the colonel's chief assistant, while the quartermaster looked after the battalion's stores. Divisions and brigades had each their own staff and a number of miscellaneous units and officers to complete their organization. Quite apart from this military hierarchy, although controlling it and providing for its equipment and food, was the secretary of state for war, with his army council and his great civil department.

The strength of the various units of the regular army just before the outbreak of the Great War was:

Infantry	149,507
Cavalry	20,332
Artillery	47,894
Engineers	10,230
R.A.S.C.	6,463
R.A.M.C.	4,781
R.F.C.	1,005
Miscellaneous	13,328
	253,540

Perhaps the greatest achievement of Lord Haldane during his term of office as secretary for war (1905-12) was the creation of the British Expeditionary Force. Under his scheme this force of 160,000 was constituted for employment abroad in case of need. It consisted of six divisions of infantry, each composed of 508 officers and 18,077 men, with 54 field guns, 18 4.5 in. howitzers, and 4 heavy 60 pounder guns, and one division of cavalry, composed of 485 officers and 9,412 men with 24 horse artillery guns. In addition, troops were provided for the lines of communication. The total strength available for the firing line was thus about 130,000 officers and men, with 480 guns.

The actual British expeditionary force that reached France in August, 1914, had a combatant strength of about 80,000 men—four divisions, and one cavalry division. The other two divisions did not reach the front till the middle of September. The original force, divided into two corps under Sir D. Haig

and Sir H. Smith-Dorrien, and the whole commanded by Sir J. French, took its place at the front in Belgium on August 22, 1914. With the expeditionary force went the aerial arm, consisting in the first instance of approximately 100 aeroplanes, which were promptly supplemented by 30 more. The most experienced pilots went out under the command of Brigadier General Sir David Henderson, Chief of the Royal Flying Corps. The pilots and trained observers were drawn from the various naval and military aviation centres in the country, with the result that, proportionately to the numbers engaged, Great Britain had a finer flying personnel than that possessed by any other nation.

The Territorial Force had been called to arms at the beginning of the war, and though the men had been enlisted for home service only they volunteered, almost to a man, for service overseas. Before the end of 1914 several units were already abroad, having been sent to stations in India and elsewhere in order to release battalions of regulars for active service. A few units, notably the London Scottish, were at the front before the end of the year. It was quickly evident, however, that more than an expeditionary force of the highest quality and willing and alert battalions of territorials were necessary if Germany was to be beaten.

On becoming secretary for war a few days after its outbreak, Earl Kitchener called for 100,000 men, and then for more. These he organized in service battalions, which were attached to the various units and numbered after the territorial battalions, thus: 8th (Service) battalion, East Surrey Regiment. Known as the New Army, the men were organized in brigades and divisions, corresponding in strength and constitution to those of the regulars and territorials. Their divisions were numbered from 9 to 26. Others raised later were numbered from 30 onwards until at 42 the territorial divisions began. The 14 of these carried the numbering to 56, after which came divisons raised for the duration of the war only. On September 15, 1914, the army strength was as follows:

Regulars	314,000
Army Reserve	80,000
New Army	500,000
Territorial Force	313,000
	1,207,000

The army reservists were training to fill the ranks of the regular battalions, including the Guards.

The above facts and figures make no mention of the vast reserves of men in the various British possessions overseas as, for obvious reasons, these could not make an immediate appearance in the fighting line. India possessed a regular army of considerable size and proved valour, but the self-governing Dominions—Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa —had only small forces raised and trained for home defence. These, however, formed nuclei round which gathered in a few months armies exceeding in size and rivalling in valour the host that Napoleon led at Austerlitz or Wellington at Waterloo ; far greater than the armies with which Marlborough and Frederick the Great won their immortal victories.

Efficient though the British force was, its numbers, comparatively speaking, were small, so immense was the scale of the struggle. It was inevitable, therefore, that the main share of the task of withstanding the tremendous German onslaught in the west should fall to the French, whose leaders, whatever hopes they may have built on Britain's aid, had never thought it could be otherwise.

The enormous increase in the German forces announced in April, 1913, which was to bring the peace strength of the German army up to the unprecedented figure of 866,000 men, demanded an instant reply from France if the margin of military strength between herself and her rival were not to be allowed to broaden beyond all possibility of adjustment. However much it might be urged in Germany that the menace of the ever-growing military strength of Russia was the reason for the constant increase in the German army, France realized that it was herself that these vast armaments chiefly threatened. For she knew that if the day of war came, the slowness with which the mobilization of her Russian ally must necessarily be carried out would expose her, for a month at any rate, to the full weight of the Germany military power. During that month every effort would be made to crush France in time to hurry the victorious German armies back across the whole width of the empire to meet the slowly gathering hosts of Russia.

It was the perception of this danger that brought into being the famous Three Years' Service bill, which, after dividing France into two opposing camps for eighteen months, was

recognized, when the storm burst, as the salvation of the nation. In March, 1913, the ministry led by Aristide Briand introduced a bill for increasing the term of service with the colours from two to three years.

In Germany, where a population of 64,000,000 had always provided a margin of men over and above requirements, it had been easy to enlarge the army by merely calling to service with the colours a number of recruits who would otherwise have been allowed to pass into the category of men capable of service but untrained. France had no such superfluity to draw upon. Her population of 40,000,000 had remained practically stationary for some years past. How was she to reply to the increase which Germany had resolved upon for her own army? There was only one solution. Each individual Frenchman must be called upon to make the sacrifice of another whole year of his life for the defence of his country. It is small wonder that this gigantic tax on the very life blood of the nation's industry aroused the bitterest opposition among the working classes who would be called upon to contribute most to it. Many schemes for half measures—such as service for 30 months—were proposed by the more moderate antagonists of the bill, but all were rejected by the army commission and the Chamber of Deputies. The scheme evoked, too, great discontent in the army, resulting in one case in something very like mutiny.

Amid all this travail, however, three years' service in France was born. In spite of the loud protests of the politicians, in spite of the secret plotting of the anarchists, the great mass of the French nation resigned itself patiently to the heavy burden. In the autumn of 1913 the last Frenchman to do two years' service left the colours, and two drafts, the recruits of 21 years and at the same time the class aged 20, who would otherwise not have come up for service till the following year, were added to the army. France's reply to the increased armaments of Germany was made.

The French army consisted of the national army, styled the metropolitan army, and the colonial army, recruited from colonial subjects in Algeria and Morocco. Early in 1914 the strength of the former was 703,000 and of the latter 87,000. Behind these were the men who had passed through the ranks, and so France was able to put in the field a force of 3,781,000 men with 92,000 officers a fortnight after the declaration of war.

The Belgian army was recruited partly by conscription and partly by voluntary enlistment, the latter being only for those who desired to make the army a profession. Its authorised field strength was, 3,300 officers and 50,300 other ranks. Its war strength was estimated at 350,000 men, but at the outbreak of war Belgium was in the midst of an army reorganization scheme, and was not able to bring all her forces into the field since her territory was overrun by the Germans. After the fall of Antwerp her total available forces fell to 82,000 men.

The Serbians mobilized over 350,000 men, fine and seasoned soldiers, but from want of transport and munitions they were unable to fight outside their own territory.

The Russian army outnumbered all the others. Its peace strength was upwards of 1,300,000 men of all ranks. At war strength its numbers were estimated at between 6,000,000 and 7,000,000 men, and its reserves of man power were far greater than those of any of the other belligerents. But in equipment and munitions it was woefully lacking, and for this deficiency the courage and hardihood of the troops could not atone.

Against these forces was pitted the might of the two Central empires. The German regular army, like the French and the Russian, consisted of conscripts who served with the colours for two or three years and then after this period of intensive training passed into the reserve. It numbered some 860,000 men organized in 26 army corps. Each army corps consisted of two or three divisions, the constitution of which was not unlike that of their British counterparts. On mobilization the army was enlarged by calling to the colours the first reserve, young men who had just completed their years of service, and with these its fighting strength was about 1,500,000. Further additions were secured by calling upon the other reserve called the Landwehr, which made a total of over 4,000,000. Behind this was an untapped reserve, the Landsturm, older men numbering about 5,000,000.

In efficiency this vast army was second to none. Its officers were zealous students of the art of war, devoted to their profession. Guns and equipment were the best that scientific skill and long experience could devise. Directing all its activities, with plans of campaign worked out to the last meticulous detail, was the great general staff which von Moltke had fashioned into a wonderful instrument of victory. Backed by an educated

and enthusiastic people steeled by the belief that might is right, small wonder that the directors of this carefully created machine viewed with elation rather than dismay the prospect of putting it to the task for which long years of thought and work had fitted it.

In comparison with Germany's might that of Austria was puny indeed, but it was by no means negligible. The dual monarchy could put about 2,000,000 men into the field, a force unable, by itself, to meet the Russian hosts with any prospect of success, but of high value as auxiliaries to the army of its ally.

To turn to an estimate of naval strength, which once more was to prove the truth of Bacon's remark "but this much is certain that he who commands the sea is at great liberty and can take as much and as little of the war as he will," the British navy, although weaker than many thought prudent, was still much the strongest in the world. Naval strength is usually reckoned in capital ships, although the attendant cruisers, destroyers and submarines must be taken into account. Capital ships are battleships and battle cruisers which can engage the most powerful vessels afloat, and obviously their standard of strength and efficiency is continually rising.

In 1914 the strongest class of capital ships were called Dreadnoughts, their special feature being that, unlike the earlier battleships, they carried all big guns. These guns were usually ten in number, mounted in pairs, with a calibre of 12 or 13.5 in. In addition Great Britain and Germany were building still stronger battleships called super-Dreadnoughts; these carried ten 15 in. guns, but in August, 1914, none of them was at sea. In July, 1914, Great Britain had 21 Dreadnoughts and seven battle cruisers, also carrying all big guns. She possessed 38 other capital ships, vessels that would at once become of high value if the Dreadnoughts were crippled or destroyed. Germany possessed 13 Dreadnoughts, five battle cruisers and 21 other capital ships. The figures for other classes are somewhat uncertain, but one authority gives them as follows. In cruisers, other than battle cruisers, Great Britain had 121 against Germany's 52. In destroyers the figures were 227 and 152, and in submarines 75 and 45. Both nations had other vessels building. The personnel of the British navy numbered 144,871 officers, seamen and marines, with reserves numbering 51,836. The German navy had 79,375 officers and men and about 110,000 reservists.

The battleships and cruisers were grouped into squadrons, each consisting of four or eight vessels with their attendant destroyers and submarines, and on the British side some of these were formed into the Grand fleet which, on August 3, passed under the command of Sir J. R. Jellicoe. With his flag on the Iron Duke he had with him four squadrons of battleships, one of battle cruisers, led by Sir D. Beatty, and three of ordinary cruisers. The eight most powerful battleships, each carrying ten 13.5 in. guns, were in the 2nd battle squadron. The 1st battle squadron consisted of the Marlborough and seven ships with ten 12 in. guns. The 3rd battle squadron contained eight ships of the King Edward VII class, older and less powerful vessels than the Dreadnoughts. In the 4th battle squadron were only four ships, all Dreadnoughts. Behind the Grand fleet were the reserves in two fleets. The second fleet contained 15 battleships of the pre-Dreadnought era and various smaller craft. The third fleet contained still older vessels that were stationed at various points as guardships. The German High Seas fleet, though highly efficient, was certainly weaker than the Grand fleet. It contained 13 battleships of the Dreadnought class, four battle cruisers, seven light cruisers and an attendant force of destroyers and submarines.

With bases at Rosyth and Scapa Flow, the business of the Grand fleet was to watch and, if possible, destroy the German High Seas fleet stationed on the other side of the North Sea remembering that, as ever, the frontiers of Britain are the coasts of the enemy. This may be described as the major operation of the war, for if the Grand fleet was sunk or driven from the seas, a vital blow would be struck at the Allied cause.

In addition to its supreme task the British navy had others almost equally vital to an alliance whose communications were largely by sea. Britain's interests extended into all parts of the world; the food supplies of her people must at all costs be safeguarded; men and material for carrying on the war must be moved freely from place to place. With the German fleet contained, to use a naval phrase, this gigantic task could be done without undue difficulty. A squadron in the Mediterranean, responsible for maintaining communications through the Red Sea, consisted of four battle cruisers, four cruisers, four light cruisers and other craft. The next strongest force was in the Chinese seas, and others were stationed to protect British

interests in African and American waters. A further squadron was provided by the warships maintained by Australia and New Zealand. Cruisers were sent out to watch the main trade routes, for it was known that fast German warships, some (the Goeben, Scharnhorst, and Gneisenau, for example) of considerable strength, were somewhere on the seven seas.

A task nearer home was to guard the narrow seas across which transports must continually pass and on which attacks must certainly be expected. This was done by forming patrols of destroyers and submarines that were continually on the watch from their bases on the east coast of England. The chief of these guarded the Straits of Dover, working from Harwich and Dover. Others were stationed at the mouths of the Forth, Tyne and Humber, and behind them all was the powerful shield of the Grand fleet. Attached to the fleet was a flying arm, the Royal Naval Air Service.

The British fleet was thoroughly efficient, while behind it was a tradition of victorious service that no other force in the world, save perhaps the French army, could equal. Its personnel was of the best, and all that careful training and long experience could do to fit officers and men for the day of battle had been done. But one or two matters had been overlooked, or rather one or two developments had not been foreseen. The most serious defect revealed in the early days of the conflict was that the naval bases on the east coast, Rosyth and Scapa Flow, were not properly protected against submarine attack. The consequence was that only a few weeks of war had passed before, in October, the Grand fleet was forced to leave Scapa Flow, its headquarters in the Orkneys, in order to find safe anchorage in harbours on the islands of Mull and Skye and in Lough Swilly on the north coast of Ireland. Experience of another kind showed that the gunnery of the Germans was extremely good, better in some respects than that of the British, and that the design of some of the newest British ships made them more vulnerable to gunfire than were those of the enemy.

In the last week of July all the national dockyards and the private shipbuilding establishments began to work with redoubled haste upon ships nearing completion, so that they might be added to the fleet at sea with the least possible delay. Further, on the day following the declaration of war the Admiralty announced that they had taken over four ships which

were building in this country for foreign Powers. The Turkish battleships Sultan Osman I and Reshadieh, the former carrying 14 and the latter ten heavy guns, were brought under the British flag, and renamed Agincourt and Erin respectively, while two large and fast destroyers which had been built for Chile were also appropriated, and entered the British navy as the Faulkner and the Broke. The Dreadnoughts Benbow and Emperor of India, mounting ten 13.5 in. guns apiece, with sixteen 6 in. guns in addition, and the powerful battle cruiser Tiger, were rapidly approaching completion.

The ships nearing completion for Germany at the outbreak of war were the battleships Markgraf, Grosser Kurfürst and König, both of 25,500 tons, and mounting ten 12 in. guns which could be changed for more powerful weapons. In addition to these was the battle cruiser Derfflinger, of about 28,000 tons, armed with eight 12 in. guns, some smaller weapons, and with a speed of nearly 30 knots.

By a remarkable stroke of good fortune the British Admiralty had decided six months before war became even a possibility that every available warship in home waters should be placed on a war footing during that summer. On March 17, 1914, Mr. Churchill, the first lord of the Admiralty, announced that every ship in the Home fleet would be placed on a war footing between July 15 and 25, and that "the whole of the royal fleet reserve" —some 30,000 strong—would be called out for eleven days. The result was that when the German attitude towards Belgium made it impossible for Great Britain to remain a passive onlooker, the British fleet was in a condition of readiness for war such as it could not possibly have enjoyed for more than four weeks out of any average year. The whole of the fleet that is ordinarily kept in full commission was concentrated at Portland under its commander-in-chief, and on July 29 this force of 150 ships—battleships, cruisers and destroyers—steamed out to take up its position in readiness for war.

The French navy in July, 1914, consisted of seven Dreadnoughts, 21 pre-Dreadnought battleships, 19 armoured cruisers and 12 protected cruisers. It operated almost entirely in the Mediterranean. Russia had a navy which was divided between the Baltic and the Black Seas. In the Baltic were 4 Dreadnoughts, 5 pre-Dreadnought battleships, 3 armoured cruisers, and 6 protected cruisers. In the Black Sea were 3 Dreadnoughts,

7 pre-Dreadnought battleships, and 2 armoured cruisers. Other battleships and cruisers were under construction.

Before 1914 an account of the forces armed for war would have ended here; but the Great War was not fought only on land and sea, but in a new element—the air. In 1912 Great Britain had formed a Royal Flying Corps. This incorporated a naval wing, which in July, 1914, became a separate unit as the Royal Naval Air Service. At the outbreak of war the R.F.C. had a total personnel of about 1,000 officers and men, but only about 100 aeroplanes in a condition to send overseas. The R.N.A.S. had only experimented with seaplanes, airships and kite balloons, and its development into an important auxiliary to the fleet began only in August, 1914.

In 1914 the French aeronautical corps had a total establishment of 334 aeroplanes and 14 dirigibles. Germany was particularly strong in this arm. At the outbreak of war she had 475 aeroplanes, and there were also efficient airships of three types, Zeppelin, Schutte-Lanz and Parseval, but the exact number in August, 1914, has never been revealed. The Russian air force was reputed, in 1914, to possess 500 aeroplanes.

CHAPTER 5

The Rally of the Empire

GERMAN statesmen, in estimating their chances in a war against Britain, placed much weight on the advantages that would come to them from expected dissensions within the British Empire. As soon as Britain was engaged in a life and death struggle her subject races, these critics believed, would throw off their yoke. There would be risings in Calcutta and Bombay; while from Nairobi to Singapore, and from Khartoum to Port Elizabeth, nations would seize the chance of slaying their British administrators and returning to their old, primitive freedom. Uganda and Ceylon, Basutoland and the Straits Settlements, the solemn marches under the shadow of the Himalayas, and the fever-haunted jungles of Central Africa were alike to witness the quick, savage revolt of their people against the British oppressors.

Nor was this all. Canada would refuse to bear the burden of a war of whose origin she knew nothing, and cared less; Australia would quietly cut the painter and secure at a stroke her independence and her freedom from war's burdens; while in South Africa the Boers would raise the standard of rebellion again and sweep every Briton into the sea.

This was the dream of Germany. It seemed impossible to her precise empire-builders that an empire that had grown, without plan or premeditation, should stand a great strain. Even those Germans who knew something of Greater Britain and of her dependencies failed to comprehend the real strength of her position. Disputes and differences, they declared, were bound to split the empire. They knew all about the line of cleavage between French Canadians and British Canadians; they were well informed of the differences in opinion between various political parties in the Dominions and at home on the question of naval defence; they had precisely recorded all the minor squabbles that must arise where independent and free peoples are working out their destiny.

What the German observers did not understand was that the differences were on the surface, and that underneath them lay a great fundamental unity. They did not realize that the French Canadians in Quebec, the British settlers in British Columbia, the Dutchmen in Cape Town, and even descendants of Germans in South Australia were one in their love of the freedom of British institutions. Behind them stood men of a hundred nations, bound to the British rule not by compulsion, but by their experience of generations of honest, capable, sincere, and disinterested administration.

During the early days of August, 1914, crowds gathered at every city in the empire waiting for news. Every phase was followed with strained attention—the declaration of war upon Russia by Germany, the outpost fighting on the French and Russian frontiers of Germany, and the mobilization of the British fleet. When, on the evening of August 4, war was declared between Great Britain and Germany the response was immediate. From end to end of the empire controversies were forgotten, differences passed out of sight, and men united in one plea—What can we do?

Canada and Australia and New Zealand began to raise armies to send to Europe; South Africa rallied her sons for fighting

nearer to hand; the Indian princes mobilized their forces and offered their armed men, with themselves and their fortunes, to their emperor. Basuto and Zulu, Kanaka and Maori, Negro and Cingalese, clamoured to serve. Men in the heart of Africa, and in tiny Pacific Islands whose names were known to but a handful of people in Britain, men who had never in their lives seen Great Britain or met more than a score or two of Britons, were found preparing themselves to fight for the flag and empire they had learnt to love. "Why should I, the king's servant, stand idle when the king is fighting his enemies?" asked one Basuto chief. And that was the question put by the empire as a whole.

In the days of early August, when Great Britain suddenly found herself confronted with her well-prepared antagonist, the silver lining to the black clouds that hung over her was the splendid constancy of the people of the empire. Everyone in Great Britain who knew anything of Greater Britain knew that the Dominions would be loyal. But even those who knew Greater Britain best could hardly have believed that at the first cry of danger to the Motherland old foes would sink ancient controversies, old antagonists would clasp hands, and men from East and West would flock to the flag as Britain's sons did. The world had seen nothing like it before. After August 4 it was no longer a case of the people of Greater Britain helping Great Britain in her war. It was the people of Greater Britain taking their share in their own war, making common purpose and finding common strength in their unity.

The people in the Dominion of Canada were resolved to lead the way. The government did not wait until war was declared. As soon as it became evident that Great Britain was likely to be dragged into the struggle, the duke of Connaught, then governor-general, who was touring the west, started for Ottawa, and the Dominion cabinet met to take action. German cruisers were traversing the seas, and it was thought possible that some of these might attempt attacks on certain vulnerable Canadian points. There were large German colonies in the United States, and smaller ones in Canada itself. Would some of these Germans seek to open guerrilla war on Canada, or try, by destroying bridges, blowing up cities, or damaging ships, to injure the empire? All these things had to be guarded against. Canada had not given much time or care to military defence in the past.

There was, it is true, a Department of Militia responsible for military matters, and at its head was a very active officer, Colonel (afterwards Major General) Sam Hughes. But Colonel Hughes's power was limited until the approach of war by the apathy of the people. There were some militia regiments, and a small regular force, but the average young man had not troubled to do militia training. The militia were little more than skeleton corps. But they were found, at the moment of emergency, to supply an invaluable groundwork on which a military organization could be built up quickly.

As it became clear that war must come, steady streams of men poured from every point to the various militia headquarters offering their services. Farmers drove in twenty and thirty miles or more, cowboys left the prairies; city men, clerks and bank cashiers, owners of prosperous businesses and mechanics—young men, middle-aged, and old—moved by one common purpose, offered themselves. The militia officers found themselves suddenly overwhelmed. There were so many recruits that they could barely record their names. Soldiering, yesterday the amusement of a few, became to-day the settled work of the nation as a whole.

Party politics usually burn with a fierce heat in Canada, and the line of cleavage between Government and Opposition, both in the Dominion and in the separate provinces, has always been clearly marked. Now, however, divisions were obliterated. Sir Wilfrid Laurier, the venerable ex-premier and leader of the opposition, called his chief adherents together and, after consulting them, publicly announced that his, the Liberal, party would lend its support without reserve to all measures deemed necessary by the government. "There should be a truce to party strife," said he, and he saw that the truce was observed. The statesmen of the several provinces echoed the same sentiment. The duke of Connaught summarised the national position —"Canada stands united from the Pacific to the Atlantic in her determination to uphold the honour and traditions of the empire." Parliament was assembled, and it unanimously resolved to raise an expeditionary force of 22,000 men, for dispatch to Europe. The Dominion government had already placed the two Canadian cruisers, the Niobe and the Rainbow, at the service of the Admiralty. The same authority paid the cost of a hospital for the wounded in Paris, and when news

came from England that there was likely to be distress among the poor in the Motherland, it sent over a gift of 1,000,000 bags of flour of 98 pounds each.

A great outburst of public and private generosity was witnessed. Provinces, cities, banks, business organizations, and individuals vied with each other in the extent of their gifts for the empire. Less than eight weeks after war was declared a list was drawn up of what had been offered and given. Among the provinces, Alberta gave half a million bushels of oats to England, and her civil servants set apart five per cent. of their salaries up to £300 a year, and ten per cent. beyond that, for the Patriotic Fund. British Columbia gave 25,000 cases of tinned salmon, Manitoba 50,000 bags of flour, New Brunswick 100,000 bushels of potatoes, Nova Scotia offered 100,000 tons of coal (afterwards changed to £20,000 in cash), Ontario 250,000 bags of flour, Prince Edward Island 100,000 bushels of oats, also cheese and hay, Quebec 4,000,000 pounds of cheese, and Saskatchewan 1,500 horses. Then the cities made their presents: Montreal, £30,000 to the Patriotic Fund and a battery of quick-firing guns; Ottawa, £10,000 to the Patriotic Fund and £60,000 for a machine gun section; Toronto, £10,000 and other gifts. Calgary sent 1,000 men for the Legion of Frontiersmen. These were typical cases.

At the same time the women of Canada were building, equipping, and maintaining a women's hospital of a hundred beds to supplement the British naval hospital at Haslar, near Portsmouth. In less than three weeks they raised close on £60,000, partly as presents to the War Office for hospital purposes, and partly for their own hospital. The Canadian Red Cross raised vast sums. The individual gifts of many rich Canadians were on a princely scale. Thus, Mr. J. K. L. Ross, of Montreal, presented £100,000 to the Patriotic Fund, paid the cost of carrying the 5th Royal Highlanders to England, and gave a steam yacht. Mr. Hamilton Gault, another millionaire, raised and equipped at his own cost a regiment—Princess Patricia's Light Infantry—soon to win wide fame. Crowds of rich men came together and raised hundreds of thousands of dollars to purchase machine guns and armoured motor cars. The Canadian Pacific Railway gave £20,000, and the men on the line gave another £20,000, in addition to promising one day's pay monthly during the war.

It was not only the rich who gave. Canada was at this time passing through a trying period of industrial depression. Many of her business men were having a desperate fight, and at the time that the war broke out the streets of many cities were full of unemployed. Yet the poorest managed to find something for king and empire. Americans living in Canada clamoured to serve. Towns mainly inhabited by German emigrants led the way to loyalty. The white men were not alone. American Indians brought their gifts, of money and in kind, and offered themselves as scouts, boatmen, and woodmen.

It was soon found that the first Canadian contingent could not be kept within the 22,000 originally intended. In a few weeks an army of 33,000 men was raised. The various regiments raised throughout the Dominion were assembled at a newly-created camp, Valcartier, outside Quebec. The army that arrived there had features of its own. There were cavalry like the Royal Strathcona Horse and the Royal Dragoons, largely composed of veterans from the South African War. There were Highland regiments drawn from cities like Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver, regiments affiliated with famous Highland units in the United Kingdom—Seaforths, Gordons, and Camerons—full of the pride of tradition and race. There were scouts from the west, plainsmen trained to pioneer work in the desolate lands of the north, cowboys accustomed to life in the saddle, trappers and hunters, and farmers. There were many townsmen, but the Canadian townsman, as a rule, sees much more of the open air than the townsman in Europe, and possesses much more initiative. A very large proportion of the men were British born, young fellows who had gone out to Canada, lived there for some years, and, at the first call of duty, had volunteered to return and fight for the land of their birth.

The Dominion government resolved that the first contingent should be completely equipped in a way surpassed by no other army in the world. No money was to be spared. Accordingly, the personal equipment of the men was brought to a point of excellence that excited general admiration on their arrival in Europe. They were amply provided with machine guns, their artillery was abundant in quantity and of the best. They had a splendid park of motor transport vehicles and the mechanical equipment was as good as could be. The hospitals of Canada had been searched to select a strong corps of trained nurses to

accompany the army. There was a complete medical department, chaplains were given military rank, and—at that time an unusual feature—secretaries to the Y.M.C.A. were given rank as officers and attached to the regular forces.

By the end of September the expeditionary force was complete, from a very carefully chosen Intelligence Department to the hospital orderlies. Then one day officers and men set out as though on a route march, but this time their steps were directed towards the St. Lawrence, and they did not look back. A fleet of great ships had been assembled there, the expeditionary force marched aboard, its guns and supplies were slung into place, and it sailed for Europe.

The voyage across the Atlantic was watched with anxiety by the people on both sides of the ocean. Would the raiding German cruisers succeed in attacking them en route? A complete veil had been drawn over the movements of the troops. For some weeks no Canadian newspapers were allowed to circulate abroad. No word was breathed of where, or how, or when the Canadians had started.

Early in October a report was circulated in England that the contingent had landed at Southampton. The report turned out to be false. Then, on October 14, the people of Plymouth were surprised in the early morning to see transport after transport arrive in the Sound, and drop anchor there. Across the waters, the sound of singing and shouting and cheering was borne from the boats, and thousands of khaki-clad men could be seen on the ships' sides looking towards the shore. The word went round the town that the men on the crowded decks were Canadians, and Plymouth and Devonport thereupon set out to give the new comrades a royal reception.

A group of camps had been arranged on Salisbury Plain, and the men were immediately moved there. The young recruits hoped to proceed to the front within a week or two, but the British military authorities had other ideas, and gave them an exceedingly hard course of training, which, starting in October, continued well on into February. It had been intended to transfer the troops from their tents to huts before the winter weather came on, but the shortage of labour in England and other causes prevented the completion of the huts, and most of the troops were still under canvas when the New Year opened. The life of the Canadian troops during those weeks on Salisbury Plain was

wearisome and trying. The camps were one great sea of mud. It was an unusually wet winter. The roads had not been made to stand the strain of the heavy military traffic that fell on them, and in places they became almost impassable. The camps were miles away from any villages, and fourteen miles from a town. The soldiers had nothing to do during the long winter nights but crouch in the semi-darkness in their tents, listening to the unceasing rain outside, unless they were able to get into the Y.M.C.A. marquee, which would not hold them all. They had plenty of money, the private soldier receiving about five shillings a day, including allowances, but there were few or no rational ways of spending it.

Lieut.-General E. A. H. Alderson was given command of the contingent shortly after its arrival in England. The king visited the camp on November 4, accompanied by the queen, Lord Kitchener, and Lord Roberts, and was greeted with immense enthusiasm. Lord Roberts paid another visit to the Canadians, and made a speech which was long remembered. "We have arrived at the most critical moment of our history, and you have generously come to help us in our hour of need," he told the assembled soldiers. "I need not urge you to do your best, for I know you will, for you will be fighting in the greatest of all causes—the cause of right, of justice, and of liberty."

Those who saw the troops on their arrival at Plymouth, and who saw them again shortly before their departure for France, could not fail to be struck by the difference. They had now experienced four months of the most rigorous military life and discipline. They had lived under surroundings of the greatest hardship, exposed to the worst weather possible, with few comforts and few conveniences, in their isolated camp on Salisbury Plain. They had been tried, hardened, and strengthened. No man of military knowledge who walked through the Canadian camps towards the end of the period of training could doubt but that here were men who, given opportunity, would bring glory to the Dominion and victory to the British arms.

The contingent had been accompanied on the journey to Europe by a special regiment, Princess Patricia's Light Infantry, largely composed of veteran British soldiers. Four hundred and fifty men in its ranks had the right to wear war medals. Its commander was Colonel Farquhar, D.S.O., who went to Canada as military secretary to the duke of Connaught in 1913, and

Mr. Gault who, as has been already stated, paid the cost of raising and equipping the regiment, served as an officer. The Patricias were named after the duke of Connaught's daughter, and they were quickly nicknamed "Princess Pat's." They remained a short time with the first contingent, and then in November were transferred to Winchester, and from there were sent in December to Northern France. They were at once moved up to the fighting zone, and were first given a spell of very heavy work, digging a line of trenches. Then they set out for the fighting front.

The arrival of the Patricias in Flanders was watched with keen interest in all parts of the Empire, for they were the only troops from the Dominions to take part in continental fighting until the beginning of the New Year, when they were joined by their comrades from Salisbury Plain. The regiment fulfilled the normal duties of trench warfare, with the accompaniment of duels between snipers, patrols and bombing raids. This experience was fully sufficient to prove their hardihood and enable them to earn the complete confidence of their commanders.

The first war measures taken in Australia proved that the Commonwealth had one great advantage over Canada. The people of each of the great sister nations were equally loyal, equally eager to help, equally determined to sacrifice all they had, if necessary, for victory. But Canada started her real preparations for war when war began, while Australia had been preparing for close on ten years. A generation before, Australia had been the least military of nations. Her people, placed by their geographical position out of the current of European controversies, had felt no necessity for arming themselves. Then the developments of the world, the rising of the new Asia, and the partitioning of the Pacific, made every thoughtful citizen from Cape York to Greenbushes realise that Australia must be ready to defend herself. The flood of emigration from China, from India, and from Japan set in southwards, and Australia built barriers against it. The Japanese fleet sailed into Sydney Harbour, and held manœuvres around the northern coasts of Western Australia. Men were quick to realize that Australia had no defences of her own against Japan. As a result Australia started to build a navy, and to establish universal military training for her young men.

This training was designed to start early under a cadet system, and in June 1914 the Australian forces consisted of about 50,000

citizen soldiers. Over 80,000 youths were enrolled as senior cadets and 48,231 men were registered in rifle clubs, a feature of the scheme which ensured that, after the period of general training, proficiency in shooting should be kept up by regular practice. The former militia and volunteer units were being gradually merged into a new citizen army and with the cadres already in existence, and the impetus of recruiting, the minister for defence, Mr. G. F. Pearce, was able to announce, in November, that Australia had a total of 104,630 men under arms. At the outbreak of war the Royal Australian Navy consisted of one battle cruiser, five light cruisers, two gunboats, six destroyers and two submarines.

There was no question of what Australia should do. "Our duty is quite clear," said the federal premier, Sir Joseph Cook. On the Monday preceding the declaration of war the governor general of Australia sent on behalf of the Commonwealth government the following offer to Great Britain. "In the event of war the Commonwealth of Australia is prepared to place the vessels of the Australian navy under the control of the British Admiralty, if desired. It is further prepared to dispatch an expeditionary force of twenty thousand men of any suggested composition to any destination desired by the Home government, the force to be at the complete disposal of the Home government. The cost of the dispatch and maintenance would be borne by this government. The Australian press has been notified accordingly." Mr. Lewis Harcourt, the British Secretary for the Colonies, replied: "His Majesty's government greatly appreciate the prompt readiness of your government to place their naval forces at the disposal of the Admiralty and their generous offer to equip and maintain an expeditionary force. I will telegraph further on the latter point."

Shortly after the outbreak of war there was a general election in Australia. The Cook ministry was overthrown and a Labour government, under Mr. Andrew Fisher, succeeded it. Apprehension was entertained in some quarters in Australia lest the Labour government should be less keen on giving assistance in the war than its predecessor. This fear was wholly groundless. The Labour leaders during the election pledged themselves in the most complete fashion. Mr. Andrew Fisher declared at the beginning of the war that Australia should support Great Britain with her last man and her last shilling. When he became prime

Bassano

EARL KITCHENER. On the outbreak of war Lord Kitchener was appointed war minister, and immediately took steps to raise a large army. From the first he warned the country that the war would be long. His magnetic personality and indomitable spirit roused the nation to great endeavour, and he was a tower of strength until his untimely death in 1916.

FORT LONCIN, LIÉGE, SHATTERED BY GERMAN GUNS, AUGUST 15, 1914

Top, left : General Leman, who directed the defence of the Liege forts. Top, right : Cardinal Mercier, who showed uncompromising opposition to the German occupation. Bottom : Albert, king of the Belgians. He strove hard to secure for his country a respite from German invasion and when it was overrun himself took the post of commander-in-chief. He and the queen won world-wide respect for their bravery and devotion during Belgium's four years of agony.

HEROES OF BELGIUM'S STAND FOR FREEDOM

H. H. Asquith, Prime Minister.

Russell

Sir Edward Grey, Foreign Secretary

Russell

Lord Fisher, First Sea Lord.

Vandyk

Sir W. Robertson, Quartermaster General

FOUR BRITISH LEADERS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR

minister he acted on the declaration. Senator Pearce was made Minister of Defence, and showed himself the right man for the place.

There was absolutely no division of opinion in the country. Even the descendants of German settlers met to declare their unswerving loyalty and affection to the king and their determination to sacrifice, if necessary, their property and lives for the welfare of the British empire. Philanthropy, private and public, was active. Hundreds of thousands of pounds were raised for war funds, and enormous sums were given for medical and charitable purposes. Thus the Commonwealth government gave £100,000 to the Belgian Relief Fund, and various state governments contributed. Gifts of food were sent to England, scores of thousands of carcases of mutton, quantities of wine, butter, bacon, cheese, condensed milk, and the like. One newspaper sent three shiploads of foodstuffs. Sydney raised £20,000 for the Belgian Relief Fund; £50,000 was raised in a comparatively short time for the British Red Cross.

The first Australian contingent consisted of 20,338 men, drawn in equal proportions according to population, from the different states of the Commonwealth. Arrangements were made to send regular monthly reinforcements of between 2,000 and 3,000 each to make up for casualties and wastage, and no sooner was the first contingent ready than a second contingent of over 10,000 was prepared. Then in October the Commonwealth government offered another brigade of light horse with brigade train and field ambulance, and the offer was gratefully accepted.

The work of preparing the first contingent proceeded automatically. Every man was a volunteer, for soldiers of the citizens' army were not liable to serve outside the Commonwealth unless they wished. The soldiers were paid what seemed to the British Tommy a princely sum, starting with 6s. a day and 1s. allowance. General W. Birdwood, who had served with Kitchener in India, was given charge of the contingent. The first force, when it left Australia, was made up as follows: There was a light horse brigade, consisting of three regiments of cavalry, a field artillery battery, and an ammunition column, signal troop, and train and field ambulance; a division composed of three infantry brigades, two light horse squadrons, headquarters divisional artillery, three field artillery brigades, engineers and the accompanying train of ammunition column, signal company,

field ambulance, etc. There were 9,000 horses and seventy guns.

The embarkation of the division began on October 17 and lasted five days. Nothing was allowed to be published outside Australia concerning it, and the departure of the transports was kept as secret as possible. But it was impossible to suppress the overwhelming enthusiasm of the people in Melbourne and elsewhere as the men marched down to the front. When Brigadier General W. T. Bridges, who was responsible for the expeditionary force until it was later on taken over by General Birdwood, left Melbourne with his staff on Trafalgar Day, he was given a reception that kings might have envied.

Much uneasiness had been caused by the presence of the Emden and other German cruisers in the Pacific Ocean, and it was believed, not without reason, that they intended to attempt a raid upon the expeditionary force on its way to Europe. Steps were taken to deal with these raiders. British ships, Japanese ships, and Australian ships manœuvred to convoy and protect the vessels bearing the troops, and nothing untoward happened to them.

The rendezvous of the transports was Albany, Western Australia. Here not only the Australians, but also the New Zealanders arrived. "It is the most wonderful sight an Australian ever saw," said one who witnessed it. The long line of transports set out, a great string of ships, each keeping its distance behind the other, a couple of cables' lengths away, moving on, a steady, unceasing procession, the pace of all being fixed at the pace of the slowest. Around were the guardian warships.

New Zealand, like Australia, was in the fortunate position of being ready by land and by sea for war. There had been for some time before the outbreak of war compulsory military training for all males between the ages of 12 and 25, and there was a fine defence force thoroughly trained, armed, and organized, with ample guns, transports, and scientific corps.

Some days before war was declared, the prime minister of New Zealand, Mr. W. F. Massey, announced that the government intended, if necessary, to offer an expeditionary force to the Imperial government, and an understanding already had been arrived at concerning the number and constitution of that force. The leader of the Opposition, Sir Joseph Ward, declared that the entire Opposition would cooperate with the government in the

defence of the empire. The news of the declaration of war was made in dramatic fashion. The governor appeared on the steps of Parliament House on the memorable afternoon and read a cablegram from the king thanking the Dominions for their loyal messages. Then he proceeded, almost as though in an afterthought: "I have yet another message—England and Germany are now at war."

Action like that in other parts of the empire followed. Men everywhere volunteered for service. The well-to-do made gifts of money and supplies. One of the most notable of national gifts was £20,000 divided between the National Relief Fund and the Belgian Relief Fund. In April, 1915, the postmaster general was able to announce that the total contribution to the Belgian fund was £133,000 in cash, and goods and produce worth £65,000. The cash and produce sent for the poor of Great Britain and Ireland amounted to £138,000. The Maori people demanded that they should be allowed to share with the white races in the defence of the Flag. They offered to raise some thousands of men, and when news came that the British Government had decided to employ Indian soldiers in the war, it was impossible to refuse to the Maoris the opportunity of doing their share in the empire's effort.

In a very short time an expeditionary army of 8,000 was ready, and on September 24 the troops went on ship-board for Europe. "Time was, not very long ago," said Lord Liverpool, the governor, "when the sight of a troopship in the New Zealand harbour denoted the arrival of troops from the Old Country. To-day the position is reversed. England has need of all her sons to-day, and the young Dominion is sending home to the Motherland of her best." The expedition was timed to sail on September 25, but, probably on account of the activity of the German cruisers in the Pacific, the sailing was postponed at the last moment. The troops and horses were landed, and waited another twenty days. Then they got away to Albany where they joined the Australians. The Australian and New Zealand contingents believed that they were going to Europe. Great was the surprise, when the ships arrived at the Suez Canal, to find that orders had come for them to disembark there, to complete their training in Egypt, and to help to guard that country from the coming attack by the Turkish army that even then was crossing the desert.

The New Zealand government made ample arrangements to keep the first contingent up to full strength. Shortly afterwards a further body of troops left for the front, and in February a third party sailed. The third party was notable on account of a corps of five hundred Maoris in its ranks—magnificent and eager fighting men.

German expectation that the declaration of war would be followed by revolt and dissention within the British empire was nowhere more completely disappointed than in the case of India. Here they had confidently predicted that the princes would seize this chance of striking off the shackles of British rule. Moslem races, fired to fanaticism by the careful preaching of a Holy War from Constantinople, were to fly to arms against Great Britain. The ancient jealousies of the hundred and one peoples who make up the vast Eastern empire were to be rekindled, and a greater mutiny was to drive the hated British into the sea. Here a maharajah was to lead his troops upon them; there the advocates of native rights were to provoke the people to rise. A witch's cauldron of hatred and strife was to be stirred, and Britain was to be robbed of the brightest jewel in her sovereign's crown.

If the Germans were astonished and disconcerted at the conduct of India immediately after the outbreak of war, it may be admitted that they were not the only people to be surprised. Few in Great Britain had the imagination or the courage to anticipate the overwhelming wave of loyalty and enthusiasm which swept over the race. Rulers of the great states summoned their armies together and hastened to offer all they had to their emperor. The Bengalee merchants raised big war funds. Most wonderful of all to those who know the East, the women of India broke the conventions that kept them from public life, and, from the maharanis on their thrones to the humblest wife of Hindu, Moslem, or Parsee, they brought forward their silver and gave their personal gifts for the men at the front. The council of the All-India Moslem League, at a meeting at Lucknow, assured the Viceroy "that the participation of Turkey in the present war does not and cannot affect our loyalty in the least degree, and that the council is confident that no Mussulman in India will swerve even a hair's-breadth from his duty to the sovereign."

The ruling princes of India made the most generous contributions to the war funds. The nizam of Hyderabad subscribed sixty lacs of rupees (about £400,000) and defrayed the entire cost,

whilst on active service, of the 1st Hyderabad Imperial Service Lancers and of the 20th Deccan Horse. The maharajah of Mysore made a magnificent gift of fifty lacs of rupees (£333,000) for expenditure in connexion with the Indian Expeditionary Force and also placed at the disposal of the government his cavalry—the Mysore Imperial Service Lancers. The same story of spontaneous loyalty and practical aid could be repeated in detail of many other states and their rulers throughout India.

In recognition of these fine efforts the King-Emperor sent a message of gratitude to the Indian peoples which still further consolidated their loyalty and encouraged them in their united efforts. His proclamation read as follows:

To the Princes and Peoples of My Indian Empire:

During the past few weeks the peoples of my whole Empire at home and overseas have moved with one mind and purpose to confront and overthrow an unparalleled assault upon the continuity of civilization and the peace of mankind.

The calamitous conflict is not of my seeking. My voice has been cast throughout on the side of peace. My Ministers earnestly strove to allay the causes of strife and to appease differences with which my Empire was not concerned. Had I stood aside, when, in defiance of pledges to which my Kingdom was a party, the soil of Belgium was violated and her cities laid desolate, when the very life of the French nation was threatened with extinction, I should have sacrificed my honour and given to destruction the liberties of my Empire and mankind. I rejoice that every part of the Empire is with me in this decision. Paramount regard for treaty faith and the pledged word of rulers and peoples is the common heritage of Britain and India.

Among the many incidents that have marked the unanimous uprising of the populations of my Empire in defence of its unity and integrity, nothing has moved me more than the passionate devotion to my Throne expressed both by my Indian subjects and by the Feudatory Princes and the Ruling Chiefs of India, and their prodigal offers of their lives and their resources in the cause of the Realm. Their one-voiced demand to be foremost in the conflict has touched my heart and has inspired to the highest issues the love and devotion which, as I well know, have ever linked my Indian subjects and myself. I recall to mind India's gracious message to the British nation of goodwill and fellowship which greeted my return in February, 1912, after the solemn ceremony of my Coronation Durbar at Delhi, and I find in this hour of trial a full harvest and noble fulfilment of the assurance given by you that the destinies of Great Britain and India were indissolubly linked.

The British government had considerable forces of different kinds in India upon which it could draw. In the first instance there were 75,000 British soldiers, the regular Indian garrison. It would not have been wise to deplete this garrison too much, but it was possible to take away large numbers of trained and hardened soldiers and to replace them by Territorials. Next there came the regular Indian Army, an army strong in numbers, rich in traditions, and trained to a point of high efficiency. The regular Indian Army numbered 160,000 men, including over 3,000 British officers and officials, and it had 40,000 reserves to be drawn upon. It was largely raised from the fighting Mahomedan races, and in the years immediately before the war, starting with the time when Lord Kitchener was commander-in-chief, its entire organization had been remodelled and its artillery and transport brought up to a war standard.

The Indian Expeditionary Force as despatched to Europe in September, 1914, consisted of 70,000 men. Other forces were sent to Mesopotamia and elsewhere, and by the spring of 1915 India had put in the field in the several theatres of war, including the British troops sent from India, a force equivalent to nine complete infantry divisions, with artillery, and eight cavalry brigades, besides several smaller bodies of troops, aggregating more than an infantry division, in minor and outlying spheres. She had placed at the disposal of the empire for service out of India, so Mr. Asquith stated in a speech at the Guildhall, London, 28 regiments of cavalry, British, Indian, and Imperial, and 174 regiments of infantry, British, Indian, and Imperial. The prime minister on that occasion declared: "When we look at the actual achievements of the force so spontaneously dispatched, so liberally provided for, so magnificently equipped, the battle-fields of France and Flanders bear an undying tribute to their bravery." Lord Hardinge, in a speech dealing with the dispatch of troops, was able to point with justifiable pride to what had been done, and to declare significantly: "We are not at the end of our military resources."

The voyage of the Expeditionary Force to Europe was carefully planned. The ships were guarded the whole way across by the allied fleets, and the first divisions arrived without loss in Marseilles in the later part of September, to be quickly followed by others. The dark-skinned troops, as they landed and marched through the streets of the rock-bound southern French port, had

a remarkable reception. The people of France cheered and shouted, broke into their ranks, and heaped gifts on them.

The Lahore Division arrived in the concentration area in the rear of the second British Army Corps on October 19 and 20. It was quickly followed by others. The Indian troops at once found themselves plunged into the heart of the fighting, but it was fighting of a character to which they were entirely unadapted by training or physique. The miseries and hardships of trench warfare told heavily on their numbers, and it says much for their morale and their leadership that they remained immovable and unbeaten for so long a period.

One of the most remarkable and touching incidents in the early campaign of the Indian troops—an incident which will be remembered generations hence throughout the East—was the farewell visit of Lord Roberts to his old soldiers at the front. Lord Roberts was determined, despite his years and despite the pleadings of his friends, to go to Flanders and do what he could to cheer some of his comrades there. He reached Boulogne on November 11, and first visited the Indian wounded on the hospital ship. The stricken Indian soldiers strove as he entered the wards to rise up from their beds and greet him. The veteran commander-in-chief went from one to the other, with a word of comfort and good cheer for each, unable to conceal his own emotion as he gazed on their battered and stricken forms.

From Boulogne he went to the headquarters of the Indian corps, where he was received with great state. He spoke to the regiments in their own tongues, and walked through the ranks of the men drawn up in his honour, his very presence an encouragement to them all. Great Indian commanders who had served under him were there. Men who had fought in the ranks under him time after time in great battles gazed up at the slight figure of the veteran field marshal again. He had planned to cheer up the wounded in more than one hospital, and to inspect the troops in many lines. But in the course of his tour he was seized with a chill, taken with congestion of the lungs and pleurisy, and was unable to rally. He died at the front after a few hours' illness, amidst the armies for whom he had lived and worked and fought so long. Some people in England spoke of his end as a tragedy. It was a tragedy for his country to lose so great, disinterested, and simple a leader of men. But for Lord Roberts himself surely there could have been no tragedy in such

an end, but rather the worthy culmination of a long life dedicated to the single purpose of loyalty and devotion to monarch and empire. From end to end of the Indian Army the story of how Roberts Bahadur had come again among them and had died among them, served as a fresh inspiration and a fresh stimulus.

Much more could be said of the response of India and the great Dominions. South Africa faced its own particular problems and the detailed description of events in German Africa and elsewhere will be found in later chapters of this work. No passing reference, however, would be complete without mention of the South African troops who fought on the Western front. It was a South African brigade which, on June 15, 1916, took Delville Wood, which in 1920 the South African government purchased as a national memorial.

From every corner of the empire came the same ready offers of men and material. Newfoundland provided a very creditable percentage of fighting men for its population: 11,922 joined the various services, and, in addition, 3,000 Newfoundlanders enlisted in the Canadian and other forces. A distinct unit known as the Newfoundland Regiment was formed, and this received its baptism of fire in Gallipoli, in September, 1915. In February, 1918, after much other active service, the king granted the Newfoundland Regiment the title of "Royal," the first such honour bestowed during the war. The forestry corps, numbering about 1,000 men, did useful work in Scotland. The Dominion also provided nearly 3,000 seamen to the Newfoundland R.N.R., who served in warships and armed auxiliaries.

In the West Indies there was already in existence the historic West India Regiment which had originated in 1778 as the South Carolina Corps, consisting of volunteers, white and black, raised to fight the French in the West Indies. During the war it served in Egypt and Palestine, and took part in the conquest of the Cameroons. The British West India Regiment was formed during the war from contingents of the inhabitants of the West India islands. The 1st and 2nd battalions distinguished themselves notably in Palestine. Amongst the many exterior regiments who retained their territorial identity, there must not be forgotten the Guernsey Light Infantry, who, following the Newfoundlanders, earned their laurels with the 29th Division whilst serving in France and Flanders.

CHAPTER 6

How Germany Welcomed the War

WITHIN a few hours of the order for general mobilization the whole German empire underwent an extraordinary change. At every railway station there suddenly sprang up not camps of tents, but long lines of pitch-pine sheds, every board ready cut so that it could be dropped into its place. When the first detachments of reserves appeared, according to the time-table in the hands of every sergeant, at their appointed station they found shelter from sun and rain, and long tables whereon the Red Cross organization had prepared water, lemonade, and even sausages. So exact were the arrangements in all these respects, at any rate throughout Prussia, that on the receipt of the order for mobilization even ice was ready to cool the drinking water. From every village throughout the huge empire little knots of men began to trudge to the stations, whence they would be transported to their regimental headquarters. Although nominally all were not required for eight or even ten days, on the fifth day of mobilization (Thursday, August 6), the open country appeared as if suddenly it had been swept of all inhabitants. In the golden cornfields stood wagons half-laden; here and there a ladder leaned against a half-finished rick; even the women had disappeared, and the only sign of life over mile after mile of the great plain was a silent figure, standing rifle in hand, by a bridge or level crossing.

For years people had talked about and discussed the German mobilization; vague legends had been published of partial mobilization in 1911, and again in 1912, and earlier during the Moroccan crisis; but never before in the history of Germany—or, indeed, in any other country—had there been any experience of this sudden stopping of work of a busy nation, this sudden draining of town and country of every man of military age. Already, on Saturday, August 8, a number of factories had closed through want of men. Vast transport organizations had suddenly ceased work for want of horses and lorries. By Tuesday the work of desolation—there is no other word to describe it—was fully

accomplished. Industrial life in Germany was cut short at the blare of a trumpet. So, too, was the life of leisure. In Hanover, for example, towards evening crowds were wont to stream out to the great beer restaurants among the trees near the city. Now, as then, the gardens, with their scrubbed deal tables and their long lines of chairs, were awave with little flags and pennons; now, as then, amongst the large and more popular restaurants one saw here and there the smaller, less gorgeous hostelry over whose rustic gate stood the ancient sign of German hospitality: "We will not break the ancient rule; you may cook your own coffee and bring your own stool." But now all these gay summer resorts were empty. The guests, the waiters and the innkeepers themselves were gone. Alongside a little river the railway runs. About every 100 yards stood a sentry, often an old man armed with a shot gun and without a uniform. Anchored to the bank a mile or two from the nearest station lay a little fleet of pleasure boats, the cushions piled together about the stern, a tarpaulin roughly thrown over the engine, and the owners (for the most part, doubtless, officers) called away in the middle of their summer cruise to join their regiment in the reserve. At local stations piles of luggage were to be seen—desolate holiday trunks, folding perambulators, a bundle of spades and little coloured flags wherewith the Germans delight to deck their sand redoubts by the seaside. When the mobilization order came trains were seized and luggage thrown out.

Doubtless there was in this, as in many other matters, a little too much zeal. Not all the wild confusion into which the civil population was thrown was by any means necessary. It is significant, for example, that twenty-four hours before the order for mobilization was given international trains approaching the German frontier were held up and passengers compelled in some instances to walk to the nearest frontier station. But it must be remembered that in all her recent history Germany had never had an opportunity to practise the mobilization of her whole army, and the wonder is, perhaps, that it worked as smoothly as it did. From the moment when war became inevitable, Germany —or, at least, Prussia—carried out to the letter the rule devised by her general staff—"take care of the civilian only when you have taken care of everything connected with the forces." The outbreak of war was the signal for the complete abdication of the civil power. The hour for which the German military caste had

waited was come at last; every lieutenant felt himself relieved of all necessity any longer to regard the ordinary rules of civil life. Officers threw off any pretence of consideration for the claims of friendship, and even of common courtesy.

It is probable that to some extent the extraordinary state of affairs in German towns and cities which would follow the outbreak of war had been foreseen by the authorities. The pinch of unemployment would come not in the first week, but after a fortnight, or longer, and if the civilian population were to sit down, as the German system required, to wait doggedly with tightened belts and in silence, save for such scraps of news as the German general staff might feel disposed to publish, it was necessary that disorder, thinly veiled as patriotic enthusiasm, should not be too sternly repressed at the outset. Hence there was no attempt to punish the ring leaders of the wild mob which tried to sack the British embassy. For over a fortnight there was even no attempt to check the extraordinary mania over South Germany for hunting phantom gold, supposed to be in transport from France to Russia. Actually, the sudden arrest of Englishmen and even Englishwomen throughout Germany on a charge of espionage began, and perhaps reached its climax, before the English ultimatum to Germany had expired.

It must be remembered that the population of German cities had been fed for weeks on the craziest lies. Ulster, they had been told, was in a state of rebellion; English troops had refused to obey orders (and it must not be forgotten that to the German military mind there is no distinction between unwillingness to shoot unarmed citizens and refusal to march against an armed enemy). Suddenly at seven o'clock on Tuesday evening, August 4, this fabric of lies was shattered when the Berliner Tageblatt scattered through the city flaring placards, "Great Britain breaks off diplomatic relations." The shock was admittedly, for one moment, paralysing. That which the greater part of the population had believed impossible from reasons of British domestic policy, and improbable because of their sublime faith in British selfishness, had happened. The childish chatter about the unity of the Germanic race, which no sane observer of Prussian manners could ever have seriously believed, was probably less responsible for the outrageous treatment of English-speaking people throughout Germany than the sudden angry realization of the fact that the press and the foreign office had

alike utterly misled public opinion regarding the actual unpreparedness of England for any war; and the bitter word "Betrayed," which was on thousands of lips in Berlin on the night of August 4, was directed as much against German diplomacy as against supposed English treachery.

On the heels of every armed host since the world began there has followed a horde of ruffians, fishing in troubled waters. Every leader of a popular cause, resorting to armed force, may and must reckon that in his wake will follow not only fighting men, but also a large crowd of half-savage harpies—not ready to fight, but only too delighted to bully. Of the crowds that attacked the embassies, legations and consulates throughout Germany on the outbreak of war, no small proportion were excited youths, students drunk with alcoholic enthusiasm, the riff-raff of the poorer quarters of the cities, eager to seize this opportunity of unbridled licence.

For several days after the outbreak of war the police stations not only of Berlin but in other cities, particularly in the industrial districts, were packed with strange crowds of gentlemen arrested as spies, huddled together with the lowest classes of the population. From one under-aged ruffian stripped while under detention in the little police station in the Mittelstrasse the police took a pistol, an eight-inch dagger, and a life-preserver. Pick-pockets naturally felt this was indeed their harvest, and for once the ruthless police of Berlin were in no position to control the situation, for the authorities had of their own act permitted the mob to get out of hand. It will, perhaps, never be known how many people in Berlin were injured for life not by the sabres of the police nor by rifle and revolver of sentry or guard, but by the knife, which at all times has played an extraordinary part in the criminal history of Berlin.

If it be remembered that in times of peace scarcely any motor-cyclist in Germany had ridden at night without a revolver in his pocket; if it be remembered that the great forests, which stretch from Berlin north and south and east and west, had harboured for years desperate gangs of ruffians, it will easily be seen that the suspension, even for a few hours only, of the strong hand of the civil government may easily have been the cause of the unfortunate amount of lawlessness, for a good deal of which homely and harmless civilians may often have been held responsible.

Outside the cities, particularly through South Germany, a yet more dangerous licence was permitted. One of the German papers published on Sunday, August 2, an amazing story from Nuremberg, to the effect that a huge quantity of gold, stated variously at 20, 40, 80, and even 160,000 pounds, had been in transport before the war from France to Russia. When the war broke out, so the story ran, this gold had been hurriedly transferred to motor-cars, wherein it was to find its perilous way across Germany. From time to time further stories of this phantom gold appeared. Now it had been transferred to cars carrying the Red Cross flag; now they were American cars, with the gold guardians disguised as harmless tourists; and finally the crazy press announced that countryfolk through Thuringia and Franconia would do well to look out for motor-cars containing middle-aged ladies. These, they said, were the gold carriers in disguise.

There followed upon this the craziest gold-hunt throughout all southern Germany. Villagers armed with sticks, shot guns, and anything that came handiest, took to making unprovoked attacks upon motor-cars of all kinds. Amongst the victims were an Austrian officer, an Austrian countess, a lady of title in South Germany, and doubtless a number of other people of less prominence. For nearly a fortnight the authorities seem to have taken no step to put an end to this extraordinary folly. Finally, the general staff was obliged to issue a notice inquiring whether the inhabitants of South German cities really any longer believed the idiotic story, and warning them that in future attacks on motor-cars would be severely discouraged.

It was left, however, for the pacifist organ, the Berliner Tageblatt, to complain querously that it did not altogether approve of the discouragement of national enthusiasm. It complained in particular that, whilst it was doubtless right to avoid undue harshness in the treatment of English-speaking peoples, for fear they might prove to be Americans, it was perhaps unwise to check mob violence against foreigners, lest perchance it should discourage the seeking out of spies.

If it fared ill with anybody in the cities who could by any chance be suspected of being a foreigner (for to the German mind every foreigner was an ex-officio spy), the fate of those who tried to travel across Germany after the outbreak of war was no less unpleasant. One by one unhappy Englishmen,

caught, often with their wives, in Germany by the outbreak of war, struggled through to England, and brought stories of hardship and maltreatment such as have been unexampled since the days when freebooters rode through Germany, carrying torture, murder, and robbery to every homestead. A British consul, travelling with his son and wife to the Danish frontier, was held up, and whilst his wife was kept in durance in one prison, he and his son were thrown into a cell with a wisp of straw to lie on, without sanitation and almost in darkness. Here he was kept for several days before a crazy officialdom consented to his release. Travellers coming from the German health resorts of Nauheim, Homburg, Wiesbaden, and other centres along the Rhine were arrested again and again, subjected to barbarous indignities, and, in many cases, finally detained as being of military age.

Two explanations of the savagery with which a number of English people were treated in Germany upon the outbreak of war have been given at various times. It is alleged that in many cases persons arrested in the Rhineland were confronted by sergeants or other non-commissioned officers accustomed throughout their military career to scenes of brutality, and quite unable to realize that the stripping of ladies in the open road to seek for bombs or secret documents was in any way unusual. Had the ill-treatment ceased with these insults, the explanation might have been accepted, because the same excuse had been repeatedly offered to account for the brutality of many of the German police, who are for the most part retired army men.

But not even Germans could swallow such childish explanations of the assault with sticks and stones upon the British embassy, as were offered on the following day. It was asserted that members of the embassy staff, or some of the servants, had thrown small coins amongst the crowd, and that this infuriated the mob. The falsity of this statement is shown by the fact that three minutes before the assault the Wilhelmstrasse, in which the embassy is situated, was almost clear of people. When the news of the rupture of diplomatic relations circulated along the Linden a crowd of students and other people, including, as a matter of fact, a number of political detectives, gathered instantly, and the assault was committed within three minutes of the receipt of the news. Later, the Berlin papers "assumed" that the coins had been thrown by Englishmen

residing in the adjoining Hotel Adlon—a suggestion which was even more childishly silly. Another explanation offered for the maltreatment of foreigners by people in authority was that to a great extent the authorities in question were such as had not come fully under the salutary influence of German civilian education. There is, perhaps, some justice in this plea, though it must be remembered that capable critics of German education have long maintained that at best its influence on the moral character of the nation was virtually nil. How foreigners were actually treated, even such as could by no possibility be mistaken for other than harmless travellers, may be illustrated from the following detailed account of the insults and indignities offered by the Germans to the British consul at Danzig, Mr. Francis E. Drummond-Hay, and his wife and children, and the party who were accompanying him. Authenticated accounts by members of his party show that not only the men, but also women and children of the consular party, were subjected to treatment of a character that in many respects cannot be made generally public.

For some time before England and Germany were at war great excitement prevailed in Danzig. As far back as July 30 the consul's telegrams were stopped or tampered with, and his telephonic connexion cut off. His first intimation that war had broken out was on the morning of August 5, when a police officer visited the consulate. He was told he was under arrest, and must leave as soon as possible. The officials further intimated that even his life was in danger. He was then conveyed to his private residence, six miles out of Danzig, and told that he and his family had an hour to pack and clear out. Mrs. Drummond-Hay, with her eldest son—a boy of 16 who had just arrived from Cheltenham on his holidays—a younger son of eight, and a governess, had previously received a visit from the officials, and were in great distress, being unable to telephone to the consul at his office in town.

On the arrival of the consul at his private residence the police gave them an hour to pack their handbags. The party then left the house in a motor escorted by police and soldiers en route for the station. At every street corner rifles were levelled at them, and they were hooted at and insulted. Arriving at the station, they were joined by the French vice-consul and a party of ten British refugees. Here they were molested by soldiers,

who demanded passes, and after being taken by the police to a waiting-room were put into a waiting train. They were told this would take them to Stettin, but that if they looked out of the carriage windows or left the train they would be shot. Instead of six hours the journey to Stettin occupied 22 hours. The crowds on the platform were angry and menacing; insulting phrases were written on the carriages, and all food was refused.

When Stettin was reached the party were again told they were under arrest and that they would be locked up in the town. After managing to secure a sandwich the consul and his party were bundled into another train for a further 19 hours' run to Hamburg. On this train they were again submitted to the greatest indignities. They were searched, insulted at night time, and unable to sleep. A drunken sergeant with a levelled revolver entered their carriage, and the behaviour of all the soldiers and officials on the train caused the greatest distress, particularly to the ladies. At Hamburg the travellers were for the first time courteously received by a German officer. After a hurried wash the refugees were put into another train to convey them to the Dutch frontier.

There the worst of their trouble began. After an examination of luggage the police refused to accept their passes, and they were told they would have to remain. The ladies, they were informed, were free, but the men must stay. For seven hours the consul and his companions were kept at the station, a man standing over them with a loaded rifle.

After a time the ladies, after having been searched in a most indelicate fashion, were separated from their friends and sent off to an hotel, while the men were marched off to prison and thrown into cells. There they were searched, and the consul and three others placed in a cell. The apartment measured twelve feet by five feet, and contained straw, a blanket, and a jar of water. There the party were locked in and left the whole of one night and the following day, the cells being destitute of every sanitary arrangement. At 9.30 on the following morning they were let out for half an hour and paraded with criminals before being re-conducted to their cell. The guard who brought food was armed with a revolver, had with him a police dog, and was followed by a rifleman. In fact, as members of the party say, they were like "rats in a trap." On the following morning the ladies, who were completely broken down

with anguish and suspense, were allowed to see their relatives. Mr. Drummond-Hay pleaded that his young son should not be longer kept a prisoner, and he was allowed to go out and join his mother. At ten o'clock on the following night the consul was told that he and his family and staff could leave. They reached Flushing after a further long and tedious journey, ten days after their departure from Danzig. Behind the firing-line Prussia threw off the thin veneer of civilization which for forty years had disguised her true character, and showed herself in her true colours—as a land but little removed from barbarism.

Yet there were strange contrasts, and where the civil government of Germany still retained, or succeeded in recovering, some vestige of control, the civil officials did try, however faint-heartedly, to stem this extraordinary flood of militarist outrage. During the day which followed the outbreak of war between Britain and Germany the emperor's court marshal sent a special message to the English chaplain in Berlin, informing him that he would do all in his power to assist the chaplain to keep open the English church of St. George in the gardens of the Monbijou palace, that he would arrange that there should be no difficulty in English residents attending service at their church as usual, and that he would be glad to learn of any arrangements for relieving distress among English residents.

Similarly, in some of the western cities, Englishmen returning home stated that the officials treated them often with decided courtesy. It was only when they came into contact with some rampant lieutenant, overwhelmed with a sudden sense of his own relief from the bonds of civil restraint, or with some half-crazy police-sergeant, ignorant, for the most part, of the very look of a passport, that maltreatment ensued. It is abundantly evident, from this and many similar instances, that what happened in Germany was the breakdown of the whole system of civil government, even where it was merely intended that it should be reinforced or controlled in its broadest outlines by the military governors. The Prussian military system and the German civil code came into conflict, and the victory of rampant militarism was assured from the outset.

The sudden revolt against, or, as is more probable, the general fear of anything that might look foreign produced some results which, under other circumstances, would have been truly ludicrous. Most of the German cities had gradually become

flooded with an international nomenclature of shops, and cafés, even streets. On the outbreak of war there was a hasty change, and whilst in London a Gambrinus still placidly continued its business, the cafés of Berlin hastily deleted even names that might suggest a foreign origin. Sign painters had a busy fortnight changing the name of the Hotel Bristol, the Englischer Hof, the Café Piccadilly, the Prince of Wales's tailoring establishment, the London Bar, the Queen's Restaurant, the Palais de Danse, and a host of other establishments. The Café Piccadilly, the largest establishment of its kind in the world, was converted into the Hoch Deutschland Kaffee Haus, the Queen's Restaurant became the Speise Haus, 1870, and the restaurants suddenly indulged in an orgy of newly-invented German names for foreign dishes. Greengages, for example, known for 40 years and more to German gourmets as Reine claude, suddenly became raenekloden or renge lodden.

The English word sauce was banned, and its place taken by the curious Germanised equivalent sosse. Russian eggs, a favourite Berlin dainty, suddenly disappeared from the bill of fare, and were replaced by a mysterious dish called "sauceeggs." Elsewhere the enthusiastic patriotism of young ladies' schools produced equally curious results. In a girls' high school in the Rhineland a deputation of Rhenish damsels waited upon the head teacher at the beginning of the day's work and informed her that it was not to be expected that patriotic German girls should consent any longer to learn the tongues of alien enemies. French and English, they declared, must forthwith disappear from the curriculum, and it was only when the mistress pointed out that up to the present they could still learn "American" that the young ladies consented to resume their study of the language of Shakespeare.

The tumult and excitement which ran riot through Germany in the first week of the war cooled rapidly when mobilization was complete. German thoroughness was not likely long to leave the question of the harvest, the problem of provision for the civil population, and of maintaining the large numbers of women and the lesser numbers of men thrown out of work, to the well-intentioned efforts of amateur organizations. Little by little the military control closed its grip upon the whole country.

Mob law ceased on August 15 when the steady growth of the Russian pressure in the east, combined with Austrian defeats

by the Serbians, made it necessary for the Germanic allies to call up the Landsturm. Now market-place, theatre, bar, and avenue were cleared of the crowds who had done so much fighting with their lips. The summoning of the Landsturm came, to some extent, as a surprise, for even the day before many people appeared to have thought that this last call on the population of the nation in arms could be avoided. What it meant to the country can be shown by a single instance.

The tram system of Berlin, probably in peace time the most effective as it was the cheapest in any European city, employed about nine thousand men as drivers and conductors. Three thousand of these were called away by the first mobilization order, but when the order summoning the Landsturm was promulgated the company found itself with about a thousand men to continue its work. These were employed at once as drivers, whilst the conductors were replaced by women, in many cases the wives of men sent to the front. They were paid at an average rate of about fourpence an hour. Similarly, the companies controlling the taxi-cabs, so far as they had not simply withdrawn their cabs altogether, obtained permission to employ a number of women who held licences as drivers. In place of petrol, which was virtually unobtainable, owing to the commandeering of all supplies for the army, they took to using benzol, which itself became very scarce, and even alcohol. Very soon there was an outcry about this employment of the wives of men already sent to the front. It was pointed out that these women were already insured, so far as possible, against actual starvation, by the government.

On the other hand, there were many thousands of young women, mostly unmarried girls, who had been thrown out of work by the ruthless dismissals carried out by the large stores, wholesale houses, and factories. So far as the factories were concerned the dismissals were to a great extent unavoidable, since the men trained to control the machinery, overseers, foremen, clerks and managers, were all now bearing arms. But it would appear that the huge stores, which had gradually become the foremost feature of the shopping world of German cities, acted immediately after the outbreak of war upon principles which were hard to reconcile with the patriotic announcements pasted on their windows. At the end of August, when the legal notices of dismissal took effect, many hundreds

of young girls, who had at all times found it difficult to make ends meet, were thrown upon the streets. Charitable organizations did their best to deal with the situation. Cheap kitchens sprang up in all quarters of the town, and the most famous of these organizations, the "Lina Morgenstein," issued an appeal for premises where their relief kitchens could be established. Satisfying meals began to be provided at astonishing prices; young girls thrown out of work could obtain a full meal for prices as low as a penny-halfpenny and as high as fourpence. Side by side with this army of girls there was another, even more pitiable class, for whom it was difficult to make any satisfactory arrangement. This was the great class of lodging-house keepers, proprietors of pensions, and still more of women who had subsisted by letting rooms to factory girls and foreigners.

The city of Berlin, in particular, began suddenly to realize to what extent it had depended upon Russians, Americans, Swedes, and other foreigners. Whole classes of its female population, with scores of tradesmen, found themselves faced, not only by ruin, but by actual lack of food to appease their hunger, and the government was compelled—earlier, probably, than had been supposed—to step in to save these people from sheer starvation.

Very soon, too, it became clear to Germans everywhere what had been effected by the silent, unsensational work of the British fleet. In all directions the military governors had to announce that great restrictions must be placed upon the use of electricity, coal, gas, and so forth. Largely with this object an order was issued suspending inter-urban traffic after midnight. It is true that the dancing halls of the city, which had given Berlin its peculiar cachet, were allowed to keep open their doors in many instances, but they were forbidden to employ orchestras playing ragtime tunes, they were compelled to reduce their lighting plant, and a sharp control was exercised upon the supply of alcoholic beverages. To all intents and purposes the stopping of tram and train service after midnight put an end to the night life of Berlin. The business of the civil population, as the military government conceived it, was not to keep things going, but to discontinue almost all forms of relaxation involving expenditure. Electric light advertisements, illuminated sky signs, and excessive illumination of shop-windows were either forbidden or greatly restricted.

Nor did the newspapers escape the heavy hand of the military authorities. The reckless flooding of the streets with free editions announcing great German victories was summarily stopped; and just as at the outset the government had seized the opportunity to favour those individuals who had for years subserved their purposes, so now they took another line against such papers as had in peace times dared to criticise army or bureaucracy. The publication of military news was restricted to the bare statements issued by the general staff, and the authorities saw to it that these announcements reached the reptile press sooner than papers which had been numbered amongst the critics of the government system. But they were careful, as in all else, to maintain the cloak of righteousness.

At first the sale of socialist papers was forbidden on bookstalls and in the street; but even this restriction was removed as soon as the iron had eaten into the socialist soul and the international theorists upon whom a few foreign observers had set their hopes had in turn taken up that patriotic attitude which competent critics had always expected of them. It may none the less be true that there was amongst considerable sections of the community a conviction that the war had been thrust upon them not by dire necessity, but by the ungoverned ambitions of the militarist caste. But the temper of the mob was such that even the expression of the mildest criticism was like to prove dangerous to life and limb. The most strenuous advocates of the general strike, and even that arch-enthusiast, Rosa Luxemburg, were left unmolested by the authorities, who sardonically left such unpatriotic personages to the attentions of the mob.

To revert for a moment to the effect of the war upon German commercial life, it should be remembered that to a very large extent, even in peace time, the trade and commerce of German towns had depended upon the requirements of members of the armed forces. There was work enough, of course, in Essen and Dusseldorf, in the tinned meat factories in the neighbourhood of Berlin and in the Rhineland, in the huge establishments manufacturing war stores of every kind, but elsewhere there was a sudden cessation of demand. Many tradesmen, especially in small garrison towns, had subsisted upon the patronage of army men of the active or retired services. These found their trade suddenly vanish, and indeed it became clear that the repeated warnings of intelligent Germans against the growth of luxury and

extravagance in all classes were justified more by the sudden cessation of this demand for luxuries than by any apparent weakening of the stamina of the nation in its hour of need. Of the many thousands of men, and more especially of women, who found themselves suddenly without employment and without means of subsistence, a large proportion had been employed in the production of articles unknown, or almost unknown, to the nation which fought the war of 1870; and the growth of luxury recoiled sooner upon the heads of those who had ministered to it than upon those who had indulged therein.

In Germany no less than elsewhere there was not only an overlapping of charity, but also at the outset a remarkably unintelligent employment of voluntary assistance. This was most noticeable on the whole in the case of the post office. Whilst there were crowds of women clamouring for any employment of any kind that would give them a roof to cover them and bread to eat, the German post office began to employ as volunteers the sons of good families to fill the places of postmen, letter-sorters and other officials sent to the front. Protest after protest appeared in the popular press, but some weeks passed before the government made up its mind to remedy the shortcoming, which in well organized Germany was, to say the least of it, less to be expected than elsewhere.

The measures taken for getting in the year's harvest were, on the other hand, both prompt and so far as could be judged thoroughly effective. So soon as the mobilization was completed, the government announced that a large number of free tickets would be issued to suitable persons of either sex willing to be transported where the need for harvest hands was greatest. In particular, these free tickets were issued to people desiring to return from the cities to homes in the country, where the harvest was still in progress. It was calculated that in such cases the cost of maintenance was reduced from nearly three pounds to about fifteen shillings a month—that is, of course, the cost to the state in the way of consumption of food, light and the other necessities of existence whereof Germany soon found herself obliged to be extremely economical. Wherever schools could be used in the early days without long transport by rail, the schoolboys were virtually compelled to assist in the work of the harvest; and even later, when the potato crop was being gathered, they were employed to collect the bundles of dried

potato haulm, and later to sort the tubers themselves. Towards the end of August, when communication by train once more began to be more or less possible, large numbers of people left Berlin and other cities for the open country, carrying with them, for the most part, no more than a blanket wherewith to modify the unaccustomed bed of straw in a barn, which was all that they were offered. The average payment for their services was about ninepence a day. Other official measures to control the sudden dislocation of employment were, for example, the announcement that an eight hours' day would be made the maximum in all trades not concerned immediately with provisioning the army.

One of the earliest signs of the money stringency was the disappearance of small change. In some parts of Germany, particularly it would appear in the mining districts of Silesia, it became necessary for the municipalities to issue local notes for small change. The authorities of Gleiwitz, the mining town, for example, issued local paper notes of the value of one shilling, having currency only within the town and its immediate district. Much self-congratulation was expressed by the German press over the fact that Germany alone of the great nations found it unnecessary to resort officially to a moratorium. There is, however, an explanation of this fact which seems to have been unduly overlooked. The German civil code provides for a kind of private moratorium between debtor and creditor in the event of war. It is true that the provision is not automatic, and that in each separate case it is necessary for the debtor to apply for a postponement of payment through the courts, but arrangements were made whereby such applications should be heard swiftly and relief granted instantly. The result, of course, was that whilst the empire did not publicly resort to a moratorium, the actual use of this system of officially recognized and controlled private moratoria was very extensive, and served the same purpose. It would almost appear as if here, too, Germany had rather successfully thrown a veil over the actual facts.

In any case, the German claim that the special measures which were resorted to by other countries were for her quite unnecessary is scarcely justified by the facts. The virtual cessation of foreign business necessarily hit the country very hard, but the collapse of her industrial and commercial activities with the consequent growth of unemployment was not so immediately apparent as it would have been had she not sent one-tenth of her total

population into the firing line. German economists had always reckoned that the real pinch would not come until eight or ten weeks after the outbreak of war, and it was because she realized this that Germany, so far as one could judge from published statements, had always largely depended on sudden overwhelming strategy and tactics rather than upon a long war, fought to the last man and the last gun. Victory must come, her economists appeared to believe, either speedily or never, and this was the real clue to that curious parrot cry of her newspapers, "Paris within a month." A long war, Germany well knew, would be decided behind the firing line.

Not until the war had been in progress for nearly a fortnight was it possible to see how changed was this German people from the hardy folk that had fought forty years previously. Little by little her population had been drawn to the great urban centres, her people had grown accustomed, if not to luxury, at least to conveniences. Their palates had been spoiled for hard fare by delicacies. Their tastes had grown less stern and their requirements greater. It may have come, therefore, somewhat as a shock to those who still preached that the Germany of 1914 was the Germany of 1870 grown richer and better prepared, to find that edicts had to be issued, one after another, restricting the amusements of the people in war time.

Between August 15 and the end of the month one finds such announcements successively. Cafés and dancing halls were only allowed to present such music as suited the circumstances of war time. Ragtime was not to be tolerated, songs must be either grave or patriotic, theatres were to present only pieces of a warlike or patriotic nature, musical comedy was virtually taboo, and the tingel-tangel, the café chantant and the cabaret were recommended to close their doors. The Saturday and Sunday dances beloved of German maidservants were suppressed, and the nation was warned that in this grave crisis of its history gravity must be enforced where it was not voluntarily practised.

CHAPTER 7

France in Wartime

An eminent English writer, who knows contemporary France as intimately as France of former days, wrote at the time: "We are all of one mind in admiring, and often with an admiration bordering on amazement, the magnificent temper in which the heroic French nation has faced its stupendous hour of trial."

Would war be imposed upon us? Such was the question, repeated anxiously in all French circles, political and financial, commercial and industrial; but the bulk of the population in the provinces, whether at manufacturing centres or in agricultural districts, was ready to believe still that the storm would pass. With more or less clearness, each imagined for himself the disastrous consequences which such a cataclysm would bring in its train for all those affected; one pictured the losses and ruin which a modern war would accumulate with its murderous arms and numberless masses of men, and the people refused to believe that there could be anywhere responsible heads of states mad enough to provoke such a frightful Armageddon.

When the definite rupture came between Austria and Serbia, public opinion realized that the conflict could not remain local, and that the efforts of the British and French diplomatists had been pure waste of time. A fortunate issue from the crisis was anticipated less and less, the fatal dénouement was perceived to be approaching, and one of the first effects of this pessimism was the almost total disappearance of gold and the scarcity of change. The difficulty arose of regulating purchases, and of changing notes of 100 and 50 francs. Immediately, economists and bankers demanded that notes of 20 and 5 francs should be put in circulation. Very quickly public imagination foresaw the almost inevitable menace of war, and everywhere it was accepted without braggadocio or terror, even when hopes of intervention were reduced to a feeble glimmer. None the less, opinion awaited from Berlin the gesture which would arrest Austria on the slope, at the bottom of which lay fatal collision

with Russia and the letting loose of European war. But nothing could stay any longer the Austro-Germans in their mad coup. Suddenly Germany took steps to mobilize her forces and at the same time dispatched an ultimatum to Petrograd, and put to the French government a question which was in itself but an ultimatum in disguise.

The whole of France lived through those last days of waiting with calmness and gravity. No one concealed from himself the danger; everyone perceived distinctly the threat and its consequences for the country and for himself—in fact, it was this clear perception of danger which supported the efforts made to avert it, and which sustained the hope that the wise governments of the Triple Entente would succeed in turning it aside. On the afternoon of July 31 the senators and the most influential deputies of all groups of opinion assembled at the Palais Bourbon, under the leadership of the socialist leader Jaurès, to examine what final sacrifice could be made to maintain peace and to spare civilization the horrors of war. These men of good intentions could only record their own impotence.

The same evening Jaurès was killed by a madman. General consternation ensued. Jaurès was a great force; he wielded in France a powerful influence over the masses and enjoyed considerable prestige abroad. By every party it was recognized that his disappearance at such a moment was for France an irreparable loss. Already on the previous evening, in his journal L'Humanité, his patriotic spirit had found noble expression in advocating national unity, on the ground that from that moment there was no question of politics, but of the country's very existence. This stupid crime—the act of an isolated individual—brought to a premature end the career of a man whose honour was unassailable; at a moment, no doubt, when Jaurès was about to become "le clairon du patriotisme"—to borrow a phrase from Gambetta—at a moment when his eloquence might have become an instrument of national defence.

For a moment reprisals were feared on the part of indignant socialists, desirous of avenging their respected chief. But who could be made responsible for the act of a maniac? In a letter to Madame Jaurès, the president of the republic expressed his regrets at the "abominable attack," at a time when "national unity was more than ever necessary." The government placarded all Paris, and caused to be reproduced in every news-

paper a manifesto, in which the prime minister, M. Réne Viviani, rendered homage to the great orator so "basely assassinated," to the "republican socialist who fought for such noble causes, and who in these difficult days supported by his authority in the interests of peace the patriotic action of the government." The whole of France, with no distinction of party or of opinion, rendered to the great citizen a tribute of homage, inspired by a just and sincere feeling of the necessity of solidarity between all Frenchmen at such a tragic moment. Gustave Hervé, in La Guerre Sociale, found a formula, which concentrated in compact phrase the universal opinion: "National defence first. Jaurès has been murdered. We shall not murder France!"

As was to be expected, numerous and contradictory rumours spread, which the public, for the most part, accepted with scepticism. It was bruited that the war was becoming general in the Balkans, and that the Turks were attacking their enemies of the year before. But wiser heads were troubled especially by what might happen in Belgium. There was a general belief that the road of the invader was sufficiently barred on the Franco-Belgian frontier by the fortresses of Maubeuge, Lille, and Dunkirk; but the public did not know that, some years before, the military administration had reduced in importance one of these fortresses and dismantled the others.

Uneasiness, too, was to a large extent assuaged when the Belgian government declared that the territory of Belgium would not be violated; but that, with a view to meeting all eventualities, it was preparing for resistance. Reassured in this direction, public opinion found elsewhere new reasons for confidence. Persistent information was forthcoming to the effect that Italy had already decided to remain neutral in the struggle. A conviction that war was henceforth inevitable had taken root in men's minds; there was a sort of rivalry among the more imaginative and the more ingenious to foresee what turn events would take in the near future. But the most general, serious and constant preoccupation concerned Great Britain. Would she remain neutral? Would she suffer German naval squadrons to come and ravage the coasts of Normandy, to disembark troops in the French ports, before the French fleet—for the most part in the Mediterranean—could arrive to bar the way? France admired the German cunning which, after the check in

Morocco, had invented the pretext of a war with Serbia, which was bound to involve the intervention of Russia, and the entry of France into the struggle, but which yet permitted a hope that Britain might discover no motive to join the belligerents.

All this time, under the veil of Kriegszustand (condition of war), mobilization continued in Germany, where the general staff was chiefly concerned with securing the success of its sudden attack from which were expected immediately decisive results and crushing victories, which would render the enemy incapable. The situation was of such gravity in the last days of July that public opinion began to reflect that even if it suited the wishes of France to insist on maintaining peace at any price, it was becoming particularly dangerous, in face of the German threats, not to make preparations to repulse possible aggression. It would be a crime against the country, it was said, "to postpone French mobilization any longer," especially when the enemy by anticipatory measures was putting himself in a position to enjoy a striking advantage over France.

On August 1, at four o'clock on a Saturday afternoon, mobilization orders were at last posted all over France. The country had been expecting for several days this measure, which was hailed with sensible relief. It was the first indispensable measure for the safeguarding of French territory, while it was at the same time a supreme means of aiding a pacific solution of the crisis. It was necessary to have an army to lean upon as a basis, and to discourage the aggressor, who would then be less inclined to attack a country in a posture of defence. In an appeal addressed to the nation, the government explained and justified the reasons which had led it to decide upon that measure, and ended with the following declaration:

> Strong in its ardent desire to reach a pacific solution of the crisis, the government, protected by necessary precautions, will continue its diplomatic efforts, and it still hopes to succeed. It counts on the self-control of this noble nation to refuse to be led away into unjustified emotion. It counts on the patriotism of all Frenchmen, and knows that there is not one of them who is not ready to do his duty. At this hour there are no parties, there is only France—eternal, peaceful, resolute France; there is only the mother country of right and justice, absolutely united in its calmness, vigilance, and dignity.

The nation rose to the level of the occasion. By its self-control, its unanimity, its calm, it fully justified the confidence

reposed in it by the government. No troubles broke out during the feverish and anguished days which the country had just lived through. The threat of invasion united all the citizens.

Despite the reassuring explanations of the government, no one doubted that there would be war, for it would have needed a miracle to calm Germany, seized with bellicose fury, and scenting already the pillage and booty to be reaped in the rich provinces of the east of France up to Paris itself. War, since German madness had imposed it, was accepted as a deliverance —a deliverance not only from the nightmare of torture of the last few days, but also from the continual alarms with which Germany had harassed France for years past—a deliverance from the threats and reiterated insolence of the brutal policy and arrogant diplomacy of a nation afflicted with megalomania —a deliverance, too, from the humiliation of defeat undeserved and unceasingly demanded for 44 years past by a conqueror swollen with pride.

Moreover, it meant the abolition henceforth of the clauses of the treaty of Frankfort (1871), which hindered and opposed the development of the whole economic activity of France. Nowhere was there any manifestation of misplaced enthusiasm; there was no turbulent agitation, no discordant voice. The spontaneous sacrifice of all provoked a patriotic impulse, which found vent in cheering and acclaiming the regiments on their way to the eastern frontier, in innumerable flags hung out at the windows as on the national fête day, July 14.

It is difficult for an Englishman to realize what is meant by mobilization in a country subject to compulsory military service. It means profound disorganization of civil life, complete disintegration of national activity. Every French citizen at the age of 21 is forced to discharge military duties for a period of three years. After that he remains at the disposition of the military authorities until the age of 48. Each man is furnished with a military booklet, which indicates his position in the army; the same booklet contains a special notice on blue or red parchment, on which are printed particular directions which it will be his duty to carry out in case of mobilization. The calling up of men extends over a period of several days, according to whether they belong to the regular army or the regular army reserve, to the territorial army or the territorial army reserve. The instructions given in the booklet are perfectly simple and

impossible to misunderstand. The name of the soldier, non-commissioned officer, or officer is followed by the name of the town where the depôt of his regiment is situated; next follows an injunction that the man must have rejoined his depôt by the first, second, third . . . tenth, or twelfth day after the mobilization order has been posted. On the date given, the man sets out on his journey, being assured by his booklet of a free pass on the railway so far as the town where his depôt may be, and where he will be armed and equipped.

Thus, then, during the first days of August, 1914, several millions of Frenchmen responded to the call to arms. Whatever their social position or profession might be—rich or poor, townsmen or peasants—all went off gaily to the depôt to resume their rank, put on their uniforms, and shoulder their rifles. Several millions of men thus brusquely left their occupations or employments, abandoning desk or workshop. Banker and merchant, engineer and manufacturer, writer and artist, lawyer and doctor, workman and agricultural labourer—all equalised by the same duty of defending the threatened country, leaving behind them home, wife, and children—set out for the great adventure. This formidable movement of men was carried out with complete order, calmness, and regularity. In a few days the depôts and arsenals had equipped and armed these masses of men; the railways transported those who had been mobilized to their depôts, whence they set out again for the frontier, after being assigned to battalions and regiments.

Everything gave place to military necessity. The groups of railways had been militarised ever since the notice of mobilization was posted, and were exclusively devoted to transporting troops, material, munitions, provisions, according to plans and timetables drawn up long before and continually brought up to date. For the convenience of civilians there remained on each line no more than four trains a day, one train every six hours. These were omnibus trains, stopping at every station, of which the times were liable to be changed at any moment, if military necessities demanded, and they might, in case of necessity, be suppressed altogether. As for the transport of goods, only perishable goods were forwarded.

Under such conditions it is obvious that there could be no question of pursuing one's daily occupation as usual. The sudden departure of so many men paralysed in a moment the

whole activity of the country, and rendered it impossible – for the moment, at least—all trade, every industry. Heads of administrative staffs, managers of banks and houses of business, of workshops and factories, etc.—all left their occupations if they had not reached the age-limit of 48. In the large banks, offices, great business houses, and industrial enterprises, this departure of an expert personnel and of specialised workmen caused dislocation. More than one firm was compelled to close its doors.

In Paris and the great provincial towns the majority of small shopkeepers had shut their shops when they went off to rejoin the colours at the same time as their assistants. On the shutters they had glued notices, mostly humorous, which revealed in what excellent spirits these modest breadwinners answered the call of duty and sacrificed their personal interests to the defence of the country. In many cases, however, wives bravely took up the task of carrying on the business in the husbands' absence, and a tricolour placard pasted on the window would be inscribed with the words "Maison Française," followed often by the information that "the proprietor is with the ——th Infantry," artillery, or cavalry.

In the countryside, also, the sudden departure of so many men could not fail to produce deep perturbation at a time when agricultural activity demands most effort, when reaping, harvesting and vintaging are either begun or on the eve of being undertaken. In these circumstances the women of France showed of what they were capable. After bidding farewell, not without tears, to husbands, sons, and brothers, who exchanged scythe and plough for bayonet and Lebel, they harnessed the few horses left behind by military requisition as being too old for utilisation by the army, and went off harvesting, storing and ploughing from the rising of the sun until the hour of its setting. Grandmothers found new vigour in their old limbs; young girls renounced their games, and, with new seriousness in their looks, accepted before the time the heavy fatigue of labour on the farm and in the garden. At night, seated round the hearth at their frugal meal, their thoughts travelled towards the absent, from whom news was awaited with anxious patience.

While the whole country was preparing with so much calm, and in a unanimous spirit of sacrifice for the great trial, the president of the republic, on August 2 at noon, signed a decree proclaiming a state of siege throughout France for as

long as the war should last. At the same time the council of ministers decided to convoke the chambers for the following day. According to the report of the minister of war, the state of siege was justified by "the necessity of concentrating all power in the hands of the military authority." The declaration of a state of siege was authorized by various constitutional laws "in cases of imminent peril resulting from foreign war or from an armed insurrection."

The constitutional laws of England do not permit under any circumstances the establishment of a state of siege. At all times, and in all places, the civil authority reserves to itself supreme power; the people has obtained for itself this prerogative after long struggles, in the course of which the Commons have maintained their independence and the liberty of the subject against all the encroachments of royal power. In France it is different. The country is nominally a republic, but its institutions are monarchical. Administration, formidably centralised, is there concentrated in the hands of the government, which discharges its functions under the more or less efficacious control of Parliament. By virtue of the state of siege, the powers with which the civil authority was invested for the maintenance of order and of the police passed wholly and immediately to the military authorities. These immediately assumed the right of making perquisitions by day or by night in private houses; of sending to a distance those claimed by the law, and those whose homes were not in the districts subject to a state of siege; of ordering the surrender of arms and munitions, and even of proceeding to search for and to remove the same; of forbidding publications and meetings likely to provoke or prolong disturbance.

In short, the administration of justice passed into the hands of military tribunals whose duty was to take cognisance of crimes and offences against the security of the state, against the constitution, against public order and peace, regardless of the position of the chief offenders and of their accomplices. In a word, as will be plain to anyone reading between the lines of legal jargon, this transference was nothing more or less than the virtual suspension of every individual liberty, of all rights guaranteed by the constitution. In ordinary times the authority of the municipality, of the prefect, of the government was constrained to respect certain legal formalities and arrangements, in default of which their decisions might come before the council

THE MEN BEHIND THE FLEET. Mr. Winston Churchill, as First Lord of the Admiralty, to which post he was appointed in 1911, was primarily responsible for the decision which stopped the British fleet from separating after the manoeuvres of July, 1914. With him here, walking to the Admiralty early in August, is Prince Louis of Battenberg (later Marquess of Milford Haven), then First Sea Lord, whose resignation in October led to the recall of Lord Fisher.

Russell

Sir A. J. Godley, leader of New Zealand forces.

Vandyk

Maharajah of Bikaner, served with Indian troops in France.

Vandyk

Sir Pertab Singh, hon. commandant Imperial Cadet Corps.

Levson

General Louis Botha, conqueror of German S.W. Africa.

Russell

General Smuts helped to crush the S. African rebellion in 1914 and later assisted in the conquest of German E. Africa.

Christian F. Beyers, prominent in S. African rebellion.

Russell

Sir Samuel Hughes, organizer of the Canadian forces.

Salomon Maritz, the Boer leader of S. African rebellion.

DOMINION PERSONALITIES PROMINENT IN THE WAR

of state and were liable to be quashed in case of any legal irregularities. But from the time named—that is, the introduction of a state of siege—military governors might arrive at any decisions they pleased, these having then and there the force of law without appeal.

It must be admitted that the military power never abused these prerogatives. In practice it could not replace the civil authority, with which it was content to collaborate and to approve such decisions as the new circumstances required. Those few cases in which the military power allowed itself to take the initiative were undoubtedly fortunate instances and received the approval of all well-affected persons—one might say, of the vast majority of the population. And yet it attacked the privileges of two elements which exercised an almost all-powerful influence on modern democratic society—the press and the drink interest—to which the civil government had always shown themselves lenient and, perhaps, too indulgent. For instance, when the crisis began the newspapers vied with one another in sensational information, and it was far worse when hostilities had begun. Every hour, from ten in the morning till the late hours of the night, clamorous sheets were issued, special editions containing on each occasion news of which the authenticity was not always certain.

The vendors spread themselves over the most animated portions of the boulevards and through the most peaceful suburbs, bellowing the name of the paper and the number of the edition. The passers-by would purchase the sheet, the inhabitants would come from their houses and purchase it, too, to be rewarded almost invariably by the same deception, since the news announced was almost always a rumour without foundation, or some trivial anecdote. It must be admitted that the newspapers had some excuse. They were obliged to maintain a fierce struggle for existence. The formidable upheaval caused by mobilization and the state of siege which immediately followed had dealt a deadly blow to quite a number of newspapers whose existence had always been precarious. Since they subsisted penuriously on subsidies from certain political committees, or on financial enterprises of a more or less risky character, these sheets, suddenly deprived of resources, ceased to appear.

The great daily papers were themselves sensibly affected. The majority of advertisement contracts, from which their chief

receipts were drawn, were suspended or suppressed. On the other hand, the requisition of means of transport rendered extremely difficult the delivery of enormous quantities of paper, which they required every day, not to mention the fact that the manufactories, losing all their younger personnel, had to relax their production. The less rich appeared in the form of a single sheet of two pages, sometimes of reduced size, while the more opulent retained a double sheet of four pages. The problem before them was to maintain their circulation; hence the consecutive editions. Soon the result of these noisy criers and sensational placards was evident. Public opinion grew visibly nervous and agitated by this flood of news, in which it was quite impossible to distinguish between the true and the false, and ended by believing in the most absurd rumours and the most far-fetched legends.

To cut short a state of affairs which led to abuse and might involve dangerous results the military authority did not hesitate to avail itself of the state of siege and to take energetic measures. It decided to publish three official communications a day (soon reduced to two) relating to war news, and that this official news only should be inserted to the exclusion of any other. It forbade the newspapers to appear with big headlines, to be cried in the streets, to be advertised by posters. No newspaper was authorised to issue more than one edition a day, which was bound to appear always at the same hour—an hour which the journal was invited by the military authority to fix for itself; no exception was tolerated.

Finally, every publication, whether daily, weekly, or monthly, including books and pamphlets, must be submitted to the censorship of the military authority. Every newspaper must in convenient time communicate to the Press Bureau its complete impression—that is, the entire proofs of the paper, exactly as the letterpress would appear—nor must any modification be made except such as were demanded by the censorship. Protests being useless, the press submitted to this new régime, with the happiest results for public opinion. Subsequently the censorship was extended to cover political comments, and the government abused this easy means at its disposal for suppressing criticism, but it is worth noting that this abuse proceeded from the civil government and not from the military authority. Disobedience to the orders of the censorship was severely punished.

The political veteran, M. Georges Clemenceau, dared to defy the censorship, which retaliated by simply suppressing L'Homme Libre, in which newspaper he exposed without mercy the faults of the government. It is true that the paper reappeared on the following day under the new title of L'Homme Enchainé. But more than once there was left of the indefatigable fighter's article nothing but the title and the signature! No newspaper escaped the vigilance of the censorship, which showed itself as inflexible towards the strong as towards the weak. Certainly it was guilty of slips, and even of glaring mistakes; its severity frequently gave rise to violent protests and was the object of rather spirited debate in Parliament, but the government had never much trouble in obtaining a large majority to approve of its measures.

The military authority also attacked the sacrosanct "bistro" —that is, the wine seller, café proprietor, the vendor of apéritifs, of adulterated liqueurs, and other alcoholic poisons. The hours of opening were rigorously fixed. The sale of fermented liquor and of spirits to soldiers was forbidden except at certain times—to wit, meal-times—while to women it was forbidden altogether. For the last 40 years Parliament had shown culpable weakness in its relations with the drink trade; it could not have been otherwise, since the drink sellers, or "bistros," both in the towns and in the country, were influential electoral agents, to whom the majority of parliamentarians owed their election. It may be granted that the manufacture and sale of alcohol were scandalously protected by public powers.

The most violent and convincing campaigns against the dangers of invading alcoholism never succeeded in obtaining from Parliament the least restriction of the advantages attached to the drink traffic. On the contrary, the liquor sellers obtained all they wished in the way of shameful concessions from those elected by universal suffrage. But the military authority was under no obligation to what was derisively called the bistocracy, and unceremoniously wrenched away its privileges. Soon it even attacked one of the most violent of alcoholic poisons—absinthe. By a simple decree of the military governor of Paris—then General Galliéni—the sale of absinthe was strictly forbidden in Paris and throughout the whole territory over which military government extended. Identical measures were enforced in the provinces. A popular movement arose

among the better classes, which so strengthened the government that the latter ratified the decisions of the military power by forbidding the manufacture, sale and consumption of absinthe throughout the whole territory of the French republic, of its dependencies and colonies. To anyone who knows what ravages were wrought by the "green enchantress" on the working classes in huge industrial centres, how she filled the asylums with maniacs and weakened the race, this vote of Parliament must seem a victory in itself.

Frenchmen knew that they had the necessary courage to sustain the shock of a formidable enemy which attacked them treacherously by violating the frontiers of a neutral country, and they also knew that the success of their resistance depended on their will, their firmness of soul, their coolness. It must be confessed that they nourished strange illusions, shared by other opponents of Germany. Germans have committed a series of capital mistakes in assuming beforehand the complacency of Belgium, the indifference of Britain, the impossibility on the part of France of opposing the invasion of her soil and the capture of her capital. The military chiefs, advisers of the kaiser, repeated during the first days of the war that the French mobilization would be hindered by sabotage, thwarted and disorganized by the workmen's syndicates; that a revolution breaking out in Paris would upset the government and create grave disorders by which the German armies might profit to reach Paris without striking a blow. With all their foresight the Germans had not foreseen the "sacred union" and Joffre.

On the other hand, the French did not suspect the formidable power of their enemies, their crushing superiority in arms and numbers. They clung to those antiquated ideas about the value of the individual combatant, about his superiority to mere material. They paid dearly for this mistake. Of what use was the dash of troops against machine guns which mowed them down and so prevented them from coming to grips with the foe? What could heroic bravery avail against the torrent of shells rained on them by the enemy?

One had dreamed of formidable encounters in which the "furia francese" should have irresistibly flung back the hostile hordes and driven them as far as the farther side of the Rhine. The opposite to this happened, and public sentiment, taken aback at first, was not slow to accept this defensive war, preceded by a

retreat, which might cause the worst disasters to be apprehended. But even while repeating to themselves that they would know how to resist the invaders, that they would "nibble" at them (according to the phrase attributed to General Joffre), Frenchmen refused to admit the material superiority of the German army, the preponderance of scientific over heroic warfare. In conversation an advocate was always found to maintain that it was to the personal value of the French soldier as a combatant that Germany was indebted for the two great checks to her western offensive; to prove that, in spite of the great number of their machine guns and their heavy artillery, the German armies of Strasbourg and Metz which rushed upon the eastern line of defence of France failed; and notwithstanding repeated efforts, were never able to break the barricade of the four great entrenched camps of Belfort, Epinal, Toul and Verdun. And in what triumphant tones would the speaker announce that the enemy had not even succeeded in taking Nancy, an open town, while the French secured the summits of the Vosges and penetrated Alsace.

The French people grew daily more conscious of the seriousness of the conflict in which they were engaged. The enthusiasm of the opening days gave place gradually to uneasy calmness, and in spite of all the fears which might naturally be engendered by the deceptive development of hostilities, the legitimate anguish experienced by all before the menace of invasion never assumed the proportions of panic. The laconic nature of official communiqués left room for optimism. They confined themselves to speaking of the operations in Lorraine and Alsace, so that nothing was known by the people at large of the formidable battles of Mons and Charleroi. It must not be forgotten that the newspapers were forbidden to publish the German communiqués. Still, rumours ran, putting things at their worst, in which the very exaggeration prevented sensible people from giving any credence, though they furnished Gallic imagination with a plentiful pabulum, since even the sturdiest optimists found in them a reason for contemplating disasters, in the possibility of which they refused to believe, but the consequences of which everyone accustomed himself beforehand to foresee. Thus the surprise was less violent when bad news arrived.

The manner in which news was distilled, a drop at a time, deserves to be related. The government seems to have dreaded

particularly the nervousness of public opinion. Some praised its prudence, others found occasion for reproach. But when one reflects that in tragic circumstances the whole of a great nation was satisfied with the four or five lines of official news vouchsafed to it twice a day, it is hard to believe that it would not have supported at once the knowledge of the whole truth, however painful it might be. It even seems to those who at the time were in a position to feel the pulse of opinion that the people of France felt humiliated by this lack of confidence. This was the impression of those who took part in the daily life of the population both in Paris and in the provinces.

In the luxurious cafés, frequented by merchants and others of the middle class, as well as at the bars of the "marchands de vin," where the spokesmen of the humbler classes love to perorate, conversation revealed the same results; nowhere was importance attached to the acts and attitude of the government and of the Parliament. A few politicians who attempted to push themselves into notice drew upon themselves remarks that were the reverse of indulgent. Every heart was tortured by the same anxiety, and the hopes of all were centred on the army, which was at grips with a formidable enemy, and for which decisive and rapid triumph was desired with trembling fervour.

All France seemed to be listening for the echo of cannon ; by a kind of collective intuition, in the poverty of news allowed to her, she guessed that the day of battle was near at hand—and with it the enemy. When an official telegram made the laconic announcement that "German cavalry have occupied Brussels," public opinion was not extravagantly alarmed. For the invaded Belgians there was unanimous sympathy. In conversation stress was laid on the solid support afforded to French resistance by the existence of such strongholds as Maubeuge and Lille. Also, when at a later stage one learned that "the great battle between the bulk of the Franco-British forces and the bulk of the German forces" was in progress, the most fantastic conjectures were rife.

Ingenuity was taxed to imagine the details of a gigantic encounter on the historic field of Waterloo, where the kaiser's dream of hegemony should be shattered like that of Napoleon. An impatient public awaited the issue of the great battle, concerning which one was told nothing in vague and embarrassed phraseology. Soon uneasiness drew closer, and suddenly a communiqué announced that "the parties of cavalry which had

shown themselves two days before in the regions of Lille, Roubaix and Tourcoing had appeared on the preceding day in the region of Douai." This was incomprehensible. Why did the communiqués speak no more of the great battle announced a week previously? How had the enemy managed to cross the frontier and advance so far? But soon the gravity of the situation was such that it became impossible to leave the country and the capital any longer in ignorance of the danger which nothing now seemed able to avert. Those only had information who found in English, Italian or Swiss journals the German communiqués, which the French press was forbidden to publish.

But this knowledge was confined to a very small number of persons in the more cultivated classes, and the bulk of the public had no idea of what was happening. All at once, falling brusquely in the midst of this uncertainty compounded of hope and anguish, like a stone dropped in a pool, appeared a short communiqué saying: "The situation from the Somme to the Vosges remains the same as yesterday." It is impossible to describe the consternation caused by this piece of news from end to end of France. The Germans had reached the Somme! That meant Amiens, 80 miles from Paris—at the very moment when it had been hoped that they had been crushed by the Franco-British forces. The deception was cruel. One painful question tortured every heart: Are we already defeated?

The government had been reconstituted two days before into a coalition ministry, presided over by M. Viviani, and including MM. Delcassé, Briand, Millerand, Ribot and two socialists, MM. Marcel Sembat and Jules Guesde. These statesmen inspired the country with confidence, and their presence in power undoubtedly contributed to reassure the population.

Those who lived in Paris during the fortnight which preceded the battle of the Marne will never forget their experience. Everyone now knew that the Germanic hordes were pouring like a waterspout on Paris. It was known also that the entrenched camp of Paris had been in an utterly neglected state at the beginning of the war, and that it could not have been put in a state of adequate defence in the course of the three preceding weeks. The fate of Belgian towns proved that the double girdle of forts surrounding Paris was unable, even had the forts been furnished with the most powerful artillery, to prevent the Germans from entering the town.

The population remained quite calm, in spite of certain wicked rumours circulated by one or two anti-republican sheets, which falsely accused of treason such leaders as Generals Sarrail and Percin. These culpable attempts to break at such a moment the compact of "sacred union" had not the least success, and earned for those who ventured them the rebuke and the contempt of decent men. However, it is a common, historical phenomenon —when a nation suffers a reverse obscure mischief makers are always to be found to suggest to the credulous a suspicion that they are betrayed, and to hand over at once to vengeance the very men in some cases who have best served their country, as was most certainly true of the generals disloyally accused.

The invasion spread. The enemy advanced by forced marches towards Paris, into which were already flowing streams of refugees from the north and the east, who disseminated tales of the atrocities committed upon the unarmed population. The worst was expected and prepared for. In the city itself and the populous outlying districts every facility was afforded to the population of departing before the arrival of the enemy. All those who were able to take refuge in the provinces on their estates, or with relations or friends, were invited to go, to diminish the total of useless mouths in case Paris should be invested or occupied. The trains which returned to the west or the south in quest of troops took away thousands of people. The central administration and the municipalities collaborated actively to ensure the feeding of the population, which remained large in spite of all the departures. The same bodies were also occupied in arranging ration lists and food tickets. All this was done in most orderly fashion, and carried out with diligent activity.

It seemed as if the capital could hardly escape from the lot which threatened it. If, in spite of all, Parisians—and with them all France—still clung to hope, there was some merit in doing so, for every day the news became less and less reassuring. However, the worst pessimists were obliged to recognize that three great facts dominated the situation. First, the unanimous impulse which had inspired the whole nation and its unalterable resolve never to yield, never to be influenced by the hardest reverses, and to resist to the bitter end. On the other hand, the news of the Russian advance encouraged the most despondent. The term steam roller had captured popular imagination, which already pictured the Russian masses pouring out like a devasta-

ting torrent as far as Berlin. If the so-called steam roller accomplished none of the miracles expected of it, it is undeniable that the hopes founded on it contributed in a fashion which can scarcely be exaggerated to the preservation of the moral of the sorely tried French population.

But what sustained in a manner infinitely less conjectural the courage of France was the collaboration of Britain—of the whole British empire. Future historians will not find in official archives any documents to tell them with what eager suspense France, at the beginning of August, awaited the decision of Britain. Still, the fact should be known. The numerous friends whom the British possessed amongst the French followed attentively all that was said and done across the Channel. The declarations of ministers indicated clearly for one who knows how to interpret reticences and reservations an inevitable decision. But certain opinions publicly expressed, and certain articles in newspapers, which the French press commented upon very naturally, gave rise to some apprehension. "Is England going to help us?" Such was the question, universally debated and answered in the affirmative by those who had studied British politics closely during the last 15 years.

In the public mind a conviction had acquired strength that if Britain made the mistake of abstaining, Germany's chances of crushing France were enormously increased. But if the British squadrons barred the North Sea, and kept the French coasts intact, then the French armies might hope to get the better of their formidable adversary. Accordingly, when on the morning of Wednesday, August 5, the newspapers announced that Britain had grasped the sword of justice to defend the honour of treaties impudently violated by Germany, there was all over France an outburst of joy. Men greeted one another with the words "England is with us!" And these four words were charged with a significance scarcely to be expressed by those who uttered them. They implied a certainty that French ports would not be bombarded and burned before the French squadrons could return from the Mediterranean; that the German army corps would not be flung on the coasts to take the defences in the rear.

It is currently admitted in France that the word of an Englishman is his bond, and when such a conviction has been implanted in the popular mind nothing can eradicate it. It was this reputation and this flattering esteem which formed the basis of that

feeling of sympathy that made possible the Anglo-French rapprochement and increased the popularity of the entente cordiale. Once more French confidence in Britain's word was justified, and that under circumstances when the existence of two nations was at stake as well as the future of humanity in opposition to a people which was destroying the very foundations of that social contract without which civilization is impossible. "England is with us!" It seemed as if henceforward all was safe. Britain and France united, with their Allies present and to come, were defenders of right and justice, champions of a cause which could not fail.

Perhaps French public opinion did not thoroughly grasp the part which Britain was to take in the conflict. Everybody in France knew that the British fleet was far superior to all the fleets in the world, and that it would very soon annihilate the German squadrons if the latter should risk an encounter. But the German ships prudently returned to the Kiel canal as soon as the British appeared in the neighbourhood of Heligoland. So complete was their retirement that the British fleet, having cleared the seas of a few raiders which professed to annoy it, was compelled to limit its rôle to a silent surveillance of the North Sea and to remain on guard at the mouth of the lair where the German men-of-war were hidden. Soon certain difficulties and internal controversies in England found an echo across the Channel, and French opinion asked if the efforts made by Britain were proportionate to the risk she ran and to the sacrifices to which France had heroically consented from the beginning—frightful losses, the complete paralysis of her entire commercial activity, and the concentration of every effort and every energy on one sole end—the repulsion and the defeat of the aggressor. This uneasiness was purely temporary. It was not difficult to convince French opinion that the British nation had realized the gravity of the danger and the importance of the interests at stake.

In speeches, in the press, in books, there were constant allusions to "true, faithful Britain," and the Englishman replied to this recognition of an essential quality in his character by paying homage to French heroism. On both sides a sincere effort was made towards a better mutual understanding and a closer mutual appreciation, which effort was facilitated by reciprocal esteem that sprang from brotherhood in arms. If the French showed recognition of the prodigious task accomplished by the British

empire, the British rendered full justice to France, their testimony of admiration being greeted as a precious sign of approval. The series of articles on the Achievement of France, which appeared in "The Times," was translated into French and circulated by the thousand.

It is impossible to evaluate and difficult to compare anguish and moral suffering. The population had a large share in these, without speaking of those endured by the inhabitants of the invaded regions. Right up to the battle of the Marne, after a few days of hope, the French beheld the black spectre of defeat, the almost realized menace of annihilation. Paris, in particular, had some dark hours to live through. Life there seemed to have stopped, all activity to have dried up. Since the mobilization order, the motor-omnibuses had been requisitioned; not a single one was running in the streets. The tramways and the local railways, impeded by shortage of personnel, had considerably reduced their services, which ceased by nine o'clock in the evening. Theatres, cinemas, places of amusement were closed. Cafés shut at eight, and restaurants at nine. National museums were closed, their most precious contents having been removed as far as Toulouse to save them at once from the dangers of bombardment, fire, and Teutonic pillage.

When German aeroplanes came to fly over Paris and dropped a few bombs, no one was afraid. Certainly it was a depressing sensation to feel that the Germans were descending the valley of the Oise, where no line of defence could stop them. In those days of tropical heat it became a distraction for the populace to visit convenient spots and watch for the arrival in the sky of Taubes, which continued unalterably blue. The crowd thronged about the heights of Montmartre, the Arc de Triomphe, along the Champs Elysées; on the terraces of the Tuileries and the stone balustrades which surround the Place de la Concorde people sat and remained for a long time in order that they might lose no incident in the aerial spectacle, when murderous Taubes were chased away by French airmen. Between two bombs the German airmen would drop insolent messages, announcing their impending arrival.

On several evenings in succession, however, the promenaders, who profited by the comparative coolness of the evening to stroll about, were surprised by an extraordinary sight. Just at nightfall, along the wide roads which run from the south of Paris to

the north, there passed an interminable procession of regiment after regiment. All the African troops, those from Morocco and Algeria, passed thus through Paris in the night, seen only by those whom the chance of a capricious walk took that way.

Being anxious not to let itself be imprisoned in Paris, if Joffre's plan should fail, the government had prepared for departure, and sent to Bordeaux the archives and the employees of the ministers. On the day following this departure, General Galliéni, the military governor of Paris, issued to the army and the inhabitants the following proclamation:

> The members of the Government of the Republic have left Paris to give new impetus to national defence. I have received the order to defend Paris against the invader. This order I shall carry out to the end.

Although foreseen and expected, this transfer of the government confirmed the fears of an investment or of an attack on Paris. But if even the most optimistic felt hope tottering, the Parisians greeted with superb coolness the decision taken by the government from weighty motives and after mature reflection. It was necessary, above all, to ensure "national continuity," as was explained in a proclamation signed by the president of the republic and by the 14 ministers who formed the Cabinet:

> . . . Without peace or truce, without cessation or slackening, will continue the sacred struggle for the nation's honour and for reparation of violated right. . . "Endure and fight on" must be the motto of the Allied armies. Endure and fight on, while on the seas the British aid us in cutting the enemy's communications with the world. . . . Let us all be worthy of these tragic moments. We shall gain the final victory. We shall gain it by indefatigable will, by endurance, and by tenacity. A nation which does not wish to perish, and which, in order to live, does not recoil from suffering or sacrifice, is sure of victory.

Paris seemed emptier than ever, but the moral of the population was intact. Besides, one was reminded that the perimeter of the fortifications erected since the last war covered a circumference of nearly 100 miles, and that investment would require 1,000,000 men. Every sort of pretext for hope was found, even at that time, when the enemy had almost reached the gates of the capital. This was not due to levity or ignorance. Everyone knew the gravity of the situation, and in the suburbs the industrial population was ready for every sacrifice to defend the town, as General Galliéni had promised. The same civic courage

inspired all and dictated one tragic duty—to confront the worst dangers with a firm heart. What would have happened if the Germans had been able to attempt to take Paris by a sudden stroke? The answer is better left in the region of conjecture.

But the African troops had come in the nick of time to reinforce the army of Paris, and it was soon known that a battle was raging between the French forces and those German troops which were trying to turn the entrenched camp. One heard the cannons. The great guns of the forts, it was said, were firing on the enemy's advance-guard, but it was no more than the echo carried by the east wind. The anxiety of the whole population reached its maximum. It was as though people no longer dared to speak, but greeted one another in silence, as though they were awaiting sentence of life or death from a throw of the dice. Those were tragic hours which those who lived through them will never forget.

Suddenly the communiqués, while retaining their brevity, lost their tone of vague embarrassment. They became more definite, and gave an impression that something decisive was happening. It was the communiqué of September 8 which announced that the battle was general, and during three days Paris and the whole of France anxiously awaited the result. Those three days were long. The defeat of the Allied troops would mean the enemy in Paris almost immediately. At last the communiqué of the 11th said that "the Franco-British troops had crossed the Marne," and on the 12th General Joffre, in his general order No. 15, told the troops: "The battle which has been in progress for the last five days is ending in incontestable victory." If all France felt relieved, Paris experienced veritable joy. This joy found no expression in acclamations, or in flying flags. The same coolness, the same calm temper which had faced danger, greeted victory. "Paris is saved," we said, "but the enemy is still formidable, and a whole rich region of France still remains to be freed."

The trench war, which was drawn out to such interminable length, made it possible to grant frequent leave to the troops. In Paris, one by one, a few theatres reopened, reviving on their bills pieces that had been successes before the war, while others produced revues, in which actualities were caricatured, and, in spite of the tragic circumstances of the moment, satire and the comic spirit found free vent, so far as the strict military censorship allowed.

Officers and soldiers on leave soon became assiduous patrons of all pleasure resorts; the restaurants, thanks to them, resumed animation, and in concert halls, music halls, cinemas, steel-helmeted heads were undoubtedly the most numerous. During the entr'acte it was by no means a rare thing to see in the foyer of a theatre uniforms which bore traces of the campaign, and which the wearers had not troubled to change, so eager were they to profit without losing a moment by the three or four evenings which their leave put at their disposal. Officially, or through the intervention of various societies, special performances were periodically organized for the benefit and entertainment of wounded convalescents of the home army and of colonial troops. A good many of the provincial towns followed this example.

At the beginning of the war, during the long retreat to the Marne, grave anxiety had been felt concerning medical arrangements. The particularly murderous character of the battles, in which men were mown down by heavy artillery and machine guns, overtaxed the organization of ambulances both in the front and at the rear, and the removal of such an unforeseen number of wounded exacted efforts for which one was hardly prepared. In Parliament and in the press serious agitation was manifested, and in fact it was owing to his vigorous reproaches in this connection that M. Clemenceau was indebted for the suppression of his journal, L'Homme Libre, transformed, as we have seen, on the following day into L'Homme Enchaîné.

When the Germans had been defeated, and operations on the front brought to a standstill, the reorganization of the medical service was most rapid, and it worked afterwards in such a way as to give general satisfaction. From the first it had been remarkably seconded by the admirable organization of the Red Cross. With branches reaching into the smallest towns of France, these societies had at disposal a body of volunteers, of ladies more or less instructed in the art of aid to the wounded. Since the outbreak of hostilities they were in a position to make use of more than 1,600 buildings—high schools, colleges, schools, large and small hotels, and private residences, where they installed in a few days more than 100,000 beds. From the Channel to the Pyrenees and the Riviera the women of France entered upon close rivalry of eager devotion to receive and attend to the countless maimed victims of that terrible carnage. A large

number stayed in the war zone, in towns unceasingly bombarded by Teutonic barbarism, and paid with their lives the price of motherly devotion to wounded soldiers. Many were named in military Orders of the Day for acts of heroism.

From sheer sense of duty and love of country, women of every class multiplied their efforts to help in assuaging misery and mourning. The works founded and maintained by them form a list which, as compiled by M. Vallery-Radot, the son-in-law of the great Pasteur, fills for Paris and its outskirts alone a complete volume. It was a woman who had the idea of the army orphanage, founded for the purpose of taking under its protection the war orphans whose families lacked means to support them. The idea was barely broached before it was welcomed with boundless enthusiasm. The president of the republic, the presidents of the Senate and the Chamber, all the members of the government, the most notable personages in Paris and the provinces, in business, in finance, in trade, in politics and art, accorded to this scheme at its birth the most eager patronage, and Parliament voted state aid to a project which in the first instance was to have been private.

The young father, stricken down while defending the liberty of his country and the independence of his fellow countrymen, gained the assurance that his little boy or girl, left in a mother's charge with no other resources than the meagre sum officially assigned, would henceforth be cared for, brought up, and educated under the auspices of a great and noble institution, possessed of every means to make these orphans into men and women capable, when peace should come, of working for the greatness and prosperity of the country. To women, too, must be attributed that charming idea of the godmothers (*marraines*). Among the combatants at the front there was a fair number of "lonely soldiers"; there were also all those who came from the invaded provinces, and were deprived of all news of their families, so that they never received a letter or a parcel to sweeten the rough reality of life in the trenches.

Generous women undertook the rôle of understudies, and with all sorts of attentions and much tact took the place of their families for these isolated sons of France. When the need of *marraines* was satisfied, another woman invented the plan of adopting a soldier at the front, and appealed to the young in schools, high schools and colleges, both of boys and girls. A

great many people had not the means of carrying out an adoption separately; but by cooperation a group of children in a class would easily collect a sum sufficient to send the poor, grown-up comrade who was fighting for them a parcel of little comforts and a short letter of inspiriting sympathy. This plan, while rendering service to the soldiers, conveyed a lesson of mutual aid, of patriotism and humanity, which might well exert a lifelong influence on the child engaged in it. Side by side with these voluntary works, created and developed by feminine energy, was the collaboration of women in social activity to make up for the absence of men, and to carry on those activities and employments which lay within their power.

Wherever possible, the working men's wives and daughters replaced their male relatives, punching tickets on the trams, becoming clerks and cashiers in banks, post offices, large and small shops, and all places of business allowed by the war to continue. They were even in some cases entirely substituted for men, and assumed the management in milliners' and costumiers' establishments, and all the essentially feminine trades, even in provision trades, with the exception of those appertaining to butchers and bakers. In the country and in the small towns, women took upon themselves the arduous labour of making bread. The newspapers gave wide publicity to a letter which M. Poincaré, president of the republic, wrote to a young girl of 17, who took the place of her father and brother at the oven when they were called up, and supplied bread to an entire locality. Many similar letters were published, among them one addressed to a young country girl of 16, left alone on a farm with her invalid mother. She succeeded in ploughing, with a primitive implement and an old horse, fifty acres of ground, in sowing and harvesting the same. Innumerable were the examples of this masculine courage on the part of Frenchwomen.

CHAPTER 8

German Invasion of Belgium

THE decision of the German high command to attack France through Belgium was, from a military point of view, unmistakably a wise decision. Without doubt it nearly won the war for Germany before Christmas, 1914. From a political point of view, it was unmistakably disastrous, for, equally without doubt, it lost her the war in November, 1918. But, in view of the consequences which that decision produced and to which German statesmen cannot possibly have been blind, it is perhaps difficult to see why Germany, in order to gain a strategical and tactical advantage, chose to expose herself to the moral censure of the world and, more importantly, to a coalition of the nations of the world, based upon that moral censure, from which only a miracle could have saved her.

Moreover, it was fairly certain that even had Germany chosen the only line of attack which, politically, was open to her, namely the line through the Vosges over the French frontier and directly westwards to Paris, she could have broken through. No doubt she would have suffered incalculably greater losses, no doubt she would have spent as many months as she did weeks in getting to within 30 miles of Paris; but she could almost certainly have got as near as she did. The question for Germany hung upon the time factor. She could not afford, that is, to allow the French and the Russians a moment's breathing space. France had to be swept from the map before Russia had time to mobilise her enormous man power and throw it irresistibly across Germany's eastern frontier.

The Central Powers had chosen the psychological moment for attack with extreme nicety. Russia, as yet only convalescent from the trouncing she had received at the hands of Japan ten years before, was but ill prepared. In France the military party, since the Dreyfus case, had been distinctly out of favour, and a succession of unstable governments had only increased Germany's conviction that France's defences were at their weakest. The third member of the entente, namely Britain, appeared to

German eyes to be in a worse plight. Torn by internal dissensions over the problem of Irish Home Rule, saddled with the administration of a presumed revolutionary India and South Africa, she was under the control of a Liberal and, therefore, pacifist government. Her inclination to interfere with the schemes of the Central Powers would seem limited; her ability to interfere effectively even more so. Accordingly, Germany was convinced that Britain would do no more than signify her disapproval of Germany's violation of Belgian neutrality. Even though she should choose to declare war, Germany would have swept Belgium aside and would be knocking peremptorily upon the gates of Paris before Britain could offer any effectual resistance.

The advantages of the Belgian route were so obvious from a military point of view that they required no stressing. The Belgian fortresses of Liége and Namur, notwithstanding all their strength, were toy forts compared with the enormous structures which France had built from Longwy down through Verdun, Toul and Nancy to Belfort. In the N.E. was the barrier of the Ardennes; in the S. the barrier of the Vosges. But through Belgium, the road, except for Liége, was clear. Moreover, the admirable system of railways constructed in the S. and S.E. of Belgium offered immense advantages to an advance by that route. Finally, France, relying upon the respect that would be shown for Belgian neutrality, had done little to defend her northern frontier, and the defences of Lille, Condé and Maubeuge were as inferior to those of Nancy and Verdun as were those of Liége and Namur.

Strategically, Germany had every right to expect that an attack through Belgium would prove irresistible. Politically, she had good reason to believe that she had nothing to fear from Britain. Her military commanders displayed an appreciation of geography which from a military point of view has seldom been excelled; and her statesmen had chosen a moment for setting her almost perfect military machine in operation which by all the laws of probability would have seemed unequalled. In all, Germany was perfectly justified in believing that the Kaiser's assertion that he would be dictating terms of peace in Paris before Christmas was no idle boast.

In spite, however, of her forethought, Germany made three grave miscalculations. In the first place she failed to foresee the unifying effect which an invasion of Belgium would have upon

the bickering parties in Britain, or to gauge the depth of resentment which such an action would provoke. In the second place she seriously underestimated the time which Russia would take to mobilize effectively; and finally she underestimated both the spirit and the power of resistance which Belgium would display.

The first of the miscalculations has already been dealt with, and the appearance upon French soil of the British army was as remarkable in its suddenness as it was unexpected by Germany. The second mistake almost proved Germany's undoing. Russia was over the East Prussian frontier as quickly as Germany was into Belgium and France. Within a week a flight to Berlin had begun, and short-lived as was the Russian success, it had a momentous bearing upon the course of events in the West.

The third German mistake, although less serious, was yet of vital importance to the Allies. The defence of Liége, brief as it was, gave just that breathing space to France and Britain which was imperative if Paris was to be saved. During those extra three weeks in which Belgium was heroically resisting the German onslaught, French forces were being brought back from the east whither they had been sent and thrown in front of Paris, and the small British army was calmly getting into position at Mons. The respite which the defence of Liége and the heroism of the Belgian army gave to England and France saved Paris and foiled the knock-out blow which Germany had so skilfully prepared; but it cost Belgium her liberty and laid her under the heel of a merciless tyranny for four long years.

Germany began the fighting on the Western front before war was actually declared. On August 1 and 2, her cavalry crossed the French frontier at points between Longwy and Belfort. This was simply a strategical move designed to convince the French that as in 1870 the real German attack would proceed by way of France. In this she was remarkably successful. France, in a fever of mobilization, despatched corps after corps of her best troops E. and S.E. to defend her threatened E. frontier. Along the lines of the N. and N.E. nothing was done. Her leaders were under two delusions: the first that Germany was quite unlikely to invade Belgium and the second that even if Germany did break her pledged word, the real attack would still be delivered through the Verdun-Toul line. Any demonstration in the N. would be designed, France thought, to persuade her to weaken

her E. forces and to divide her armies. With the memories of Metz and Sedan still burning fiercely in her mind, the very last thing France would do would be to split her troops into two or more armies. Such a policy had cost her the victory in the war of 1870, and France was rigorously set on avoiding a similar mistake. Britain had yet to be involved, and in any event her troops had to be mobilized and carried across the sea. It was impossible that she could render any effective aid to Belgium before at least three weeks. In the result, Belgium was left alone.

On August 2 German forces occupied the grand duchy of Luxemburg. This little frontier state, under 1,000 square miles in area, had been protected by treaty in the same way as Belgium. Luxemburg was powerless to resist. But the violation of her neutrality was no less a crime than the invasion of Belgium. With that precision and efficiency which characterised the whole of the German advance in 1914 and which proved so conclusively how long and how adequately her plans had been rehearsed, the Germans proceeded to turn the little state into an advanced military position. A despotic control was established over the country, villages were destroyed, woods cut down, and trenches dug with a ruthless disregard for any but strategic purposes. The value of this territory from the military point of view lay in its geographical position. By advancing through the state, troops, while avoiding the barriers of the Ardennes in the N., could deploy into N. France and up to the valley of the Meuse, and thus threaten the flank of the armies defending the frontier S. of Longwy. But the gap was too narrow and the roads and railways insufficient to permit of an effective attack by that route, and it was in Belgium that Germany sought to find a road so broad and so well provided with adequate transport facilities that she could pour her enormous man power into N. France with the least possible delay.

The request of the German government for permission to march through Belgium was contained in a memorandum marked "very confidential" and sent by the German minister in Brussels to M. Davignon, the Belgian minister for foreign affairs. It bears the date August 2.

> Reliable information has been received by the German Government to the effect that French forces intend to march on the line of the Meuse by Givet and Namur. This information leaves no doubt as to the intention of France to march through Belgian territory against Germany. The German

Government cannot but fear that Belgium, in spite of the utmost goodwill, will be unable, without assistance, to repel so considerable a French invasion with sufficient prospect of success to afford an adequate guarantee against danger to Germany. It is essential for the self-defence of Germany that she should anticipate any such hostile attack. The German Government would, however, feel the deepest regret if Belgium regarded as an act of hostility against herself the fact that the measures of Germany's opponents force Germany, for her own protection, to enter Belgian territory.

In order to exclude any possibility of misunderstanding, the German Government make the following declaration:

1. Germany has in view no act of hostility against Belgium. In the event of Belgium being prepared in the coming war to maintain an attitude of friendly neutrality towards Germany, the German Government bind themselves, at the conclusion of peace, to guarantee the possessions and independence of the Belgian kingdom in full.

2. Germany undertakes, under the above-mentioned condition, to evacuate Belgian territory on the conclusion of peace.

3. If Belgium adopts a friendly attitude, Germany is prepared, in cooperation with the Belgian authorities, to purchase all necessaries for her troops against a cash payment, and to pay an indemnity for any damage that may have been caused by German troops.

4. Should Belgium oppose the German troops, and in particular should she throw difficulties in the way of their march by a resistance of the fortresses on the Meuse, or by destroying railways, roads, tunnels, or other similar works, Germany will, to her regret, be compelled to consider Belgium as an enemy. In this event, Germany can undertake no obligations towards Belgium, but the eventual adjustment of the relations between the two states must be left to the decision of arms. The German Government, however, entertain the distinct hope that this eventuality will not occur, and that the Belgian Government will know how to take the necessary measures to prevent the occurrence of incidents such as those mentioned. In this case the friendly ties which bind the two neighbouring states will grow stronger and more enduring.

M. Davignon's reply, which is dated 7 a.m. on the following day, August 3, was as follows:

The German Government stated in their note of the 2nd August, 1914, that according to reliable information French forces intended to march on the Meuse via Givet and Namur, and that Belgium, in spite of the best intentions, would not be in a position to repulse, without assistance, an advance of French troops. The German Government, therefore, considered themselves compelled to anticipate this attack and to violate

Belgian territory. In these circumstances, Germany proposed to the Belgian Government to adopt a friendly attitude towards her, and undertook, on the conclusion of peace, to guarantee the integrity of the kingdom and its possessions to their full extent. The note added that if Belgium put difficulties in the way of the advance of German troops Germany would be compelled to consider her as an enemy, and to leave the ultimate adjustment of the relations between the two states to the decision of arms.

This note has made a deep and painful impression upon the Belgian Government. The intentions attributed to France by Germany are in contradiction to the formal declarations made to us on August 1, in the name of the French Government. Moreover, if, contrary to our expectation, Belgian neutrality should be violated by France, Belgium intends to fulfil her international obligations and the Belgian army would offer the most vigorous resistance to the invader. The treaties of 1839, confirmed by the treaties of 1870, vouch for the independence and neutrality of Belgium under the guarantee of the Powers, and notably of the Government of his majesty the king of Prussia. Belgium has always been faithful to her international obligations, she has carried out her duties in a spirit of loyal impartiality, and she has left nothing undone to maintain and enforce respect for her neutrality. The attack upon her independence with which the German Government threatens her constitutes a flagrant violation of international law. No strategic interest justifies such a violation of law. The Belgian Government, if they were to accept the proposals submitted to them, would sacrifice the honour of the nation and betray their duty towards Europe. Conscious of the part which Belgium has played for more than eighty years in the civilization of the world, they refuse to believe that the independence of Belgium can only be preserved at the price of the violation of her neutrality. If this hope is disappointed the Belgian Government are firmly resolved to repel, by all the means in their power, every attack upon their rights.

The German case is set out in a despatch sent by the Belgian minister in Berlin to M. Davignon, and dated August 4.

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a translation of part of the speech made to-day in the Reichstag by the Imperial Chancellor on the subject of the infamous violation of Belgian neutrality.

"We are in a state of legitimate defence, and necessity knows no law. . . . Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and have perhaps already entered Belgium. This is contrary to the dictates of international law. France has, it is true, declared at Brussels that she was prepared to respect the neutrality of Belgium so long as it was respected by her

adversary. But we knew that France was ready to invade Belgium. France could wait; we could not. A French attack upon our flank in the region of the lower Rhine might have been fatal. We were, therefore, compelled to ride roughshod over the legitimate protests of the Governments of Luxemburg and Belgium. For the wrong which we are thus doing, we will make reparation as soon as our military object is attained. Anyone in such grave danger as ourselves, and who is struggling for his supreme welfare, can only be concerned with the means of extricating himself; we stand side by side with Austria."

It is noteworthy that Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg recognises, without the slightest disguise, that Germany is violating international law by her invasion of Belgian territory and that she is committing a wrong against us.

On August 3, King Albert sent a telegram to King George as follows:

Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870 and the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium.

He then proceeded to take what measures of defence were possible. Belgium had seen the storm coming for some time, and in 1912-13 measures of army reform had been passed in the parliament. Those measures, however, were far from complete, and Belgium was pitifully ill-prepared to receive the storm about to burst upon her. In spite, however, of her weakness, Belgium was far from being so powerless as Germany imagined. The mistake she made was in dividing her forces. Belgium had only six divisions of infantry, and one division of cavalry. The troops, moreover, were arranged without regard to strategy on a purely neutral system; for, with exquisite care for his nation's honour, King Albert placed one division near the coast to repel any British violation of his territory; there were two divisions near Namur, to check any French attempt at invasion; and, holding two divisions in reserve near Antwerp, the king sent only his third division towards Liége to withstand the German attack. It may have been quixotic in the circumstances to have adopted so honourably neutral an attitude of defence. On the other hand, the idealism which inspired King Albert was based largely upon the consideration of the future position of his country at the end of the war. Belgium had to show herself ready to defend her

neutrality at every point, without any regard to alliances that might be formed in the course of the conflict. As her state of neutrality had been guaranteed by the Great Powers, she must wait for a blow to be struck at her by one of her guarantors, before she was in a position to call on any other guarantor to assist in her defence.

War between Germany and Belgium was not opened until the morning of Monday, August 3. According to the evidence of people living in various frontier villages, the German troops crossed into Belgium as early as Sunday, August 2. They came only in small parties, as advance scouts, rather than to make any vigorous attack; they were very polite, and had many excuses for intrusion. Sometimes the excuse was that they wanted their horses shod; at other times they had missed their way; or, again, they required some information and had come to ask it. On August 3 they arrived in increasing numbers. They asked for accommodation in convents and in schools. "They asked nicely," wrote one resident of a frontier village, "but gave the impression that if refused they would take more." Then, on the 4th, disguise was thrown off, and the troops poured in in force.

The first point of contact with Belgian troops was in the little town of Visé on the river Meuse some few miles S. of Maestricht. During the few days prior to the presentation of the ultimatum over 160,000 German troops had been collected quietly on the frontier. Motor transport had been provided, and the plan was to rush forward and secure the control of the bridges and railways towards Liége and Brussels. The Belgians, however, were prepared, and on the approach of the German advance guard blew up the central spans of the bridge and fiercely contested the crossing, aided by the guns of the forts in front of Liége. After three hours' fighting the handful of Belgian troops was driven back and retired on the city, destroying in their retreat everything that might be of the least service to the invaders. The Germans contented themselves with the capture of the crossing, and threw out a cloud of cavalry to maintain contact with the retreating Belgians. The main column of infantry moved slowly forward on Liége, and the invasion of Belgium had begun in earnest.

Already Germany had received her first surprise. The day on which she invaded Belgium, Great Britain had declared war

upon her. Germany was amazed and indignant. But, also, she was alarmed. It became all the more imperative that a knock-out blow should be struck at France with the least delay. Once Britain had time to mobilise, the weight of united French and British forces in the west at so early a date might prove more of an obstacle to her knock-out plan than she could overcome before Russian pressure made itself felt in the east. At all cost Belgium had to be swept aside within a few days. Moreover, in daring to challenge the might of Germany at all she had delivered an offence to the pride of Germany which was not to be lightly forgiven. A stubborn and prolonged Belgian resistance might well throw out of gear all the cherished and perfectly thought out plans of the German high command. Belgium had to be taught that she could interfere with the mighty schemes of the German empire only at her peril and that any resistance was worse than useless. And so Germany proceeded to crush Belgium with an iron ruthlessness which became only the more intense as the Belgium resistance grew more stubborn.

The atrocities which accompanied the Prussian march through Belgium, beginning with the sack of Visé and culminating in the horrible massacre at Louvain, will remain for all time a blot upon the reputation of a fine nation. And it is indeed difficult to understand and quite impossible to condone the terrible barbarities which Germany inflicted upon that innocent little nation. Isolated and occasional atrocities perpetrated by groups of drunken soldiers temporarily out of hand are to be expected in any war. But systematic and persistent barbarities perpetrated at the instigation of the commanding staff of an army of occupation are something for which no justification can be found.

It is possible that the stories told are exaggerated. This, however, would seem unlikely, and there remains little room for doubt but that the wanton destruction of undefended towns and the looting, pillaging, murder, and worse, of defenceless men, women and children was part of an organized plan to terrify Belgium if not into submission at least into quiescence. The success of the German plan depended upon a speedy victory in Belgium; and it is significant that the worst atrocities perpetrated at Louvain, Malines, Aerschot and Termonde coincided with a series of dangerous attacks from the Belgian army isolated round Antwerp. While we may discount largely the stories of conspiracy amongst the civil population of conquered Belgium

upon which the Germans based their justification of their outrages, it is as well to remind ourselves not only of the desperate ferocity of the ruined peasantry but also of the very near success which attended the magnificent sorties of the Belgian line from Antwerp.

After the occupation of Brussels, the German right wing swung S.W. towards France, leaving on its right flank the still unbeaten Belgian army concentrated in front of Antwerp, and admirably placed to cut the German lines of communication. Two magnificent attempts were made, the first on August 24, and the second on September 9, and the measure of their success is to be judged in the light of the horrors subsequently perpetrated at Louvain and elsewhere.

Three other points must be remembered. The German lines of communication through Belgium, upon which the very life blood of their western army depended, were exposed to perpetual wrecking and sabotage at the hands of the incensed civil population. It is beyond human nature to witness the destruction of all your worldly goods and the desecration of your country without seizing every opportunity to wreak a fierce revenge. Outrage begat outrage, and the fate of the small foraging parties of Uhlans and other troops trapped by the Belgian peasants is best left to the imagination. Secondly Prussian militarism was the most iron-disciplined of any organized system the world had seen. The proverbial licence of soldiery freed from restraint was intensified by the tyranny they suffered under when in the line. Thirdly, Belgium is a wine-drinking country, and the large supplies of liquor which suddenly became available for the German soldiery were but further encouragements to rapine, looting and murder.

All these factors, however, are no condonation of German behaviour. While they may aid an understanding of how it was that a highly civilized nation could act with such inhumanity they by no means excuse it. German "frightfulness" was initially deliberate; and it became but the more appalling as panic, and the unparalleled opportunity for its indulgence, grew.

While one section of the German army was striking through Visé at Louvain, Antwerp and Brussels, a more powerful attack was being delivered on the fortifications of Liége. Next to Antwerp and Namur, Liége was the greatest fortified place in Belgium. It was surrounded by a series of detached forts,

constructed about a quarter of a century before under General Brialmont, a famous Belgian engineer. There were twelve of these detached forts, each from three and a half to five and a half miles from the city, in a perimeter measuring 31 miles. Each of these forts was an independent unit.

On the right bank of the Meuse were the forts of Barchon, Evegnée, Fléron, Chaudfontaine, Embourg and Boncalles. The two chief of these covered the main line of railway from Cologne. On the left bank of the river the forts were Pontine, Liers, Lantin, Loncin, Hollogne and Flémalle. Six of the forts were large and six small. The larger forts were considered impregnable by many. Each consisted of a triangular mass of concrete with, sunk in it, revolving and disappearing steel turrets. Their armament consisted of two 6 in. howitzers, four 5 in. quick-firing guns, and three outer quick-firing guns in disappearing turrets. The forts were well equipped with machine guns and with search-lights, protected with armour, and surrounded by moats. The small forts had two guns fewer than the larger ones. Military experts were by no means unanimous in their views concerning the value of the forts of Liége. Many, including, it is said, the kaiser himself, thought that owing to the careless way in which they were generally looked after and the absence of an adequate force of troops, or of sufficient ammunition, they were negligible. There was some excuse for thinking so, as it was notorious that the forts had been for a long time guarded with great laxity. What the Germans evidently did not know was that, some months before war was declared, a brave and active military commander, General Leman, had taken charge, had secured troops, and had placed the 12 forts in strong condition.

On the morning of August 4 the German army moved out in the direction of Liége. Spectators say that the advance was a magnificent sight. The army rolled slowly down to the River Meuse, bringing with it innumerable machine guns and motor-wagons. The troops were in their green-grey uniform. Aeroplanes soared in the sky reconnoitring overhead. It was noted that the uniforms were new in every detail. The troops appeared as if they were carrying out a triumphal march. As an English girl said about that time, "They looked like soldiers on the stage." As the Germans attempted to cross the river they came under the fire of the guns from the forts, guns directed in the early stages by aeroplanes. The Germans attempted to make



THE INVASION OF BELGIUM. Map showing the stages in the German advance. By Aug. 24, 1914, the S. and E. were overrun, but the enemy were unable to advance their line in the N.W. until the fall of Antwerp, Oct. 9, 1914.

pontoon bridges. The bridges were scarcely completed before well-directed shots demolished them. The gunners in the forts had every range taken, and could place the shells with automatic regularity on any desired spot within range. But even the destruction of the bridges could not hold the Germans back. They crossed the Meuse in small boats, rafts, and in other ways.

On the night of August 4 the German soldiers, impatient at the delay, crept past the forts in towards the town. As they were moving quietly across the open space a great searchlight suddenly played on them, covering them with a blaze of light, and the guns of the forts opened a tremendous fusillade. The Germans, dazzled by the light, not knowing where to go, unable to resist, moved almost blindly about in the shambles of death. There was nowhere to hide, no escape from the pitiless, unceasing hail of shrapnel. It is said that not a single man of this bold party returned to the German lines. The few not killed were taken prisoners.

On Wednesday, August 5, the Germans opened a violent attack against the Barchon fort. The ever-growing cannonade gradually extended to the forts of Fléron, Embourg and Boncalles. The artillery practice was very good, but the shells used were far too light to have much effect on the steel cupolas and concrete-supported sides of the forts. During the afternoon the German infantry advanced and attempted to storm the forts. They came on in close order, endeavouring by sheer weight of numbers to carry all before them. But rush and dash and daring are of very little use against men armed with modern guns behind the walls of a well-equipped fort. The Belgian heavy guns and howitzers seemed to fill the heavens with bursting shell.

As the German troops got closer, machine guns played on them. Still they pushed on. They made for the wide openings between the forts—openings in which were entrenchments held by Belgian infantry. At the critical moment, when the German soldiers, or those left of them, paused and reeled under the awful punishment they were receiving from the guns, the Belgian infantry, at the word of command, leaped out and attacked the enemy with the bayonet. The German line broke, and was thrown back a considerable distance in great confusion. It was estimated that as a result of the first two days' fighting no fewer than 25,000 Germans were killed or wounded. That is a figure impossible to verify. Certain it is that the death roll was a heavy one

On Friday, August 7, at about 2 a.m., an extraordinary incident occurred that revealed the reckless daring of the German army. A little party of German cavalrymen—two officers and six soldiers—made a desperate effort to kidnap General Leman. They rode into the city dressed as Englishmen, and exchanged greetings in English with people. Arrived at headquarters, they stated that they were British officers who had come to the rescue of Liége, and they desired to see the general. Something in their manner made one aide-de-camp—Major Marchand—suspicious, and he hastily closed the door leading into the general's private apartments, and raised the alarm. A bullet at short range stopped him. Members of the general's staff and some gendarmes present rushed on the Germans. The latter, hastily firing a volley, attempted to escape, but were pursued, and all shot down, after their coup had come within a hairsbreadth of success.

Additional masses of German troops arrived on Thursday, crossing the Meuse by a pontoon bridge which they had placed in position near Maestricht, close to the Dutch border, out of reach of the guns of the forts. Zeppelins and aeroplanes drove back the Belgian aircraft, and began to drop high explosives on the steel cupolas of the forts.

The Germans attempted assault after assault. They were absolutely reckless of life, and were willing to pay a very high price for immediate success. In some of their advances they repeated the tactics of the third Japanese army when storming Liaoyang, and used the bodies of their own comrades fallen in front of them as ramparts behind which to pause before making further advance. Tales told by the defenders show the gruesomeness of the advances, and the courage displayed. Here is the story of a Belgian officer who shared in the defence:

Some of us late arrivals only managed to get to our post when the German attack began. It was night-time. We replied very sharply with our guns. Until the dawn came we had no very distinct idea what our practice was. Then we noticed heaps of slain Germans in a semicircle at the foot of our fort. The German guns must have been very much less successful, because they rarely hit us that night. They did better at daybreak. We did better still. As line after line of the German infantry advanced we simply mowed them down. It was terribly easy, monsieur, and I turned to a brother officer of mine more than once and said "Voilà! They are coming on again in a dense, close formation! They must be mad!" They made no attempt at deploying, but came on, line after

line, almost shoulder to shoulder, until, as we shot them down, the fallen were heaped on top of the other in an awful barricade of dead and wounded men, that threatened to mask our guns and cause us trouble. I thought of the French saying, "*C'est magnifique, mais ce n'est pas la guerre!*" No, it was slaughter —just slaughter!

So high became the barricade of the dead and wounded that we did not know whether to fire through it or to go out and clear openings with our hands. We should have liked to extricate some of the wounded from the dead, but we dared not. A stiff wind carried away the smoke of the guns quickly, and we could see some of the wounded men trying to release themselves from their terrible position. I will confess that I crossed myself; I could have wished that the smoke had remained! But—would you believe it?—this veritable wall of dead and dying enabled those wonderful Germans to creep closer, and actually to charge up the glacis. They got no farther than half way, for our machine guns and rifles swept them back. Of course, we had our losses, but they were slight compared with the carnage inflicted on our enemies.

This appalling waste of life by the German high command is only explicable on the grounds that they had under-estimated the defensive power of Belgium. The few days' delay, however, had given time for the new enormous siege guns to be brought up which Germany had constructed. In order to save the city from destruction by bombardment General Leman offered to permit the Germans to occupy the town. Unconditional surrender of the forts and the town was, however, demanded, and this being refused the bombardment was begun. The forts, with the exception of Fléron, were still undamaged and perfectly able to offer effective resistance. On Thursday night, August 6, the Belgian infantry occupying the lines between the forts fell back, and the Germans entered the town through the gap afforded by the disablement of Fort Fléron on the following morning. But the town was of little value while the forts still held out. They commanded the town, swept the approaches and paralysed the railway. And the Germans therefore proceeded to a systematic demolition of the fortifications.

No one had foreseen the destructive power of modern heavy guns. The Germans themselves were a little sceptical of their value, and the French were openly derisive. The annihilation of the defences of Liége and Namur was speedily to open the eyes of an astounded world. The new siege guns brought up by the Germans were 11.2 in. howitzers. Enormous masses

of metal weighing over 30 tons each, they had an effective range at least one and a half times longer than any of the guns in the Belgian forts. The Belgians were practically powerless to reply, and were compelled to endure silently the agony of piecemeal demolition of their defences. Thick steel cupolas were cracked like egg-shells. Concrete walls collapsed like pieces of cardboard. The defenders were choked and blinded by the fumes, maimed, blown to bits.

The end came at last. Fort after fort was battered and broken by the dominating German fire. In one fort the defenders blew up everything rather than surrender when they could hold out no longer. At Chaudfontaine a shell penetrated the magazine and blew the place to atoms.

Fort Loncin was the last to stand out. Here Leman and a small group of survivors made a final stand. Three out of four of the garrison had been killed or incapacitated; the general himself could scarcely move, his legs having been partly crushed by a fall of masonry; most of the guns were out of action. The general made all ready for the end, burning papers, destroying everything of military value, preparing to blow up the place at the last moment. Then came a tremendous concerted bombardment from the entire strength of the German howitzers.

A strong infantry force had moved up, ready to storm the fort. The fire paused; the infantry leaped in. As they advanced a magazine exploded, killing some of them. There was no more fighting. Those of the garrison left were helpless. A German officer related the fate of General Leman himself. After a German shell had exploded the magazine in one of the forts, German soldiers entered on the work. They came on the body of the general, with blackened face, lying amid the ruins. "Respect the general! He is dead!" said his adjutant, who stood guarding the prostrate figure. General Leman was not dead. Later on he recovered consciousness. When he offered his sword to the German general, the latter refused to accept it. "Military honour has not been violated by your sword," he said. "Keep it." General Leman had remained unmoved up to now. But at this tears sprang to his eyes.

With the fall of Liége the way to Brussels was open: Belgium was defenceless. The Belgian army was powerless in face of the German avalanche, and could do little more than fight a series of desperate rearguard actions. Reluctantly but

Telgmann

THE KAISER WITH HIS CHIEF-OF-STAFF. The German military manoeuvres, which took place in July, 1914, while the Austrian ultimatum was being considered by Serbia, have since been regarded by historians as a preliminary mobilisation for war, enabling the German armies to take the offensive the day war was declared. The Kaiser is seen here at the manoeuvres with General von Moltke, chief-of-staff.

Crown Prince Alexander, the joint head of Serbian army.

General Mishich led the Serbian 2ndarmyduring 1914–15.

General Yankovitch, leader in repelling Austrian invasion.

SERBIAN HEROES, THEIR CAPITAL AND SERAJEVO. Panorama of Belgrade, showing the quays and shipping on the Danube. In the background is the cathedral. The photograph on top left is of Serajevo, Bosnia, where the archduke Francis Ferdinand was assassinated.

inevitably, it fell back. But the Germans did not hurry. Although they had been delayed by the magnificent defence of Liége, their time-table was not seriously deranged. Everything with them had been so carefully planned, their dispositions were so admirable, all eventualities had been so skilfully provided for, that Belgium was powerless. Liége had held up the advance for a momentous week. But its value, although inestimable in the time it gave to the mobilising French and British forces, lay more in its effect upon the morale of the Allies than in its interference with German plans.

Germany's intention was to turn the left wing of the French line which ran south from Namur: By the capture of Liége the Belgian army was thrust back north-west upon Antwerp, and a wedge was driven between the French and Belgian forces. A small body of Belgian troops supported by a French division was still defending Namur and occupying the triangle formed by the rivers Sambre and Meuse. If the Germans were to be successful Namur must be captured without delay and the defending forces hurled back. Von Kluck, the German commander, seized his chance. One body of troops was moved due west from Liége to occupy Louvain and Brussels, complete the conquest of Belgium, and pin the remnants of the Belgian army to the defences of Antwerp. The main body, in overwhelming strength, turned south-west and struck like a thunderbolt at Namur.

On August 15 the German cavalry had made an attempt to seize Dinant and the river crossing above Namur. They had been heavily repulsed by French artillery, but the lack of cavalry by which this success could have been followed up permitted the Germans to bring up their heavy howitzers without further opposition. Not again were they going to make the mistake of putting densely packed masses of infantry against steel and concrete forts. On the 20th the bombardment began. By the 23rd the city and most of the forts were in the hands of the invaders. Such was the power of Germany's siege guns.

Namur was looked upon as a much stronger fortress than Liége. By many it was thought to be impregnable, and after the heroic resistance of General Leman it was expected to occupy the Germans at least a fortnight. If it fell, then the whole French line was in danger of being turned, and north-eastern France was open to invasion. The main body of French troops

was still clustered down in the south-east, making abortive attacks through Alsace and Lorraine, and the reluctance of the French command to split their forces and attempt a defence of Belgium was again to prove as disastrous as it had previously done, for it must be remembered that the French were still convinced that the real danger lay in the south-east. Even the fall of Liége and the irresistible rush of the German right wing through Belgium had done little to shake their conviction, and although they realized the danger which threatened their exposed left flank, and even their rear should the German hosts rout the remnants of the Belgian army and sweep south through northern France, they none the less felt that to weaken their centre by dispatching troops to the defence of Belgium was to invite just that disaster which had overtaken them at Sedan. Some defence against the northern pressure was, however, imperative, and reluctantly troops were hurried north. The number was insufficient and they were badly placed, the French being completely deceived by the wideness of the German sweep. France hoped to strike through Alsace into the heart of Germany, and so threaten an attack upon the exposed line of German communications into the north.

But the distance was too great, and the available troops were far too few to win more than a few miles of territory in south-west Germany, a success which, however gratifying politically to France, troubled Germany no whit. Rather it pleased her, for the more successful France might be the more eager she would be to press on in that quarter. And such eagerness would but expose her the more surely to the great sweep of von Kluck. In the result France fell between two stools. In the south-east she retained many more troops than were needed for successful defence behind her enormous fortresses, but insufficient to make a successful attack. In the north her troops were too few and arrived too late.

The Belgian army round Namur, horror-stricken by the fall of Liége, deprived of Allied support on which they had relied, were seized with panic. Their defence collapsed at the first thrust of the mighty German host, and within two days the survivors of the south-west Belgian army were so much chaff before the tornado of the oncoming Uhlans. Namur was battered to bits with merciless precision, her last fort falling on the 26th, and the way to northern France was open. Cavalry and

infantry poured through the gap and pushed south along the west face of the Ardennes. The French counter-attacks were hurled back in disorder and Germany prepared to crush the French armies between enormous pincers, the Namur forces from the east, and the far-flung right wing of the Germans which had swept through Brussels on the west.

Meanwhile the right wing of the German advance had pushed through Belgium with staggering swiftness and irresistible pressure. Day after day clouds of Uhlans harassed the retreating Belgians and ravaged the countryside, while with monotonous regularity they were followed by lorry-load after lorry-load of grey-clad infantry. The destructive power of the heavy German artillery and the speed with which motor transport enabled her to move her army were the two factors which nearly defeated the Allies almost before the war had begun.

The scenes all along the line where the two armies were in touch were full of interest and excitement. The Belgians, worn and grim, fought behind hedges and roadside barricades, in shallow trenches, and behind the walls of village houses. The Germans, as they advanced, drove out the villagers and destroyed all before them. The Belgian authorities by this time had given instructions that civilians were in no circumstances to take part in the fighting, but were to leave the war to the soldiers. The story of the German atrocities had, however, already convinced most people that this was the only course. At a multitude of points little parties of Uhlans would come into contact with little parties of Belgian infantry or cavalry; there would be a charge, a volley, a struggle. Now an ambush would be laid, and some Uhlans would dash carelessly to death. Now the Germans in turn would conceal their cavalry or their machine guns, and the Belgians would move forward unconsciously to destruction.

A skirmish of some moment occurred at Tirlemont on Tuesday and Wednesday, August 11 and 12. Two thousand German cavalry advanced in the direction of that town, and were attacked by a regiment of Belgian lancers. The latter were driven back by the superior German machine-gun fire. On the Wednesday morning the Germans attempted to take the offensive. They were met by the steady fire of a body of Belgian infantry, and were forced back for some distance. About the same time a regiment of German dragoons attempted to surprise the Belgian

troops at Aineffe. After a three hours' fight, they were driven off, leaving 153 dead on the field, and 102 prisoners in the hands of the Belgians.

Another outpost affair took place near Eghezee, when a body of 350 Uhlans, with 60 cyclist scouts, were surprised at a village while sitting quietly in the cafés of the little town enjoying themselves. Their horses were grazing in the fields and the men were wholly unprepared. Their own cyclists rode in to give the alarm. The Uhlans in a sudden panic rushed off, leaving horses, rifles, machine guns and everything behind them, the Belgians killing about 40 of the men as they ran.

An action of some importance occurred on August 12 and 13 at Haelen. A force of German cavalry and artillery, accompanied by a small body of infantry, numbering probably 10,000 in all, attempted to move around Tirlemont to outflank the Belgian army. They found themselves opposed by a Belgian division of cavalry and a mixed brigade, numbering between 7,000 and 10,000.

Towards eleven o'clock on August 12 the Germans were seen on the Steevoorn-Haelen road. The Belgian artillery, which was well placed, opened fire on them, and a fierce fight followed which lasted until early evening. The Belgian guns wrought great destruction. The Germans tried to ride through the enemy by sheer dash and daring. At one point their cavalry dashed at a series of formidable Belgian barricades, only to be picked off and driven back by the infantry fire. Then there came a fierce charge, when the German cavalry and the Belgian cavalry rode right into one another, and a hand-to-hand conflict ensued.

The country was very unfavourable to the Germans, its broken nature making cavalry advances difficult. The invaders, even according to the account of their enemies, showed extreme courage. At one point the German cavalry even attempted to charge a line of Belgian machine guns, and pushed forward, despite immense slaughter, until sheer butchery forced it back.

The Germans revealed in this fight the qualities which were to carry them far in the days that immediately followed. "They may not have shown much pluck before," said one Belgian major at the end of the day, "but they have certainly shown it to-day." But this was a case where the rush tactics of the Germans were in vain. They had finally to retire with a loss of about a thousand men.

The battle of Haelen was one of those fights where the individual soldier had a chance to distinguish himself, and the Belgians told many tales of the bravery of their own men afterwards. There was, for example, one farrier-sergeant by name Rousseau, of the Chasseurs à Cheval, who, with a little band of eight men, charged a whole company of Uhlans and routed them, bringing a dozen horses back as trophies. One lieutenant, asked to send reinforcements, summoned the town fire brigade of Diest, and collected up what soldiers he could find along the road. He and his little band rushed to the point where they were wanted, stormed a Prussian battery and drove it back, the lieutenant himself seizing a soldier's rifle and shooting dead the Prussian officer in command. The day ended in a Belgian victory.

By this time the Belgians were becoming exceedingly confident. At first they had almost despaired of their prospects in the war. Now they thought they had proved in fight after fight that they could hold their own, even against the Germans. Had they been better acquainted with the methods of the German General Staff they would have known that the settled policy of the German army was to play with the enemy during the time of preparations for a great move as a cat plays with a mouse. The German plan, as admitted by such a writer as General F. von Bernhardi, is to offer a relatively weak front during a period of concentration, to send out a dense screen of cavalry to keep in touch with the enemy, to make a show of weakness, to discover the strength of the foe and their dispositions, and then, when the right moment comes, to attack "like a thunderbolt from the clouds."

The Germans at the beginning did not condescend to make elaborate preparations against the Belgians. Doubtless, they hoped and expected that forces such as that sent against Haelen would be sufficient in themselves to sweep away any opposition. When they found out their mistake they reverted to their regular tactics, paused, gathered strength, and then struck.

The Belgians, after the first fortnight of war, came somewhat to despise the foe. The Germans were ill-equipped, short of food, lacking enthusiasm, and driven unwillingly to fight, said the Belgians. "I go out to capture the Germans," said one Belgian, "not with a gun but with a buttered roll; I hold the roll out; the Uhlans when they see it are so hungry that they rush

up and surrender themselves in order to get food." Doubtless, some of the Uhlans and hussars, hastily pushed through the country, did march on short commons. But Belgium was only too soon to discover that the army behind was well provided.

On Saturday, August 15, the Germans moved forward to strike their real blow. The forts of Liége were no longer able to offer a serious resistance. The little town of Huy, with its important bridge over the Meuse, eastward of Namur, which had been taken after a fierce struggle, opened up an important thoroughfare. The German armies were now able to move in strength into the heart of Belgium. Behind the cavalry screen four army corps moved forward. Their aircraft swept northwards, and from this moment little more was heard of the Belgian aeroplanes, which up to this stage had been doing useful work. One German army moved in great strength westwards towards Dinant. Its doings have already been told. Another moved up behind the northern cavalry screen.

On August 16 the Germans attacked in force the position to the south-east of Wavre, where the Belgian and French armies met. They came in crescent formation, their aim being to turn the right flank of the Belgian army. The Belgian headquarters reported that the attempt had been vigorously repulsed, but the repulse was not permanent.

On Monday the Germans advanced all along the line from Wavre to the Dutch frontier at great speed and with irresistible force. On Tuesday they opened an overwhelming artillery fire on Tirlemont. Their infantry and cavalry were sometimes as many as ten to one against their enemy. The German aeroplanes acted as scouts; they located the Belgian forces, signalled the exact position to their own guns, and enabled them to aim the shrapnel with overwhelming effect.

When the Belgian lines had been shaken sufficiently by shrapnel fire the German cavalry poured in. They swept through the ranks out into the villages behind. The people there were in their homes or working in the fields, confident in the power of their own soldiers to protect them. Suddenly the German cavalry swooped on them, and neither age nor sex was spared. As the people who escaped rushed madly across the fields and along the hedges the German guns opened out on them. It was battle practice against old men, women and children. War had come in earnest now. Those fortunate enough to escape found two

trains waiting about five miles from the town. They rushed on them, and were carried to Brussels, where their tale of pillage, death and woe caused consternation.

On Wednesday, August 19, the Belgian field army made a stand at Louvain itself. The Belgians had chosen their position well, and it was expected that they would offer a stubborn resistance. After some fighting, however, the Belgian forces suddenly retired. They had been beaten all along the line by the force of the German onset. The Germans were showing the qualities which were to carry them so far later in the war. The recklessness in advancing, the wholesale sacrifice of life, the powerful artillery fire concentrated on central points, the innumerable machine guns and the aeroplanes, helped them to victory. Among the many descriptions of individual fights one fragment, by Raymond Coulson, stands out:

> The Belgian lancers, six hundred, were out scouting. As they were trotting down a long road they suddenly sighted the enemy and began to charge. On the left, they came unexpectedly on a large, deep hole that threw a considerable part of their line into disorder. Then, entirely without warning, there burst over on the front the sharp, terrible roar of the mitrailleuses. The cavalry were running into a nest of little Maxim guns the Germans had brought up on horses. They rode until their saddles were emptied. We saw them in a small hollow. Two minutes later a number of riderless horses scattering widely over the countryside told us what they were meeting. Yet in the face of that stream of lead they actually dismounted and tried, with carbines, to worry the Maxims. At the same time they found themselves exposed to infantry fire from the woods. They came back at a gallop, a small scattered remnant of the host. At the same moment German guns began to open up around the semicircle of horizon. Shells burst like puffballs on green fields, searching our wide front. The thunder of big guns, the rhythmic beat of pom-poms, the roar of mitrailleuses, and the rattle of rifle fire came suddenly from ahead all the way from right to left. Around the skyline village after village went up in a pillar of smoke. The German advance was irresistible. The Belgian troops in attempting to stay it lost very heavily. Three regiments were almost annihilated. In the end the Belgian field army was for the time broken, and withdrew in the direction of the forts of Antwerp to find protection there. Brussels, the capital, was left open to the foe.

Following the attacks on Liége, the German emperor made another effort to win the Belgians to his side. He approached

King Albert, through Queen Wilhelmina of Holland, and promised, in recognition of Belgian valour, to guarantee the most considerate treatment of the Belgian population, and every respect for the integrity of Belgian territory, if Belgium would abandon her resistance and allow the German troops a right of way in their attack upon France. King Albert replied with an absolute negative. "Great Britain, France and Russia," he said, "have promised formally to support us in the struggle upon which we are engaged. French armies are hastening to our appeal and are already on our soil. If they are powerless to preserve us from a disaster, honour would not allow us to draw back. What Belgium has so well begun, France and Great Britain, with her help, will succeed in terminating. They will chase the routed enemy towards Germany, and our honour will not only be safe, but our name for ever glorious."

But for that heroic temerity Belgium was now to pay the price. After the fall of Louvain, Belgian resistance except around Antwerp and for isolated skirmishes ceased. Germany marched through the country unopposed. The Belgian Royal family and the government removed from Brussels to Antwerp and the capital was suddenly faced with a German occupation.

There was little sleep in Brussels on the night of August 19. In the early morning hours a cry arose from street after street: "The Germans are coming." During the night the Civil Guards marched back, singing the "Marseillaise," and moved through the city out on the other side towards Antwerp. There was to be no resistance to the Germans. Brussels was an open town; as such it was protected by the laws of war against bombardment. It would simply submit to the presence of the enemy. It could do no less; it would do no more.

A proclamation by the burgomaster was pasted on the walls late in the evening:

August 19.

Fellow-citizens,—Despite the heroic resistance offered by our troops, seconded by the allied armies, there is reason to fear that the enemy may occupy Brussels. Should such an event come to pass, I trust I may count upon the calm and the *sang froid* of the population. Above all, one should not lose one's head or give way to panic. The municipal authorities will not desert their post. They will continue to perform their duties with the firmness which you have a right to expect from them in such serious circumstances.

It is hardly necessary for me to remind my fellow-citizens of their duty towards their country. The laws of warfare forbid the enemy to use force to obtain from the population information concerning the national army and its means of defence. The inhabitants of Brussels should know that they are within their rights in refusing to furnish any information whatesoever to the invader. None of you must think of acting as guides to the foe. This refusal is indispensable in the interests of the country.

Every one should be on his guard against spies and foreign agents who should attempt to obtain information or provoke any form of manifestation. The enemy cannot legally attack either the honour of families or the life of citizens, or private property, or religious or philosophical convictions; nor can they interfere with the freedom of public worship.

Any abuse committed by the invader should be immediately notified to me. So long as I am in possession of life and liberty I will protect, with all my might, the rights and the dignity of my fellow-citizens. I implore the population to assist me in my task by abstaining from any hostile act, any use of arms, and any participation in fights or discussions.

Fellow-citizens, whatever may happen, listen to the voice of your burgomaster and continue to trust in him. He will not betray you.

Long live Belgium, free and independent. Long live Brussels.

ADOLPH MAX.

It cannot be wondered that the Germans decided to make the entry into the Belgian capital as impressive as possible. From purely a military point of view, they could have saved time by pushing onward without rest, and ignoring Brussels. But *morale* counts for much in war, and the German General Staff had rightly gauged the moral effect of a triumphant entry, not only on their own people, but on the world at large. It was decided not to make the entry into the capital with the regiments that had borne the brunt of the fighting. Their stricken ranks and wearied gait might have given Brussels some encouragement. An entirely fresh army corps was brought up, and at two o'clock on the afternoon of August 20 it began its triumphant march towards the Place de la Gare, the heart of Brussels.

German troops took possession of the railway station, the telegraph and telephone offices, and the central points commanding the city. The telephone bureau was quickly attached to the German headquarters farther south. Almost automatically, German

authority was established. It was a remarkable example of how a great city can, in an afternoon, pass under the control of an invader. The German flag flew from the town hall. German outposts took possession of the villages around. They drew a cordon around the city. Count von Arnim was appointed acting-governor. He issued a proclamation stating that through the circumstances of war he was forced to levy on the people requisitions for food and other supplies. While hoping that everything would go quietly, he warned them that the severest possible measures would be taken against anyone who fired on German troops or interfered with the German communications.

Enormous bodies of troops, apparently six or seven army corps, marched through the city in the days that immediately followed its occupation. The requisitions for foodstuffs for these myriads soon materially affected the supplies of the city. Most of the Belgian wounded had been removed when the Belgian army retired towards Antwerp. Their place was now taken by German wounded, brought in from the front.

One surprise came within a few hours of the German triumphant entry. The burgomaster was informed that the city of Brussels would have to find an indemnity of £8,000,000. M. Max declared that all the money had been sent to Antwerp. Dire threats were uttered against him. He calmly replied that he must await the course of events. Soon, the authorities paid for what they had, not in gold, but in paper money issued by the German governor. In a few days the Germans announced their intention of regarding Belgium as German. Greenwich time was altered to German time, and steps were taken for a new Germanised government.

Following the fall of Namur, the German military administration of Belgium was organized. The Germans showed that they intended to regard the country as annexed by conquest to the German empire. Field Marshal von der Goltz was appointed governor-general of Belgium, and the entire country south of Alost and Malines was mapped out into military commands. The German language was introduced, the clocks were altered to German time, and day by day the process of the Germanification of the country proceeded apace. The story of the German conquest and administration of Central and southern Belgium is an appalling one. Never before in modern history has a civilized country been treated with such merciless severity. The German

general staff deliberately adopted a policy of terrorism. This was considered necessary for a double reason—to prevent popular risings among the Belgian people and attacks upon the German communications, and—an even more important matter—to present such an example to the neighbouring population of Holland as would deter them from joining the Allies.

Meanwhile the victorious army had pushed on through Belgium. Bruges and Ghent were defenceless and the troops pushed on to Ostend. Here a stand was made by a handful of Belgian troops and some British marines, and the German advance guards were driven off. But for some weeks the Germans showed no signs of further activity. Germany was mobilizing her forces for an attack upon Antwerp and preparing for that turning movement south-west which was to roll up the French army and carry the victorious German arms almost to the suburbs of Paris. On August 22 and 23 the blow was struck and British troops at Mons were meeting for the first time since Waterloo the shock of a great European power.

Belgium was fast gripped. The few outlying territories on the north-east not yet occupied could be snapped up at leisure. Antwerp and the intrepid Belgian army offered an obstacle of greater difficulty, but apart from sorties, it was thought that they represented no great danger. There was no hurry and the Germans were content to hold the Belgians in check until their heavy siege guns could be brought from Namur.

The German invasion had been characterised by three main features. In the first place, it was shown with what desperation and utter ruthlessness Germany was prepared to wage war. In the second the power of modern armaments was for the first time revealed and the effect they were destined to have upon the future course of the struggle was made evident. In the third place, it showed the revolution which modern motor transport had had upon the mobility of armies. Day after day, Germany was advancing across a huge front spreading from the Dutch border to N. France, and advancing, moreover, with overwhelming speed, yet never once were her troops short of provisions or ammunition. Moreover, they arrived at their destination perfectly fresh. They had covered a distance six times longer than they could have marched in the same time, and with no effort to themselves. Upon those three factors rested the success of Germany in August, 1914, a success which left the

military experts of the world amazed, a success which horrified and shocked the moral conscience of the world.

Germany herself was far from blind to the enormity of her action, as is witnessed by the attempts of the kaiser after the fall of Liége to win Belgian neutrality, and by the statements of the German chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, in the Reichstag, admitting that Germany was technically wrong and promising full reparation after the war.

It is not to be forgotten, however, that Belgium's right to immunity as a small and powerless nation was frankly prejudiced by her possession of such a large slice of Africa as is contained in the Belgian Congo. And in a war whose major origins were undoubtedly intimately bound up with the desires of great powers to expand their colonial possessions within the only territory of the world not already colonised and occupied, it cannot be doubted that Germany's claim for a "place in the sun" and Belgium's possession of the Congo represented two aims which ultimately were bound to conflict.

CHAPTER 9

Campaign in East Prussia

THE great army which Russia could put in the field seemed likely in the early days of the war to be a decisive factor. The great Moltke said that Russia had a habit of appearing too late in war and then coming in too strong. In 1914 that view was to be falsified. Russia began mobilization on July 29 and did not complete it until August 24. But, greatly daring, she opened her offensive before mobilization was complete. The German general staff had assumed that they would not have to deal seriously with her until at least a month after the outbreak of war, and they believed that during that interval it would be possible to strike such effective blows on the western front as to enable them to divert to the eastern front whatever forces might be necessary to defeat Russia.

If Russia had acted entirely upon military reasons dictated by her own interests, it is very likely that this forecast would have been verified. The soundest plan would have been for

the Russian armies quietly to complete their mobilisation behind the frontier forces and along the middle Vistula, and then, when they had their full forces available, move forward on a broad front, with the advantage of superior numbers at every point. But to wait for weeks to complete the concentration of an army of four or five millions would have been to allow Germany to put forth its full force for the attack on France. In their loyalty to the alliance the Russians therefore decided to take very serious risks, and to begin offensive operations against Austria and Germany before even their mobilisation was complete.

To follow the campaign in Eastern Europe it is necessary to have a clear idea of the regions in which the armies were to operate. Even in 1914 Russia presented obstacles to an invading army scarcely less formidable than those which Napoleon encountered in 1812. Her vast territories, and the ease with which the country could be laid waste before an advancing army, still made Russia comparatively secure against foreign invasion. The frontier towards Germany and Austria was some 1,500 miles long, and the greater part of this extended line was the frontier of Russian Poland, that province which projected like a huge wedge between Prussia in the north and Austria in the south.

But its frontier was entirely an artificial boundary. No mountains, no rivers, separated Russian Poland from Prussia. The boundary was a purely artificial one defended only by posts set up along it at intervals for custom house purposes. Russian Poland was a huge plain watered by the Vistula and its tributary streams. To the north, East Prussia interposed between the province and the Baltic. The border district between the Narev River and the frontier line was a region of marshy forests; then inside the German frontier line lay the region of the Masurian Lakes. This is a land of innumerable lakes and pools, with belts and clumps of fir and beech woods occupying much of the land between their swampy margins. Near the coast of East Prussia, where the Vistula flows into the Baltic, stands the old German fortress of Königsberg.

The distance from the frontier of Russian Poland to Berlin was only about five hundred miles. In the early days of the war it was believed that the Russians might be at the gates of Berlin within a month. But before Russia could advance into

Germany with any hope of success she had to secure the flanks of her army in Russian Poland from the possibility of a German attack from East Prussia on the north or an Austrian attack through Galicia on the south. To guard against the first danger the Grand Duke Nicholas, the Russian commander-in-chief, planned an advance into East Prussia, under the immediate command of General Rennenkampf, one of the few Russian generals who had emerged from the Russo-Japanese war with an enhanced reputation. Whatever may have been the possibilities of an advance towards Berlin, there is no doubt that the campaign in East Prussia, though it ended in something very like disaster, was of immense service to the Allies, who were struggling against superior forces in the west.

As has already been pointed out, Germany counted on a considerable delay before she would have to deal seriously with Russia. General Le François, who was charged with the organization of the defence of East Prussia, had only at his command a comparatively small force. This included the 1st army corps (headquarters, Königsberg), the 20th (headquarters, Allenstein), the 17th (headquarters, Danzig), and the 2nd (headquarters, Stettin)—all of them East Prussians and Pomeranians. These were among the best fighting men of the German army. But the four corps united would not number quite two hundred thousand men. To hold their own against Rennenkampf's army they would have to be supplemented by second-line troops—reservists and men of the first levy of the Landwehr organized in new reserve corps—and these formations would take some time to complete. For local defence of the wilderness of lake, marsh and forest along the frontier, hastily formed detachments of the Landsturm would also be available; but at the outset, in case of invasion, the advantage of numbers would be on the side of the Russians.

Rennenkampf's plan of campaign was to advance in two columns, the left column by the line through Lyck and Lötzen; the right column—the stronger of the two—along the main railway line from Kovno, by Gumbinnen, on Königsberg. Rennenkampf had decided to act at the earliest possible moment, even before his own concentration was quite complete. In the second week of August, 1914, he began the general movement of his army from the Niemen to the immediate neighbourhood of the frontier. On August 14 the rapid reinforcement of the Cossack

vanguard on the Prussian side of the border, and the reports brought in by the airmen, warned the Germans that the enemy's advance in force was imminent. On the following day Rennenkampf crossed the frontier on a broad front right and left of the Gumbinnen railway line, while his southern column, under General Samsonoff, another distinguished leader of the Manchurian War, crossed the border farther south, and began to advance by way of Lyck through the lake region. In the following days both columns met with a desultory resistance from German detachments, which fell back slowly before them through the woods. The Russian movements in this stage of the campaign were constantly watched by German aeroplanes. The Russians possessed far fewer of these modern appliances for reconnaissance, and their flying machines, mostly heavy biplanes, were inferior to the German ones, which were chiefly Taubes, and the flying men, conscious of their lack of speed, were much less enterprising.

The German plan of campaign was to delay the advance of the enemy's left column through the lake and forest region by the operations of Landwehr and Landsturm detachments, and to fight a decisive battle against the right column on the northern line. The place chosen for this stand was at Gumbinnen. Here the railway line, running east and west, and the old high road beside it, crossed the marshy hollow of a little river in the midst of a tract of densely wooded country. The western bank of the river was heavily entrenched, and thousands of trees were cut down to form long lines of abattis—that is, obstacles constructed by laying the trees with their branches to the front, and entangling them with barbed wire. Probably over 200,000 men were concentrated for the defence of this hurriedly fortified line. When the work was begun it was not expected that any serious attack could be made on the position by the Russians before the beginning of September.

On Sunday, August 16, Rennenkampf had cleared the country up to the Gumbinnen position, and found his further progress arrested by the entrenched line held by the Germans. According to Russian reports, the enemy's force was made up of three army corps. Allowing for the probability that some of the reserve formations and local defence detachments had joined them, they would be at least 150,000—and might be perhaps 200,000—strong.

On Wednesday, August 26, Rennenkampf attacked and the battle that followed was fierce, stubborn, terrible. Except for the light horse artillery that accompanies a cavalry division, the raiders were lacking in gun power. They could not reply to the enemy's batteries. They had either to ride down the guns across open country, with shrapnel playing on them all the way, or dismount and creep in open formation to the point at which a rush might carry the position.

The trenches were filled with German riflemen, and the fire of innumerable Maxims had to be met. Only the incomparable mobility of the Cossacks enabled Rennenkampf to break the German centre. On the Russian Guard fell the heaviest fighting. The enemy held a village of scattered farmhouses, set in low, level land. Each farmhouse was full of riflemen; behind was ranged the German lines, from which several batteries poured shrapnel into the advancing Russians. Clearing villages is infantry work, but there were no Russian foot soldiers available. Some Russian horsemen, however, were near the spot. They dismounted and fixed bayonets—every Russian cavalryman carried a bayonet—and slowly worked their way to the village, clearing the farms of sharpshooters as they went.

Meanwhile, a couple of German guns were firing on them at short range, and an overwhelming number of entrenched infantrymen was raining bullets on them. When the Guards cleared the village and advanced on the German lines, there was barely a third of them left standing. Yet they pressed on within a hundred yards of the German position. Their leader, who already had a bullet through his thigh, now fell with a shattered shoulder. But the Guards went on, their bayonets ready to strike. They could see the eyes of their foes, and along the German front there were signs of wavering. So a mounted squadron of the Russian Guards was sent full-tilt on the Prussians, and crashing on the line of the enemy, captured the guns and then harried the soldiers.

A wedge was driven clean through the German army. Three army corps fled north-westerly towards Königsberg; the fourth corps ran south-west towards Osterode. All four flung away their arms and ammunition, and even their food, in their haste to save themselves. The intricate system of defences in the swamp country was unused. Even a fortified position on the River Angerapp was abandoned without a fight.

This panic evacuation of a great tract of fortressed country was somewhat of a surprise even to the Russians. There seemed nothing in their victory that should have led to so far-reaching and astounding a disaster to Prussia. But General Rennenkampf understood what had happened.

EAST PRUSSIA. Terrain over which the campaign of 1914, which ended in the Russian defeat at Tannenberg, was fought.

His raid was only one part of an enveloping movement. While his men held the German army at the frontier, and then broke it, another Russian force from Poland, under General Samonsoff, was striking up to the west of the marsh country, taking the beaten German troops in the rear. As a result most of them turned again, and fled towards the coast of the Baltic Sea and the fortress town of Königsberg. Caught between two powerful Russian forces, their entrenchments and blockhouses round the Masurian Lakes had become traps. An almost impregnable system of frontier defence was thus overthrown in a day by cavalry raiders supported by a distant second army.

By Wednesday, August 26, all the difficulties that Nature, assisted by military engineers, had placed in the way of a

Cossack advance in East Prussia were behind the battle front of the Russian armies. General Samsonoff, in the south, moved towards the railway centre at Osterode; in the north, General Rennenkampf rode in pursuit of the main body of 120,000 German troops. So swift were the Russians that they almost arrived at Königsberg with their fleeing foes. Advance guards of the garrison had to take the field and fight a rearguard action to save their comrades.

Being without heavy guns, siege engineers and infantry force, Rennenkampf could not endanger Königsberg. Yet he could not leave it. He drew his army across its eastern lines of communication, and made what preparations he could for a masking operation. In the meantime swarms of his Cossacks went about the serious business of the campaign. From the fields of Eastern Prussia the people of Berlin obtained the larger part of their food supplies. The region was one of the four great granaries of Germany, and the crops were ripening for the harvest on which Berlin expected to live for another twelve months, in spite of the blockade of the British fleet. But the Russians destroyed the crops, captured Tilsit with its immense stores and emptied it. The occupation of Tilsit and Insterberg gave Rennenkampf the command of a second line of supply by the railway running northwards from Insterberg Junction.

No such serious opposition was offered by the Germans to the southern column. There were a number of small engagements, in none of which the Germans made any obstinate defence. They were mostly intended to be mere delaying actions. Lötzen was occupied by the invaders, and the little Fort Boyen, on a neighbouring hillock, barring the pass by which the railway line runs between two lakes, was forced to surrender after a brief bombardment. There was a more serious fight at Frankenau, where Samsonoff defeated a considerable German force, capturing some guns. This success brought the Russian left column safely to the north of the difficult lake region along the frontier, and it was able to get in touch with the right or main column under Rennenkampf.

After the battle of Gumbinnen, the Germans in the north of East Prussia had fallen back on Königsberg without again risking a serious engagement. By the end of August they were under the cover of its advanced forts. Rennenkampf was content with the steps he had taken to mask the fortress, and the rest of

his army joined with his left column and marched south-westward in the direction of the Lower Vistula. Allenstein, the headquarters of the 20th German Army Corps, was occupied without resistance. It was an important station for the German Flying Corps. Before evacuating the place the garrison sent away the airship and aeroplanes stationed there, and burned the big Zeppelin airship shed.

By the end of August the invaders had occupied nearly the whole of East Prussia. The inhabitants of farms and villages had taken to flight in panic at their approach, some of them going as far as Danzig, which was crowded with a quarter of a million fugitives. The rapid success of the Russians led to the most exaggerated reports. It was said that they were advancing in overwhelming numbers towards the Vistula, and were about to attack the fortresses of Graudenz and Thorn, and that Königsberg had been completely invested. This last news was obviously untrue, for Königsberg is linked with the Frisches Haff and the sea-coast by its western forts, and could not be blockaded unless by an enemy who had command of the Baltic. All that the Russians had been able to do was to entrench themselves before the eastern front. Rennenkampf, with the field army, had advanced a little towards Allenstein, but before he could reach the Vistula he would have to traverse a belt of difficult country, abounding in lakes, marshes and woods, round Osterode, Tannenberg and Eylau.

Though apparently he had swept all before him, his position was, in fact, becoming difficult, and his action in pushing so far could only be justified on the ground that the whole invasion of East Prussia was a demonstration in force, intended to alarm the Berlin General Staff into keeping back for the defence of the eastern frontier troops that would otherwise have been sent to France. Strictly speaking, the whole movement was a premature enterprise, with a good deal of bluff about it. But the complete collapse of all resistance after the victory of Gumbinnen gave Rennenkampf the idea that he might safely push still farther forward—though he was too good a soldier to be influenced by the current reports that the Russian army would be able to make an almost unopposed march to Berlin.

By the end of August the Germans were preparing for a very effective counter-stroke. Of the troops that had retired into Königsberg, only enough were left in the place to stiffen the

garrison. The rest were transferred by sea and by the coast railway through Elbing to Danzig and the Lower Vistula. Along the river a large army was being concentrated for the reconquest of East Prussia. General von Hindenburg had taken command of it. More by luck than by skill in selection, the circle of courtiers and intriguers gathered about the Emperor Wilhelm and constituting the directing minds of his great staff had hit on a good man for the command of their eastern armies. General von Hindenburg's name was not given among hundreds of German generals included in "Wer Ist's"—the German "Who's Who." He was one of the laughing-stocks of the modern fashionable soldiers who took part in the kaiser manœuvres. All he was known for was his curious hobby for keeping the wild Masurian Lakes region in East Prussia in its original state of uncultivation. The only thing that moved him to leave his Hanoverian café and go to Berlin, in the days before the war, was a politician's proposal for the drainage and cultivation of the Masurian Lakes. He called on deputies, he called on party leaders, he pleaded before committees; and when all these efforts of his proved vain he went to the emperor and begged that the scheme for reclaiming the lakes should be abandoned.

The ruling German military school regarded the old man as a nuisance and a fool, and as somewhat of a coward. They agreed with the administrators who wanted to drain the lakes, and thus to open up to cultivation an immense region which had been unproductive from the primeval age of the world. Over the drained and populated ancient waste of marsh and water the German staff intended to march their armies across the Niemen river and cut the railway communication between Warsaw and Petrograd. But, moved by the entreaties of the old warrior, Kaiser Wilhelm stopped the scheme for draining the lakes, and in the ancient watery wilderness Hindenburg continued to spend his holidays every year.

Nobody in authority remembered him, even when the emperor and his staff were thrown into deep perturbation by General Rennenkampf's sudden raid into East Prussia. The command of the new army of defence would have been entrusted to another, untried, courtier-general who had succeeded in pleasing the emperor but for the patriotism of General von Ludendorff, an able man of the younger generation connected with the great staff. He is said to have urged the claim of his old master in

military studies, with the result that Hindenburg was given all the forces he required for his long-thought-out operations in the Masurian Lakes.

Something like 2,000,000 Russian troops, operating far away on the southern reaches of the Vistula against the main eastern forces of Germany and Austria, depended for food and ammunition chiefly on their railway-head at Warsaw. Warsaw in turn depended on its railway communication with Petrograd, and as the line to Petrograd ran close to Osoviec, and actually touched the River Bobr a few miles northward at the town of Grodno, where the Bobr flows into the Niemen, there was good reason for the interest which the kaiser took in the attack of his armies upon Osoviec.

Hindenburg was no mean strategist. Early in life he had seen that the Masurian Lakes system, which extends far into Russia to the banks of the Niemen and Bobr, was the key to Russian Poland. By cutting the Russian railway at Osoviec or Grodno he could win Warsaw, and throw the main Russian armies back from Silesia and Posen without a battle. For if the railways were cut, starvation and lack of ammunition would force all the Russian troops in the bend of the Vistula to retire towards the new railway-heads of Siedlce and Brest Litovsk. And even before they could withdraw, the Siedlce line, close to the Warsaw line, could also be cut. Without a general battle the main Russian forces could be thrown back on Brest Litovsk, nearly 240 miles from the German frontier. It will thus be seen that, in his attacks upon Samsonoff's army, Hindenburg aimed at more than freeing East Prussia from the invader.

In concentrating his troops for the counter attack Hindenburg had the advantage of the perfect network of strategic railways on Germany's eastern frontier. Within a few days of the Russian occupation of Allenstein Hindenburg had collected some 150,000 men from the Vistula and elsewhere; the German command of the Baltic made it possible to tranship the troops which had been driven into Königsberg and add them to his forces. The Russians under Samsonoff were at least 200,000 strong. Hindenburg took up his quarters at Marienberg on August 23 with Ludendorff as his chief of staff.

The line held by the German troops was not a boldly marked position like that of Gumbinnen. Indeed, to an ordinary observer, there were no features to distinguish it from several similar tracts

of country in the frontier district. But Hindenburg had selected it on account of his own special knowledge of the ground. He would fight where he could extend his line by taking into it some of the lakes which he had found by experiment to be complete obstacles to any hostile movement. The ground behind his line was easily traversed from right to left, so that he could rapidly reinforce a flank during the battle. The ground in front, though to the ordinary observer it was of much the same character as that which he held, was really cut up by tracts of soft, marshy land and swampy pools which would make movement difficult ; and behind its right there was a tract of marshy forest, with numerous small lakes, that would make the retirement of any large force in that direction exceedingly difficult, and the hurried retreat of guns and transport wagons practically impossible. He quickly got his forces into position on a front that reached from Osterode on the north to a point near Soldau on the south. Thrusting towards the former, the Russians discovered that the Germans had been strengthened, and it was not possible for them to be driven out.

It would seem that at the outset Hindenburg was inferior in numbers to the invaders, but he was reinforced by railway during the three days' fight. From the outset he was stronger in artillery than his opponents. Heavy guns had been brought up from the Vistula fortresses, and batteries of field artillery had been borrowed from the army corps on the Posen frontier. " The Germans crowded their guns into the line as if they were rifles," said a Russian officer. This concentrated fire of artillery proved particularly telling against the Russian frontal attacks during the first two days. Some of these attacks, however, were locally and temporarily successful. Several villages along the front were stormed with the bayonet, but it was difficult to hold them under the downpour of high-explosive shells, of which they were at once made the target.

On August 26 Hindenburg retook Soldau. When, the next day, Samsonoff tried hard to recapture it, he not only failed, but was swept back east to Neidenburg, thus having his left flank turned, and losing his main line of supply and retreat by the Soldau-Mlava railway. Evacuating Allenstein, the Russians retired on Hohenstein, where they made a determined stand, the fighting lasting from August 26 to August 28, but they were compelled to retreat.

On the second day a daring Russian aviator, wheeling high in the air above the woods, saw what at first he took to be long columns of transport wagons moving rapidly along the rear of the German position from centre to left. Venturing closer, he found that these were not supply or ammunition columns, but long strings of motor-vehicles of all kinds, from motor-buses to taxi-cabs, conveying infantry to the left, and rushing back empty to bring up more. His report was delivered in time to enable the Russian staff to order a reinforcement of the right, and on this flank the fighting that decided the battle began in the afternoon of the second day, Hindenburg weakening his centre in order to accumulate a superior force for the flank attack. The enveloping movement on this side, begun in the later hours of the day, was carried on during the night.

At sunrise on the third day the Russian right was turned, and the collapse of their line began. Their only way of retreat was by the south, over a tract of lake and marsh, which was crossed by a narrow defile of firm ground by Ortelsburg and Johannisburg to the frontier. On August 30 they were withdrawing everywhere, losing very many men and guns in the swamps and shallow miry lakes. Hindenburg's knowledge of the terrain enabled him to place his guns on solid spots, and the Russians were mercilessly shelled. On August 31 Samsonoff made a last desperate attempt to rally his men, but he and General Pestitch, his chief of staff, were killed, and the effort came to nothing.

As the Russians gave way from right to left under the converging pressure of front and flank attacks they found it a difficult matter to extricate themselves from the wilderness of woods, lakes and marshes in which they had given battle. Three Russian generals had fallen in the final struggle—Samsonoff, Pestitch and Martos. Tens of thousands of prisoners and scores of guns were taken. The Germans claimed that of the five army corps which formed the enemy's main battle-line they destroyed three and a half. The large number of Russian prisoners of war reported as being interned in Germany in September, 1914, came almost entirely from the battlefield of Tannenberg. It was the most complete victory won by the Germans in the opening phase of the war.

Its immediate result was the precipitate evacuation of East Prussia by the invaders. Rennenkampf extricated from the dangerous lake region the remnant of the army that had fought

and failed. The force that was masking the eastern forts of Königsberg was ordered to withdraw. A column that had been moving towards Danzig and the Vistula delta received similar orders. Near Insterberg Rennenkampf fought a rearguard action, which Hindenburg claimed as a second victory. But the Russians fought only in order temporarily to check the pursuit. After the battle Rennenkampf fell back by Gumbinnen, where he fought a rearguard action, after which he recrossed the frontier and retreated to the line of the river Niemen. There considerable reinforcements were awaiting him, but it was some time before Russia was able to renew the offensive in this region.

CHAPTER 10

Russian Offensive in Galicia

GALICIA, the scene of Russia's successful campaign in 1914, was then a province of the Austro-Hungarian empire, but it formed part of the great Polish plain, and was separated from Hungary by the Carpathian mountains. Compared with the giant mountains of Switzerland the Carpathians are hills rather than mountains. Along this Galician border they form a broad belt of forest-clad sandstone ridges, mostly under 5,000 feet high, traversed by a number of passes and hill roads, forming an admirable natural defence for Hungary. The province of Galicia is thus a terraced slope descending to the northern plain which stretches from its margin to the shores of the Baltic. Behind the Galician frontier the Austrians had constructed, as the Germans had done in Prussia, railways which were primarily planned for the purposes of war. To the north of the Carpathians in Galicia were two important cities, Cracow, in the west, and Lemberg, in the east, about two hundred miles distant from one another, while almost midway between them was Przemysl, one of the most modern Austrian fortresses, completed just before the war.

The Central Powers had prepared a combined plan for the conquest of Russian Poland. An Austrian army was to advance

from Galicia, between Cracow and Lemberg. At the same time a German force, of about equal numerical strength but inferior quality, was to strike at Warsaw from Eastern Prussia and German Poland. The defending Russian army would then be assailed on three sides, and either routed or driven back from its railway centre at Brest-Litovsk.

Like all German war plans, this was excellent on paper. Had the Russians also done the obvious thing in reply to the obvious movements of the enemy forces, the grand duke Nicholas and his chief of staff, General Sukhomlinoff, might have been outgeneralled. Unfortunately for the Austrians, the Russian military staff was well aware of the German war plan and engineered a series of surprises that completely disarranged from the beginning the programme of the Central Powers. The German forces were violently wrenched from all cooperation with the Austrian armies by General Rennenkampf's sudden raid into East Prussia. His immediate menace to Königsberg, his destruction of the food resources of Berlin, and his threat at Thorn and Danzig aroused the German instinct for self-preservation. Alarmed for their own fields and cities, they withdrew from Russian Poland, where their advanced guard had reached Lodz on the way to Warsaw, and hastily concentrated in Prussia against the Cossack invaders.

This left the Austrian armies in the west of Russian Poland at the mercy of the Russian military staff. The Austrian commanders—General Dankl, General Auffenberg and several archdukes—did not lose confidence. Possessing 2,500 guns and 1,000,000 young men of the regular army, with large militia supports in Galicia, they regarded Russia as a sleepy giant who could be stabbed to death before he was half awake. Speeding up their mobilisation, they launched two great armies over the frontier. The first army, commanded by Dankl, was based upon Przemysl, and the second army, commanded by Auffenberg, was based upon Lemberg and placed at right angles to Dankl's army to guard against a flanking movement by Russia from the east. On August 10 the 1st Austrian army crossed the frontier and advanced towards Krasnik. The movement was slow because Austria was hoping for German reinforcements, but the Russian advance into East Prussia had made it necessary for Germany to send all the forces she could spare from the western front to reinforce Hindenburg.

The Russian concentration in Western Poland was not yet complete, but a considerable army had been collected west of the river Bug with its left protected by the fortress of Zamosc. It was with this army that Dankl first came in contact, but as the Russians were considerably outnumbered they slowly fell back on the Bug. As the Russians continually gave ground the Austrians were able to report almost daily successes to Vienna and Budapest. These reports had a political as well as a military value. The Austrian empire—"the ramshackle empire," as it was often called—had a mixed population. A considerable proportion of its people were Slavs whose secret, and, in some cases, open, sympathies were with Russia and Serbia. News of Russian victories would have fostered the spirit of rebellion which existed among them: every Austrian victory lessened their hope that they could look to Russia for relief from an alien domination.

Pressing back the small Russian forces opposed to him Dankl advanced towards the towns of Lublin and Kholm, some fifty miles into Russian Poland. Meanwhile the Russians had collected very considerable forces between Warsaw and Kiev. By August 25 the Austrians were within striking distance of the railway which connected Ivangorod and Warsaw. They had reached the line between the Vistula and the Bug, where the grand duke Nicholas had resolved to hold them. Meanwhile a Russian counter-offensive was being planned. A second Russian army under General Russky was assembled, based on the fortresses of Lutsk and Dubno, and appeared to be merely the left wing of the Russian army resisting an advance into Poland.

The other army under General Brusiloff was to advance on Galicia from the north-east. To screen this threat to Lemberg from the east a constant series of Cossack raids had been carried out from the beginning of the war on the eastern frontier of Galicia. The actual defence of Lemberg was left to the army of General Auffenberg. The Russian plan was that the 1st army should fall back before Dankl, the 2nd army, under Russky, was to drive a wedge between Dankl and Auffenberg, while Brusiloff with the 3rd army turned Auffenberg's right flank. Brusiloff accomplished his advance with complete secrecy. It took place in daylight, over a period of thirteen days, from August 19 to August 31. The Austrians had a host of spies, working with Teutonic thoroughness; they had a large force of well-mounted,

dashing cavalrymen, including the cavalry divison of the Hungarian Guards—the best horsemen in either Austria or Germany. They had scouts in aeroplanes darting over the frontier. Yet the Russian turning movement in Eastern Galicia was not discovered until too late.

This was partly due to the fact that the country through which Brusiloff was working was an ancient Russian duchy that had been torn from the ancestors of the tsar. Eastern Galicia was the Alsace-Lorraine of the Slav empire, peopled by a Slav race, with the same language, religion and customs as the men of Brusiloff's army. At the villages priests and people came out with banners to meet their "little brothers." In the towns flowers were thrown from the upper windows along the streets upon the armed redeemers of the ancient duchy. And all that could be done by silence or pretended ignorance to mislead the Austrians and Hungarians was done by the peasants. It is, moreover, very likely that Russian secret service agents had well prepared the Little Russians of Galicia for the invasion.

But this does not palliate the failure of the Austrian general military staff. They knew what Eastern Galicia meant to Russia. Why, then, were they not fully forearmed against the inevitable attack? The probable explanation is that they were so obsessed by the Moltke system of warfare that they were blind to everything except the "scientific" scheme of operations they were carrying out farther to the north-west, in Russian Poland. They had a strong front between the Vistula and the Bug rivers, and by continually moving forward into Russia they thought to force the Russians to concentrate against them. The attackers had merely to advance strongly and conqueringly in order to compel their opponent to attempt to stop them. Nothing else mattered. Cossack activity in Galicia was merely a feint and a vain distraction.

Meanwhile, General Brusiloff made the very most of his opportunities. As quietly as possible he moved over the tributaries of the Dniester, in Galicia, and pushed back the Austrian cavalry screen without revealing his strength. On the versatile Cossack fell all this preliminary work. He had to do without infantry support or any considerable show of artillery power. Neither the infantryman nor the ordinary field artillery could be brought into action without revealing that which it was necessary to conceal.

THE FORMER AUSTRIAN BORDER PROVINCE OF GALICIA

This map shows the province into which the Russians made a succesful advance in the early months of the Great War, the chief result of which was the capture of its capital, the populous city of Lemberg or Lwow.

The Cossack horseman had to veil his main army and clear its path through forts, blockhouses and bridgeheads, while appearing to be merely a border raider. Excellently was he suited for this kind of work. Far in advance of the tramping foot soldiers and the labouring big gun teams, moving at the rate of eight miles a day, the Cossack kept up a continual skirmish with every sort of hostile arm—cavalry, scout, infantrymen, and gunners in fortified places, and even armoured trains. Helped only by his own light artillery, he fought in every manner practised by modern troops. He charged with his lance; he dismounted and took positions with the bayonet that all Russian cavalry carried; at need, he entrenched, and proved himself a marksman.

The Cossack was a member of a military caste, born, bred and trained entirely for a life of war. His ancestors, hammered into shape by a continual conflict with warlike Mongol races, had built up the kingdom of Poland and then, to preserve their independence, had gone over to the duke of Moscow and become the empire-builders of Russia. Never had the Cossack enjoyed himself as he did in Galicia against the Hungarians and Austrians. On their unfortunate heads he emptied all his box of tricks. It would be interesting to learn from some survivor of the famous cavalry division of the Magyar Guards, who met the Cossacks near Lemberg, and then—after a railway journey across Europe—encountered the British lancers and dragoons at Ypres, which of his two foes he found the more formidable. Certainly the Cossacks were more tricky fighters than the British horsemen. Their clever horsemanship was equal to that of any performer in the circus.

In Galicia, when hard pressed, they fell "dead" in heaps, their "dead" horses beside them. As the enemy came to search their bodies the dead men used their carbines with surprising effect. Another time a herd of little Cossack horses would stampede, and the riderless animals would sweep towards some guarded bridgehead or blockhouse. Even little Cossack horses were useful to Austrian soldiers; they could be sold for good money to Galician farmers. But, just before the animals were caught, grey figures swung from beneath them, lance in hand, and charged. It was like a show in the arena, but deadly for the spectators. When it came to a straightforward cavalry fight, sabre against sabre, the Cossack still won.

All the tricks of war, however, were not practised by the Russians. The Austrians, on occasions, showed themselves masters of craft. An instance occurred on August 23 in the frontier fight for Tarnopol, an important Galician town on the Sereth River, seventy miles east-south-east of Lemberg. Piercing the enemy's front line, a Russian division swept onward to meet the main body of their foes. They passed an Austrian officer who was sitting on the earth bandaging his leg. Naturally they did not hurt this wounded man. But they failed to get with the bayonet into the enemy's trenches: he was prepared, and brought them down with a terrible concentrated fire. Withdrawing after one of these reverses, a Russian officer noticed a wire running along the road. He found it led to a field telephone, and by this concealed instrument the supposed Austrian was sitting, and giving warning to his general of all the Russian movements. When the bandage round the man's leg was removed, it was seen that his limb was quite sound. After the telephone operator was stopped the Russian bayonet went over the Austrian trenches, and the Cossacks rode down the fugitives.

In spite of the continual skirmishings, drawing nearer and nearer to Lemberg, no alarm was felt by the Austrian commander until General Brusiloff's army, crossing stream after stream, forced the passage of the Lipa. Even then the Austrian general military staff suspected that a blow was coming southward against the rear of their main armies. They had three army corps round Lemberg to protect from any turning movement their one hundred and fifty mile battle-front, stretching north-west through Russian territory. But this was not sufficient when General Russky's army and General Brusiloff's army were at last seen combining for attack. The Austrians hurried up two more army corps which moved against Russky, while several divisions of foot—line infantry and brigades of militia troops—reinforced the position to be held against Brusiloff's force. In all there were at least about three hundred thousand Austrian troops round Lemberg.

All this, however, was done too late, in the last days of August. General Russky and General Brusiloff had united, some forty miles east of the city. The combined armies then acted under the leadership of General Russky in a concerted attack upon the capital of Galicia. In both brains and fighting

power the Austrians were outmatched. General Russky was one of the leading strategists of the new Russo-French school, a quiet, bookish, scholarly man, hardened to war in Manchuria, where he had distinguished himself by bold leading and personal courage. General Brusiloff was another brilliant and yet sound leader, with high practical experience in modern warfare. With the two Russian generals was the hero of Bulgaria, General Radko Dmitrieff, who had vanquished the German-trained Turkish army at Kirk Kilisse and other recent battles of the Balkans. He had thrown up his appointment under the Bulgarian government in order to go as a volunteer to help the Slav people in the struggle against the Teuton, whose intrigues had brought Bulgaria low in the hour of her victory and disrupted the Balkan Alliance. In numbers the two opposing armies seem to have been, in the end, about equal. But the Russian artillery, made chiefly in France, was superior to the Austrian. Moreover, the Austrians had weakened their artillery to help the Germans in Belgium and France.

In addition to this disadvantage in the machinery of warfare, the southern Austrian army was caught in a moment of disarray. Its main reinforcement of two army corps was intercepted on August 29 by General Russky and was shattered, and the victorious Russians moved on and occupied a height known as the Naked Hill, from which they dominated Lemberg. In the meantime General Brusiloff's army, forming the left Russian wing, swung round to encircle Lemberg from the south. In so doing it struck against the main southern Austrian army entrenched at Halicz, a fortress town on the Lipa, that pours its turbid waters into the Dniester.

The Austrians were bent on getting round Brusiloff's southern flank and then rolling up the combined Russian forces. But this manœuvre did not succeed. General Brusiloff held up the turning movement, and his gallant Bulgarian assistant, General Radko Dmitrieff, made a terrible frontal attack on the enemy on the lower course of the Lipa.

The Austrian position was very strong and difficult to assail, with bluffs of volcanic rock and extinct craters; the natural defences had been improved by Austrian engineers, and thirty small forts had been built round Halicz. The river passage was, in fact, regarded as impregnable. But the Russian bayonets went over river, rifle pit and trench, while the Russian gunners

swept a path for their infantry and smashed the hostile batteries and destroyed the forts. The Russians advanced in open order at first, creeping up and firing in thin, prone lines; then getting nearer in a spurt, and again holding the ground by rifle fire till their supports could come up. Then they rose up to prove the truth of their old saying, handed down from the days of Suvarov: "The bullet is a fool and the bayonet a hero."

The Austrians and Hungarians fought well. They faced the bayonet courageously and used it themselves, but their rifle fire was not sufficiently well-aimed to stop the rushes. The battle opened on August 31 and went on for twenty-four hours, till the Austrian line was pierced, and 20,000 of the defenders were either killed or wounded. The hand-to-hand fighting at the battle of Halicz was fierce and dreadful, but the drive and steadiness of the Russian troops made them at last irresistible. Many days of hard marching had not tired them, and they bore the main part in the struggle for Lemberg which was their next effort.

After the victory they closed in on the capital from the south, driving the fragments of the broken Austrian wing before them. Meanwhile, Russian aeroplanes were flying over the doomed city, and General Russky's army, rapidly covering the forty miles between Zloczow and Lemberg, captured some fortified positions close to the city. On the north and the north-east the Russians deployed, and then the heights on the south-east were also taken. For six days the battle raged—from August 29 to September 3. The Russians at first fought from dawn to darkness, their big guns thundering over them as they attacked or threw back counter-attacks; finally they fought night and day.

The Austrians battled on with great energy in a good position. The progress of the Russians was impeded by the hilly nature of the ground, and especially by the great number of extinct volcano craters, that formed admirable natural forts, all held by strong bodies of the enemy. Out of these craters the Austrians had to be shrapnelled and bayoneted at heavy cost. Their artificial defences were only trifling obstacles compared with these natural fortifications. The country was stony and devoid of water, and the overworked, struggling Russian troops suffered badly from thirst in the hot, wearying summer weather that prevailed at the time.

AUSTRIAN MONITOR ON THE DANUBE. The Danube gave Austria easy access to Serbia's territory. On the great waterway at the outbreak of hostilities were six of the monitors, one of which is seen in this photograph, in addition to the same number of torpedo boats, which constituted a menace to the Serbian capital.

E.N.A

General Radomir Putnik commanded the Serbian armies with great skill in 1914 and during the terrible retreat into Montenegro and Albania in the autumn of 1915.

King Peter of Serbia, though nominally head of his fighting forces, delegated the actual direction to his son Alexander, Crown Prince, and General Putnik. He accompanied his armies in the retreat of 1915.

Marshal Joffre, appointed in 1911 generalissimo of the French armies in the event of war, held that position 1914-16. He was then made a marshal of France.

Henri Manuel

General Lanrezac came into prominence by the skilful extrication of his forces from the German enveloping movement after the battle of Charleroi in August, 1914.

ALLIED COMMANDERS EAST AND WEST

Alexander von Kluck commanded the German 1st army in the great sweep into Belgium and France, and was outgeneralled at the battle of the Marne. He retired in 1916.

E.N.A

Helmuth von Moltke, chief of the German general staff, 1906–14, was superseded after failing to capture Paris in October, 1914.

Karl von Bülow led the German 2nd army in the invasion of Belgium in 1914. Defeated by Foch on the Marne, he was transferred.

THREE FAMOUS GERMAN GENERALS IN THE WEST

A GENERAL'S STAFF AFTER MONS. This photograph, taken while the Germans were actually firing into and over the barricade at the top of this street at Frameries, shows General Shaw discussing operations with his staff after the battle.

The nearer they drew to Lemberg the fiercer the fighting became. But it had already been apparent at Złoczow that the Russian guns ruled the battlefield, and on September 1, just as General Brusiloff was winning at Halicz, General Russky succeeded in driving the main Galician army beneath the shelter of the Lemberg forts. The Russian troops were then very tired, but, exultant at the prospect of victory, they fought even better than before. For two more days the battle flamed and thundered round the forts, both armies being terribly swept by shrapnel from the opposing guns.


LEMBERG
(Lwów)
GALICIA
RUSSIA
HUNGARY
CARPATHIANS
Tarnopol
Złoczów
Brody
Dubno
Rovno
Sokal
Rawa Ruska
Jaworów
Mosciska
Przemysl
Sambor
Drohobycz
Stryj
Halicz
Kalusz
Stanislau
Kolomea
Delatyn
Jablonica
Zabie
Kuty
Kossow
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Kossow
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Ottynia

answering fire weakened, the Russian infantry was ordered to storm the first line of works. They leaped out and, going forward at a run, took the defences and bayoneted the few men who remained by the few guns not yet destroyed by the Russian howitzers. Then, from the second line, the Austrians tried to annihilate the attackers by shrapnel from light field artillery and by rifle and machine gun fire. But the enemy's heavy guns on the second line were by this time also too badly damaged to counter the big Russian guns. These shelled and shrapnelled the opposing light artillery and machine guns, and thus relieved the infantry occupying the first Austrian lines. When all the enemy's artillery had been mastered, the defending troops did not await the final bayonet attack, but retired from their works—the retreat changing into a rout as their rearguards gave way.

This rearguard action was of the most extraordinary kind—only in a German or Austrian retreat could it have occurred. To save themselves and their own countrymen the Austrian and Hungarian officers ranged on their rear the Slav regiments—Little Russians of Galicia, Poles, Serbs of Bosnia, and mutinous Bohemians. This rearguard screen was thrown out on the road to Gorodok, and to prevent the Slavs from refusing to fight and from going over to the Russians, a line of Hungarians stood behind them, with orders to shoot them in the back the moment they showed any hesitation. Happily, this state of things became known to the Russian commander. At the critical moment he ordered a devastating artillery fire, with the guns at a high angle, to be opened on the rearguard. The shells and shrapnel were so aimed that they passed high over the heads of the Slav regiments and fell and exploded on the retreating Austrians and Hungarians. It was this surprising, terrifying hail of high-explosive shells and wrecking shrapnel bursts that changed the retreat from Lemberg into a panic flight. The columns broke and scattered along all the western paths, abandoning guns, ammunition and supplies, and fleeing in terror towards the next fortress of Gorodok.

North and east and south the Russians closed on the town, taking the last line of forts, and then pouring into the streets at nine o'clock on Thursday, September 3. Some Austrian detachments tried to fight back the victors in the thoroughfares of the city, but were cut off and captured. The Slav population

welcomed the Russians with shouts of joy, and the sound of their happy voices singing the Russian national anthem mingled with the last shots fired by the routed enemy outside the capital of the ancient Russian duchy.

As the conquerors, dull-eyed and weary from a battle that had raged at last night and day without ceasing, passed down the streets they forgot their fatigue and their hunger and thirst. Flowers fell on them from the crowded windows, and cheering men and women, speaking a language they could understand, pressed by their side and offered them food and drink and kissed their hands.

At half-past ten on September 3 the Russian flag fluttered out from the staff of the town hall, and a deputation of townspeople waited on General Russky and assured him that the desire of all the Slav population was to become true and loyal sons of the mighty Russian empire. The conduct of the victorious troops was good. Having a large provision train, they had no need to ask the people for any assistance, and exemplary order was at once maintained by the military authorities, with the co-operation of the municipal bodies. The only booty taken was the Austrian army stores, with 200 guns and much baggage. The war material was enormous, as it had been collected from all parts of Austria-Hungary and stored in Lemberg to provide the armies on the frontier with supplies for six months or more. Its capture was of much importance.

But large as were the immediate consequences of the storming of the capital of Galicia, these were only the by-products of the great victories at Halicz and Lemberg. The great thing was that the Napoleonic stroke had succeeded. Something like 300,000 hostile troops, forming the powerful right wing of the greatest army that ever invaded Russia, were shattered and fugitive. They had been gathered to protect the two main Austro-Hungarian armies operating in the country to the north. Their defeat and flight exposed the main armies to an attack from the rear as well as on the front and flank. General Russky with his men went northward at once with a large force, while General Dmitrieff and General Brusiloff acted together round Lemberg against the army they had broken, which was being reinforced by German troops and Hungarian militia.

While Brusiloff and Russky were converging upon Lemberg the Austrian army in Russian Poland under General Dankl held

the line it had taken up in the direction of Lublin and Kholm. The Russian army opposing Dankl had been strengthened by withdrawing some of Rennenkampf's forces in East Prussia, and on August 26, the Russian right wing advanced against Dankl's army near Krasnik.

As the attack was not driven home, the Austrians claimed the victory. But the action had the effect intended. General Dankl was made anxious. To increase his strength he brought across the Vistula part of the Austrian force operating round Kielce in expectation of German support in a movement towards Warsaw and Ivangorod. This weakened the subsequent outflanking attack delivered on the other side of the river at Ivangorod. Even more immediately important was the check to General Dankl's advance towards Lublin. In conjunction with the attack that afterwards followed on Ivangorod, the progress of Dankl's army along the other bank of the Vistula would have endangered the entire Russian position. It would have cut in two the Russian armies in Prussia, Poland, and Galicia. Dankl was so placed as to be extremely dangerous to the Russians, who therefore turned their main attention to him.

Such were the circumstances in which the decisive stage of the battle opened on Friday, August 28. Far in the south, at the extreme right wing of the two hundred mile battle-front, General Russky and General Brusiloff were then fiercely engaging the Lemberg armies. To prevent any troops being shifted from the Austrian left wing or centre to the support of the overwhelmed right wing, the Russian commander-in-chief strongly attacked all along the line. The centre, by Tomashov, close on the frontier and near the railway running to Lemberg, was the point from which reinforcements could most easily have been moved. So there the Russian attack was pressed with most violence, with the result that the 15th Hungarian division, holding this important sector, was routed.

The general battle raged for a week between the Vistula and the Bug without any decision being reached. The fact was that this period of the conflict was not important from the standpoint of the Russian commander. He wished only to hold back Dankl, and to prevent him from helping the Austrian armies in Galicia. There, at Zloczow, Halicz, and Lemberg, General Russky and General Brusiloff and General Radko Dmitrieff were breaking through the southern Austrian right wing, and thus turning the

other Austrian positions northward between Lublin and Kholm. The main Russian army had to wait for a successful issue of its detached southern forces.

Naturally, Dankl knew what was happening far to the south. Furious were the attempts he made to retrieve the defeat of the distant right wing by shattering the main Russian army in front of him. On August 31 the Austrians made a desperate advance on Ivangorod, a fortress town possessing the only available bridge over the great river. Had Ivangorod been won, the main Russian army would have had the tables turned on it and have been taken in the rear. But the Ivangorod garrison, with Russian forces operating round Warsaw, defeated the Austrians. These retired up the river towards Opole, where General Dankl had entrenched, threw two pontoon bridges over the water, and joined his army. Strengthened by them, Dankl again tried to reach the Lublin railway, but the Russian commander, having thrown all his reinforcements on this side, beat back the advance once more.

While the attack on Ivangorod was being made by the Austrians over the river, with Dankl cooperating with them on the opposite side, the Austrian centre also violently assailed the Russian main army. The Russians were hard put to it to withstand the onslaught of the Austrians. The position suddenly changed about September 6. By a wonderful feat of marching, General Russky brought some of his troops up from Lemberg, and the Austrian army penetrating into Poland was then attacked on three fronts. All the offensive was knocked out of it by the heavy losses it suffered ; it was completely reduced to a defensive rôle, and compelled at some points to retreat.

For a few hours it looked as though the Austrian front would be pierced. But the Austrians worked with great energy to repair their centre and right wing. Reinforcements of 300,000 German troops with heavy artillery were railed to them in the nick of time, together with supports from Tirol and Hungary. One hundred and fifty thousand of the Germans marched with their big guns into Russian territory, and were placed on the hills round Turobin.

The other three German army corps were used to stiffen a new right wing, formed of the fresh Austro-Hungarian troops and the fugitives from the battles of Halicz and Lemberg. These fugitives were mainly loyalists, the disaffected Slavs to the

number of 70,000 having surrendered to the Russians. Refitted, reorganized, and emptied of mutinous troops, the broken Galician army was really more powerful than it had been before.

The final position on which the Austrians posted themselves was a strong line to hold. Indeed, it might have been regarded as excellent, if it were not for the marshes behind it and its distance from the frontier railways. The troops were ranged between the Vistula and the Bug on a line running from Opole to Zamosc and Tomashov. In one place they were still within gunshot of the Lublin railway.

The country was rolling and wooded, affording good cover for infantry, and admirable positions for foliage-screened batteries. No outflanking movement by the Russian army seemed possible. The first Austrian force above Krasnik was protected by the wide, deep, unbridged waters of the Vistula. Moreover, Austrian war-boats, with quick-firing guns, joined in the battle from the river. Any movement by the flank was prevented by the waters of the Vistula on one side, and on the other by the fortress of Gorodok and by a larger army than the Russians possessed at Lemberg.

The Russians proposed to carry the position by a frontal attack instead of an outflanking movement, and for this purpose collected a general reserve which could be shifted to any part of the Austrian line which it seemed possible to penetrate.

To begin with, a feint thrust was made at a point that was far removed from the spot chosen for the real piercing attack. It was on the left wing of the Austrian forces that the real frontal attack was to be made. So, against all expectations, General Dankl, in his apparently quite impregnable position on the Vistula, was the first to feel the full weight and edge of Russia's power. For some days the long battle continued in a close-pressed Russian offensive all along the line. The Austrians suffered most at Tomashov, where General Russky was co-operating in the attack. When this delusive operation had taken effect, the hammer-stroke fell some 40 miles away on Dankl's army.

The decisive tactics of the Russians had a characteristic subtlety about them. They massed a strong force with many guns on the opposite side of the Vistula. It was composed of tried troops. They could easily destroy the single German division that was holding the left bank of the river. This they did about September 8. Meanwhile, General Dankl was invited

to advance from his strong, entrenched position farther East. The pressure upon his front was entirely relaxed now that the general reserve had been massed behind the troops that had been holding him.

He resolved to take advantage of this state of things, and also to relieve the pressure at Tomashov, by another swift, forceful offensive movement towards his customary objective—Lublin and the railway line. The road was now left clear for him to within some eight miles of the railway to Warsaw. Then, however, his men were hufled back with great violence and speed. The Austrians were barely back in their trenches when the first great frontal attack of the modern era was delivered. There was the preliminary artillery duel, in which the superior Russian guns were pushed forward to search and overpower the hostile batteries. This result was largely achieved. Some Austrian river gunboats tried to get an enfilading fire against the Russians, only to be smitten from the side themselves. For by this time the Russian force on the farther bank of the Vistula had routed the German division and had brought up their guns to take part in the battle. The hostile gunboats were sunk or forced to retire, and the riverside Russian batteries then began in turn to enfilade the Austrian position.

While this side conflict was proceeding, with important consequences for General Dankl's troops in their hour of retreat, the decisive infantry attack on the centre of the Austrian front opened. In grey lines the Russians moved onward from cover to cover, making quick rushes, and then lying prone and firing steadily at any heads showing in the trenches, while their supports were running into position behind them.

It was at the village of Vysoky, eastward of Krasnik, that the lines of General Dankl's army were pierced on September 9. There the Russian bayonet came over the Austrian trench, stabbing with dreadful skill as it passed. Behind, the machine-guns were pushed through the first broken defence, to help in the decisive work of shattering the enemy's second line. As the foremost troops were fighting in the twilight of daybreak against the re-forming Austrians, another mass of grey, tall figures crashed into the conflict. The Austrian line was completely broken. General Dankl abandoned his position with great speed, and in doing so exposed the German army on his right to a flank attack.

All this Austro-German left wing could have been completely routed, and even annihilated, by the attacking army and its powerful supports on the opposite bank of the Vistula. But the Russian commander was aiming at larger results than the immediate destruction of General Dankl's forces. In pursuit of these results he detached only sufficient troops to keep the beaten wing on the move along the shore of the Vistula, and thrust it back if it tried to turn eastward and grope for a connection with its centre.

Every other Russian soldier was then marched, weary but nerved by victory to more labour and fighting, against the western flank and rear of the central Austrian armies. For the flight of the Germans from the heights of Turobin had naturally exposed their neighbours on their left to a turning movement similar to that which had made them retire. But the grand duke Nicholas did not intend the Austrian centre to escape by a retreat. All through the evening and night of September 9 the Russian troops marched, some corps covering a remarkable distance by a splendid display of endurance. The result was that Auffenberg's army on September 10 was completely encircled at the battle of Rava Russka. General Russky held it on the south-west near Tomashov. Round Zamosc and along the northern front it was retained by its old opponents; on the east and south, part of the Russian left wing barred all the roads.

North and east and west the Russians drove in upon the Austrians, and though the southernmost attacking force drew off, leaving an apparent path of retreat, this movement was as deadly in effect as an attack would have been. For the only line of retirement thus allowed to the broken Austrians led to the wide, disastrous swamp lands of the River San. Into this terrible trap the Austrian centre army was forced by blow after blow on flanks and rear.

At the same time Dankl's army, now separated by a two days' march from its broken centre, was more vigorously handled by the Russian commander. As soon as the Austrian centre forces were scattered and bogged in the southern river swamps some of the Russian troops were again moved towards the Vistula to co-operate in drawing Dankl's army in disorder into another stretch of marshland between the Vistula and its tributary the San. The water draining from the Carpathian Mountains into Galicia turns both rivers into streams that ooze and trickle for miles into the

country on either side, and turn the land, even in the month of September, into green, untraversable morasses. It was bad strategy on the part of the Austrian commander-in-chief to place his armies with their backs to a wide, long stretch of swamp. But he had been so confident of at least holding the Russian attack that he did not trouble to arrange for the possibility of a sudden retreat. In the end this cost him half his army, almost all his war stores, and a large number of his guns—some captured in the fight, but more bogged during the murderous rout through the river swamps.

For two or three days after the victory over the enemy's left wing and centre, the two immense bodies of defeated troops were shepherded into difficulties rather than continually cut down. For most of the victors were as fatigued as the vanquished, though the Cossacks seemed to be indefatigable. They kept the routed forces moving and allowed them no chance to re-form.

Meanwhile, the Russian commander was again drawing off troops from the centre for more battle work. For the Austrian right wing in Galicia, between Rava Russka and Gorodok, close to Lemberg, was putting up a magnificent fight. This stand was unexpected, for many of the troops had been thoroughly defeated in the first battles around Lemberg. The conflict appears to have begun soon after the capture of Lemberg, when the Bulgarian General Radko Dmitrieff advanced with some 40,000 men to drive in the still retreating wing and thus expose the retreating centre army to a rear attack.

Into this part of the battlefield, however, there were suddenly poured enormous reinforcements, including the second three German army corps sent in answer to Austria's appeal. The Austro-Germans took the offensive and made continual attacks of a most determined kind. The brunt of these assaults fell upon the 40,000 men under the heroic Bulgarian. In this place the Austrians and Germans outnumbered the Russians by four—or even five—to one. The Russians fought in a splendidly stubborn and enduring manner. For three days and nights the conflict raged unceasingly, and Dmitrieff had to use his troops to the uttermost. It was General Brusiloff who came to the help of his former companion in victory at Halicz. But even when their forces were united they were still outnumbered by the opposing army. The Austro-German forces here were directed by the Archduke Frederick.

A considerable force of Austrians and Germans assailed the Russian advance guard, with a view to shattering it and then breaking through the centre. The Russian infantry and guns were strongly entrenched. In reserve there were several Cossack detachments. At first the Austrian foot soldiers attacked under cover of a bombardment. But they encountered so heavy a gun fire and rifle fire that they wavered and fell back.

Then an attempt was made to carry the trenches by a cavalry charge. The flower of the Austro-Hungarian army, officered by the Magyar nobility, was hurled against the Russian front. The Hungarians, in their bright jackets, galloped furiously forward in close order. It seemed as though nothing could stay their impetuous course. Massed shrapnel fire made great gaps in their ranks ; a rain of bullets from the machine-guns swept away their leading squadrons ; at last the magazine rifles of the Russian infantry volleyed at them.

But the Hungarians never hesitated. Those who survived only urged their horses to cover the ground more quickly, and prepared to strike. The Russian infantry rose with their bayonets in a hopeless attempt to repel an overwhelming charge. In less than a minute, it seemed, the trenches would be taken. But behind them the infantry heard a thud of hoofs and clatter of steel, and the Hungarians were countered by a whirlwind of Cossacks. For two hours the Austrian and Russian infantry watched with excited eyes the scene of carnage, each cheering on their men, and getting in a quick, helping shot on occasion. In the end not a man was left of the first cavalry division of the Budapest Guard. Its commander, General Frohreich, it was reported, could not bear the disgrace of the defeat and shot himself on the battlefield.

With desperate valour the Austro-German right wing tried to maintain its position between Rava Russka and Gorodok. When its centre and left wing gave way the need for holding out against the southern Russian army became still more urgent. For it then had to cover the retreat of Dankl's and Auffenberg's forces, and prevent General Brusiloff and General Dmitrieff from sweeping down also upon the broken fugitives. But on September 12 General Russky joined again with General Brusiloff and General Dmitrieff. The archduke's force was turned in the north, and it, too, fled westward. More fortunate than the other two Austro-German armies, it was able to fall back towards the

famous fortress of Przemysl, which required a long siege even with modern artillery to reduce it.

Thus in the first three months there was an Austrian invasion of Russia, which was swept back and turned into a Russian invasion of Galicia ; a Russian invasion of East Prussia, which was hurled back and turned into a Prussian invasion of Russia, which was first blocked on the Niemen, and then pressed back again into East Prussia ; a German rush upon Poland, with Warsaw as its objective, which, quite close to Warsaw, was arrested and hurled back again almost to the Prussian border. And, finally, the Russian successes in Galicia brought practically the whole of that province into Russian occupation.

CHAPTER 11

The Effort of Serbia

AUSTRIA'S declaration of war against Serbia on July 28 found the latter in the midst of a reorganization of her army. Her treasury was depleted and her people were war-weary. In 1913 she had emerged victorious but exhausted from the second Balkan War. The one advantage which she had was that her army of about 250,000 men was largely composed of seasoned soldiers. Though she had a large quantity of small arm ammunition she was short of rifles, artillery and shells. The frontier between Serbia and Austria was 300 miles long, and the Serbian army could not adequately guard the whole of it.

Serbia was unfortunate, too, in the fact that her capital, Belgrade, stood actually on the frontier, at the junction formed by the Danube with the Save. The Austrian government had planned what was termed a "punitive expedition" against Serbia. The intention was to make an enveloping movement by four army corps with Nish as the objective. Two corps were to cross the Danube at Basiasch and Belgrade, while one corps from the north-west was to cross the River Save in the vicinity of Shabatz, and act as a right flank guard to the Austrian advance. A fourth corps, moving from Serajevo on Ushitza, was to turn the flank of any Serbian line of defence, and at the same time, by invading the Novi Bazar district, to separate

Serbia from Montenegro, who immediately after Austria's declaration of war had thrown in her lot with her neighbour. On July 29, Austrian artillery began to bombard Belgrade from the opposite bank of the Danube, and there was firing also from Austrian monitors on the Danube, while the Serbian government at once left the capital and retired to Nish. The Serbian army, commanded by the Crown Prince Alexander, with Marshal Putnik as his chief of staff, took up a position on the hills behind the town of Valievo.

During the first week in August five Austrian army corps made repeated efforts to cross the Danube and the Save. The points of crossing were successfully disputed by the Serbian frontier guards, assisted by detached columns from the army of the Danube, and an advance guard of the western army. In no case did the Austrian attempts meet with any measure of success, while a combined effort to invade Serbia from the extreme east at Orsova resulted in a minor disaster for the Austrian arms—a foretaste of what was to come. The three battalions that formed the Austrian advance guard lost touch with their own main body, and at the same time fell into a carefully prepared trap. They suffered heavy losses.

This marked success produced a very wholesome effect upon the morale of the Serbians, who had resented the bombardment of their capital from across the Danube, to which they had been unable to make an effective reply. They regained confidence, not only in their own powers, but in the ability of their generals. After this affair the Austrians showed activity on the river Drina, which formed the western frontier of Serbia, but were quite unable to effect a crossing. On August 11, under cover of a very heavy combined rifle and artillery fire along the whole of the front from Losnitza on the Drina to Shabatz on the Save, a reconnaissance in force was carried out in which the Austrian aircraft were particularly active, but still no crossing was effected.

The Serbian forces within the triangle found themselves not only hopelessly outnumbered, but with both their flanks threatened should the Austrians succeed in crossing either of the rivers. It was therefore considered advisable to begin a partial retirement until the Serbian main army could be brought up to strengthen the defences. This retrograde movement was in part a precautionary measure, but was also conceived with the object of luring the Austrians across the rivers. On August 12 an Austrian

advance guard crossed the Drina, pushing eastward, while a detachment of the 4th Austrian corps effected a crossing of the Save near Shabatz. On the following day, pontoon bridges having been constructed at several points, the Austrians began to pour across the river and to march into Serbia.

During the whole of August 13 the Serbian rearguard showed the utmost resolution and pluck by denying the crossings to the enemy. Only when night had fallen to cover its movements did it fall back and occupy positions facing the Austrian 8th and 13th corps. These corps had incurred serious losses in storming the Serbian positions on the Drina. On the 14th the Austrians resumed their forward movement. The 8th corps marched on Tzer; the 13th corps straddled the valley of the Jadar with a division on either bank; while a third division and the regiment of mountain artillery threatened the Serbian flank. As soon as

it was evident that the Austrian main armies were committed to this forward movement, while the 4th and 9th Austrian corps were still held up at Shabatz by a Serbian retaining force, Serbian reinforcements were dispatched on August 15 to endeavour to turn the Austrian left flank. All through the 15th and 16th the Serbians resisted all the attacks of the 13th corps along the Jadar valley, and only abandoned their trenches when the Austrian flanking column had completely turned their position. Then during the night they again retired, and took up a third line of defences near Zavlaka. The Serbian reinforcements were rushed up rapidly. Throughout the 17th, 18th, and 19th those reinforcements concentrated so as to outflank the Austrian flank movement. In vain the Austrians launched attack upon attack in a fruitless endeavour to break up this cloud of assailants which was enveloping their flank. In their immediate front, too, the Austrian troops were unable to dislodge the Serbians from their positions.

By the afternoon of the 18th it became evident that the Austrian offensive movement was giving way. Their losses had been heavy; they had entirely failed to shake the Serbian defensive; and they had not been able to obtain any assistance from their 4th and 9th corps, who were still held up at Shabatz. On the 19th the Austrian offensive broke up altogether. The Serbians had succeeded in driving a wedge between the Austrians. The plight of the Austrian 8th and 13th corps was desperate. In front and on their flank was an unbeaten enemy, while on their rear an unfordable river separated them from a country the inhabitants of which were, if not hostile, at least disloyal.

Small wonder that the Austrian retreat almost degenerated into a rout, in which every man did the best he could for himself. When the nature of the country is taken into consideration, with its dearth of roads and lack of villages and farms, it is probable that the Austrians suffered as much from hunger as from the enemy's pursuit. Throughout August 20, 21, and 22 the Serbians pushed the pursuit, and eventually drove the remnants of the 13th and 8th corps either into the Drina or across it. Of the 130,000 Austrian troops who had crossed the Drina on August 12 and 13 some 20,000 were killed or wounded, and over 5,000 were taken prisoners. The Serbians captured over sixty pieces of artillery and an immense amount of other military stores and equipment. During the whole of this period the Serbian con-

taining force in front of Shabatz had been able to hold off the Austrian 4th and 9th corps, preventing them from co-operating with their western army. As soon as the rout of the latter became pronounced, the Serbian main army at Tzer broke off the pursuit and turned north-eastwards with a view to encircling the Shabatz army. The general commanding this Austrian force, under cover of a violent assault upon the Serbian positions, drew off the major portion of his army, and made for the banks of the Save. The attack was defeated with great loss to the Austrians, and it was only because of the excellent work of a flotilla of Austrian war vessels lying in the Save that the remnants of the Austrian eastern army were able to cross the river and to avoid capture. It was on Monday, August 24, that the last detachment of the Austrian army succeeded in making its escape from Serbian territory.

There remained in the Serbian area of hostilities only one effective Austrian corps. This had originally opened operations against eastern Serbia. When Russia began the invasion of Galicia, this corps was called off to face the tsar's armies, but it had not got very far when news of the engagement at Shabatz brought it back into the Serbian area of operations. It was this corps which faced the Serbians at Semlin on September 8, 9, and 10, but was obliged to give way. Such portions of the Bosnian corps as had not been involved in the Shabatz disaster retired from Serbian territory and fell back upon Visegrad, whence they were evicted by a joint effort of the Serbian and Montenegrin forces on September 11.

In a month the Serbian forces, which numbered at most 250,000 men in the area of hostilities, had inflicted an overwhelming defeat upon a slightly superior Austrian army of invasion, capturing nearly half of its war material. But the battle of Shabatz (or of Jadar, as it is sometimes called) had even greater consequences. It delayed the Austrian mobilisation, and it also compelled the Austrian and German general staffs to reconsider their carefully pre-arranged plans. Two Austrian corps which were destined to help the Germans in Alsace were hastily recalled. Reserve corps which were to have been sent to meet the Russians in Galicia were ordered southwards instead of eastwards, while Germany herself had to consider the advisability of transferring troops from Belgium and France to replace the Austrian forces that had been diverted to Serbia.

THE EFFORT OF SERBIA

In September, 1914, the Austrians made a second attempt to invade Serbia. The battle usually known as the battle of the Drina began with the Austrians crossing the Drina on September 8 and 9. Under great pressure the Serbians yielded ground, and on September 11 the Austrians again held Shabatz. The Serbians had been reinforced, however, and after a preliminary repulse they drove the Austrians back towards the Drina. After an exhausting struggle both sides settled down to trench warfare, but the second Austrian invasion of Serbia had definitely failed. In the meantime Serbian and Montenegrin forces made several raids into Bosnia, but the threat of a third Austrian invasion induced them to withdraw their forces from Bosnia to concentrate against a new attack.

For the third attack the Austrians had collected a force of 300,000 under General Potiorek. It was necessary, for not only had Serbia escaped the punishment which Austria had resolved to inflict upon her, but also her continued defiance of her powerful neighbour was leading other Balkan states to doubt the final triumph of the Central Powers. The reasons which made Austria anxious to crush Serbia, made Great Britain and France anxious that Serbia should not be overwhelmed. All that the Western Powers could do to help Serbia they did. Supplies of every sort were shipped to the Mediterranean and sent up to Nish. But the Serbian army had been fighting hard since the beginning of the war. In spite of all the Western Powers could do to help her, she was still short of munitions. Winter was coming on and the trenches on the frontier became full of water, and Serbia's thin line, outstretched far beyond its strength, could not resist the pressure of the new forces brought against it.

Under these circumstances General Putnik was compelled to order his troops to retreat to the mountains. The retreat was not carried out in good order. The Serbian infantryman was one of the finest in Europe, but he had been put to an ordeal much beyond his strength. Owing to the overwhelming power of the Austrian artillery and the incessant charges of the Austrian infantry in the last weeks of the trench warfare, the Serbian soldiers had had to fight day and night without sleeping. The Austrians attacked furiously all along the frontier from Orsova to Visegrad. The Serb would have died where he stood, but when he was ordered to leave his lines and make a long march back to the mountains he completely lost heart.

His rearguards could not hold back the enemy. They swept over the frontier and converged upon the important town of Valievo, commanding the roads to Belgrade, Obrenovac, and other strategical points. By the capture of Valievo, on November 11, the Austrian commander surmounted the first series of barriers which formed the natural defences of Serbia, and planted the centre of his great army in the middle of the Serbian highlands. At the same time he swung his right wing over the heights far to the south. Ridge after ridge was lost by the Serbs, who grew more demoralized as the superior numbers and irresistible artillery power of the enemy pressed them back continually.

All along the line the Serbs gave way. Their centre was thrown back on the Kolubara river on November 20, and on November 28 the great part of the mountain defences, including the passes of the Suvobor heights, were stormed or turned by the invaders. Belgrade, the capital of Serbia, had fallen, and the line of the Austrian advance stretched for 70 miles from the Danube towards Cacac, or Chachak, in the Morava valley.

On December 1 the weakening Serbian army held only the rocky wedge between the Morava valleys. In the middle of this wedge was the arsenal town of Kragujevatz, defended on the north-west by the Rudnik ridge, with peaks rising from 3,000 to 4,500 feet. Some fifteen miles westward of the Rudnik ridge was another high and snow-buried tract of mountain, the Maljen ridge. Then between the Rudnik and the Maljen extended the lower heights of Suvobor, over which ran the passes to Cacac and Kragujevatz. The ground at Suvobor rose in fold after fold to a height of 2,000 feet. It was the gateway into the central highlands of Serbia, and the 1st Serbian army had surrendered it to the enemy almost without a blow and withdrawn to the lower slopes. All the ridges of Maljen westward were also lost to the Serbs on November 25 and the 4th army was retreating up the valley on the western Morava. Far to the south, along the railway leading to Salonica, by which the Serbians usually received their supplies, armed bands of Moslems and other insurgents broke their line of communication with the outer world. The Austrian staff believed that with the forcing of the Suvobor ridges the resistance of the Serbians had been completely broken. But the Serbian army had obtained supplies of shells and ammunition, and its leaders resolved on a last desperate effort. The order for the counter-attack was given on December 2.

General Mishich, with the 1st Serbian army, had halted on the little mountain stream—the Dicina. He suddenly advanced in a general attack on the morning of December 3, 1914, and completely surprised the Austrians. He caught them leisurely moving along the valley paths. Capturing the overlooking hills, the Serbs shot down the hostile columns while the Austrians were still wondering where they should place their artillery. Naturally, the Serbs knew every fall and rise of the ground, for Mishich himself had been born and bred near the Suvobor, and his gun sites, skilfully captured by sudden strokes, commanded the paths along which he was driving the enemy. So overwhelming was the recoil of the Serbs that Potiorek and his staff thought all the Serbian armies had been massed for the attack on the Suvobor.

Under these conditions the Austrian commander attempted in the heat of the action to alter entirely his dispositions for battle. He ordered both his wings to send large reinforcements to his centre. But the movement of large bodies of troops through snowstorms in the mountain chains of the Balkans, intersected only by a few rough roads, was not a quick or easy matter. The guns were also held up, with the supply wagons, and most of the Austro-Hungarian troops had nothing to eat for two days or more. And this at a time when the searching coldness of the high altitudes, in which they were operating in midwinter, hourly lowered their vitality.

The Serbian artillerymen did admirable work. As soon as their infantry had rushed a good gun position for them they got their pieces up, and then opened with shrapnel on the enemy, bunched up in the valley and plainly outlined against the snow. All the targets were large and extraordinarily clear, and with their long experience of mountain warfare the Serbian artillerymen, with guns firing twenty rounds a minute, wrought terrible havoc. It was the remarkable increase in the destructive power of the Serbian artillery that made the Austrian staff conclude that all the forces of Serbia were concentrated in front of Suvobor.

At the end of ten hours of fierce, incessant conflict the Austrian first line was thrown back with the loss of some of its mountain howitzers. The troops retired on the positions defended by their heavy siege guns. But the Serbians, exhilarated by their preliminary success, wanted no sleep or food. Onward they swept in the darkness, gaining ground over which it would

have been impossible for them to advance in daylight in the teeth of the long-range Austrian guns. After midnight they snatched a little sleep and ate what food could be brought up ; and long before the slow winter dawn broke they had hauled their light guns closer to the enemy. Then came the grand attack, carried out with an impetuosity and tenacious fighting power unparalleled even in Serbian history. The leadership of the company officers was magnificent. After a short struggle the enemy's front was broken, and his well-entrenched positions were enfiladed and captured. Line after line of rising crests, each commanding the other, and all with a wide field of fire, dominated the ground which the Serbians approached. Each assault up the slopes, against machine-guns, artillery and rifle fire, was an arduous business, and if the snow on the ground had not been trampled into mud by the retreating invaders the storming parties could have been marked down miles away. But the mountaineers went up in widely extended order, throwing up little mounds at the end of every rush. Then, as their guns in the rear beat down the fire from the heights, the troops closed to the final charge and broke through on the rise.

The end came near Gorni Toplitza, where the road runs round a great height overhanging the river valley. On the edge of the mountain the Austrians had a battery of field guns in a plum orchard. In the road below was a string of ammunition wagons, from the which guns were served. The Serbian artillerymen hauled up their guns on the flank of this position and poured on it a devastating enfilading fire. The torrent of shrapnel shot down men and horses, and the high-explosive shells which followed wrecked the batteries, limbers and ammunition carts. Some men tried to escape, throwing away their packs as they made for the shelter of a neighbouring ravine. But they were all caught before they reached it.

After the slaughter at Gorni Toplitza all that the Austrian troops thought of was to get beyond the range of the Serbian guns. They did not stay even to put their own abandoned artillery out of action. They left their machine guns and their unexhausted stores of ammunition.

At Valievo there was at last a rally of the best regiments of the 15th army corps and the several brigades of the 16th corps brought up to reinforce it. There were Hungarian regiments also, sent hurriedly down from the neighbourhood of Belgrade

to stop the rout. The Hungarians and Austrians entrenched along the main road from the Suvobor region, and got their guns into position. The Serbs could be seen slowly advancing against them along the road. But a considerable time passed before an attack was made. Then it was an overwhelming surprise. For the Serbs who could be seen along the road were only a reserve, waiting to pursue the enemy when he was broken. The main force had crept over the mountains; they attacked on the flank and threatened the rear, with the result that the battle did not take place. The rout was only intensified.

When the 1st Serbian army, under Mishich, was winning one of the best-handled battles in the Great War, the 3rd army, under Sturm, and the 2nd army, under Stephanovitch, came down from the slopes of the Rudniks. Sturm's men worked through the turned flank of the central Austrian forces on December 5, and then broke off a large part of the enemy's northern wing by a night attack in which thousands of prisoners were taken. At the same time Stephanovitch, with the 2nd army, drove hard into the middle of the Austrian northern wing, and caught it as it was still extended in its vain circling movement round the Rudniks towards Kragujevatz.

But although the powerful northern wing of the Austrian army was severed from its centre and thrown back violently, no overwhelming victory against it was achieved. This was all according to the plans of General Putnik. Being much outnumbered, he could not spare the forces necessary to rout the enemy's strong northern force. Having broken the centre of Potiorek's front, the Serbian commander gave his chief attention to capturing the Austrian southern wing, operating in the western Morava valley. Here the 4th Serbian army, usually known from its base town as the Ushitza army, was striding across the river valley above Cacac. For some days the Serbians in this sector of the front could only hold their own by a great effort against superior forces brought against them.

But when General Mishich stormed the Suvobor ridges the Austrian southern wing, connected by wireless with its centre, knew that it was in peril. So it began to withdraw on December 5, but as the commander of the 4th Serbian army was even better acquainted with the general situation, he did not allow the withdrawal to take place in an orderly manner.

Waiting till nightfall, when he knew the roads would be choked with the enemy's heavy artillery, he delivered an attack at midnight. As dawn came the Austrians were in full retreat. They threw out rearguards in the river valley, but the Serbians knew the mountain tracks, and dropped down behind the entrenchments, making continual hauls of guns and prisoners.

On December 7 some of Mishich's men captured the summit of Maljen. Then, linked with the advancing edge of the 4th army that was curling south around Ushitza, they achieved the enveloping operation which the Austrian commander had vainly hoped to accomplish. The three fugitive army corps which had constituted the centre and southern wing of the invading force were cut off from the northern wing and shepherded to destruction. There was little fighting. It was merely a race towards the Drina and Save rivers, through the labyrinth of mountains in north-west Serbia. The Austrians kept to the valley roads, and the Serbians cut them off in thousands by using the straighter mountain paths. The fact that these paths were buried in snow did not seriously trouble the mountaineers, who had pastured their sheep there since boyhood. They could work their way across them in the dark. By December 10 Sturm with the 3rd army was nearing Obrenovac, on the Save, a few miles below Belgrade.

Meanwhile, eastward, General Potiorek was trying to retain Belgrade with his detached northern wing. Formed of the 8th and a mixed army corps, this force had checked the advance of the 2nd Serbian army, under General Stephanovitch, and had pressed hard against the garrison of Belgrade. This garrison, on the fall of the Serbian capital, had retired to the mountain of Kosmai, north of the Rudnik range. Here it was attacked by part of the Austrian northern wing on December 7, 8 and 9. On the last day, however, the complete overthrow of the main forces of the enemy enabled General Putnik to rearrange his forces. He moved part of his 3rd army towards the Save, some twenty miles south of Belgrade. Another part he attached to his 2nd army, and added his cavalry to it, and also the Belgrade garrison. This combined force was placed under the command of General Stephanovitch, who was famous for his victories in earlier campaigns.

By December 10, when Stephanovitch assumed full command of the eastern operations, the Austrian forces had been bent back

from the Rudnik ridge and the heights of Kosmai. Their front stretched from Grocka on the Danube to Konatice on the Kolubara river. Some fifteen miles behind them was the city of Belgrade, which they were endeavouring to retain for the honour and prestige of their empire. The failure of the movement of invasion was patent to the world. General Potiorek sorely needed the possession of Belgrade to palliate the overthrow of the third Austrian plan of conquest of Serbia.

General Putnik reckoned on this. The loss of Belgrade had become a gain to him. By means of his lost capital he was able not merely to shatter the centre and southern wing of the invading armies, but also to make a new concentration of force against the powerful remnant of the enemy's strength. Right in the centre of the Austrian front was a hill through which ran the railway from Salonica to Vienna. General Stephanovitch brought up his heavy guns by this railway on the night of December 10, and then at dawn he flung his troops forward, under the cover of his gun fire, and stormed up the hill. At the same time his left wing advanced up the Kolubara river towards its junction with the Save, some eight miles behind the Austrian front. The enemy had to draw back, for fear of being suddenly taken in the rear, and sent two monitors up the river to check the Serbian cavalry division, which was trying to work over the marshes and cut off the entire Austrian force.

But this movement of the Serbian left wing was only a feint. It was intended simply to make the Austrian line waver. While Potiorek was manœuvring his troops in answer to the feint, Stephanovitch made another frontal attack. Then for three days there was a violent, swaying battle along the base of the little triangle of Serbian soil that ended in a point at Belgrade. The Austrians fought manfully, and, indeed, gave the Serbians one of the best fights in their long and warlike history. Instead of merely clinging to their hill entrenchments, they made fierce and tenacious attempts to break the Serbian front. But it was in one of these counter-attacks, near the central height where the railway entered a tunnel, that the resistance of the Austrians was broken. After the Serbian riflemen, with their machine guns, had thrown back the enemy, the Serbian artillery caught the retiring troops.

This produced a panic in the dense retreating column, and the Serbian infantry left their trenches at a run and formed

into two streams, flowing on either side of the column of fugitives in the river valley. And as these streams ran uphill more quickly than the grey-blue flood moved, the Austrian rearguards, composed of heavy forces entrenched on strong positions, were turned. By December 14 the Serbians approached the line of hills forming the southern defence of Belgrade. Here General Potiorek had constructed a system of earthworks, consisting of deep trenches with shrapnel cover, and well-concealed gun positions, with numerous heavy howitzers and field-pieces. He intended to stand an indefinite siege on this fragment of Serbian territory, holding Belgrade as a bridge-head for another advance along the main Morava valley. In this way something would be saved from the debacle, enabling the campaign to be represented as a reconnaissance in force, similar to Hindenburg's first advance against Warsaw.

But his troops had received so terrible a punishment that they could not garrison the siege defences. The Serbians, steeled by victory after victory, and absolutely reckless of death as they drove in upon their capital, with their old king, the grandson of Black George, moving through their foremost ranks, charged up in the ring of hills. On the central height of Torlak, on the evening of December 14, they shot and bayoneted two Austrian battalions. Then moving forward in the darkness they captured all the heights.

No Serbians slept that night. They dragged or man-handled their guns towards Belgrade, and placed them on heights commanding the pontoon bridges by which the enemy were fleeing over the Save. At dawn on December 15, 1914, the pontoon bridge was destroyed by shell fire. A cloud of fog and rain veiled the scene, but the gunners knew the position of their mark, and, breaking down the bridge, they cut off the retreat of the remnant of the two Austrian army corps. The rearguard outside the city was destroyed, and then the Serbian cavalrymen, accompanied by King Peter, swept from the height of Torlak and entered the streets of the capital, killed a detachment of Hungarians who would not surrender, and began to round up the prisoners to the number of ten thousand. As the street fighting between the cavalrymen and the Hungarians was going on, King Peter entered the cathedral of his capital to give thanks for the almost miraculous salvation of his small, heroic nation.

CHAPTER 12

France's Frontier Battles

In order to understand the battles of Mons and Charleroi, and the subsequent retreat of the Allies' left wing to the Marne, it is necessary to follow the course of events in east and north-east France from the time when the German host first entered Belgium to the time when von Kluck and von Bülow almost surrounded the British Expeditionary Force at Mons.

The success of the Germans in Belgium was partly conditioned by the suddenness of their attack and partly by the unpreparedness of the French command to counter it. The French plan of campaign was based upon a conviction that the main attack of the enemy would be delivered through Lorraine and Alsace. Even when reluctantly they were compelled to realise that the Germans were waiting on the defensive in the east while north and west they were pushing rapidly through Belgium in a movement that threatened to turn the French left flank, they were still disinclined to weaken their eastern forces and quite deceived as to the extent of the German sweep. The very success of the Belgian resistance lent weight to this self-deception. For the defence of Liége and the south-west turn of the main German forces towards Namur all encouraged the French to believe that the main attack of the Germans in the north would be delivered through the gap between Dinant and the Ardennes. The idea of a German sweep through Brussels which would take the invader to the west of Paris never seemed to have occurred to any of the French generals with the exception of Laurezac, and it was only his most pressing insistence that persuaded the higher command to move his army so far to the north-west.

These events, however, were of later development. The first contact of the German and French forces occurred in Alsace. Even before the declaration of war German patrols had crossed into French territory on the Alsace frontier, and there is no doubt that such a move was designed to concentrate French attention on the eastern front and deceive France as to the main objective of the German attack through Belgium. In any event, France



THE DEBATABLE LAND OF ALSACE-LORRAINE

This map shows the various places in the former German province in which severe fighting took place during the early months of the war.

acted on the provocation with extreme promptness. On August 7 a weak French force moved through the Belfort gap and advanced on Mulhouse, and the next day, after driving back a weaker German force, occupied that town and the neighbouring Altkirch. The avowed objects of this movement were to seize and destroy the Rhine bridges, but it would appear as though the chief reason was the desire of the French to seize a political advantage. Certainly General Joffre's proclamation announcing the approaching liberation of the provinces torn by Germany from France in 1871 would seem to disclose the political rather than the military motives of this advance. General von Heeringen, in command of the German 7th army, was, however, preparing a counter-stroke, and had massed his troops on the Colmar-Breisach line. On August 10 he attacked in overwhelming numbers and almost succeeded in cutting the French communications. The French were compelled to evacuate Mulhouse and to commence a retreat, which by the 12th had brought them back, seriously depleted in numbers, to a position only ten miles from Belfort.

The ill success of this hasty and premature attempt only incited the French command to stronger measures. A new Alsace army was formed under General Pau and by the 14th was ready to advance. Meanwhile the Germans, anticipating a French attack in Lorraine, had withdrawn most of their forces northwards. General Pau, therefore, encountered little opposition, and driving the weak German troops before him re-occupied Mulhouse on the 20th. Pushing on he reached the outskirts of Colmar two days later, in the advance inflicting a severe defeat upon the Germans at Dornach on the 19th. Such object as the French had in these manœuvres had been achieved, for the enemy had been entirely cleared out from Upper Alsace. The futility of the move was, however, quickly demonstrated.

The repulse of the French attack in Lorraine and the disturbing situation in the west, where Kluck was marching on Paris, compelled the abandonment of the ground won and a retreat of the French to the Belfort frontier, the majority of the troops being dispatched hurriedly westward to aid in the battle of the Marne. Nothing of political or military value had been gained by this ill-starred advance; on the contrary, troops which would have been far more usefully employed elsewhere were completely wasted. The only gain which the French had to show for their

endeavours was the control of the passes south of the Vosges, which secured them an open avenue of advance into Alsace.

In Lorraine the French movements, though more legitimate, were even less successful. The rapidity of the disturbing German successes in Belgium determined the French, still ignorant of the true nature of the German strategy, to make a diversion by an attack through Lorraine. The object was either to compel the Germans to draw troops from their offensive in Belgium to the defence of Lorraine or, if the Germans should fail to offer adequate defence, to penetrate north-eastwards and strike at the German communications.

Two armies of Lorraine were accordingly organized, the 1st under General Dubail, the 2nd under General Castelnau. Rather foolishly it was arranged that both armies should act independently under orders from the French high command. The general plan was a simultaneous advance of the French armies towards Metz and Strasbourg with the intention of linking up with the Alsace offensive farther south and securing the right flank of the whole line on the Rhine. A small independent corps was detailed to penetrate the Vosges and provide the connecting link on the south-east between General Pau in Alsace and the Lorraine armies. Dubail was to advance towards Saarburg and push the opposing forces south towards Strasbourg. Castelnau was to move against Saarbrück, pivoting on Dubail's left flank at Étain, and sheltering himself from the German forces at Metz. On the left of the Moselle two corps were stationed with a view to their future employment against Metz and in the north.

To meet this concentration of forces the Germans with great forethought had prepared a heavily fortified line running south-east from Metz through Morhange, Benestroff and north of Saarburg to the Vosges. The ground had been carefully surveyed, the ranges had been marked and an extensive system of trenches defended with barbed wire and adequately equipped with machine guns had been prepared. It was, in fact, an admirable chain of field fortresses with its flanks resting on the permanent defences of Metz and Strasbourg. To defend this line the Germans had the 6th and 7th armies under Prince Rupert of Bavaria and General Heeringen respectively. In numbers, therefore, the combatants were not unequal, the French having about 470,000 men, the Germans about 400,000; but in everything else the advantage lay with the latter.

German strategy, here, was designed to be purely defensive. The German armies in Lorraine were to act as the pivot on which von Kluck was to execute his wheel on Paris. In no circumstances were they to attack, but rather were to draw the French on by every show of weakness, and thereby secure all the more time for the great encircling movement already in operation. The farther the French penetrated the more they exposed their flank and rear to the German pincers.

At first the German commanders kept to their instructions implicitly. Strong rearguards were thrown out to keep contact with the advancing French troops, the main body of the armies remaining on the defensive behind the Morhange-Saarburg line. The first concentration of the French could not be completed until the 18th, but on the 16th an advance was made and by the next day, after pushing back the Bavarians, two corps had occupied the Vasperviller-St. Georges line. General Dubail began to move his left wing to the right of Saarburg, his right wing standing on the Vosges to repel any counter-attack. On the 19th an attack was delivered on the ground to the north-west of Saarburg, and although it made some progress it quickly became evident that it would be unable to break through and open a way for the cavalry. The losses were very heavy and although the right and centre gained ground on the 20th, inflicting a serious check on the Germans at Walscheid and occupying Saarburg, little more could be done until Castelnau moved up on the left. Actually, however, he was seriously repulsed and, in order to avoid an attack upon Dubail's flank, exposed by Castelnau's retreat, Joffre ordered the former to retire. On August 23, Dubail's army held a line from Dames-aux-Bois to the Col du Bonhomme, but of his original army scarcely half survived.

The 2nd army under Castelnau fared even worse. The advance was begun on the 14th and some progress was made, the Germans continuing to fall back quietly while offering a steady resistance. For two days this steady retreat was continued, the French suffering heavy losses from the accurate fire of the German artillery. By the morning of the 17th the French had reached Morhange and had swung round north-west on a line facing Delme, Chateau Salins and Dieuze. At this point the German resistance began to stiffen, and a change of plan began to make itself evident in the German command. For this there appear to be two reasons. In the first place the vacillating von

Moltke, in supreme command of the German armies, was tempted by the French advance to forgo the original plan of the sweep through Brussels and reach a decision by crushing the French in Lorraine. To this end he diverted four reserve corps, detailed to strengthen his right wing, to the support of the Lorraine armies, and although at the eleventh hour he changed his mind and reverted to the original plan, his policy encouraged the German commanders of the Lorraine armies to take the initiative.

The ambition for personal glory amongst the royal and other commanders of the German armies was a factor which was perpetually to interfere with the strategy of the German high command throughout the war. In this instance the lack of what Foch subsequently described as "intellectual discipline" in the court general Prince Rupert of Bavaria had extremely significant

consequences, which had a serious bearing upon the ill success of the German wheel on Paris.

The position on the 20th was roughly that the weary and heavily punished French troops had come up against the fortified German line, and in their initial attacks had been repulsed. Both French generals, Castelnau and Dubail had, however, ordered an advance. The German general in his turn had issued orders for a decisive attack, and succeeded in taking the French completely by surprise. Dubail, however, in spite of his losses, managed as we saw to keep his position and even to gain ground; but on the left at Morhange, Castelnau's forces suffered terribly from concentrated artillery fire and were flung back in disorder. At the same time his left flank was strongly attacked by a force moving down from Metz. This attack was all the more effective in that the French left wing which had been ordered to remain on the defensive had attacked Morhange precipitately and had been driven back by a terrific fire. Their heavy losses, and the shattering of their morale by the devastating accuracy and intensity of the German gun fire, conspired to rob them of effective power to resist the sudden flank attack, and at 4 p.m. on the 21st, Castelnau had to order a retirement which, in spite of the arrival of reserves, continued until the army was back on its defended positions behind the river Meurthe. By this retirement he exposed Dubail's left wing, and Joffre sent orders to that general to withdraw his troops.

The lesson learnt from the failure of the French in the battle of Morhange was primarily the folly of an attack unsupported by artillery against a heavily fortified position. The great mistake of the Germans was in repeating that error. In counter-attacking as they did they simply drove the French back on their own defences and surrendered all the tactical advantages which defence of the Morhange—Saarburg line had given them. Moreover, the Germans, by keeping large bodies of French troops busily engaged in attacking wellnigh impregnable positions in Lorraine, were preventing the dispatch of French reinforcements westwards. But by driving the French back to the Meurthe they liberated large numbers of French troops, unnecessary for defence, for service in the Ardennes and at Charleroi just at the most critical juncture of the German strategy. Finally, the Germans retained far too many troops in Lorraine. Their right wing was far more important, and thither should have been sent

every man they could spare. At it was, half the number of troops they had in Lorraine could have kept the French in check; twice the number would have been insufficient for a really decisive counter-attack. The French were compelled to retreat, but the Germans were unable to press their advantage.

Thus early in the struggle the eastern line became established, running in a generally south-east direction from a point north of Verdun, north of Nancy to the Swiss frontier east of Belfort. And although there was some terrible fighting along this section, particularly at Verdun and Nancy, there was no real movement of any size until the summer of 1918. However, the magnificent defence which the two French generals and the remnants of their armies made of that long line during the end of August and the early days of September, 1914, was the rock upon which was based the victory of the Marne. For the unshakable

strength of the French defence became the pivot upon which Joffre was able to base his own turning movement which stretched from Paris to Verdun. And the achievement of these French armies was all the more remarkable in that they were drained of their best troops for service in the west. Their losses, however, were appalling, one reserve division alone losing over 5,000 men and 140 officers between August 24 and September 12.

The third theatre of war in which the French engaged the Germans during August was in the Ardennes. On the outbreak of hostilities the French 5th army under General Lanrezac was moved to the north-east frontier and posted in the triangle formed by the union of the rivers Sambre and Meuse at Namur. The attack on Liége persuaded General Joffre that the real German menace would be directed south of the Meuse. Completely deceived by German strategy and badly served by his own intelligence corps, he decided upon an early attack through the Ardennes against the supposedly unprotected German flank and rear. For this purpose he brought up the 3rd army, consisting of three corps, under General Ruffey and the 4th army, consisting of six corps, under General Langle de Cary.

Joffre's complete plan was to deliver an attack upon the German spear-head in Belgium from all sides at once. The Belgians should attack the right flank and rear, the expected British force should strike at the extreme right, Lanrezac and the 5th army should attack the centre and left, while the 3rd and 4th armies should push through the Ardennes and strike at the left flank and rear. This pleasant picture of a noose suddenly flung over the head of the German attacking forces lacked only one quality—practicability. Three factors contributed to its failure. In the first place the extent of the German sweep through Brussels was not realized until the German claws had almost closed upon the unsuspecting British and French armies. In the second place, the strength of the German forces in Belgium and particularly in the Ardennes was grossly underestimated; and in the third place, the reliance which the French command placed in the impregnability of Namur, upon which hinge the safety of both left and right wings depended, proved unfounded.

The concentration of the 3rd and 4th armies was almost complete by August 14, and orders were given to advance, with the general direction of "attacking the enemy wherever met." The Lorraine army was meanwhile dissolved, and was partly re-



BRITISH SOLDIERS IN ACTION ALONG THE CANAL AT MONS, AUGUST 23, 1914

Charleville, France, headquarters of the German general staff, 1914–16.

Men of the King's Liverpool Regiment holding line of impromptu fire pits in the Ypres sector, 1914.

GERMAN G.H.Q., AND BRITISH TRENCHES IN EMBRYO

Henri Manuel

General Galliéni was governor of Paris, 1914–15, and was largely responsible for the German defeat on the Marne. He became minister of war in 1915.

Vandyk

Promoted general in 1897, Paul Marie Pau served with distinction in the early months of the Great War as director of the French offensive in Alsace

Henri Manuel

Although retired, General Mannoury was placed in command of the French 6th army in 1914. In 1915 he was appointed military governor of Paris.

Raymond Poincare was president of the republic on the outbreak of war and by word and action stimulated the French will to conquer.

MORE FRENCH LEADERS IN EARLY MONTHS OF WAR

E.N.A.

Topical

THE BRAINS BEHIND THE GERMAN ARMIES. Left, Ludendorff who after the fall of Liége went as chief-of-staff to East Prussia. In supreme command with Hindenburg, 1916–18, he planned the last German offensive in the west. Centre, Paul von Hindenburg. He commanded the Austro-German forces in East Prussia, 1914–16. Promoted field-marshal, he was German generalissimo, 1916–18. Right, Falkenhayn who succeeded Moltke as chief-of-staff in 1914. Sent to command against Rumania after Verdun, he also directed the Turkish operations in Palestine.

organized as a 6th army under Manoury with instructions to defend the heights of the Meuse and strike against the fortresses of Thionville and Metz.

Unknown to the French intelligence service the Germans had collected their 3rd and 4th armies in the Ardennes, and although strategically rather ill placed, they were still in a position to offer a most crushing reply to any French advance. A further mistake on the part of the French was soon revealed. The French cavalry had been disposed on either flank in such a way that there was a hopelessly inadequate screen in front of the French columns. In the result their first intimation of their approach to the enemy was more often than not the falling of shells on their line of march.

Joffre had arranged the two armies in échelon with his left in front so that he could attack either north or east, and on the 20th the whole body moved northwards. Speed rather than caution appears to have been the order of the day, and by the evening of the 21st the 3rd army had arrived on a line between Cons and Virton, the 4th army continuing the line through Florenville along the river Semoy. Contact between the two armies seems to have been broken, and the fact that they had encountered nothing but patrols had further encouraged the belief that the German centre was almost denuded of troops.

But whatever the reason, the precautions against surprise taken when the march was resumed on the 22nd were negligible, and the troops set out in column as for a long march. The presence of a thick fog scarcely improved matters, and the result was disastrous. Whole corps in column of march were exposed to the German fire, divisions were sent to the attack with no artillery support, and no real attempts to discover the strength or disposition of the enemy were made. The carnage was frightful. In the confusion units lost touch with one another, and it suddenly became clear that the right wing of the army was quite unprotected. Fortunately, General Hache and his division flung themselves into the gap and won time for the other divisions to retreat. So ended the battle of Virton in the Ardennes.

The Germans, however, were far too uncertain of the real position to take advantage of their tactical success, and the French were allowed to retire unmolested, and on the 26th had taken up a position behind the Meuse, the crossing of which they prepared to resist. The day before, however, the last fort defending Namur

had fallen, and the Germans were free to throw the whole weight of their overwhelming right wing upon the shaken French troops.

The position of the combatants therefore at the commencement of the battles of Charleroi and Mons was roughly as follows: The Germans had reduced the frontier forts of Belgium and driven the Belgian army back on Antwerp. Brussels had been occupied and von Kluck was beginning his turning movement south on Paris, a movement which was to take him to the west of the Allies' line and almost behind them. In the east the French thrusts in Alsace, Lorraine and the Ardennes had all been more than effectively parried and the French were back in line on their frontier fortifications. Along the comparatively undefended northern frontier was the fortress of Lille and Maubeuge, but after the fate of Liége and Namur, little reliance could be placed in that, as was borne out by the subsequent course of events. In any event, the value and strength of the frontier fortifications were entirely proportioned to the effectiveness of the field armies defending them, and even so early in the struggle it had been made abundantly clear that forts might be a liability rather than an asset. Once the left flank of the Allies was turned, retreat became imperative and the forts could be reduced at the enemy's convenience.

On the Allies' side, a cordon of armies stretched from a point west of Mons east to Charleroi, and then ran south-east in front of Longwy, Verdun and Nancy to Belfort. On the extreme left was the British Expeditionary Force, and next to that, in order, were the 5th, 3rd, 4th, 2nd and 1st French armies. The danger point, however, was in the west. Once the overwhelming weight of the German right wing fell upon and drove back the British army and the French 5th army, the whole line was turned and only precipitate retreat could save it from disaster.

Such was the general position before the battles of Mons and Charleroi and the retreat to the Marne, which was to mark the zenith of the German success on the western front and carry them to within a day's march of Paris.

CHAPTER 13

Mons and Charleroi

THE embarkation of the British Expeditionary Force began, under conditions of the greatest secrecy, on August 6. By August 16 it had been completed without the smallest hitch or casualty. On Saturday, August 22, two army corps were in position round Mons. On Sunday, the 23rd, fighting began. Such was the rapid sequence of events which followed immediately the declaration of war. In less than four weeks the British forces were ready to meet their immediate task. "They came," it has been said, "not to win a victory, but to save an army from disaster." Before following them to the field of battle, it is important to record some of the incidents of their transport abroad, for this landing on French soil of a British force, with all its auxiliary services, must always remain an event of the first importance in military history.

Of the French harbours used for the disembarkation of the British army Boulogne was one best fitted for that purpose. Lying well behind the old tidal dock and out of sight of the Quai Chanzy, where the cross-Channel steamers land their passengers from Folkestone, is the Loubet dock (Bassin Loubet), with a frontage on three sides, equipped with electric cranes and railway sidings. Here it was possible for five transports to berth at one time and discharge not only troops, but all the vast impedimenta of a modern army, its guns, transport wagons, horses, ambulances, stores, ammunition, and motor lorries.

So admirable were the arrangements to preserve complete silence with regard to their movements that the whole of the first contingent had been landed in Boulogne before the British public was even aware that it had left the shores of England. The regiments comprising it were ordered to leave their home stations without knowing where they were going. They entered railways trains, the engine drivers of which were ignorant, till the moment of departure, of their final destination, and even when they embarked in transports, while they could guess that

they were bound for France, they did not know to what port they were being sent. To such an extent was this secrecy carried that even the captains of these ships did not know precisely where they were bound until they had opened their sealed orders. The British public was not alone in a complete ignorance of these movements. As will appear later, German Intelligence was quite powerless to discover any accurate information concerning them. In their passage across the Channel to Boulogne and Havre—the second great port of disembarkation for the British Expeditionary Force—the transports were guarded by a portion of the French fleet. French submarines were on constant patrol duty.

At Boulogne it was not possible to conceal the fact that arrangements were being made for the reception of the force. Not a word, however, appeared in any newspaper, English or French. The first sign of the coming of the troops was the arrival of a number of smart Frenchmen, in uniforms of the cavalry, engineers, artillery and line, who took up their quarters at the Hotel Christol, and showed a surprising acquaintance with the English language. These, it was soon learnt, were staff interpreters detailed for duty with the British troops. To them fell the duty of aiding the landing and dispatch of the British troops and afterwards of accompanying them in the field. The second notable sign of the coming of the troops was the sudden appearance of British staff officers at the same hotel, and a motor car, driven by an English private, which made many hurried visits to the famous old chateau, Tour de L'Ordre, in the Haute Ville of Boulogne, where Colonel Daru, the governor of the town, had his headquarters. These were followed by more cars of French ownership, in which staff officers of both armies scoured the country round.

The third sign of the coming of the troops was a sudden order given to the merchants of Boulogne to clear their goods from the sheds lining the Bassin Loubet—an order obeyed with alacrity, seeing that the goods had not paid duty. Then the first transport came, bringing vast stores of camp equipment and just a bare handful of troops. Only a handful, but, to the joy of the people of Boulogne and the British residents, they were men of a splendid Scottish regiment—the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. The Boulonnais will long remember them. They were the first to come and the last to go. For two weeks they were

quartered in the old barracks behind the post office. None knew that they had landed until they came swinging along the road past the tidal dock and the Central railway station, over the bridge and lock gates opened by Napoleon III, and round the little square to the barracks, khaki-clad, and kilted, with knees bare and pipes skirling.

Preparations were hurriedly advanced for the reception of the main body. Five camping grounds were laid out on the hills around Boulogne. There was the Marlborough camp on the Calais road, almost under the shadow of the great column which commemorates the massing on these heights of Napoleon's grand army for the threatened invasion of England in 1804. There was the St. Martin's camp, in two sections, on the road to St. Omer, and the St. Leonard camp, also in two sections, on the road to Pont de Briques. All this ground had historic associations, having been used by Napoleon for his troops. French territorials were employed to prepare these camps, to make a rapid harvesting of growing crops, to dig trenches, lay water pipes, and erect stand pipes. The Highlanders pitched the tents, and in a few days the fields were covered with canvas.

Near the Marlborough camp, in the grounds of a building once a convent, a base hospital for the British was prepared, at first with only a few beds, but afterwards with many. At this date, in the first two weeks of the war, it was apparently thought that Boulogne would become a permanent base, through which troops could be poured, and to which the sick and wounded might return. How quickly that idea was abandoned, those who watched the arrival and departure of the troops realized. The enthusiasm with which the French civil population greeted the arrival of their allies was a memorable and pleasant feature of these early days. Crowds lined the quays and visited the camps to welcome the British soldiers, and by order of the mayor the whole town of Boulogne was decorated with bunting in the colours of Great Britain, France, and Belgium.

The invasion began in great force on August 13 and continued for ten days. The Bassin Loubet was the scene of the disembarkation. Into this commercial harbour swung ships from 2,000 to 5,000 tons burden, piloted by tugs, and berthed with great ease along the quays. Many of them bore names which showed that they had been taken from Transatlantic service. All were crowded with troops, and their decks cumbered with wagons.

Every man was of the best fighting age, from 25 to 35. Many of them were reservists, and a fair sprinkling of them had South African ribbons. The younger men were those who had enlisted for seven years' service. Whatever mistakes the higher commands of the British army may have had to confess to, however better trained the German staff may have been to meet the strategical exigencies of a great continental war, there can be no question that the British rank and file were a magnificently trained body of men fitted to meet, at terms of advantage, any army in the field. Every witness bears testimony to their disciplined steadiness and to their fine marksmanship. Indeed, the Germans were the first in their admiration of the superiority of their enemy in this particular, and at their first experience of British rapid fire their officers reported that they had hosts of machine guns against them.

For ten days the camps on the hills fulfilled their purpose in giving the troops a good night's rest under canvas and a hot meal before they started for the front. The infantry stream slackened and a tide of artillery set in. Those of the gunners who were given a day's rest in Boulogne spent it at the St. Leonard camp on the road to Pont de Briques. To the artillery succeeded other branches of the service—the cavalry, represented by dragoons, lancers and hussars, whose stay in Boulogne was shorter than that of any branch—the Army Service Corps, who came and went every day, the Royal Army Medical Corps, who on some days outnumbered all others and came with endless ambulance wagons and a large number of men, the Royal Engineers, and, lastly, the Royal Flying Corps, who possessed, perhaps, the most incongruous transport of all, ranging from motor wagons impressed hastily into the service, some of them bearing the names of well-known furnishing houses of London, to a London omnibus, a taxi-cab, or the roughly equipped chassis of a car intended to beat records at Brooklands.

So much Boulogne saw of the Flying Corps on land. It had seen a more impressive spectacle in the air some days before when 36 service aeroplanes flew the English Channel. When they were assembled at their headquarters at Maubeuge, the Royal Flying Corps numbered four squadrons with 105 officers, 755 other ranks, and 63 aeroplanes. This force, making its appearance for the first time on active service, also established an aircraft park at Amiens.

When the disembarkation was complete, and not before, Lord Kitchener published his famous communiqué:

The Expeditionary Force as detailed for foreign service has been safely landed on French soil. The embarkation, transportation, and disembarkation of men and stores were alike carried through with the greatest precision and without a single casualty.

Each man, before he left England, received a twofold message. The first came from King George, and was read by commanding officers to their battalions before they embarked. It ran as follows:

You are leaving home to fight for the safety and honour of my Empire. Belgium, which country we are pledged to defend, has been attacked, and France is about to be invaded by the same powerful foe. I have implicit confidence in you, my soldiers. Duty is your watchword, and I know your duty will be nobly done. I shall follow your every movement with the deepest interest, and mark with eager satisfaction your daily progress. Indeed, your welfare will never be absent from my thoughts.

I pray God to bless you and guard you, and bring you back victorious.

GEORGE R. AND I.

August 9, 1914.

They also received and were bidden to carry with them in their pay-books the following instructions from Lord Kitchener:

You are ordered abroad as a soldier of the King to help our French comrades against the invasion of a common enemy. You have to perform a task which will need your courage, your energy, your patience. Remember that the honour of the British Empire depends on your individual conduct. It will be your duty not only to set an example of discipline and perfect steadiness under fire, but also to maintain the most friendly relations with those whom you are helping in this struggle. The operations in which you are engaged will, for the most part, take place in a friendly country, and you can do your country no better service than by showing yourselves in France and Belgium in the true character of a British soldier. Be invariably courteous, considerate, and kind. Never do anything likely to injure or destroy property, and always look upon looting as a disgraceful act. You are sure to meet with a welcome, and to be trusted. Your conduct must justify that welcome and that trust. Your duty cannot be done unless your health is sound, so be constantly on your guard against any excesses. In this new experience you may find temptations, both in wine and women. You must entirely resist both temptations, and, while treating all women with

perfect courtesy, you should avoid any intimacy. Do your duty bravely. Fear God. Honour the King.

KITCHENER, FIELD MARSHAL.

The success attending the transport of a large body of troops and material to a foreign battle ground must be measured by the lack of exact knowledge of their movements gained by the enemy. As has been said, German Intelligence was considerably fogged as to the precise movements and ultimate concentration of the British forces. Von Kluck fully believed that the British had landed in Ostend, Dunkirk, and Calais. With regard to the line of advance they had no certain information whatever. Even as late as the morning of August 23, the first day of battle, there was complete ignorance at German headquarters as to the true nature or exact strength of the opposition which they were likely to meet from British arms.

On August 12 British general headquarters left London for Southampton, crossed to Havre, and reached Le Cateau late on the evening of the 16th. On August 14 Sir John French himself arrived in Amiens, and spent the next three days in visits to the French minister of war, to General Joffre, and to General Lanrezac at the 5th army headquarters, learning the disposition of the French forces. The areas of concentration allotted to the British were between Maubeuge and Le Cateau, with a front of about 25 miles from north-east to south-west and averaging ten miles in depth. The cavalry was at the north-eastern end, in readiness to act with Lanrezac's army.

The swift progress of the army towards its battle positions was marked by a major misfortune in the death of Lieutenant General Sir James Grierson, commanding the 2nd army corps. Grierson, who collapsed suddenly on a train journey, was known as one of the ablest general officers in the army, with an unequalled knowledge of the military theories which governed the German war-machine, and of the constitution and prevailing strategy of all the continental armies. Sir John French, it is officially stated, asked for Sir Herbert Plumer to replace him, but the secretary of state for war appointed Sir H. Smith-Dorrien.

August 20 was a fateful day in the early history of the war. Brussels fell to the enemy, and the main Belgian army retired into Antwerp. British aerial reconnaissance observed endless columns of the 1st German army on the march, stretching from Louvain into the distance. On this day General Joffre gave his

orders for a general advance, and these were passed on by British general headquarters to include a movement northward during the next few days. The first contact with the enemy, however, was not made until dawn of August 22, when two officer's patrols of C Squadron of the 4th Dragoon Guards pushed out from Obourg on the canal north towards Soignies. One of these found a German piquet on the road, and fired on it. These shots are generally believed to have been the first fired by British troops in the war. British cavalry covering the advance reached Soignies (ten miles north-east of Mons), and at Villers-St.-Ghislain inflicted heavy loss on a small German cavalry detachment.



As Sir John French motored to Lanrezac's headquarters early on the 22nd he says that he saw large numbers of French troops moving in retreat in a southerly direction. His intelligence department that evening estimated that at least three German corps were marching against the British, carrying out a wide turning movement. He took up a position along the canal from Condé to Mons, and thence, after following a dangerously exposed loop in the canal, turned south to Harmignies, so that his right flank was posted at right angles to the rest of his front. The 5th cavalry brigade guarded Binche, while the cavalry division, under General Allenby, was kept as a reserve, ready to move to any part of the line that was

endangered. French's position was chosen rather for attack than for defence, and, in case a defensive battle had to be fought, he intended to fall back to a line a little farther south. This work of taking up positions was carried out on Saturday, August 22, and on the following day the troops went on digging themselves in along the canal and among the hills. All Sunday troops continued to arrive at Mons, many of them going at once into action.

The French troops who should have prolonged the British left had not arrived, and the left was in the air; by the night of the 22nd the Germans were near Tournai, threatening that flank; they also drove back the British cavalry and penetrated between the British right and Lanrezac's left at Anderlues. They attacked Lanrezac with such violence and superiority of force, threatening his communications from south-east, that his position was untenable. The British troops were ordered to entrench and stand on the defensive until French progress in other directions gave the signal for a general advance.

It will be convenient here to say something about the strength of the army which, after an interval of nearly 60 years, was to meet European troops in battle. It consisted of two army corps, each about 32,000 strong, a cavalry division, and artillery with 250 guns, and occupied a front of 25 miles. Along the canal from Mons to Condé was the 2nd corps, under Sir H. Smith-Dorrien. It had two divisions each of three brigades, each brigade consisting of four battalions. General Hubert Hamilton commanded the 3rd division, and to his left was the 5th division under Sir Charles Fergusson. The 1st army corps, which stretched from Mons to Binche, was commanded by Sir Douglas Haig, and consisted of the 2nd division, under Sir Charles Monro, and the 1st division, under Major-General S. H. Lomax. In the 2nd division was a brigade of guards, and in the 1st were two other battalions of guards. The 4th division was coming up in support.

Sir John French was aware, on the evening of the 22nd, that the French had been ejected from the line of the Sambre, and he determined to abandon all idea of an immediate offensive. A request from Lanrezac for a British attack on the enemy's flank, to relieve pressure on his own line, was refused, but the British commander agreed to stay where he was for the next 24 hours.

At daybreak on August 23 German artillery began to shell the exposed loop or salient on the canal north-east of Mons. Cavalry patrols on both sides were early on the move, and



brushes occurred at points along the front. It soon became evident that the first German blow would fall on the Mons salient. At 8 a.m. German infantry advanced in this quarter, violently assailed Nimy bridge, and developed a turning movement against the British right. Soon after midday a very large force of German guns was in action. The 9th German corps began to force back the right of the British 2nd corps, east of Mons, and Smith-Dorrien, commanding that corps, withdrew from the canal loop, blowing up the bridges over the canal. At other points along the canal the Germans attacked in force, but suffered heavily. These earliest attacks were made in mass formation, a method which the Germans found immensely costly against British rapid fire, and later abandoned for more open formations.

As the day progressed and von Kluck's army was bringing to completion a wheeling movement to the south-east, the attack gradually developed in a westerly direction along the canal. The German 3rd corps came into action about the bridge of Jemappes, two miles from Mons. Attacks were made upon advanced parties holding the bridge heads, but the resistance was so stubborn that, though they effected appreciable advances, the Germans suffered severe losses. However, by the early afternoon their attack had spread to a point seven miles north-east of Mons.

About 3 p.m. General Hubert Hamilton reported a serious assault on the 3rd division around Mons. There the chief danger lay. In every other sector, including the sector held by the 1st corps, the British line was holding well and repulsing, with considerable losses, all attempts to force the canal. Early in the afternoon both British flanks were threatened by greatly superior German forces. At 5 p.m. Sir J. French was informed by General Joffre that at least four German corps (160,000 men) were attacking him, and that the French 5th army was in retreat. French ordered an immediate retirement of the British to his second position, which had been prepared a little to the south. The British troops had punished the Germans badly, but by nightfall the Germans had bridged the canal and were advancing in great strength. Sharp fighting went on for hours, but it was not until dawn that the British were ordered to retreat.

There was great excitement in Britain when it was known that the little British army was in action with its formidable foe. The first official statement was issued by the Press Bureau at 2.30 on the Monday afternoon. Its first sentence ran thus:

> The British forces were engaged all day on Sunday and after dark with the enemy in the neighbourhood of Mons and held their ground.

The extent of the casualties was not reported at the time, but they were not heavy. Of the 16,000 killed, wounded or missing in the battle, the greater proportion were incurred in the retreat.

At Frameries the British rearguard put up so good a defence that it compelled the Germans to carry out a formal attack in which at least nine battalions of the 6th German division were engaged and suffered heavy loss. The British 3rd division played the chief part in this rearguard action. The extrication of two British corps from the enveloping attack of four German corps (with a fifth in reserve) was a remarkable feat—all the more remarkable as the Germans were amply supplied with motor transport which, at this date, the British lacked, and aircraft.

The main object of the retirement was achieved in so far that the army remained intact on either side of Bavai on the morning of the 24th. The success of the manœuvre was materially assisted by the miscalculation of von Kluck, who had believed that Sir John French would make a stand. He learnt the true position, after he had issued his orders, too late to carry out the enveloping movement which might have brought him decisive success.

The Official History of the War (Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1914) sums up the situation at this stage in the following manner:

Altogether the British commanders were not ill satisfied with the day's work. The unsatisfactory position on the canal had been imposed upon them fortuitously; but it had been held for a sufficient time, and had been evacuated without great difficulty or disaster, in favour of a second position only a mile or two in rear. The men, too, were in high spirits, for they had met superior numbers of the most highly renowned army in the world and had given a good account of themselves.

The ground fought over had in many parts been extremely difficult. The battlefield stretched for 20 miles or so through a belt of coalfields. Scattered over this district are the drab features associated with a mining district—small settlements of cottages, with environs of allotment gardens enclosed with wire fences. The ground was broken with pit heads and slag heaps. It has been described as "a close, blind country, such as no army had yet been called upon to fight in against a civilised enemy in a great campaign." The same authority describes that section of the front held by the 5th division as:

A wilderness of deep ditches, straggling buildings, casual roads and tracks, and high slag heaps. These last seemed to offer points of vantage, which were generally found to be non-existent when their summits had been explored, as they were commanded by some other slag heap; while certain of them, which seemed to promise all that could be desired, were found to be so hot that men could not stand on them. The artillery was more embarrassed even than the infantry; the officers had great difficulty in finding suitable positions for batteries, or even for single guns, and were equally at a loss to discover good observation posts.

From the German point of view, though the battle of Mons was claimed as a victory, it was very far from being an unqualified success. Their advance was delayed for a whole day and their losses were very heavy. They were glad enough of the respite of a night, under the misapprehension that the British force would stand to receive their further attacks in the morning. During that night British soldiers made their first acquaintance with Verey lights which, on the German side, were to play such an incessant part in night warfare.

Many thrilling stories of the battle of Mons and the subsequent retreat are contained in letters written home by soldiers who participated in these events. A selection of these moving, human

documents supplements in interesting fashion the foregoing accounts of the fighting.

A private of the 2nd Royal Munster Fusiliers, a battalion in the 1st brigade under Sir I. Maxse, gives the following account of the saving of the guns:

> We were sent up to the firing line to try and save a battery. When we got there we found that they were nearly all killed or wounded. Our Irish lads opened fire on the Germans, and you should have seen them fall. It was like a game of skittles. But as soon as you knocked them down up came another 1,000 or so. We could not make out where they came from. So, all of a sudden, our officer gave us the order to charge. We fixed bayonets, and went like fire through them. You should have seen them run! We had two companies of ours there against about 3,000 of theirs, and I tell you it was warm. I was not sorry when night-time came, but that was not all. You see, we had no horses to get those guns away, and our chaps would not leave them. We dragged them ourselves to a place of safety. As the firing was at full swing, we had with us an officer of the Hussars. I think he was next to me, and he had his hand nearly blown off by one of the German shells. So I and two more fellows picked him up and took him to a place of safety, where he got his wound cared for. I heard afterwards that he had been sent home, poor fellow.

Another vivid description of the fighting is given by a lance-corporal of the 1st South Wales Borderers, in which he tells how they entered Mons just in the nick of time. A regiment of Uhlans, he says, were attacking the rear of a convoy, and they soon got to work, hundreds of Germans being killed by the fire of the British artillery at close range. They found that the Germans had been looting the dead, and were wearing British khaki, with full equipment.

> The next day, he proceeds, we were relieved by the South Lancashires, and it was officially reported to us that we had not been relieved more than two hours before the enemy were all shelled to pieces, hardly any escaping, only we were reported to have been cut up instead of them. After that we were caught in a death-trap. We got into a village and we were surrounded by a brigade of Uhlans, but were saved by the timely arrival of the Scots Greys and the Lancers, who put about 1,500 out of action in six hours, charging them through and through. Of course, we were not losing one-sixth of what the Germans were. But I shall never forget it—the Germans came so unexpectedly. Whilst we guarded the right flank the Guards charged the centre square, killing many in ten minutes.

A corporal of the 1st Royal West Kent Regiment tells another thrilling story:

We were among the first lot to march up to Mons from Valenciennes, but our opening round with the Germans came the day before we reached there. It was a complete knock-out blow for a whole patrol of 28 Hussars. We were forming up in the main street at Wasmes to go to the relief of A Company, which was ahead, when some "civvies" (civilians) brought word that the Germans were coming. Up to that time we hadn't seen any. Some of us lay on the ground and others took available cover. Presently the Germans came along in fours, at walking pace, without a notion of danger, talking, smoking, and patting their horses. We suddenly gave them a volley of "Kentish Fire," and as we peppered them they shrivelled up. I aimed at three and saw them all drop. Every German was killed, and as there was not a single casualty on our side we thought it a great start.

It was different the next day, for, after a night in an orchard—in an unsuccessful attempt to reach A Company—we found ourselves defending the Mons canal. Five of my company officers were then killed and the other was wounded, and 17 men of the company were left dead on the field. Following this, in our rearguard fighting, day and night, we had a continual gruelling; but we sold every foot of ground only at a long price in the lives and blood of our enemies. Our brigade was covering the retirement of the main body, and we reached the little village of Crepy, near Compiègne, on August 31. The next day, when partridge shooting was beginning at home, sure enough I was "winged" among the turnips. Overnight my company was split up into outposts, spread out about two miles, covering all roads and places from which surprise attacks might come.

I was sent back to headquarters, about three miles away, for keeping communication. Before daybreak I was ordered to return with some maps and a message for the company. When I got to where the outposts had been left they were missing. They had apparently retired to some other position. It was just getting light, and happening to look back as I returned I saw an officer and eight men extended over the ground where our men had been left. I took them to be English. Putting down my gun, I whistled and began semaphoring with my arms, "Are you B Company?" They dropped down at once and fired on me. As the bullets came along, you can bet your boots I wasn't long in dropping, too, to make them think I had been hit. This idea succeeded, for they ceased firing. Then I slowly wriggled on my stomach across the road into a turnip field. A general engagement was beginning, and I must have been between the two sides. Crawl-

ing to the middle of the field, I stopped to rest, and heard voices, but not loudly enough to distinguish the language. So I took my cap off, and, raising it on a couple of turnip stalks, shouted, "Hallo, West Kent!" That only brought more shots.

I crawled on, with rest, for about two hours, with shrapnel bursting about me and bullets whizzing over. Several times, when a lull came, I called out, "Hallo, West Kent!" but the result was always the same—more bullets. Finally, I decided to crawl for the British big guns I could hear. I was going along gingerly, on hands and knees, when I got hit on the right arm. The bullet scooped a bit of flesh out, and severed the muscle, but it felt simply like a burn. All the same, I crawled on. I didn't want to be swamped in the advancing tide of Germans. I went on like that through field after field for, I should think, about two miles. Then I was thankful to come across the "Jocks"—the King's Own Scottish Borderers—who were beginning to retire. I walked on, just in front of the "Jocks," till, at a place where the road dipped, I found the artillery horses and gun-limbers sheltering under a farmhouse wall. A driver gave me a long drink out of his bottle, and helped me to cut my sleeve open to put the field-dressing on the wound. Then he gave me a smoke, and let me take a seat on the gun-carriage while he walked. The road was choked with motor-lorries, transport wagons, and the like. At last we came up with a "bun" wagon (Red Cross) and I got in.

How a detachment of Scottish troops were surrounded in the darkness by Germans is realistically described by another who took part in this memorable battle. He relates how the Gordons were in action all day on Sunday, August 23, at Mons, on Monday retiring to a new position, marching all day. On Tuesday they were in action again, and suffered considerably through the enfilading fire of German machine-guns, mounted on motor-cars, which caught them in the trenches. At eleven o'clock that night the word was passed along to retire. They rose quietly and slipped away, warning other trenches as they went. Before starting they were told that they had a long march, and had to get rid of all the weight they could.

Most of us, he says, left our packs in the trenches. About one or two o'clock in the morning, as we were marching down a narrow road, taking the sides in order to go as quietly as possible, we were fired on from a field on the left. The word passed that it was a French piquet. We thought we were retiring on the French lines. Our colonel ordered us to line the barbed wire fence in the field on the right-hand of the road, and went alone into the left, calling out, "Les Anglais—les

Anglais!" We heard them answer him, and it was evident that he was trying to make them understand, still thinking they were French. While we were waiting behind the fence the Germans were getting round us on the far side. The colonel then came back across the road and into our field and stood in front of us. We were quite helpless. We stood there surrounded. For a few minutes we were talking quietly in the dark asking each other what was going to happen. I heard one word—"Highlanders!"—and then they began to shoot. I dropped at once for shelter. "Darky" Wilson, who had been with me all through in the trenches, said "Now we're in for it!" and fell on top of me shot dead. Some tried to move off to the left, but there was no way of escape. The Germans were within three yards of us, and shot straight at every man who was standing.

In conclusion, he tells how they were too frightened to move, and stayed there till light came, and then crawled out.

I could see the colonel lying apart from the other men. A number of other Highlanders were making off in the distance. I ran after them, and fell in with two others, and together we came through to Boulogne, walking the whole way.

While the little British army was thus stemming to some extent the tide of the German advance, the French forces on its right were also feeling the weight of the German onset. Some 22 miles to the east of Mons stands the town of Charleroi and, being in the centre of the French position, this place has given its name to the battle which was the most important of the war up to the first battle of the Marne, one that was remarkable for the escape of a French army from an envelopment such as the Germans carried out in 1870 at Sedan. The German staff expected to reap the fruit of the advance through Belgium at this point, but its plans were thwarted by the quick manœuvring of the two generals concerned—Lanrezac on the French side and Sir J. French on the British.

Owing to changes in its organization made by Joffre at the last minute, the 5th French army commanded by Lanrezac had not completed its concentration before it was attacked. It was composed of the 1st, 10th, 3rd and 18th corps, in order from right to left, though the last was not ordered from Alsace before August 16, and did not arrive till August 21. It was stationed on the eve of the battle from Givet on the Meuse to the line of the Sambre near Namur—which fortress was to protect its centre—and Charleroi, with its extreme left north of the Sambre

near Anderlues. It included five divisions, badly equipped, and may have totalled some 250,000 men. At Namur were 25,000 Belgian troops, somewhat shaken in moral, under General Michel, and at Maubeuge a mass of 30,000 reservists and territorials, badly equipped owing to the shortage of boots, and without transport. They could not, therefore, be regarded as available for field warfare, especially against highly trained troops. The mission of the 5th army, in conjunction with the British Expeditionary Force, then arriving at Maubeuge and moving towards Mons, was to protect the French left flank and to strike the German right, which was supposed by the French high command not to extend far west of the Ardennes.

The position of the 5th army was one of great peril. Three German armies were closing upon it—namely, the 1st (Kluck), passing across its front to execute a vast enveloping movement—and if the British should be encountered to deal with them; the 2nd (Bülow), moving directly upon its front on the Sambre; and the 3rd (Hausen), the existence of which does not appear to have been known to the French supreme command, moving against its right flank and rear. Thus the 5th army and the British were threatened with the double envelopment which marked Cannae and Sedan. The total German force is placed by Baumgarten-Crusius at 30 infantry and five cavalry divisions (each German cavalry division included rifle battalions, machine gun companies and cyclists, besides cavalry and horse artillery, and thus was far more formidable than a British or French cavalry division) against 16 British and French infantry divisions and four cavalry divisions. In fighting force on the spot the Germans had a superiority of about two to one (600,000 to about 320,000 men).

Lanrezac, with good reason, was anxious as to his position. He had warned Joffre in vain of the risk of such a great German turning movement as was now being carried out. On August 20 he was ordered to take the offensive in combination with the 4th army (Langle de Cary) on his right, which was separated from him by a wide gap, and with the 3rd army (Ruffey). He was unable to do so because all his troops had not arrived, and the British were not yet in position. On the 21st he pointed this out to the French headquarters, and was told that he could wait till the 24th before attacking. It was fortunate that he did not advance on the 20th; had he done so he would have walked

with his whole army into the trap which the Germans were trying to set for him.

On August 21 the Germans took the initiative. Troops under Gallwitz began the bombardment of Namur with heavy German and Austrian artillery, and two Germans corps appeared on the Sambre, and with detachments forced the passage of that river at Tamines and Jemappe, driving back detachments of the French 10th and 3rd corps. French documents show that Lanrezac's intention was to allow portions of the German army to cross the Sambre, and then fall on them in full strength, a judicious plan which his corps commanders disregarded by making a series of ill-concerted attacks. On the French left Sordet's



cavalry was pushed back, opening a serious gap between the 5th French army and the British.

That same evening Hausen's 3rd army at three points near Dinant attempted to force the passage of the Meuse, gravely threatening the communications of Lanrezac and engaging the attention of the French 1st corps—which nevertheless was able to protect the river line. That night Bülow announced that he would fight the great battle on the 23rd. Perfect cooperation between Bülow and Hausen was necessary to bring off the stroke. Fortunately for the Allies, Bülow developed a violent attack with four corps on the Sambre on the 22nd before Hausen was ready. After severe fighting the Germans pushed across

the Sambre and penetrated into Charleroi, where they burnt many of the houses and killed many inhabitants. Heavy loss was inflicted on the Guards by a counter-attack of the 38th Algerian division south of Châtelet, but French authorities state that their own casualties were "terrible." By nightfall the French had been driven back to a line which ran from near Thuin to Mettet, and the Germans were clear of the difficult industrial district. This retirement exposed the flank of the British at Mons, and was one of the reasons why Sir J. French was forced to give the British forces under his command the order to retreat.

On the evening of August 22 Lanrezac issued orders for an attack on Bülow's army; but during that same night Hausen placed 340 guns in position on the east bank of the Meuse, from Yvoir to Blamont, to cover a crossing and take Lanrezac in flank and rear. To meet this attack, on August 23 the 1st French corps had to be withdrawn from the front northwards, where it was on the point of administering the *coup de grâce* to the Guards; but it succeeded in stopping the 3rd German army. In the morning German airmen reported that the roads behind Lanrezac's front were crowded with disorderly columns retiring south-west and west. About the same time German troops penetrated into Namur, moving between the forts, and the Belgian field troops and three French battalions decamped with all speed, losing heavily in their retreat.

But at the critical moment the French on the Meuse, notwithstanding the enormous artillery ascendancy of Hausen's army, inflicted such heavy loss that by nightfall no strong German force had crossed the river. At 4.30 p.m. German airmen reported the general retreat of the French, though, according to French authorities, Lanrezac did not order this till 9 p.m. It was the news of this retreat that led Sir John French to break off the battle of Mons. By morning of the 24th the 5th army held a front from Beaumont to Rosée, and the danger of envelopment from Hausen's army had practically vanished. It fell back, despite heavy loss, in fairly good order to another line between Avesnes and Regniowez.

The losses on both the German and French sides were considerable. Bülow claims that he only lost 11,000 men, and that the French losses were at least double; he says that he took 4,000 prisoners and 36 guns, but he gives no figures for Hausen's

loss, which is known to have been considerable. Lanrezac's management of the battle has been severely criticised in France, and he was superseded soon after it by Franchet d'Espérey. But he had to contend with superior numbers and a deplorably bad strategic position, due to the German movement through Belgium and the sudden appearance of Hausen's army. If the line of the Sambre had been defended with more energy, Lanrezac could not have escaped, and could not, by saving the 5th army, have saved France. The Germans regard the battle as a tactical success for themselves, but a strategic failure, and such it was. Many of the advantages gained by the advance through Belgium were lost when Lanrezac and French escaped the toils. Hausen was removed, ostensibly on the grounds of ill health, after the Marne, but really it would seem because the German staff blamed him for failing to cut off the French. As the German historian Baumgarten-Crusius, in his book "The Movements of German Armies in the battle of the Marne," points out, the real fault rested with the German high command, which failed to profit by an extraordinarily favourable situation.

In his book "The March on Paris," General von Kluck states that the Germans only learnt on August 22 of the presence of British troops in front of the 2nd army (Bülow). The more important was it, observes Kluck, that his own army, the 1st, should keep well to the westward, and so outflank the British, but an army order directed Kluck's army to wheel to the left in support of Bülow, and this order was upheld in spite of Kluck's appeal to the supreme command. He says that had he been free he could have outflanked the British army from the west, forced it back on the French 5th army (Lanrezac), and taken both in the rear. The battle of Charleroi was a definite German success, but it would be absurd to exaggerate it into the importance of a decisive victory.

In so far that the subsequent retreat did in fact extricate the Allied armies from incalculable disaster it may be said that the first great German stroke had failed, and the opportunities presented to them by their advance through Belgium were lost. But it would be equally wrong not to admit that the battles of Charleroi and Mons might easily have been converted into decisive victories. That they were not must be attributed, amongst other causes, to defective intelligence on the side of the Germans and faulty leadership, which led to sudden changes of plan.

CHAPTER 14

The British Retreat and Le Cateau

The night of August 23-24 was quiet, enabling the first stage of the retreat to be carried out in good order. The 5th cavalry brigade was detailed as a rearguard to the 1st corps, with orders to concentrate on Bonnet, and to attack at dawn, so as to hold up the German advance while the 1st and 2nd divisions retired. In effect they were very little disturbed before reaching the new line Feignies—La Longueville—Bavai. This, it has been pointed out, was not altogether a good sign, pointing as it did to a German flanking attack towards the west on the front held by the 2nd corps. Sir H. Smith-Dorrien had in fact made preparations to meet such an attack, and by dawn of the 24th his line was bombarded during the whole of its length. While the 1st corps were practically unmolested, the 2nd corps in many instances were called upon to make a fighting retreat.

A notable encounter took place on the 9th infantry brigade front at Frameries, where at 6 a.m. the Germans attacked in force and were repulsed with heavy loss by a rearguard of the South Lancashire and Lincolnshire regiments. Though only a minor action, it deserves to be recorded, for German accounts show that, apart from artillery action, they were thrown back by the excellence of the British rapid fire. One writer says: "Tommy seems to have waited for the moment of assault. He had carefully studied our training manuals, and suddenly when we were well in the open he turned his machine guns on." The machine guns were, of course, the rifles of the British infantry. The Germans later advanced to find the place abandoned. "Up to all the tricks of the trade from their experience of small wars, the English veterans brilliantly understood how to slip off at the last moment."

One of the chief difficulties at this time was to extricate the 5th division (Sir Charles Fergusson) from the Mons line. Here the left flank was seriously threatened by German forces of considerable strength advancing due south between Thulin and Condé. The cavalry and the 19th infantry brigade had been prematurely withdrawn, and Sir Charles Fergusson was obliged

to appeal for renewed cavalry support and the assistance of a small force of infantry and artillery still in reserve at divisional headquarters. The 2nd and 3rd cavalry brigades were sent forward, and these reinforcements created a diversion which relieved the pressure on the 5th division. An action developed in an area between the Mons-Valenciennes road on the north and the Elouges-Audregnies road on the south. At 12.30 p.m. the Germans opened their attack, and shortly after General de Lisle (2nd cavalry brigade) saw an opportunity for a cavalry charge on the German flank. This was made with great spirit, but was unfortunately checked by artillery fire and barbed wire. The action shortly became exceedingly serious, with the threat of a German enveloping movement, but the small infantry force with its single battery succeeded in holding their positions for a few hours. When the order to retire came the rescue of the guns afforded an opportunity for deeds of heroism which earned two officers the V.C. One of these was Major E. W. Alexander, of the artillery, the other Captain Francis Grenfell, of the 9th Lancers, who galloped with a small party of his men to assist in the rescue in the face of intense fire.

The retreat now began to continue from the eastward, the 3rd division falling back on Bavai, and the main body of the 5th division on a line Bavai-St. Vaast. The cavalry division also prepared to withdraw. Unfortunately, owing to the impossibility of getting orders to retire to certain parts of the line, some units were delayed, and lost very heavily. Indeed, the British losses on the first day of the retreat were more severe than they had been the day before, when the army had stood at Mons against the German attacks.

On the whole, however, the day's operations gave no cause for pessimism. The 5th division had defended six miles of front, and with the 19th infantry brigade and the cavalry had countered von Kluck's enveloping attack. The enemy had suffered severely, and the British troops were still full of confidence. They were, however, even at this stage suffering great hardship from lack of sleep, for scarcely a pause could be given for any adequate rest. The necessity for incessant vigilance and constant movement told heavily upon them. In the words of one battalion commander: "We had marched 59 miles in the last sixty-four hours, beginning the march in the middle of an entirely sleepless night, and getting only eight hours altogether on the other two nights. Many

men could hardly put one leg before the other, yet they all marched in singing." Added to this lack of sleep, the mere action of retreat necessitated constant labour in the digging of hasty entrenchments. The weather was very warm, and marching along sunbaked roads or through the close-wooded country involved much additional fatigue. And at this stage the retreat had only just begun.

Meanwhile, reports were being received that the French were in general retirement, and Sir John French was confronted with serious problems as to his next dispositions. He had at one time seriously thought of taking advantage of the fortifications of Maubeuge, but memories of 1870 and the fate of Bazaine at Metz induced him to abandon the idea. He gave the order to continue the retreat to the line Le Cateau-Cambrai. But now his course was complicated by certain territorial difficulties. In the way of retreat lay the forest of Mormal, nine miles in length and with an average depth of three to four, with no road through it from north to south but forest tracks narrow and unmetalled. It was necessary to skirt this obstacle, and it was decided to do so in two separate columns. To pass the whole force to the west of the forest would have involved a flank march across the front of the enemy, and to the east would have caused confusion with the French army. It was therefore decided to divide the two British army corps, one retiring to the west and the other to the east of the woods. The movement was to be begun so that all rearguards were clear of the Bavai-Eth road by dawn on August 25.

The retreat was accordingly continued along these lines with the cavalry engaged in a prolonged rearguard action. No very notable incidents marked this day's retirement, but the threat of German envelopment and the continued retreat of the French made it obvious to Sir John French that he would not be able to stand on the Le Cateau position, but must press back on St. Quentin and Noyon. The discomfort was added to by heavy thunderstorms and the misery of being soaked to the skin.

In issuing orders for a continuation of the retreat, Sir John French had come to a momentous decision. His orders were carried out by Sir Douglas Haig (1st corps), but as will be seen later, Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien (2nd corps), took a divergent view, which, in brief, was that as many of his troops had only just come in or were still arriving after over 20 hours' continuous work, and as the enemy was close on his front, it was impossible

to continue his retirement immediately. So he gave orders to fight on the ridge south of the Le Cateau-Cambrai road.

Before entering into a description of that action, two incidents of Sir Douglas Haig's retirement must be recorded. When established on their new line at about dusk on the evening of the 25th, rumours reached regimental officers that the Germans were approaching Maroilles and Landrecies, near which places lay the two main passages over the Sambre. These rumours, at first discredited, turned out to be correct, and the evening saw two defensive actions. At Maroilles, about 6 p.m., German patrols engaged our cavalry patrol, and with the assistance of field artillery forced them to fall back. Reinforcements from the Berkshire Regiment, when attempting to recover the lost bridge, found that it had been heavily barricaded, and the only access to it was under fire of a field gun. After considerable losses they were obliged to abandon the attempt.



Meanwhile, at Landrecies, where reports of the proximity of the enemy had at first been disbelieved, the 4th Guards brigade were sharply attacked by an advance body of the 9th German corps who had come into the town from the Mormal forest. The fighting took place in the streets of the little town, and machine-guns were brought into play. The British, reinforced, finally drove the Germans from the town after a six hours' battle. In both these actions the Germans secured some minor advantage by challenging and answering challenges in French.

At 7.30 on the evening of August 25 the orders were issued for the retreat to be continued the next day for a further ten or fifteen miles. The British higher commands, in the confusion of retirement, were in a considerable fog as to the exact direction of the German pursuit or the strength of the forces which were immediately threatening them. That within a few miles there were formidable bodies of the enemy, the actions at Landrecies and Maroilles clearly showed. The 2nd corps, too, had been involved in a rearguard action at Solesmes. The Germans were known to be hurrying troops towards the west flank of the British. Sir John French evidently considered that the best means of saving his small army was by continued retirement.

The retreating units of the 2nd corps were in some considerable confusion, and Sir H. Smith-Dorrien's decision to stand was partly based on the impossibility of assembling them for further retirement before dawn. General Allenby had reported that unless this were practicable the enemy would be upon them before they could escape. He further reported that his cavalry were too scattered and too exhausted to be of effective assistance in covering the retreat. General Hubert Hamilton (3rd division), when asked by the corps commander whether he could be on the move while it was yet dark, replied that many of his units were only just coming in, and that it would be impossible to assemble them for retreat before 9 a.m. It was after consultation with these generals, and bearing in mind the fatigued condition of his troops, that Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien made his momentous decision to give battle. To do that it was necessary to secure the consent of the divisional commanders to act directly under his orders—and this was readily given. A message was sent (about 5 a.m.) to G.H.Q., St. Quentin, and it is interesting to record the first reply from Sir John French to Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien's decision. It concluded:

> If you can hold your ground the situation appears likely to improve. Fourth division must cooperate. French troops are taking offensive on right of 1st corps. Although you are given a free hand as to method, this telegram is not intended to convey the impression that I am not as anxious for you to carry out the retirement, and you must make every endeavour to do so.

The 4th division here mentioned was a unit of the 3rd army corps, the main body of which was still in England. It was com-

manded by Major General T. D'Oyly Snow, and had arrived in France on the evening of August 22-23. It was incomplete in its details, having no divisional cavalry, heavy battery, signals, ammunition column or field ambulance. With these immense disadvantages it was called upon to take up a position on Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien's left in boggy country, which soon exhausted men and horses. When the corps commander's message reached General Snow he agreed to stand, and his troops were soon actively engaged with the enemy.

The disposition of the 2nd corps at dawn on August 26 was as follows: From right to left the main body of cavalry was between Le Cateau and the Sambre (later moved to the left flank to join forces with the French cavalry under General Sordet), the 5th division were holding a front from the southern outskirts of Le Cateau to Troisvilles with the 19th brigade in support. In the centre was the 3rd division extending as far as Caudry, and on the left the 4th division with its left flank on Esnes. The gap to Cambrai was filled by the 4th cavalry brigade, and later by General Sordet's cavalry corps. The German force advancing in pursuit was General von Kluck's 1st army, with which the 2nd corps had already joined issue at Mons.

August 26 was the anniversary of Crécy, and though it was not to witness any notable British victory, it was to be memorable for many fine deeds of British arms associated with the battle of Le Cateau. This town lies in the valley of the Selle in open cultivated country not unsuited to defensive warfare, and stood at the right corner of the battlefield over which the 2nd corps fought with varying fortunes during the whole of the day.

At 6 a.m. the first German scouts made their appearance in Le Cateau, and shortly afterwards the German batteries opened fire upon troops immediately to the west. The situation at once became serious, for the Germans appeared on the flank of the 2nd corps with a distinct chance of pouring through the gap which existed between the 1st and 2nd corps. They did, indeed, advance up the valley of the Selle, where they were caught by a counter-attack on their western flank, which arrested their progress and foiled the first turning movement on the eastern flank of the British forces.

About 10 a.m. the batteries and battalions of the 5th division to the west of Le Cateau found themselves under heavy enfilading fire which destroyed guns and inflicted many casualties, but

about this time the German battalions began to advance in thick masses, and offered a target which was taken advantage of with great effect by artillery and infantry. The Germans quickly filled their gaps and continued to advance, but in the main they were checked by the excellence of British marksmanship. On the right centre of the line attacks developed somewhat later, but early in the morning the village of Caudry was very heavily bombarded, and German troops advanced against the village. In this section, however, they were at first held (by the 7th infantry brigade) without difficulty.

On the left wing the day began unhappily for the British. As has been said, the 4th division had no proper means of reconnaissance, and had to rely on the reports of French cavalry which they could not check. French patrols, it is said, had reported the front clear, and certain units, notably a battalion of the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, were caught unawares in close formation by intensive machine gun fire. This battalion lost half its strength before it could be extricated. Large bodies of German troops made their appearance between Wambaix and Cattenières on the 12th infantry brigade front, but despite enfilading fire and a vast superiority in machine guns and numbers, their attack was resisted for an hour and a half. A single brigade was holding a German cavalry division, two Jäger battalions and a mass of machine guns and artillery. But a short retirement at last became necessary, and the 12th brigade was withdrawn to a line Ligny-Esnes. Once re-established, the 14th brigade R.F.A. and the 12th infantry brigade stood fast, and may be said at this time to have repulsed a heavy German attack. Also the way was left open for a still further retirement of the 4th division when it became necessary.

Meanwhile, the 11th infantry brigade to the west of Caudry was holding its positions, but the Germans offered little or no target, counting probably on the early retirement of the brigade or the possibility of surrounding it. Up to this stage of the battle, which had been proceeding for six hours, the 2nd corps had maintained its ground along the whole front, but the position gave cause for the gravest anxiety, and the developments of the afternoon were to prove that this was well founded.

To return to the right of the line, the 5th division was under the fire, direct and enfilade, of at least three German divisions. The question of immediate retirement was discussed between Sir

Horace Smith-Dorrien and Sir Charles Fergusson, the 5th divisional commander. As it appeared that this would need a strong counter-attack to enable the troops to be drawn off, it was decided to hold on to the position for the time being. This decision, however, had soon to be revised in view of the shaken condition of the line and a threatened German enveloping movement to the right.

A start was made at about 1.20 p.m. to evacuate the guns, a task of extraordinary difficulty owing to their position in the firing line. By the most heroic conduct of the gun teams many were got away under heavy fire, but in a number of cases they had to be abandoned after being rendered useless to the enemy. Losses in this section amounted to 25 field guns and a howitzer.

About 2 p.m. general orders for retirement were given by Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, to begin with the 5th division, followed later by the 3rd and 4th divisions. West of Le Cateau German pressure and machine gun fire was becoming intolerable, and the enemy battalions were rapidly gaining ground. The end was inevitable, and after nine hours' persistent fighting this part of the line was overwhelmed. It is said that the Germans in the final attack kept sounding the British "cease fire," and signalled to the British battalions (the Suffolks and Argylls) to surrender, which they steadfastly refused to do.

Orders for retirement filtered through to brigades, but in places it was impossible to get in touch with the battalions, and a regrettable feature of the general retreat was that numbers of scattered units were perforce left behind. How thus by accident rather than design these marooned units formed an effective rearguard to the main body will be seen later. One of the battalions which received no order to retire was the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, who held their position with the greatest tenacity until they were overwhelmed by the Germans. This dogged defence was of great value to the retiring troops to their left, for it effectively delayed the main German advance. By the end of the battle this battalion numbered only eight officers and 320 other ranks. Fortunately, too, the outflanking movement to the east of Le Cateau was also checked, leaving time for the corps commander's general scheme of retreat to be put into operation. The retirement from the right of the line started about 3.30 in the afternoon, and on the whole was effected

without undue losses. The Germans appeared to have neglected the opportunity of harassing the retiring troops with cavalry, and contented themselves with shelling and bringing their machine guns to bear on them.

In the right centre of the battlefield events moved more slowly, and beyond occasional opportunities for firing at long range at bodies of German troops, the British forces were not seriously engaged until the order to retire was received. The movement was carried out in perfect order, despite heavy shelling which had been called down by German aerial reconnaissance. But when the units of the 5th division concentrated on a single road from a scattered front there was naturally some confusion.

It may help the reader to visualise the nature of such a retirement if we give details of the space occupied by columns of troops on the march. An infantry brigade took up two and a quarter miles of road, so that a division may be said to have occupied nearly seven miles. The divisional artillery were spread out for five miles, and the divisional ammunition column required another one and a half miles. Ambulances and divisional trains occupied one and three-quarter miles. These figures, which are the official estimate in military text books, may be presumed to refer to units at full strength marching in peace time order. But in the circumstances of a retirement in which orders have miscarried and troops are only able to assemble according to the exigencies of the battlefield, the congestion must naturally be far greater. On the left of the 15th infantry brigade the 9th had also encountered little opposition and was able to withdraw without serious loss, except to the artillery, who were obliged to abandon four of their guns.

Fighting was a good deal warmer in the neighbourhood of Caudry, which was captured by the Germans from the troops of the 7th infantry brigade at about 2 p.m. At the same time a flanking attack developed against the left wing at Esnes, which was checked. A counter-attack on Caudry (by the 3rd Worcesters) succeeded in recapturing the southern part of the village. Later in the afternoon troops from this area were withdrawn towards Ligny, and met with considerable opposition, but on the whole the retirements of the 7th and 8th infantry brigades were effected in a satisfactory manner.

By 8 o'clock the 2nd corps had everywhere started its retirement, and in general may be said to have extricated itself with-

out too severe punishment. The turn to move had now come for the 4th division, between Esnes and Caudry, and this was vastly helped by the intervention of General Sordet's cavalry, a diversion which was expected but which was none the less timely. Beyond this force General D'Amade's troops were in and round Cambrai, and it appeared that this covering by the French army would be sufficient to secure the British left flank.

Orders to retire reached the brigades of the 4th division at about 5 p.m. Though no general attack was being launched upon them, the Germans were shelling the line with increasing severity and renewing their attempt to turn the left flank. Besides the French support, divisional artillery was being evacuated early and would be in a position to cover the retreat. Of the brigades the 12th seems to have got away most satisfactorily, and though heavily shelled with shrapnel escaped serious losses. The 11th was still in position as late as 6 p.m., and only escaped in scattered units, some of which remained fighting until a late hour.

Whether or not the Germans were deceived as to the general nature or direction of the retirement, they made no concerted effort to harass the 4th division, and they were seen to bombard the evacuated positions for some hours afterwards. The official comment on the day's fighting reads as follows:

> In fact, the whole of Smith-Dorrien's troops had done what was thought to be impossible. With both flanks more or less in the air, they had turned upon an enemy of at least twice their strength, had struck him hard and had withdrawn, except on the right front of the 5th division, practically without interference, with neither flank enveloped, having suffered losses certainly severe, but, considering the circumstances, by no means extravagant. The men looked upon themselves as victors, some indeed doubted whether they had been in a serious action; yet they had inflicted upon the enemy casualties which are believed to have been out of all proportion to their own, and they had completely foiled the plan of the German commander.

The British casualties at the battle of Le Cateau amounted to 7,812 of all ranks killed, wounded and missing, and 38 guns were lost. But, as in the instances already recorded, most of the latter were rendered useless before they were abandoned.

The order to hold on to positions "at all costs" is one that cannot without the gravest risk be revised by the regimental officer on the spot. Though he may see an immediate advantage

in retiring his troops to ground with a better field of fire, or may urgently desire to rescue his men from the enfilading fire of the enemy, the grim necessities of war may require him literally to obey that order. In other words, the sacrifice of certain battalions and certain batteries may be absolutely essential to the safety of the main body, and for all the officer in the field knows this rôle of self-immolation may be allotted to him, not only in the case of a general retirement, but also during a stand when time is needed to bring up reinforcements.

So naturally enough when orders for retreat failed to reach units on the scattered battlefield of Le Cateau those units remained where they were, prepared to fight to the last man or until a complete encirclement forced them to surrender. In this instance, however, as has been said, it was no part of Smith-Dorrien's scheme to sacrifice a single man who could be retired, and it was no more than the impossibility of communication which led those gallant troops to stand fast.

The story of what happened to the 1st Gordons in the 3rd division is one of the most tragic incidents in their regimental history. The account in the Official History of the War: Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1914, p.p. 187-88, well bears quoting in detail:

> Some time after dark, firing having ceased, it became known to Lieutenant Colonel Neish of the Gordons that an order had been shouted by two staff officers to different parts of the line for the 8th infantry brigade to retire and that this order had reached every one except the bulk of his own regiment, the company of the Royal Scots which lay on its right, and two companies of the Royal Irish on its left. At 7.45 p.m. Brevet-Colonel William Gordon, V.C., of the Gordon Highlanders, being the senior officer in army rank, assumed command of the whole of these troops; and at 9.20 p.m. Colonel Neish sent an officer and two men to Troisvilles to obtain orders, if possible, from the headquarters of the 3rd division. This officer not returning within the allotted time of two hours—he had fallen, as a matter of fact, into the hands of the enemy at Troisvilles—Colonel Gordon assembled his force towards Caudry at midnight, and at 12.30 a.m. marched off quite undisturbed through Audencourt, two miles north-north-west of Bertry. All was quiet in the village, and at 1.30 a.m. the head of the column reached Montigny, one and a half miles west of Bertry. Here a light was seen in a cottage, and the occupants—a man and a woman who were presumed to be French—reported that early in the morning the British troops had moved on Bertry and



Central News

TSAR OF RUSSIA AND TWO ABLE GENERALS. Left, the Grand Duke Nicholas who was commander-in-chief of the Russian armies until 1915, when he was sent to command in the Caucasus and conquered Turkish Armenia. Centre, Nicholas II. He succeeded his father as tsar of Russia in 1894 and shortly afterwards married Princess Alix of Hesse, this photograph being taken in the same year. He was murdered in 1918. Right, General Brusiloff. As commander-in-chief of the Russian 8th army, he assisted in the conquest of Galicia, 1914-16. In 1917 he succeeded General Alexeieff as commander-in-chief.

General Auffenberg, Austrian 2nd Army commander, was defeated in Galicia.

General Mackensen won distinction in German attacks on Warsaw in 1914

Field-Marshal von Hindenburg with members of his staff on the Eastern front.

THREE ENEMY LEADERS ON THE EASTERN FRONT

General de Castelnau commanded the French 2nd army operating in Alsace.

General Langle de Cary took a notable part in fighting on the Meuse.

General F. P. Antholne took part in the battle of Morhange, fought August, 1914.

General Franchet d'Esperey, head of the French 5th army, October, 1914.



General Pierre Dubois commanded the 9th army corps, helping Belgian army.



General Maud'huy distinguished himself at first battle of the Marne, Sept. 1914



General Dubail held a command in Alsace-Lorraine in Aug.–Sept., 1914.



General Russky, Russian soldier, gained several victories in Galicia.



General Rennenkampf was leader of Russia's brilliant raid into E. Prussia.



General Ivanoff, Russian soldier who captured Jaroslav.



General Radko Dmitrieff distinguished himself in 1914.



General Samsonoff who was defeated at Tannenberg, 1914.

SOME FAMOUS FRENCH AND RUSSIAN SOLDIERS

The Grande Place and town hall, Armentières, before the destruction wrought during the war.



Part of the town of Guise and its 16th-century castle. This place figured in the early fighting.

The Sambre Canal at Landrecies, scene of the heroic stand of the Guards brigade during the retreat from Mons.

Remains of casemate in fortifications at Maubeuge, after the town had been captured by the Germans.

FRENCH TOWNS OF POIGNANT WAR MEMORY

Maurois. The man was ordered to guide the party through Montigny on the road to Bertry, which he did; and at 2 a.m. the head of the column reached the cross roads to the south-west of Bertry. Here three shots were fired, and after a few minutes' delay, during which the advanced guard endeavoured to ascertain the nationality of the post, there was a heavy outbreak of rifle fire. The men were extended and answered it.

Orders were then given for the column to move back along the road to Montigny. But in the darkness the road south-west to Clary was taken instead and the column came upon a field gun which was trained to fire down the highway. This gun was rushed and taken before it could be discharged, and a mounted German officer near it was pulled off his horse, but the rear of the column was now met by rifle fire from the south and south-west. Once again the men were extended and replied, but the fire from the front and rear showed them pretty clearly that they were trapped. The head of the column now made an effort to force its way into Bertry, and stormed a house on the outskirts of the village in which were a number of German officers. The enemy, however, was by this time thoroughly alarmed. Firing began on all sides, and, after fighting against hopeless odds for the best part of an hour longer, Colonel Gordon's party was overpowered. Of the Gordon Highlanders about 500 were taken, but a few escaped, and a handful of them actually made their way through the German lines to Antwerp, whence they were sent back to England. The fortune of war was hard upon the Gordons. For the time they practically ceased to exist as a battalion, but by their gallant resistance to all German attacks between 5 p.m. and dark, they had rendered incalculable service to the 3rd division and to the army at large.

Other units were similarly stranded and suffered many casualties. It is estimated that of 2,000 troops left behind about 1,000 finally escaped and were able later to rejoin the ranks. Though unintended, their stubborn resistance was of invaluable service to the main body. It kept the Germans on tenterhooks of anxiety as to what was in front, and made them disinclined to press their advantage immediately. One German eye-witness says:

> In front of us there still swarmed a number of scattered British troops, who were easily able to hide in the large woods of the district, and again and again forced us to waste time in deployments, as we could not tell what their strength might be.

Meanwhile, the main retreat continued in such order as was possible in roads choked for miles with troops and transport.

The men were overcome with weariness, wet through, and many had been without proper food for hours. The task of sorting them into their allotted positions was one of extreme difficulty, but it was accomplished, though naturally the body was continually being joined by stragglers.

At dawn on August 27 troops were pouring into St. Quentin, where they were able to snatch a few hours' rest before resuming their march. So far the retreating army had been very little molested by the enemy, though the 4th division was for a time followed fairly closely by their cavalry. On the whole the Germans were quiescent, and the difficulties which confronted the staff were mainly concerned with the continued movement of troops, so weary that they slept as they marched, and when they fell out from sheer exhaustion were too comatose to be moved. Officers, themselves worn out, had the greatest difficulty to keep their columns moving or even to ensure that the horses were fed and watered. It says much for the discipline of the British regular army that the retreat was everywhere continued, and much for the resilience of the men and their degree of physical fitness that they recovered so rapidly after short spells of rest and adequate food.

Between August 23 and August 28 the 2nd corps had fought two general actions and had marched 75 miles. At this stage of the retreat the 5th division went into billets at Pontoise. The 3rd division halted at Crissoles and Genvry, not far from Noyon. The halting places of the 4th division were at Bussy, Farniches and Campagne. By this time Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien may be said to have shaken off von Kluck's pursuit, and to have been relieved of the gravest of his anxiety.

On August 27 General Joffre telegraphed his congratulations to Sir John French. He paid tribute to the gallantry of the British army in engaging vastly superior forces, and acknowledged the great help afforded in protecting the left flank of his armies. "The French," he said, "will not forget the services rendered."

Sir John French, although in later days he criticised Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien's decision to stand at Le Cateau, at the time paid generous tribute to his corps commander. In his dispatch he wrote: "I say without hesitation that the saving of the left wing of the army under my command, on the morning of August 26, could never have been accomplished unless a

commander of rare and unusual coolness, intrepidity and determination had been present personally to conduct the operation."

There remains one ponderable feature of the battle and the subsequent retreat, and that is von Kluck's failure to engage in a vigorous pursuit which would have undoubtedly resulted in disaster to the small British force. That disaster which for the moment must have been irreparable might have changed the whole course of the war. But whatever reasons actuated him, the German army commander turned his troops south-west instead of south, leaving the retirement practically unmolested, and missing an opportunity such as is seldom offered to a commander in war.

In the foregoing section the narrative has followed only the operations of the British 2nd army corps. It is now necessary to return to the 1st corps and Sir Douglas Haig, who, it will be remembered, had accepted Sir John French's decision to continue an uninterrupted retirement. Here again the Germans made no attempt at any general attack, but one or two incidents marred the complete immunity of his retirement. On the night of the 26th the position of the 1st corps was in and around Etreux. The Connaught Rangers, for example, were surprised by the enemy in the village of Le Grand Fayt and were fired on from the houses, suffering very severe losses. The Munsters fought a most gallant action by Etreux, holding back the enemy for fully six hours until they were completely hemmed in on three sides by German troops and finally overpowered. It was learnt afterwards that the Irish battalion had been holding its own against at least six battalions of the enemy.

On the 28th the retreat of the 1st corps was continued to La Fère along roads congested with troops, transport and refugees. A certain amount of cavalry pursuit was encountered but successfully checked, notably at La Guinguette, where a very spirited action succeeded in discouraging further activity on the part of the German cavalry. There was still a gap of 11 miles between the 1st corps, south of the Oise and of La Fère, and the 2nd corps with the 4th division, north and east of Noyon. This gap was partly covered by cavalry, but to bring the two wings close together was the preoccupation of the next days of retreat.

It was Sir John French's intention to make the following day, August 29, a day of rest. Orders were given to this effect, and

except for the cavalry the troops in general had a short breathing space to recover from fatigue. But any prolonged rest was yet impossible. There was a good deal of activity on the 2nd corps front, and it became clear later in the day that the French 5th army had failed to stem the German advance. Orders were therefore given for further retreat to a line Soissons-Compiègne. General Joffre was anxious that the British should join in a counter-stroke, but Sir John French was of the opinion that his army was not in a condition to take the offensive until the men had had time to recuperate and units were in a position to refit. On August 30 the retreat continued with little interference from the enemy, but the troops were still so tired that the full distance could not be attained. Meanwhile, Joffre had ordered a widespread retirement of the French forces.



Much the same circumstances attended the retreat on the following day; little activity on the part of the Germans, but great hardships to the retiring army through heat, dust and thirst. They were again too fatigued to accomplish the distance designed. The 1st corps halted on the northern side of the forest of Villers Cottérêts, the 2nd corps at Coyolles and Crépy en Valois. But there was to be no rest yet. It became increasingly clear that the German 1st army was approaching in great force, and it was necessary for Sir John French to avoid contact with it until General Joffre should be ready to counter-attack. Orders for further retreat were therefore given.

The retreat of September 1 was not so uneventful, being marked by more than one gallantly fought rearguard action. At Néry, where the 1st cavalry brigade and a battery of the R.H.A. had billeted for the night, a patrol of the Hussars encountered suddenly in the early morning mist a column of German cavalry. The encounter was followed by a rain of shells on the village. It would scarcely be true to say that the British rearguard were surprised, for they had expected to be called on to resist the enemy—but there is little doubt that the suddenness of the contact was equally disturbing to the Germans. Still, they mustered

six regiments of cavalry and two batteries, and had the advantage of position. The single battery of the R.H.A. was man-handled into position, one gun being disabled at once by a direct hit; another was put out of action almost immediately, and the task of silencing the German batteries was soon left to a single gun. This battle of odds was most gallantly carried on; officer after officer fell, but still the gun spoke, and of the survivors who continued to the end two earned the Victoria Cross, and amongst those who died on the field one officer (Captain Bradbury) was awarded the decoration posthumously. This minor action of Néry (or Compiègne) was, however, finished off by the cavalry with infantry support, and so hot did they make it for the Germans that they were obliged to retire precipitately, leaving eight guns behind them. The Hussars captured 78 prisoners.

Rearguard actions were also fought this day at Crépy en Valois, where the outposts of the 5th division were attacked by mounted German troops, who when checked did not pursue, and at Villers Cottérêts. Here the cavalry were naturally the first to feel the shock, but the main attack fell on the Guards regiments of foot (4th Guards brigade) who were covering the 2nd division during an interval for rest. The infantry contested every foot of ground and fell back according to orders, only very gradually. Fighting lasted until 6 p.m., but despite heavy casualties the rearguard action achieved its purpose. The Germans, too, suffered heavily, and it is said that they so lost their direction that they were responsible for many of their own casualties.

Meanwhile, the main body trudged on with no final destination yet in sight, for the close proximity of the enemy (some of his cavalry was at this time behind the British line) determined Sir John French on continued and immediate retirement. In the past twenty-four hours he had had an interview with Lord Kitchener, who had travelled from England to investigate the situation, when it was agreed that the British commander-in-chief should conform to the movements of the French army, while acting with caution to avoid being in any way unsupported on his flanks. But this did not mean that he was called upon to make any immediate stand.

The last stages of the British retreat took place between September 2 and 5. The troops responded to an early call on the 2nd, starting on this march in many cases at 1 a.m. For the 1st corps Sir Douglas Haig was able to make use of railway

transport for his ammunition columns, which left the wagons free for the conveyance of kits, baggage, and footsore men.

The remaining few days of retirement can be passed over rapidly, for they contained no pitched battles and little harassing action on the part of the enemy. On the night of September 2 the line of the British army extended from Meaux north-west to Dammartin. General French gave orders that the Marne should be crossed next day (as did General Lanrezac to his 5th army), and between 3 a.m. and 4 a.m. the 1st division had crossed the Marne at Trilport, the 2nd and 3rd at Meaux, the 5th at Isles les Villenoy, the 4th at Lagny, and the cavalry division at Gournay. By nightfall they were in line between Jouarre westward to Nogent, having blown up the bridges behind them. At this stage Sir John French had hoped to give his men a day's rest, for he had learnt that von Kluck was moving his army eastward, and would not seek battle immediately. But to conform to General Joffre's plan, which included a retirement over the Seine if necessary, he was obliged to order further movements to take place next day.

The next stage of the retreat was to the Grand Morin, the 1st corps marching southward upon Coulommiers, and at dawn of September 5 the last stage was begun, which ended at nightfall with the British troops S.S.E. of Paris on a line from west of Rozoy to Brie Comte Robert, which was on the verge of the Paris defences. Strategically now the French armies, with the B.E.F., were in the position for which General Joffre had been manœuvring, and General von Kluck was at last at a disadvantage. He was to pay for his mistakes and hesitations when the Allies took the counter-offensive at the battle of the Marne.

Altogether the retreat from Mons occupied thirteen days, necessitating marches amounting at least to 200 miles. The hardships and discomforts which the British troops endured have already been described, but they cannot be over-emphasised. Hunger and thirst, lack of sleep, laceration of the feet, unendurable fatigue, forced marches under a pitiless sun, undertaken under circumstances where the element of surprise attack, of enfilade fire or of ambush was never absent, were the lot of the British army for close on a fortnight. Highly-trained and disciplined as the force was, it had been mobilized with great speed, regimental officers had had little opportunity of getting to know the reservists who had been drafted to their units, and even

this disability naturally added to the difficulties of leadership. It is the privilege of the soldier on the spot to allow his mordant humour to play on the comparatively easier circumstances of the staff, but in the retreat from Mons staff officers shared all the hardships of the men. The responsibility which rested on them during daily retirements, often ordered at an hour's notice, was truly onerous. To them fell the task of communicating orders to the brigades, of organizing the lines of retreat and reassembling units at the halting places. However orderly a retreat may be, confusion is bound to occur, and there were days and nights during the retreat from Mons when the situation was wellnigh inextricable. It says much for the unflagging work of the staff that at every halt a presentable line was formed.

As a passage in military history the retreat from Mons can never be accounted inglorious to British arms. Apart from successful actions and the many heroic deeds which marked these anxious days, Sir John French had magnificently fulfilled his instructions. His cooperation with the French had been complete, and his retreat was a natural corollary to General Joffre's movements. His losses were heavy, 16,000 killed, wounded, and missing, with 42 guns and a great quantity of material, but considering the numbers engaged and the nature of the operation they were not disproportionate. One of his tasks was to preserve as far as possible a nucleus of his regular army upon which the new armies in training could be drafted and built up, and this he triumphantly did.

That the indomitable spirit of the British remained unshaken during the great retreat is evident from a letter of a corporal of the Coldstream Guards. From this account it appears that on the third day after Mons it was supposed that the British had left the enemy 20 miles in the rear. About 5,000 or 6,000 Germans, however, came and trapped them. All that was possible under the circumstances was done to line the road, and by good luck there was a house on either side. The soldiers lay between them ; in front there was barbed wire, which must have been put there before the war, but it was a godsend. The enemy tried to break it down with their rifles, but were knocked down as they came up. Some of them got partially over the wire, and they were hanging there the next morning—riddled with shot. It was their big guns from which they fired case shot that did most of the damage.

The corporal continued the story thus:

Our major was a hero. When we were hard pressed and they charged our weak line we were almost on the point of retiring, but he stood up in the midst of the fire and shouted: "Never let it be said that a Coldstreamer retired in front of a German dog!" We all felt as one, and we lay down and never flinched. They got to us, but never broke our line. One big beast of a sergeant went up to one of our men and said: "It is all right, I am a French officer. The French are here." He then ripped the poor fellow up. Four others attempted the same thing, but one of our officers shot the four with his revolver.

Well, they charged us seven times. Each time their trumpeters sounded we gave it them hot. They were nearly through once or twice. We saved the remainder of the division. Had we not been there they would have got into the town and cut up the whole division, as they were asleep. They lost 1,500, and we lost 60: seven out of one company. The papers said we had 700 against 5,000, but we had only one company that took part in it, as the remainder of the battalion were in the town to the rear of us. I think we will get a special bar for it.

A private in a battalion of the King's Royal Rifles in his version of the retreat says:

We did not like the order to retire at Mons. We knew we were doing better than the Germans, and inflicting heavy losses on them. The officers knew we were disappointed, because on the fifth day of retiring—we had had three days at Mons before we began to retreat—our commanding officer came round and spoke to us, saying: "Stick it, boys, stick it! To-morrow we shall go the other way, and advance. Biff—biff!" The way he said "Biff-biff!" delighted the men; and after that you could frequently hear the men shouting "Biff-biff!"

We went on retreating, with occasional stops, just to give the Germans a taste of what we could do. On one occasion I and six others were left to cover a Maxim gun whilst it was being limbered up to be taken back to some other position. The Germans were shelling us all through this, and it was pretty hot work. We had to take up the position of the gun, and we kept firing rapid to make it appear that the Maxim gun was still there. We thought ourselves lucky to get through, because the Germans were shelling the positions on both sides of us. Then we had to go at the double for about five miles. It was a hard jog-trot all the way. When the seven of us were hurrying to catch up to the others we were joined by some stragglers. One was a cavalryman who had lost his horse. Some were East Surreys and others were West Kents. We became quite a little army corps all on our own. Towards the close of the fifth day of retreat I fell out. I remember a big

explosion of a shell, and all the rest is a blank. I came to on the train with other wounded. Lucky thing I didn't get the full benefit of that shell.

At one place during the retirement an English airman flew over the German lines three times. He seemed to do it for devilment. He was out of rifle range, but the Germans were shelling him for all they were worth. That airman seemed to have a charmed life. I saw a fine "scrap" in the air between a British and a German aeroplane. The British airman can move about quicker and has a much greater speed. This is partly due to the fact that the German machines are armoured underneath. The English airman got above the German and they had a fight for about a quarter of an hour. Our man emptied his revolver into the German, who kept trying to get out of his way, but could not owing to the Englishman's speed. The German then seemed to plane down in good order, but when he got to the ground he was dead.

One of our wounded officers was given a glass of water by a German officer. It so happened that next day the German officer was himself wounded. He was brought into our hospital and put in a bed next to that which was occupied by the British officer to whom he had given a drink the previous day. Another curious incident was that of a German soldier in civilian clothes who came into our lines. He told us that he was formerly a waiter at the Hotel Cecil, and said he was tired of fighting and wanted to give himself up. He was quite alone. We had a narrow escape one day. The Germans surprised us by occupying, in overwhelming numbers, a ridge opposite to where we were. We thought it was all up with us. Suddenly there was some firing on our right. We thought they were more Germans, but they proved to be two divisions of French troops, although we didn't know they were there.

The more gruesome side is vividly described by yet another participant. Referring to the retreat as a "nightmare," in which no very clear impression of the order of events was retained, he compared his feelings with those of a madman, after a serious illness, being forced towards the edge of a precipice.

My battery, he says, were on the move from August 18 to 30 without rest, and from the Sunday when we were attacked at Mons until the following Sunday not one of us in the battery felt as if we had had a wink of sleep. It was bad enough through the day, fighting the repeated attacks of the Germans, but it was worse at night, when we had to pick our way through unknown country. The roads were bad, and we could not show lights for fear of serving as a guide to the German gunners, who were always hovering around. Now and then their searchlights played full on to us as we struggled along,

and when we were discovered in that way we always got a heavy artillery and rifle fire into us. Some of our lads got hit then, and where it was possible we carried them along with us, but we had no room for dead men, and if the wound was fatal we had to leave the victim to be buried by the Germans, or any other person with Christian charity.

One night when we had been toiling along for hours, and were like to drop with fatigue, we ran right into a big party of horsemen posted near a wood. We thought they were Germans, for we couldn't make out the colour of the uniforms or anything else, till we heard someone sing out: "Where the hell do you think you're going to?"

Then we knew we were with friends, and we didn't mind their abuse. Well, as you know, we pulled through, but if the Germans had been worth their house room as soldiers we wouldn't have got off so easy as we did. After that things were a good deal quieter with us for a day or so, but we were soon at it again. We were in the fight at Compiègne, but the most awful work of all began on Sunday week, when we were posted to resist the German march on Paris. It was touch and go with us, and, though we are pretty confident, I can tell you there were times when it looked as though they were going to bear us down again by their old trick of pouring on endless streams of men and horses and guns to crush us by sheer brute force. Our infantry gave the Germans the soundest dressing down you ever saw.

The fiercest fighting took place when the Germans tried to force their way across the river at different points. As they came up to the fording points, every one of which was commanded by our artillery and bodies of picked French and British riflemen, they were galled by the infantry fire, and we kept plugging them with shells. They had evidently made up their minds to throw their pontoons across regardless of the cost, and when that's the case you can't do much. The first party got their pontoon into position nicely, and they came rushing across it like a swarm of bees. A shell from the French battery on our right dropped right on to them, and the bridge and its load went toppling into the river, being carried away downstream under a heavy rifle fire. The same thing went on the whole day, until we were sick of the sight, and mists were floating before our eyes, and shrieks were ringing in our ears. Only at one point did they manage to get across the river, and then they had to face a bayonet charge from the Allies' infantry, who rushed on them with rare joy and hurled them back into the river. It was here that a whole battalion of German infantry was captured. They simply couldn't stand up against the rush of the men with the bayonet, and they threw down their arms in token of surrender.

There was one lad with our battery who received a bullet in his arm first go off at Mons, but kept on his mount until the Wednesday, when he collapsed at Cambrai. He had a narrow shave from blood-poisoning, but the doctors and his own pluck brought him through. There was a man of the Buffs who carried a wounded chum for over a mile under German fire.

An incident of this time which necessitated superhuman exertions was the change of base from Boulogne and Havre to St. Nazaire. The advance of the Germans westward had made the former ports appear unsafe, and St. Nazaire on the Loire was then chosen. Boulogne was the easier to clear, but the situation at Havre was more difficult Some idea of the magnitude of the task is to be gained from the fact that during four days (from August 30 to September 3) 20,000 officers and men, 7,000 horses and 60,000 tons of stores had been dispatched from Havre to St. Nazaire.

Of one arm of the service during the battles of Mons and Le Cateau and during the retreat only passing mention has been made. That is the Royal Flying Corps, then testing its powers as a fighting force for the first time. It took the field under Brigadier General Henderson, with an advance base at Amiens and later at Maubeuge. Its arrival in France has already been described, and without delay it took upon itself the duties of aerial reconnaissance. To make the first of these in any war in the service of the British army was the privilege of Captain P. B. Joubert de la Ferté, of No. 3 squadron, in a Blériot, and Lieutenant G. W. Mapplebeck, of No. 4 squadron, in a B.E., on August 19. During the following days and during the retreat constant reconnaissances were made, which were invaluable in spotting massed movements of the enemy. One of the most valuable of these was made on August 22, and reported the massed troops of von Kluck's 2nd corps evidently engaged in an attempt at an enveloping movement.

During the retreat the R.F.C. found itself under the necessity of retiring its headquarters every day and, with its machines and personnel, a great bulk of material upon which its very existence depended. Mostly during the short halts landing grounds had to be improvised, for no regular aerodrome was available, and all the time reconnaissance work had to be continued. This, by the way, did not concern only enemy movement. During the confusion and retirement the R.F.C. observers rendered great help

in tracing the movements and exact positions of the British troops. Pilots who landed at corps headquarters were able to reassure the commanders as to the condition of their distant units and the movements of the enemy. But their greatest service during these anxious days was to expose von Kluck's manœuvres and confirm the news of his wheel in a south-easterly direction. They certainly contributed to the escape of the British army from the toils of the Germans.

How elementary was their equipment, compared to what it became later, can be gathered from the fact that they possessed no bomb-throwing gear, but carried small grenades in their pockets and larger bombs tied to their bodies. Little had been done to equip the aeroplanes, and officers were often armed only with service rifles and revolvers. But execution was done against enemy aeroplanes. In Sir John French's first dispatch, issued September 7, and addressed to Earl Kitchener as secretary of state for war, he said:

> I wish particularly to bring to your lordship's notice the admirable work done by the Royal Flying Corps, under Sir David Henderson. Their skill, energy, and perseverance have been beyond all praise. They have furnished me with the most complete and accurate information which has been of incalculable value in the conduct of operations. Fired at constantly, both by friend and foe, and not hesitating to fly in every kind of weather, they have remained undaunted throughout. Further, by actually fighting in the air, they have succeeded in destroying five of the enemy machines.

"Fired on by friend and foe" is a phrase which demands some explanation. In these early days the machines had no identification marks, and though these were quickly improvised it was some time before mistakes of identity could be entirely avoided.

Sir John French concludes his dispatch by referring to the great services rendered by his chief of staff, Sir Archibald Murray, the quartermaster-general, Sir W. Robertson, the adjutant-general, Sir N. Macready, and other members of the general and personal staffs at headquarters.

CHAPTER 15

The French in Retreat

While the British Expeditionary Force was helping to hold back the great enveloping movement of the main German army, the northern forces of France were fighting their way southward. The British troops escaped more lightly than their immediate comrades-in-arms at Charleroi. For the 5th French army, after the passage of the Sambre was forced on its right, was placed in a difficult position by the failure of the 4th army to hold Givet, close to the point where the Meuse flows from France into Belgium.

Pressed back relentlessly by the army of General Bülow, with General Hausen, commanding the Saxon army and the Prussian Guard, operating near their right wing, the 5th army had to retire with all possible speed. For in front of it a body of Germans was advancing on Rocroi, near its distant path of retreat. To protect the retiring infantry and guns, the horsemen of the two divisions of French cavalry on the western flank rode their mounts to a standstill. These divisions were under General Sordet, who was afterwards to bring his force to the relief of the British 2nd corps at the battle of Le Cateau. The struggles of the French 4th army, operating from the Meuse, were heroic. Round Dinant, where they had triumphed a little while before, the French were heavily outnumbered. They fell back fighting artillery duels and rearguard actions.

Just near the French border, at the little Belgian river town of Givet, the German troops got across the Meuse. Some of them advanced on Rocroi, and thence to Rethel; others ascended the Meuse against a magnificent resistance by the French. At one point a French brigade of some 5,000 troops beat back a German division of some 20,000 in a fight lasting 12 hours. The steadily increasing power of resistance in the French culminated at Charleville, a town lying on the French Meuse opposite to Mézières. It is near Sedan and the great hollow in the hills in which the main French army was trapped in 1870 by Germans occupying the encircling heights.

On Monday, August 24, the town of Charleville was evacuated of its civil population. The French army also retired, leaving a few machine guns behind, and the French gunners concealed themselves in positions commanding the town and the three bridges that connected it with Mézières. The following day the German advanced guards came towards the two towns. They rode across the bridges into the deserted streets, and after they crossed three tremendous explosions took place behind them. The bridges, mined in preparation, had been fired. The German cavalrymen were smitten by machine gun fire; but having machine guns with them, and, finding their foes were not numerous, they made a stand. Every French machine gun team was at last brought down.

When the main invading army advanced along the river valley, the French artillery high on the hills raked the column with shrapnel. The head of it was blown away; but, under a continual gun fire, the German sappers threw their pontoon bridges across the Meuse, while the German artillerymen had to engage in a duel with the French. But the Frenchmen went on firing at the river bank until the signal was given to retire. Afterwards, between Charleville and Rethel, there was another stubborn battle, with the Germans pushing on against gun fire and winning a hard-earned victory.

Eastward, between Charleville and the great fortress of Verdun, the sag of the French forces went on. An army from Charleville—or rather, from its sister town of Mézières—was repulsed from the Semois region of the Ardennes by Duke Albrecht of Württemberg with a large force. Then at Longwy, an antiquated fortress town near Verdun, the army of the crown prince succeeded in bursting into France after a long siege operation, and advanced towards the forest of Argonne on August 27. On that day, the day after the Le Cateau battle, things looked black for France. The British army did not know yet if it had saved itself. Everywhere else, from the coast almost to Verdun, there was a Franco-British retreat. At Nancy, on August 25, there had been a fierce encounter between the crown prince of Bavaria and the garrison of Toul.

But General Joffre was working to improve his fighting forces. Under his direction General d'Amade, on the left of the British force, organised a new 6th army out of four reserve army divisions, a regular army corps and General Sordet's

cavalry. A 9th army, composed of three corps from the south, was formed under General Foch. What is still more important, General Joffre, while leaving his re-formed battle-front to test the enemy's strength again in such battles as that at Guise, continued the general retreat in France. For he found that the new French 6th army, being mainly reserve troops, was not strong enough for his secret purpose. It was so unsuccessful in resisting the attack of von Kluck's army that all northern France had been left open to the enemy. But General Joffre had a strong general reserve near Paris. It could be used to reinforce the Allied line at any point where the enemy could be pierced or turned. General Joffre waited for his opportunity. Such in general outline was the position of the French towards the latter days of August; but for a fuller understanding of the course of events a more detailed description of the actions involved and the moves that led up to them is necessary.

By August 25 their victories in Lorraine, the Ardennes and on the Sambre had appeared to justify the Germans in withdrawing at least two army corps for service on the eastern front. Von Moltke certainly took the view that the great general action had been fought in the west and had resulted in a decisive victory. But when he proposed to withdraw troops he found that his generals on the spot were jealous as to who should spare them. Eventually it was decided to withdraw them from the right.

Meanwhile the Allied commands had certainly no cause for optimism, and on the same day (August 26) that the German 11th corps and Guard Reserve corps received orders for East Prussia, General Joffre and Sir John French were in anxious conclave at British headquarters at St. Quentin. It was a particularly grave moment for the British commander-in-chief, for he had received news that Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien had that day decided to stand at Le Cateau.

The night before General Joffre had issued orders that "further operations would be carried out with a view to forming a mass of manœuvre on the left flank to carry out an offensive," and the plan was that this mass of manœuvre was to be provided by the French 4th and 5th armies and the British, plus the new French 6th army. But the rapid sequence of events led to a decision that the general French and British retreat should be continued by gradual stages, and Sir John French

certainly felt that, at this stage, the British force should not be called upon to take part in any wide offensive action. He was angry that "the very sudden change of plain and headlong retirement of the French 5th army" had placed the British army in an unnecessarily isolated situation. He writes:

> Lanrezac appeared to treat the whole affair as quite normal and merely incidental to the common exigencies of war. He offered no explanation and gave no reason for the very unexpected moves that he had made. The discussion was apparently distasteful to him, for he only remained a short time at my headquarters and left before any satisfactory understanding as to frontier plans and dispositions had been arrived at.
>
> Joffre remained with me some considerable time. I gathered from him that he was by no means satisfied with the conduct of the subordinate general. No very definite plans were decided upon, the understanding, as the French commander-in-chief left, being that the retreat was to be continued as slowly and deliberately as possible, until we found ourselves in a favourable position to make a firm stand and take the offensive.

There was, however, one very definite decision arrived at, and that was on the part of Sir John French, who refused point-blank to cooperate in any immediate offensive. But in spite of certain asperities, excusable at the moment, he did, in fact, retain touch and cooperate with the French throughout the succeeding weeks. General Joffre in his turn showed himself most sympathetic and "understanding," and promised that the French 5th army should be directed to take energetic action in order to relieve the pressure on the British.

On the morning of the 27th this army was still retiring over the Oise above Guise and was prepared for further retirement to the line Montcornet-Marles-Ribemont. In the early afternoon, however, General Lanrezac received verbal orders to make a vigorous attack immediately towards St. Quentin. The movement of the army into its battle positions necessarily took time, for on the evening of the 27th the 5th army was behind the Oise with its left below Guise and its right above Rumigny. It was necessary to transfer the bulk of the army below Guise and establish it opposite St. Quentin facing west. This and other factors made it impossible to open the offensive before the 29th. Lanrezac's difficulties, which included the exposure of his right flank, do not seem to have appealed to General Joffre, and an interview between them was marked by ill temper and exaspera-

tion on the part of the commander-in-chief, who ordered Lanrezac to proceed with the attack without delay and threatened to break him if he did not do so.

On August 29 Lanrezac had to open his battle, with no protection to his left except from two tired French reserve divisions, which speedily fell back. While facing about to move on St. Quentin, his right, formed by the 10th corps, was violently attacked south and east of Guise by the Germans in considerable strength. He determined, therefore, to abandon the movement on St. Quentin as being too dangerous, and Joffre tacitly concurred. He directed the 3rd and 1st corps to support the 10th corps against the Germans near Guise, while the 18th corps covered his left and faced towards St. Quentin.

It crossed the Oise, but near Itancourt found itself heavily engaged by troops in approximately equal force of von Kluck's and Bülow's armies. The Germans were checked and driven back with considerable loss across the Oise at Guise, but the danger of being turned by von Kluck's advance was such that Lanrezac could not profit by this success of his right; and on his left the 18th corps had to re-cross the Oise as German reinforcements entered the battle. Lanrezac had no choice but to break off the engagement on August 30, and resume his retreat as his right was in the air and von Kluck's advance continued. The German loss was stated by Bülow at 6,000 killed and wounded. The French casualties were estimated by the Germans at a considerably higher figure, and in addition about 2,000 prisoners were taken.

Lanrezac's decision was backed up by an order from general headquarters to retire on the evening of the 30th, and he issued orders to his army to gain the high ground north of the Lower Serre and Souche. By the 31st his dispositions lay in a semicircle around Laon.

Sir John French paid tribute to the help that this action afforded him. He wrote:

> On the 29th a very brilliant and successful attack by the French 5th army at Guise heavily defeated three German corps and threw them back with severe loss. This had a great effect in assisting the retreat, for it not only enabled the 5th army to hold its own for some time on the Oise between Guise and La Fère, but it considerably relieved hostile pressure on the British and on the French troops on our left.

Unfortunately for General Lanrezac neither this appreciation of his action, nor the fact that his retreat was ordered by General Joffre, could save him from his personal fate, and very shortly afterwards he was relieved of his command. He was succeeded by General Franchet d'Esperey.

After the defeat of the French 4th and 3rd French Armies in the great battles of Virton-Ardennes, August 20—24, and of the French 5th army at Charleroi, the French 4th army (Langle de Cary) was ordered to establish itself on the left bank of the Meuse, and to hold there while maintaining contact with the 5th army, then in rapid retreat. The front of its five corps ran from Mézières to Sassey, south of Stenay. At Sassey it was in contact with the 3rd army, but west of Mézières a gap of 30 miles opened between it and the 5th army, into which the Germans of the 2nd and 3rd armies were pouring. The defence of the Meuse was not energetic, and was unsuccessful.

On August 25, troops of the German 4th army (Duke of Württemberg) bridged the river at Remilly, and during the following night forced a passage at Donchery, below Sedan. On August 26 there was violent fighting at these points, and the German artillery drove the French back from the outskirts of Torcy, south-west of Sedan, where the bridge over the Meuse had been left intact through want of explosives. The centre of the French position had been pierced; but after crossing the river the Germans were checked, though they had secured a good bridge-head south of Sedan.

A fresh front was formed by the French from Sassey and Luzy, on the Meuse, along the high ground south of the river near Sedan, with their left in the air west of Mézières, near Signy l'Abbaye; and Langle de Cary resolved to fight on this line. On August 26 the Germans bridged the river at several points between Cesse and Luzy, and threatened his right. Other bridges

were constructed by them at Mouzon, and they began to develop an advance along the whole Meuse front, and to push south from Remilly and Sedan, but suffered a severe repulse at Noyers. This caused so much alarm to the German 4th army command that he demanded aid from the 3rd army (Hausen), stating that the 8th corps had been brought to a complete standstill south of Sedan. Hausen, however, was ordered by the supreme command to march south-west, and he did not go to the 4th army's aid. His advance towards Signy l'Abbaye, nevertheless, brought him on the flank of the French 4th army.

On the night of August 27, Langle de Cary issued orders to the French to resume the battle next day, and drive the Germans back into the Meuse. The Germans were attacking on the French right, where their advance from the Meuse became most threatening; and on the French left, where they were held in check with severe fighting in the direction of Signy l'Abbaye. In the centre, the French troops gained ground towards Sedan, and German troops recrossed the Meuse. In the early morning, and again in the early afternoon, a fresh cry for aid was addressed by the German 4th army to Hausen, with the warning that the Germans had been compelled to withdraw their left towards Olizy. Hausen, therefore, ordered his 12th and 19th corps to move south-east on the 28th.

The French had won a distinct success, handling the German 4th army very severely, and had their reserves been thrown in, it is possible that they might have gained a great victory, as the German 5th army was paralysed by orders from Moltke to be ready to send troops to Russia. The situation was generally good on the French front, but Langle, in view of Joffre's orders for a retreat, was obliged to fall back on the Aisne, to the immense disappointment of his troops. He had, in fact, considering himself victorious, asked permission to continue the battle. The answer from general headquarters had been:

> We see no objection to your keeping your positions to-morrow (August 28), in order to assist our success and to prove that our falling back is merely strategic; but on August 29 everybody must be in retreat.

He retired rapidly, abandoning a great extent of country and the Argonne, where there were many opportunities of fighting delaying actions. His conduct of the battle has been severely criticised by French authorities, who blame him for failing to utilise great opportunities to deliver the counter-attacks which

Joffre had ordered, whenever possible, and for the disconnected, incoherent character of the fighting. The population of the country he traversed fled, reproaching his troops for their retreat, and embarrassing his movements.

At the end of the battle he made it clear that he had acted under superior orders, and in his army order of the evening of August 28 he recorded that:

> The army inflicted heavy losses upon the enemy, yesterday and to-day. It returns to the Aisne line in accordance with orders received, to prepare for the offensive in a new direction.

While Langle de Cary's army was fighting, the 3rd army (General Ruffey), was holding its positions practically unmolested against the German 5th army, which showed little disposition to attack them, but on the left of the 4th army General Dubois, commanding the 9th corps of the 3rd army (General Castlenau) was fighting at Signy l'Abbaye against superior German forces.

General Dubois' corps contained a division of Moroccan troops. In the early morning of August 28 the Zouave regiment was attacked, and after three hours' fighting was obliged to retire to avoid envelopment. This left the road to Signy l'Abbaye open to the enemy, who occupied the village. This German advance towards the south was a direct threat to the communications between the 9th corps and the rear and between the French 4th and 5th armies. General Dubois determined to recapture the village. Fierce fighting took place midway at Dommery, a village which was taken, lost and recaptured. The battle was still undecided in the evening, but the German advance had been checked. On the morning of the 29th the 9th corps was under orders to cover the left of the 4th army and keep in touch with the 5th army. It fought gallantly to fulfil this task, but was soon in the general retreat.

Although the fall of Maubeuge did not actually take place until September 7, practically on the eve of the battle of the Marne, the story of the fortress properly belongs to this chapter. Strategically, Maubeuge was one of the most important junctions in northern France during the Great War, as five railway lines meet here, connecting the French and Belgian coalfields. Its fortifications had not been thoroughly reconstructed, but were similar to the works which failed so completely at Liége and Namur. It had been built between 1878 and 1896

as part of the defence scheme of General Séré de Rivières. Fifteen detached forts and batteries were placed two or two and a half miles from the town, and of the 435 guns which they mounted the most powerful were forty-eight 6.3 in. weapons with a range of about 10,000 yards. As a feature of the frontier defences it was intended to absorb the forces of a German army attacking the flank of the Lorraine-Meuse line.

Modern developments in railway communications had before the war discounted its importance as a road centre, and the advance in power of siege artillery had rendered its fortifications to a great extent obsolete. The French mobilization scheme left Maubeuge on one side, and in consequence the exact function which that fortress should fulfil was still undecided at the outbreak of war. It had neither been modernised, nor entirely abandoned as of no military importance. In 1910 the governor had been told that "the hypothesis of an isolated defence against regular siege need not be considered."

On the outbreak of war Joffre entertained a definite idea of employing the garrison of Maubeuge in a siege of Metz. This garrison amounted to 30,000 men, but stragglers driven into the town during the retreat raised the numbers to at least 40,000. The governor was General Fournier, who was destined to hold one of the unhappiest positions allotted to a general officer during the war. Quite early in the period of mobilization, the governor's reports so alarmed the French minister of war (M. Messimy) that he sent General Pau to Maubeuge with orders to dismiss Fournier and have him shot. Pau, with more appreciation of the military difficulties and less hasty judgement (if not more humanity), exonerated the governor of any negligence, and the decree was rescinded. General Fournier was then left with a ring of forts, about four miles in diameter, mostly of earthworks and brickwork, though with some concrete, to defend against an invader who had made short work of the fortresses of concrete and armour at Liége and Namur. The retreat on the left of the French 5th army and the B.E.F. left Maubeuge to meet the exigencies of a regular siege.

At first the Germans seemed not much interested in the reduction of Maubeuge. They were pursuing those tactics, which they found so successful at all stages of the war, of so encircling a main obstacle that it fell rather from the hopelessness of its own position than the strength of any frontal attack. In the

battles of March, 1918, they brought this method to perfection, ignoring the front line but making their way through gaps until they had established themselves in positions far behind. It was then possible to "clean up" the first line of defence with the greatest ease and without loss. It is said that the Germans mistook the strength of the garrison of Maubeuge, estimating it at 7,000 whereas in reality it was 40,000. The French, too, had little idea of the strength of the force against them.

A plan for the reduction of Maubeuge was drawn up which was to be carried out by bombardment and the gradual advance of infantry, but the Germans at this time had not the weight of shells to spare which they had poured into the Belgian fortresses. Between August 28-31 batteries were placed in position. The French garrison attempted no assault, hoping perhaps to lure the Germans on to a premature destruction. The German commander, von Zwehl, was too alert to fall to the temptation of an assault en masse. His reinforcements were only gradually arriving, and the investment of the fortress being slowly completed. Even so, the infantry at his disposal was not more than 24 battalions. He had not even aeroplanes to assess the damage done by the slow bombardment of his artillery, or the strength of the opposition which remained against him, or indeed to inform him of any concentration of the French garrison for sorties or sudden attack. He was, in fact, allowed two machines on September 2.

Von Zwehl had borrowed a brigade from the 2nd army, and it is characteristic of the whole German attitude towards the reduction of Maubeuge that throughout the last days of August, particularly during Lanrezac's attack on Guise, the higher command was for ever pressing for the return of this force. By September 4, however, von Zwehl realized that he must take more energetic action, before his infantry was wrested from him and before a new enemy appeared in force on the western border.

It is one of the mysteries of the war how the "Russian rumour" gained such general currency, and was for so many weeks so universally believed. In England it spread like wildfire, and was supported by a mass of second-hand evidence. During the dark days of August the spirits of the Allies were warmed by stories of great masses of Russian troops passing through the British Isles, entrained in the dark, embarked in the dark, of whom only occasional glimpses were caught on railway

sidings. A few were bold enough to know someone who had talked to members of this phantom host and had been answered in an outlandish language. Whoever was responsible for starting the rumour no one in authority was foolish enough to contradict it, and it is an interesting repercussion that the Germans so fully believed that large forces of Russians were about to be landed at Ostend that they seriously contemplated raising the siege of Maubeuge. At least this consideration decided the German command on immediate action to force the issue.

On September 5 the Bersillies and Salemagne works were carried by German infantry, and on the next day further important defences were stormed. Despite a stubborn resistance on the part of the French infantry, and with the aid of further heavy artillery support, by the afternoon of September 7 all resistance was broken down. General Fournier then surrendered.

Part of the garrison had escaped to Lille, but 32,692 unwounded and 1,489 wounded and sick fell into German hands. The defence of the place against a German force of half the garrison's strength has been severely criticised, the more so as the Germans were short of ammunition; but after the war a court-martial justified Fournier's conduct. On the German side the siege was covered by the weak 7th reserve corps under General Zwehl, which was thus prevented from taking part in the battle of the Marne. Had the command at Maubeuge shown the tenacity displayed by the French at Verdun, the German difficulties during and after the Marne would have been enormously increased.

By the time Maubeuge had fallen General Joffre's armies were in the positions for which he had been manœuvring, not necessarily from choice, but as a last resort to enable him again to take the offensive. The French retreat was marked on a greater scale by the same hardships and losses as were endured by the British in their retreat from Mons, but the French commander-in-chief in the early days of September was at least able to congratulate himself that he had saved his armies from disaster and retained them as an effective striking force. One thing at least was clear, and that was that the war was not to be settled by any quick decision, though even at this time the French could scarcely have looked forward to four more years of war by attrition.

CHAPTER 16

First Battle of the Marne

With their armies in full retreat and thousands of their countrymen in flight, the feelings of the Parisians at the beginning of September, 1914, could not have been otherwise than acutely anxious. The tide of war had come dangerously near their gates. As early as August 30 the first bombs had been dropped on the capital from enemy aeroplanes. Refugees and wounded soldiers were pouring into the city, and energetic measures were being taken to improve the fortifications and to make all possible provision for a siege. In the Bois de Boulogne there was gradually accumulating a vast cattle and sheep farm, and hasty measures were being taken to improvise granaries and pile up all available stores of wheat. Under the vigorous governorship of General Galliéni the ring of outer forts (with a circumference of about 100 miles) was strengthened and the intervals entrenched and wired. That the French intended to hold Paris to the last had it been seriously invested was never in question, and as a step towards alleviating the privations which accompany a siege everyone having relatives outside the war area was urged to send his women and children away.

Outwardly Paris was calm, but showed the usual features of a capital city in war time. Its boulevards were darkened early, its railway stations swarmed with families anxious to get away, and at the same time with refugees from the war area, grateful for the comparative security which the city afforded.

Censorship of news was severe, and rumour was rife. It was known that events along the widespread battle line had been very little favourable to the Allies' cause, but it came as a thunderbolt to Parisians, and little less so to the world, to hear that their government had decided to remove itself to Bordeaux, a step which had not been considered immediately necessary even in 1870, when it retired no farther than Tours on the Loire after Sedan, and only as a last resort moved as far as Bordeaux. The blow could not have been much softened to them by a proclamation, signed by M. Poincaré and all the ministers,

which was issued on the morning of September 3. An English translation of this reads as follows:

Frenchmen! For several weeks our heroic troops have been engaged in desperate combats with the enemy. The valiance of our soldiers has given them at some points a marked advantage. But, in the north, the onset of the German forces has constrained us to fall back. This situation imposes on the president of the republic and upon the government a grievous decision. In order to guard the national safety, it is their duty to move, for the moment, from the city of Paris. Under the command of an eminent chief, a French army, full of courage and spirit, will defend against the invader the capital and its patriotic population. But the war must be pursued at the same time on the rest of our territory. Without peace or truce, without stay or default, the holy struggle for the honour of the nation and the reparation of violated right will continue. None of our armies is crippled. If some of them have suffered heavy losses, the gaps have been immediately filled from the depots, and the calling up of recruits assures us for to-morrow new resources in men and energy.

To hold out and to fight must be the word of command for the Allied armies, British, Russian, Belgian, and French! To hold out and to fight, while on the sea the British help us to cut our enemies' communication with the outside world. To hold out and to fight, while the Russians continue to advance to strike a decisive blow at the heart of the German empire. It is for the government of the republic to direct this obstinate resistance. Everywhere, Frenchmen will rise to defend their independence. But to give this formidable struggle all its vigour and efficiency, it is indispensable that the government should retain its freedom of action. On the demand of the military authority, therefore, the government is temporarily removing its residence to a place where it can remain in constant relations with the whole of the country. It invites members of Parliament not to remain far away, so that they and it may form the guard of national unity.

The government is quitting Paris only after having assured the defence of the city and the entrenched camp by every means in its power. It knows that it need not recommend calm, resolution, and sang-froid to the admirable Parisian population. They are showing, every day, that they are equal to the highest duties.

Frenchmen! Be worthy of these tragic circumstances. We will obtain victory in the end. We will obtain it by a tireless will, by endurance, and by tenacity. A nation which is determined not to perish, and, in order to live, recoils before no suffering or sacrifice, is sure of victory.

These brave words, however, cannot much have lessened the injury to national prestige which the Parisians must have felt when they saw their government depart, ministers, senators and deputies, followed by civil service staffs with all their official impedimenta, to a (then) unknown destination. Nor could the feeling of insecurity have been any less when the embassies of the Allied countries followed suit, leaving the interests of their nationals in neutral hands. Nothing but definite news of victory in the field could relieve the prevailing atmosphere of doubt and gloom, and this fortunately was not long in coming.

The great offensive which opened on September 6 cannot with any real propriety be called the battle of the Marne, for the armies engaged occupied a front far greater than that territorial distinction would imply. As far as the British force is concerned, however, it is applicable, and tradition justifies its retention, in Great Britain at least, as the title of much wider operations.

The situation in the early days of September was one upon which the Germans might well congratulate themselves. For a fortnight they had been consistently victorious, for they would scarcely have accounted as important such temporary set-backs as they received in an advance so brilliantly conceived and quickly executed. But there were urgent reasons why they should press home their victories and deal a final and crushing blow on the Allied forces. The defeat of the Austrians at Lemberg and the general menace to the eastern frontier warned them that it would be necessary to deplete the divisions on the west to fortify their eastern armies. They were also having trouble with their lines of communication, owing partly to the continued resistance of the fortress of Maubeuge.

On the west the Allied line rested on Paris with its widespread defences—on the east Verdun and Toul. It became clear to the German command that the next step should be to force a gap in the right centre of the Allies. This is the explanation of von Kluck's wheeling movement to the south-east. The German commander undoubtedly overestimated the damage he had inflicted on the British at Le Cateau, and was probably deluded into the belief that Franchet d'Esperey's 5th army had become the flank of the French forces. On the evening of September 5 he had crossed the rivers of the Marne, the Petit Morin and the Grand Morin, and his patrols had reached the Seine. But as has been said (by Professor Pollard): "It was a brief and solitary

glimpse of the river on which stood the capital of France." Meanwhile, General Joffre's scheme was to draw his line closer together so as to force von Kluck's army out of the gap into which this manœuvre had led him.

On the early morning of September 5 General Joffre issued his "instructions" for an offensive to begin on the following day, and later visited Sir John French, who was also in consultation with General Maunoury. The general outline of the instructions was that the attack should be developed from the left. In his own words, the French commander's scheme was "to profit by the adventurous position of the 1st German army, and to concentrate against it the efforts of the Allied armies on the left."

The region in which he fought was the classic battleground of France. In the heath to the north, below the vineyards of Champagne, where the grapes were ripening in the September sunshine, was the monument of the great defeat of the Huns—

the so-called camp of Attila. It was an immense oval of earthworks, where Attila and his horde were said to have rested before the battle that ended in the barbarians being routed by the Gauls and Romans. The plain around was the practising ground of the French army—their Aldershot—and the range of every visible object was known to the French artillerymen. In their retreat through this familiar scene the gunners had already given the enemy a foretaste of their speed and accuracy of fire.

Closer to Paris, amid the marshes of Saint Gond and the tributary streams of the Marne, Napoleon had fought against the Prussians in 1814, his back to the wall and his genius at its height. Every French officer knew by heart the details of this brilliant campaign by the most brilliant of all French leaders in war. They had studied every yard of the ground, and Sir John French, an ardent admirer of Napoleon's military skill, was also acquainted with the scene of the 1814 battle. There were woods, like the Forest of Crécy, a few miles south-east of Paris, where an army could shelter from aerial observation. Sir John French concealed his forces there, and they escaped the notice of scouting German airmen. There were many heights, giving good gun positions. There were streams to impede movements on both sides, and innumerable farmhouses to be loopholed for rifle and machine gun fire.

Meaux, the principal town of the region, was some twenty miles from the forts of Paris. A charming old cathedral town on the Marne, it had been in peaceful days the Henley of France, and a line of houseboats, rowing-boats and canoes still floated on its placid stream. Above Meaux the waters of the Ourcq flowed into the Marne, running from some hilly eastern country, through which it had cut a ravine. On the steep eastern bank of the Ourcq General von Kluck left his heavy artillery, with some 100,000 men, to protect his flank against the turning movement threatening from Paris.

Then with about 150,000 troops he crossed the Marne, as has been said, and struck south towards La Ferté Gaucher, traversing the two streams of Petit Morin and Grand Morin. All the time he was moving the British army was watching him across the farther bank of the Grand Morin, and the 5th French army was waiting in trenches ahead of him by the next southern stream, the Aubelin. The German patrols, scouting ahead of their main force, found, however, nothing to alarm them. The

British commander had left a gap of a mile or so between the British and French armies. Through this gap German cavalry rode southward till they were at Nogent, east of Paris, with the rich prospect of Central France opening before them. Such was the situation on the morning of Sunday, September 6, 1914.

It was extraordinary. Here was an invading army, reckoned to have the most efficient organization in the world. Its cavalry scouting system was strengthened by an aerial method of reconnaissance, carried out by skilful pilots who held the record for the highest flights. It had very powerfully engined flying machines, and every scientific aid to observation that could be devised. Besides its cavalry scouts and reconnaissance officers in aeroplanes, this invading army was reputed to possess the best system of espionage in the world, and to have covered its lines of advance with spies. Yet with the old-fashioned help of a forest Sir John French was able to conceal his concentration.

Blind to his own peril, General von Kluck was trying his movement of envelopment against the French 5th army. Many explanations have been attempted, but none of them explains anything. The affair stands pre-eminent as one of the most decisive blunders in military history. Grouchy's mistake at Waterloo in wasting time and men by attacking a Prussian rearguard and allowing Blücher to march unopposed with his main army to cooperate with Wellington, was not so gross an error as Kluck's.

Von Kluck was afterwards degraded for it. He suddenly fell from the position of the leading German general in the western theatre of war into the obscurity of something little better than a corps commander in the dullest part of the battle trenches. But the blunder may not have been due entirely to him. In all likelihood the German military staff reckoned that they had forced General Joffre to weaken his left wing in order to resist the pressure on his right. This wrong preconception of the state of affairs may have made von Kluck unsuspicious of the whereabouts of his most stubborn foes, while the efficient counter work of the British flying corps restricted the scope of his aerial reconnaissance.

Undoubtedly, too, von Kluck and the German intelligence service believed the British army demoralised. "They regarded the British army as practically crushed," said Sir John French, "and practically useless as a fighting force." They knew nothing

of the new French 6th army under Maunoury, which was assembling on their right flank. This army Joffre intended to use to crush the German right. Nor had the German command knowledge of the new French 9th army, which was employed in the French centre.

The rival armies in presence from west to east were as follows:

	divisions
6th (Maunoury)	8
British (Sir J. French)	5
5th (Franchet d'Esperey)	11
9th (Foch)	8
4th (Langle de Cary)	8
3rd (Sarrail)	11
	51
1st (von Kluck)	10
2nd (Bülow)	8
3rd (Hausen)	6
4th (Duke of Württemberg)	8
5th (Crown Prince)	8
	40

At full strength a division would number about 18,000 men, but all these units had been fighting, and were far below establishment, so it is doubtful whether they averaged 12,000 on the first day of battle. Thus, the French 12th corps had only six battalions fit for battle and present, and Galliéni estimates that 5½ of Maunoury's divisions totalled only 60,000 men. To the above divisions which may have numbered 600,000 men for the Allies and 450,000 for the Germans, must be added troops on the line of communications and units brought up in the battle, at the close of which, according to German authorities, 45 German divisions had been engaged against 66 Allied divisions. Two German corps were neutralised by the Belgian army, and a third was besieging Maubeuge.

Joffre's orders, which reached the army commanders on September 5, were: the new 6th army to cross the Ourcq on the 6th, moving towards Château-Thierry, with the 1st cavalry corps linking it to the British; the British to face east and attack in the general direction of Montmirail; the French 2nd cavalry corps to link the British right to the left of the French 5th army, which was to attack between Courtaçon and Sézanne; the 9th was to cover the right of the 5th and move north of Sézanne; the 4th army was to attack and link up with the 3rd, which was to attack the left flank of the Germans west of the Argonne.

The German orders were for the 1st army to follow the 2nd army, echeloned behind it, act as a protection to the German flank, and crush any hostile movement from Paris in conjunction with the 2nd army; for the 3rd army to advance towards Troyes-Vandœuvre; for the 4th and 5th armies, by a continued advance south-east, to open the passages of the upper Meuse to the 6th and 7th armies. The original idea of driving the French up against the Swiss frontier was abandoned, and a plan of double envelopment of the Allies adopted. Joffre issued a general order to his troops couched in what must now seem rather grim phrases. He said:

> At the moment when a battle on which the welfare of the country depends is about to begin, I feel it my duty to remind you that it is no longer the time to look behind. We have but one business on hand—to attack and repel the enemy. An army which can no longer advance will, at all costs, hold the ground it has won and allow itself to be slain where it stands rather than give way. This is no time for faltering, and it will not be suffered.

Sir John French greeted the morning in a more cheerful frame of mind. "When day dawned," he writes, ". . . some ray of the great hopes in which I had indulged during the first two or three days at my headquarters at Le Cateau seemed to revive." His optimism is reflected in the general order which he issued to his armies on the eve of battle. He said:

> After a most trying series of operations, mostly in retirement which has been rendered necessary by the general strategic plan of the Allied armies, the British forces stand to-day formed in line with their French comrades, ready to attack the enemy. Foiled in their attempt to invest Paris, the Germans have been driven to move in an easterly and south-easterly direction, with the apparent intention of falling in strength on the 5th French army. In this operation they are exposing their right flank and their line of communication to an attack from the combined 6th French army and the British forces. I call upon the British army in France to now show the enemy its power and to push on vigorously to the attack beside the 6th French army. I am sure I shall not call upon them in vain, but that, on the contrary, by another manifestation of the magnificent spirit which they have shown in the past fortnight, they will fall on the enemy's flank with all their strength and with their Allies drive them back.

Orders in much the same belligerent spirit were issued to the German troops, who were told that "everything depends on the result of to-morrow."

Joffre directed the 6th army to open the attack one day in advance of the other armies, and on September 5 Maunoury's artillery and that of the German 4th reserve corps almost simultaneously opened fire near Monthyon, and fighting continued all that afternoon. The main battle began on Sunday, September 6. Von Kluck in the night had ordered two of his four corps south-east of Paris to march to the aid of his corps near Monthyon, and during the day he recalled the other two, thus opening an enormous gap between his army and Bülow's 2nd army, apparently still supposing the British in his front to be incapable of action. The British, advancing slowly across the forest of Crécy, were held in the morning by a German demonstration, but in the afternoon, noting signs of a German retreat, pushed forward to the Grand Morin. Gallièni severely criticises the leisureliness of their advance. This delay was partly due to the fact that General Joffre's orders reached the British G.H.Q. too late to countermand a continued retirement which was being carried out according to the earlier French plan. Meanwhile, the French 6th army attacked from Meaux north with great energy. Though von Kluck was hurrying up reinforcements and the fire of the German artillery was deadly, the French gained ground.

The battle line of the Ourcq conflict extended from the town of Nanteuil-le-Haudouin, some ten miles below the forest of Compiègne, to Meaux, some twenty miles from the north-eastern Paris forts. In this section the fight went on furiously in the hilly country stretching for some ten miles westward of the river. The French troops, helped by their light field artillery, quickly cleared the western hills of Germans. When, however, they approached the river heights on September 6 they found themselves opposed by armament that no personal courage could overcome. One Zouave battalion, for instance, lost 800 out of a thousand men. In two days they only gained a mile and a half. The German artillery fire shattered their advance.

The numerous heavy howitzers and big guns that formed the most formidable part of von Kluck's striking power were set in position over the stream and dominated all the crossings. No temporary bridge of any kind could be thrown over the Ourcq; the terrible fire destroyed everything. The German gunners had measured the ranges of every natural object round about, and they kept off something like 250,000 troops who possessed no armament of equal power. For against large howitzers the

The French town of Compiègne, 52½ miles N.E. of Paris, figured prominently in the early days of the war. The illustration shows the 16th century town hall with its graceful façade and belfry.

Hindenburg's early victories made him a popular idol in Germany. This colossal wooden statue was erected in Berlin, and in aid of war charities nails were purchased and driven into it.

Longwy, the French town in the department of Meurthe et Moselle, is on a strategic railway that the Germans seized at the outbreak of war. The town, the ruins of which after the bombardment of August 21–26, 1914, are here shown, surrendered to the Germans on August 27.

SCENES OF ALLIED HEROISM AND A GERMAN STATUE

FIERCE FIGHTING IN THE ARGONNE. The district in eastern France known from its wooded character as the Forest of Argonne was the scene of prolonged encounters between the French and Germans throughout the war. The illustration shows fighting in the village of Louppy-le-Château, alternately lost and retaken by the French.

FRENCH ATTACK AND DEFENCE NEAR ARGONNE FOREST. The Argonne owed its great strategic importance to the fact that a successful advance through it would turn Chalons and Verdun and render the French front on the Meuse untenable. The illustrations show fierce struggles between French and German forces in the autumn of 1914.

BRIDGE ACROSS THE MARNE DESTROYED BY GERMANS. The French department of Marne suffered severely in the war, and this illustration shows the havoc wrought by the Germans in their retreat after first battle of the Marne, September, 1914

small French guns were of little use. It was, in short, an open air siege battle—the first important affair of the kind in the western theatre of war. By it the Germans proved that the trouble they had taken to drag about an unusual number of heavy pieces of ordnance with their armies was more than repaid by the defensive powers of these batteries.

The French, in their artillery, had sacrificed power to mobility. Their light quick-firing gun was almost as handy as a Maxim in an ordinary battle, and yet, with its melinite shells, as terrible against infantry or cavalry as a gun twice its size. But in siege warfare against long-range, hidden howitzers it could make no progress. This fact afterwards decided the German commander-in-chief to utilize the heights of the Aisne valley for a siege defence on a larger scale, using the immense guns that had destroyed the Maubeuge forts to beat off the Allied armies.

In the meantime there was temporarily a practical defeat of the French operation on the Ourcq, intended to cut the lines of communication of several German armies and turn their coming retreat into a rout. It had appeared most hazardous of von Kluck to leave only two reserve army corps to guard his rear and the main line of German communications. But the event showed that the German general's faith in his heavy artillery was well founded. The German rearguard was not thrown back from the Ourcq until some heavy guns of the British army were brought up from Meaux to shell the enemy's artillery positions. By this time, however, von Kluck had drawn back over the Marne, and the French 6th army had then no opportunity of turning his flank.

Thus, in their chief object, the French operations on the Ourcq section of the battlefield can hardly be said so far to have succeeded. It was the fault neither of the general nor of his spirited, plucky men. It was the fault of the French ministry for war of more than a decade before. They had given the French army the finest light field artillery in the world, but they had made a mistake in neglecting the change which the progress of motor traction had produced in the conditions of the old problem of so moving heavy guns and heavy howitzers as not to slacken the march of an army.

The French people had for long been foremost in developing the private motor-car industry. They had indeed constructed the first armoured motor-car carrying a Maxim or a small quick-

firer. But in military motor-tractors and vehicles the German and Austrian armament firms had been encouraged by their governments to make such progress as left all other nations at the outbreak of war at a disadvantage. General Joffre in July, 1914, was training a force of heavy field artillerymen, but the war came before they were fully prepared. One of the things that made the comparatively small British Expeditionary Force so useful was that—taught by experience in the South African campaign, when at times big Krupp guns had to be faced—it had a proportion of fairly heavy batteries in its field artillery.

On the British right the French 5th army engaged Bülow's troops, and one of von Kluck's four corps which was moving back across the Marne. They forced the Germans north in prolonged fighting, bending in Bülow's right flank and gravely threatening his position. The 9th army was heavily engaged north of Sézanne, where the Germans made great attempts to break through its front; it could do no more than barely hold its positions. The 4th army was forced back very slightly; the 3rd army generally checked the crown prince in his effort to move on Bar-le-Duc, but it lost ground at the south of the Argonne.

On September 7 von Kluck's movement of his whole army to the Ourcq imperilled the French 6th army, and, recognizing the danger, Gallièni hurried aid to that army from Paris in a fleet of taxi-cabs which he requisitioned. At dusk it had gained a little more ground, though the Germans now had three corps in action, and its left flank was in danger. But it had attracted to itself von Kluck's whole force, and thus created the gap in the German front which proved fatal to the German plans. The British had been delayed by a German cavalry screen with infantry detachments from von Kluck's troops, using machine guns very skilfully in difficult country, but they reached the Petit Morin after seizing Coulommiers, thrusting into the gap in the German front.

The French 5th army pressed Bülow hard and pushed back his right six miles; it detached the 10th corps to the right to aid the French 9th army, which was again violently attacked and very hard pressed, but held its ground gallantly. The 4th army maintained its front everywhere except to its extreme right, where the loss of Sermaize was dangerous, imperilling its connexion with the 3rd army. The 3rd army was fiercely engaged.

A German corps from Metz was attacking Fort Troyon and attempting to break through the Verdun line of forts. That day Maubeuge fell, setting free one German corps and vital railways when German supplies and ammunition were running low.

On September 8 a fierce battle raged on the Ourcq, where each side strove to outflank the other without decided success. As the fresh German troops arrived the French northern flank wavered. Galliéni hurried up reinforcements and it held. The British crossed the Petit Morin, after at La Trétoire inflicting severe

loss on the Germans; they began the attack on La Ferté-sous-Jouarre and violently shelled the Marne bridges crowded with German troops. The 5th army attacked with increased energy and crossed the Petit Morin high up, capturing Montmirail and placing Bülow in peril of having his whole front rolled up as the gap between him and von Kluck widened.

The 9th army was again violently attacked; the Prussian Guard assaulted at St. Gond and stormed Fère-Champenoise; Foch's centre and right were forced back under a fearful fire from the German heavy artillery, and all but broken. Foch's coolness and the fighting qualities of the French retrieved the position. But it is a fable that he sent to Joffre the message: "My centre is giving ground; my right retiring; situation

excellent ; I am attacking." The 4th army was attacked almost as fiercely, but did not yield. The 3rd army gained a little ground. The Germans bombarded Fort Troyon all the afternoon, yet at nightfall the garrison was unshaken. The crisis of the battle had arrived and the German ammunition was beginning to run low.

On September 9 the flank battle on the Ourcq was fiercely maintained, as fresh German troops of von Kluck's army assailed the French 6th army. Here there was extreme danger; a division of the 4th corps, one of the best, momentarily recoiled, then recovered itself. The British were thrusting north into the gap between von Kluck and Bülow, and von Kluck was now in imminent danger of being enveloped on both flanks and crushed. At noon Hentsch, who had been sent by the German staff to examine the position, reached the 1st army and stated that as Bülow was being forced back and the German situation was unfavourable, a general retreat to the Aisne must be executed.

At the critical moment the German staff had lost heart. Von Kluck began to retreat about 1 p.m. ; an hour earlier Bülow announced by wireless that his own right was in retreat. The general retirement of the Germans, carrying with it the news that a great and decisive battle of the war had been won, was noticeable from the Allied line during the afternoon. Early in the day the British had reached the Marne and pushed through La Ferté, crossing the river there and also west of Château-Thierry, where they advanced 4 miles north of the Marne, thus threatening von Kluck's rear and Bülow's right flank.

The French 5th army entered Château-Thierry, and the aid of its 1st and 10th corps decided the battle on the left of Foch's 9th army, which was still very hotly engaged north of Sézanne. It had been forced back slightly from the St. Gond marshes, but at dusk the position improved as the Germans weakened, and Mondement was stormed by the French. The 4th army attacked with great spirit on its right, and sent two divisions to its aid. The 3rd army advanced, but much of its attention was centred on Fort Troyon, where three German attacks that evening collapsed before the steadiness of the French garrison. Sarrail refused to abandon Verdun, though Joffre had authorised him to do so. At Nancy the Germans suffered a complete defeat.

On September 10 the French 6th army rapidly gained ground as the German retreat was accentuated. Von Kluck's army this day was placed under Bülow. The brief dismissal, which must

have been a bitter blow to von Kluck, read: "First army until further orders is placed under commander of 2nd army." To the south French troops of the 6th army crossed the Ourcq and pushed north astride of that river in conjunction with the British, who had now linked up with them. Thirteen guns and 2,000 prisoners were taken by the British, who pursued in pouring rain. The 5th army pushed its centre and right to the Marne, capturing six guns and 1,500 men. The 9th army attacked north and south of the St. Gond marshes, which were nearly dry, and hustled the German rearguards. It stormed La Fère-Champenoise in the morning, and by the evening reached a line 11 miles south of Epernay. The 4th army attacked without success at Vitry-le-François, where the Germans were strongly entrenched. The 3rd army captured Sermaize, and two German assaults on Fort Troyon were repulsed.

On September 11 and 12 the Allies in the west advanced rapidly to the Aisne; the 9th army reached Epernay and Châlons in the centre, and on September 13 occupied Reims. The 4th army seized Vitry-le-François. The 3rd army pushed up to the line of railway from Verdun to Ste. Menehould. The Germans were now approaching or had actually reached the line which they were to fortify and hold with little change till 1916.

The German staff in its report on the battle states that the thrust of the British into the gap between the German 1st and 2nd armies compelled the retreat. This gap, however, had been caused by the brilliant work of the French 6th army. The hardest fighting fell to the lot of the French 6th and 5th armies, to Foch and to the French before Nancy, but all fought magnificently. The net result was that after a fortnight of defeat and retreat the French armies with the British had taken the initiative and driven back the Germans in the west 35 miles.

German critics severely blame both Moltke and the kaiser for the defeat, pointing out that they withdrew troops for the east and left a large force in Belgium, thus fatally weakening the German attack on the Marne, and that they persisted in an attempt to break through at Nancy without sufficient force for such an operation. None of the German army commanders showed any great genius. Bülow, von Kluck, and Hausen blame one another, but Bülow is held responsible for the order for retreat.

The credit for the victory rests as much with Galliéni as with Joffre, though Galliéni's part has been often ignored. The French



THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST BATTLE OF THE MARNE

Plan showing how the German advance was arrested by the French and British armies and the line forced back beyond Reims. The ground gained in the operations is clearly indicated.

generalship was of a high order, but Galliéni held that mistakes were made in not bringing a larger force at the outset from Lorraine to the Ourcq (two additional corps were sent too late), and in failing to put in the French cavalry at the close of the battle to exploit the victory. The behaviour of the French troops was admirable. German and French authorities criticise the slowness of the British movements, which have not yet been satisfactorily explained, but may have been due to Sir John French's experiences at Mons and the orders from the British government to act with caution.

Von Kluck's swift withdrawal west instead of east surprised everyone and necessitated changes in the Allied movements. It was severely blamed by Bülow. Throughout the battle Galliéni employed what cavalry he had to raid the German flank and rear, and the work done in this direction was excellent. The French report the prisoners as being 38,000 with 160 guns. The French loss was stated after the war at 300,000, which must include losses in the retreat and in the Lorraine battles.

The British were only slightly engaged in the battle of the Marne proper, and by reason of the skill with which the French commander-in-chief had prepared it, the victory of the Allied forces between the Morin and Marne scarcely ranks among the highest achievements of British arms during the early period of the war. The retreat from Mons does, the storming of the Aisne heights does, the defence of Ypres does; but the affair on von Kluck's flank was only a sound, solid, workmanlike job, carried out with all possible finish and dispatch. It was General Sarrail's 3rd army round Verdun and Bar-le-Duc, holding out heroically against overpowering odds, and the iron division of Toul holding out at Nancy that won the supreme honours of the immense battle. The 4th army under Langle de Cary, the 9th army under General Foch and the 5th army under Franchet d'Esperey had each a harder task than the British force.

Sir John French, however, had no reason to be displeased with the conduct of his troops or the issue of the action. He claimed justly that the B.E.F. had played their allotted part with vigour and success, and that the battle definitely put an end to any original plan upon which the German staff based their invasion of France. The Allies, he says,

> fought and badly defeated an army not only flushed with the knowledge that it had effected a tremendous inroad into

the enemy's territory but which also enjoyed one other incalculable advantage: it was commanded and led by a sovereign who possessed absolute authority—military and civil. The emperor and commander-in-chief was saved by a great general staff which had been steadily and vigorously preparing for this tremendous trial of strength for many years.

The moral effect on an army which has been steadily retreating when it is at last able to turn on its pursuer and force him to retreat cannot be overestimated. Though generals may talk of strategic retirement and the advantages to be gained later on, the soldier in the field knows nothing but weariness of body and of spirits when his movement is in the wrong direction. A retreating army is always a depressed army, and though during the gloomy days between Le Cateau and the Marne the Allied troops showed great doggedness and resolution, they badly needed the tonic effect of victory. If this was not everywhere of a spectacular character the advance beyond the Marne taught them at least that they were not a beaten force, but perfectly capable of taking the initiative when the opportunity offered.

The battle was marked by many deeds of heroism and soldierly initiative. One of these which Sir John French afterwards praised as "a very fine piece of work" was the bridging of the Marne at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre. When the 11th infantry brigade approached the river (on September 9) they found that the broken bridges were covered by German snipers and machine guns occupying houses on the farther side. Attacks by infantry assault were extremely difficult, and reduction of the improvised fortresses by artillery rendered difficult also by the impossibility of reconnaissance. Two battalions of infantry did, however, succeed in crossing the river by a weir, and protracted shell fire finally drove the Germans from the bridge-heads. Further battalions crossed by the weir, and others were ferried across in boats, but it was the work of the Royal Engineers in constructing a floating bridge under these awkward conditions that made the movement possible and earned the commander-in-chief's special commendation.

At the battle of the Marne the Royal Flying Corps were again to prove their usefulness and efficiency. A policy of de-centralisation was adopted for the first time, and certain squadrons allotted to the three corps headquarters. These reported enemy movements fully from day to day, watched the condition of bridges and communicated the existence of hidden dangers to the troops

in the front line. They also reported to the corps commanders the position of their own troops, always a matter of extreme difficulty and first importance to identify in a fluctuating battle. They were of invaluable assistance to the French high commands, and General Joffre, at this stage, paid generous tribute to them in a message which ran:

> Please express particularly to Marshal French my thanks for the services rendered to us every day by the English Flying Corps. The precision, exactitude, and regularity of the news brought in by them are evidences of their perfect organization and also of the perfect training of pilots and observers.

Sir John French held that the battle of the Marne properly came to an end on the evening of September 10 when the British forces reached the line La Ferté—Neuilly—St. Front—Rocourt. In describing the operations afterwards, he said:

> The French 6th army had been wheeling up their right into line with us, and the French 5th army was nearly in line on our right. The enemy were in full retreat to the north and north-east. During the day the cavalry, the 1st army corps and the 2nd army corps had fought numerous engagements with the enemy's rearguard and had made large captures. Allenby, as usual, had handled his cavalry with great vigour and skill.

In his dispatch dated September 17 Sir John French refers thus to the casualties suffered by the force under his command:

> Although I deeply regret to have had to report heavy losses in killed and wounded throughout these operations, I do not think they have been excessive in view of the magnitude of the great fight, the outlines of which I have only been able very briefly to describe, and the demoralisation and loss in killed and wounded which are known to have been caused to the enemy by the vigour and severity of the pursuit.

The reasons which actuated the German commanders in the field to order an immediate retirement were for long after the war a matter of some obscurity, but their actions can now be judged in the light of further official explanation. The relation of German headquarters to the army commanders on the western front was governed by the fact that these headquarters were over 100 miles away from the battle front. There is no doubt that the supreme command, preoccupied by affairs in the east, had in these early days of September a comfortable assurance that all was well in the west. News reached them slowly, and it appears that they first learnt of the seriousness of

the situation when it was too late to do much to correct it. They had no adequate reserve with which to counteract their enemies' success or snatch from them a hard-earned victory.

At this juncture a liaison officer (Lieutenant Colonel Hentsch) was sent from the supreme command to undertake a motor-car journey of some 400 miles, interview the army commanders on the spot, and, having judged the situation, if necessary give orders in the name of the chief of the imperial staff. This delegation of summary powers to an emissary was a peculiar feature of the German military system. Colonel Hentsch, therefore, must be considered as the mouthpiece of the supreme command in agreeing to retirement. Having interviewed the commanders of the 5th, 4th and 3rd armies on September 8, he spent the night at the headquarters of the 2nd army with General von Bülow. On the morning of the 9th, Bülow, alarmed at the passage of the Marne by the British army, realized that von Kluck would be obliged to retire, and that his own 2nd army must follow suit.

On consideration Colonel Hentsch agreed to the decision, and at once motored to the headquarters of the 1st army at Mareuil. He did not succeed in finding von Kluck, but interviewed his chief of staff, General von Kuhl, who was divided between a view that a possibility of defeating the French on the Ourcq still existed, and a realization of the immediate dangers threatening the 1st army. In the face of the plenary powers of Colonel Hentsch, however, he had no authority for deliberation, and accepted the orders for retreat. Meanwhile Bülow had notified the 3rd army, on his left, of his retirement, and that army (Hausen) had no choice but to conform to the movement.

No ready means were apparently available of informing the supreme command of the fact that the whole right and right centre of the German army were now falling back, and on September 9 Moltke was preparing plans for the continuance of the offensive. But the retirement, once it set in, soon became general, and Moltke had to accept the inevitable. Whether it could have been avoided is still a matter of controversy, but there can be no doubt that two of the chief factors which contributed towards it were the ignorance of the higher staff of events in the field and the absence of any general reserve.

CHAPTER 17

The War at Sea

"ADMIRALTY—All ships. Commence hostilities . . ." So ran the wireless message received at 11 o'clock on the night of August 4. Picked up by the British fleet—by the old Vindictive churning her way toward the Bay of Biscay, by the ships guarding the Straits of Dover, by Commodore Tyrwhitt and his destroyers operating from Harwich, by Admiral Jellicoe beginning his tireless sweep in the grey wastes of the North Sea—it was, as it were, the trigger which loosed the force.

Leaving Harwich at dawn on August 5, Commodore Tyrwhitt proceeded to look into Heligoland Bight, which he found protected by a cordon of trawlers fitted with wireless. Whilst the 1st destroyer flotilla swept up the Dutch coast, Captain Fox in the Amphion with the 3rd flotilla was signalled by a British trawler that she had seen a strange ship throwing things overboard twenty miles north-east of the Outer Gabbard. At 11 a.m. the flotilla sighted a small, fast ship belonging to the German Hamburg-Amerika company making towards the German coast. She had, in fact, laid a line of submarine mines off the coast of Suffolk, extending to a point about 60 miles out to sea; but this was not known at the time. The character of the ship was never in doubt. As the flotilla drew near a shot was fired as a signal for her to heave to; but, instead of doing so, she put on extra steam, in the vain hope of escaping from ships which had a marked superiority in speed.

Four destroyers, Lance, Laurel, Lark and Linnet, surrounded the ship, and the action—if such it can be called—was quickly over. Only four shots were fired. The first carried away the bridge; the second seems to have gone wide; but the third and fourth were sent clean into her stern, with such effect that they ripped it completely away. Within six minutes from the firing of the first shot the German ship heaved her bows in the air and went to the bottom. She proved to have been the Königin Luise, a vessel of 2,163 tons and 20 knots—an apparently

innocent passenger ship which had obviously been taken in hand long before the war began and converted into a mine-layer. As such she had left the Ems before the declaration of war with a cargo of mines for the Thames estuary. She carried a crew of about 130, of whom about 50 were saved by the boats of the British destroyers.

After the prisoners, of whom many were wounded, had been distributed among the ships of the flotilla—the majority being taken on board the Amphion—Captain Fox proceeded with the plan of search, the Amphion leading and the destroyers being spread out fanwise over a wide area. In the early morning, after the ships had for some time been on a southerly course, they again approached the area in which the Königin Luise had been sunk, and a detour was made to avoid the danger zone. This was successfully done until 6.30 a.m. on August 6, when the Amphion struck a mine. A sheet of flame instantly enveloped the bridge, rendering the captain insensible, and he fell on to the fore-and-aft bridge. As soon as he recovered consciousness he ran to the engine room to stop the engines, which were still going at revolutions for 20 knots.

As all the fore part was on fire, it proved impossible to reach the bridge or to flood the fore magazine. The ship's back appeared to be broken, and she was already settling down by the bows. By the time the destroyers closed in it was clearly time to abandon the ship. The men fell in for this purpose with the same composure that had marked their behaviour throughout. Three minutes after the captain left his ship another explosion occurred which enveloped and blew up the whole fore part of the vessel. The effects showed that she must have struck a second mine, which exploded the fore magazine. The Amphion was actually sunk in the same way as the battleship Petropavlovsk in the Russo-Japanese war. She struck a cable upon which mines were strung, and the momentum of the ship, though considerably checked by the explosion of the first mine and the stoppage of the engines, was sufficient to carry her against the second. Of her crew 148 were killed or drowned, together with about 20 German prisoners rescued from the Königin Luise.

The loss of the Amphion, trivial in its immediate result, was an additional anxiety to the commander-in-chief. This form of warfare involved the detachment of mine sweepers, and his

anxieties for his base were increased. It was evident, too, that the fleet had been located, for not only were German trawlers overhauled with pigeons on board, but several ships reported periscopes, which suggested that the fleet was being shadowed by submarines.

It was, in fact, of vital importance that the Germans should get in touch with the Grand Fleet, and on August 6 ten U boats set out from Heligoland. One boat returned owing to a breakdown of her engines, seven returned with their reports: two were missing. On the 8th, when the cruiser Birmingham was in the North Sea, periscopes were reported, and the officer of the watch on the Birmingham changed course at once, so as to present the bows of his ship to the submarine, in which position she offered the smallest possible target. The Birmingham's engines were put full speed ahead, and the cruiser tore down on the doomed enemy. Her bows ripped open the thin steel sides, and the submarine simply filled and sank at once. There were no survivors. The number U 15 was seen on the conning tower as she went down.

So far Great Britain's precautions in the North Sea and Channel had proved adequate for the defence of the Expeditionary Force and the clearing of the adjacent waters. Two further responsibilities rested on the British navy: the safeguarding of the food supplies from the west and the assurance of the safe passage of French troops from Algeria and Morocco.

The Cape Verde-Canaries station was allotted to the fifth cruiser squadron under Rear-Admiral Stoddart, and the northern, or Finisterre, station to the ninth cruiser squadron under Rear-Admiral de Robeck; but the latter was on a third fleet basis and its mobilization proceeded slowly, so that the admiral left Plymouth with only the Vindictive and the Highflyer. On his way down he captured the Tubantia with gold and reservists on board, and a couple of German colliers. He induced the Vigo authorities to dismantle the wireless of German ships in harbour, and the Portuguese dismantled the wireless of 26 other German ships in Lisbon.

The German light cruisers Karlsruhe and Dresden were known to be in the vicinity of Haiti, and in American ports were 14 German ships listed as being convertible to commerce destruction. Although the Karlsruhe was engaged by the Bristol her extra speed enabled her to get away, and after a stern chase

she was able to make Porto Rico. This incident is dealt with in detail on a later page.

In the North Atlantic one or two exciting incidents occurred during the early days of the war, but owing to the great superiority of the British and French forces in those waters things quickly began to resume their normal condition. When war was declared the Cunard liner Lusitania was lying at New York, and it was reported that German cruisers were keeping a discreet eye on this vessel, which, besides being one of the largest and fastest boats in the British mercantile fleet, was also held at the disposal of the Admiralty for conversion into a merchant cruiser. The Lusitania left New York at midnight on August 5, and, with lights out, proceeded on a course different from that ordinarily followed by transatlantic shipping. Nevertheless, she was seen and chased by the German cruiser Dresden, which at that time had not proceeded south; but, thanks to her speed, she was able to get safely away.

In this she was favoured by fortune, for hardly had she successfully shaken off her pursuer than one of the turbines broke down, and she had to complete the voyage at a speed of under 20 knots. A similar adventure befell the French liner Lorraine. She also was at New York at the outbreak of war, ready to return to France with 450 reservists on board for the French army. Her speed was considerably less than that of the British liner, and things looked unpleasant for her when, on the very evening of her departure, she sighted the Dresden. There seems little doubt, however, that the German cruiser had consumed too much fuel in her fruitless chase of the Lusitania to be able to pursue the French ship for long, and the Lorraine got safely away.

During these early days very little was heard of the doings of German commerce destroyers, and the first which came into prominence was the Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse, a vessel belonging to the Norddeutscher Lloyd running between Bremen and New York. Built in 1897, she displaced 14,349 tons, while her designed speed was 22½ knots. She had evaded the Grand Fleet in the North Sea on August 4, and made her way to the north-east of Iceland. Here she captured and sank the English fishing vessel, Tubal Cain, and within a few days she was cruising to the south of the Canary Islands. Here she had a merry but brief existence, though her career was marked throughout by

humanity and by a courtesy which was lacking among the Germans ashore.

On August 15 the Union Castle liner Galician, homeward bound from the Cape, was overhauled by the Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse. Immediately the wireless operator in the liner began to send out the S O S message, hoping that the cruiser Carnarvon would be within reach; but hardly had the first letter been clicked out when the German cruiser interrupted with a peremptory : "Send one letter more and I sink you." A boat's crew from the Kaiser Wilhelm went aboard, and their first action was to destroy the wireless gear. The examination complete, the Germans went back to the Kaiser Wilhelm, and instructions were given to the Galician to follow closely. This she did, until soon after midnight the cruiser signalled: "Provision all your boats for five days. You will have to abandon your ship"; but within half an hour there came another signal from the Kaiser Wilhelm: "No more orders. You are released. Good-bye!" The cruiser went off at full speed, while the Galician went about and resumed her voyage to Teneriffe. Arriving there two days later she learned that the S O S message which the Kaiser Wilhelm had interrupted with a threat to sink her had just gone far enough to indicate to two of our cruisers in the vicinity that a British ship was in danger somewhere to the south. They had, therefore, set off in that direction, endeavouring to get in touch with the Galician by means of wireless, which was picked up by the Germans.

Another British ship, the Arlanza, was also stopped and released by the Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse, but there were two which did not come so well out of the meeting. On August 16 the New Zealand Shipping Company's steamer Kaipara, from Monte Video, was cautiously approaching the Canary Islands when she was boarded. Her wireless was smashed, explosives were placed in the hold, and, when the last man had left, she was sunk. Within a few hours of this sinking another British ship, the Nyanga, was rounded up and treated in exactly the same fashion. Having accomplished this, the Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse went into Rio de Oro Bay, in Spanish territory, on the West African coast, where she coaled from a German tramp steamer, the Duala. On August 27 she had again to put into Rio de Oro to coal, being met this time by the colliers Magdeburg, Bethania, and Arucas; and here she came to the end of her career.

Whilst she was coaling, the British cruiser Highflyer appeared and opened fire. One of the first shots disabled the German's port quarter gun and took part of the bridge away. The Kaiser Wilhelm was a heavier vessel than the Highflyer, displacing over 14,000 tons as against the British cruiser's 5,600, but the latter was armed with eleven 6 in. guns as against the German vessel's six 4.1. The issue was soon decided, and the Kaiser Wilhelm was sunk in shallow water, many of the crew escaping ashore.

In the Western Atlantic, coaling was a difficult matter for the German ships. On August 7 the armoured cruiser Suffolk discovered the German light cruiser Karlsruhe coaling at sea from the Norddeutscher Lloyd liner Kronprinz Wilhelm. The German ship had ample warning of the Suffolk's approach, and, having a superiority in speed, was able to slip away. The Suffolk at once sent a wireless message to the Berwick and the Bristol, which joined her in the chase. The Karlsruhe was considerably faster than the Bristol, but as the latter got farther and farther away from her consorts the German ship began to hang back, as though prepared to engage the Bristol in single combat. The two cruisers fought for half an hour, and although the Bristol was not hit she claimed to have put several shells into the German. When the Karlsruhe took refuge later in the neutral port of San Juan, Porto Rico, it was stated that her stern was riddled with shell, that she had one of her after guns smashed, and eight men injured.

Other German ships carrying supplies for the commerce raiders were captured or sunk in various places ; but, apart from armed merchantmen, not a single German cruiser outside European waters was accounted for during the first seven weeks of the war. Nevertheless, the damage they did was infinitesimal, and by the middle of September only 12 British ships had been sunk at sea. On the other hand, German commercial shipping was everywhere held up. Only in very few cases was it necessary for a British warship to sink a captured vessel, as there was nearly always a British port close handy into which the ship could be sent as a prize, a facility Germany did not enjoy.

We may now turn to events in the Baltic, where Russia and Germany had fleets. In August, 1914, light German cruisers and destroyers shelled Libau and various points on the Russian coast, but on August 20 a German squadron was chased by a superior Russian force, and one of its ships, the Magdeburg,

ran ashore and was destroyed. On October 10 German submarines attacked a Russian squadron of cruisers, and several Russian ships had narrow escapes ; on October 12 the Russian cruiser Pallada (7,900 tons) was sunk with all her crew by U 26. As an offset, the old German armoured cruiser Friedrich Karl was sunk on November 25.

From the very beginning of the war a close watch on the German coast had been kept by British submarines, and their reports paved the way for the action called the battle of the Bight of Heligoland. The submarines reported that a considerable force of German light cruisers and torpedo-craft was lying under the protection of the formidable defences of Heligoland. The Admiralty determined to strike a blow at those ships ; but as it would have been an extremely risky business to attempt to cut them out from under the numerous 12 in. batteries of Heligoland, resort was had to stratagem to entice the German vessels away from their protection.

Under the scheme arranged, three of the submarines were to proceed on the surface towards Heligoland, in order to induce the enemy to chase them westwards. The destroyer flotillas, aided by the light cruisers Arethusa and Fearless, were then to work in behind any German vessels which might come out to give chase. The light cruiser squadron was to be at hand, but farther out, to render help should it be required, while the huge ships of the battle cruiser squadron were still farther to the west, to meet the large German armoured cruisers and battleships should they venture to put to sea. The seventh cruiser squadron was used as a reserve to attack any German ships that might be driven westwards.

At midnight of August 26 Commodore Keyes, with his two destroyers and eight submarines, moved towards Heligoland. All next day the two destroyers scouted diligently for the British submarines, which at nightfall took up positions whence they could assist in the operations of the following day. August 28 broke calm and misty. The mist added to the difficulties of the underwater craft, as it enabled enemies to approach unseen, and rendered it almost impossible to distinguish friend from foe. Cautiously the two fast destroyers searched the waters in which the fighting was to take place for German submarines and, finding none, steamed in slowly towards the land in the wake of the decoy submarines. As this little group of vessels neared the

island the mist thickened till the limit of visibility was reduced to 5,000 or 6,000 yards. Meanwhile, the other British submarines dived and waited for a chance to attack.

As it happened, the Germans had wind of the affair, and had prepared a counter-trap to draw the British destroyers in towards Heligoland, when German light cruisers would cut in behind them. Out came first one German destroyer, and then some 19 or 20 others, that gave chase to the two British destroyers and the three submarines. A German seaplane rushed up, then circled and returned to Heligoland. After the German destroyers a detachment of German light cruisers weighed and put to sea. Meanwhile the British vessels were in action at long range, and for the best part of two hours the British craft continued a westward course. The cruiser Arethusa led the destroyers of the third flotilla, and the Fearless the vessels of the first flotilla, in the rush upon the enemy, steering in to cut them off from Heligoland. At 6.53 the first German destroyer was seen from the Arethusa and chased; 20 minutes later the Arethusa and the third flotilla were in the midst of some 20 hostile destroyers, and a furious engagement began.

From the time when the opposing flotillas came into contact the story of the battle loses its unity. The large numbers and the high speed of the vessels engaged, coupled with the smoke from the shells and the mist that still hung over the sea, made it impossible for the commanders to retain complete control of their forces, and the action developed into a series of confused dog fights in which every vessel did her best in whatever position she happened to find herself.

Just before eight the first two German cruisers were sighted off the Arethusa's port bow. They were the two-funnelled Frauenlob, a light cruiser of 2,600 tons with a speed of 21 knots and ten 4 in. guns, and the three-funnelled Stettin, of 3,500 tons with a speed of 24 knots and ten 4 in. guns. They immediately opened a heavy fire on the Arethusa which, until the Fearless and her destroyers came to her aid, was roughly handled. When the Stettin turned away with the Fearless in chase, the Arethusa concentrated her attentions on the Frauenlob. At 8.30 only one 6 in. gun in the Arethusa remained in action; but it was enough. A shell shattered the forebridge of the Frauenlob, and she turned away towards Heligoland, which now came into sight on the Arethusa's bow through the mist. The Arethusa had suffered

severely. Shells in her hull had damaged her machinery; all her four torpedo-tubes had been disabled and her deck was on fire amidships. The Fearless and her pack were whipped off the Stettin, which also disappeared in the mist. The signal was made from the Arethusa to turn westwards, and with her destroyers she proceeded on the new course, while the small craft reformed. Some minutes later it was found that her speed had fallen as the result of the injuries she had received, and all hands were engaged in getting her once more into fighting trim, effecting temporary repairs, and clearing away the wreckage.



Now it was that Commodore Tyrwhitt received a stirring report from his destroyers of the first flotilla. While he had been so hotly engaged, the leading ship of the German flotilla, V 187, a vessel of 650 tons, and 32½ knots, armed with two 20-pounders and four machine guns, had been caught and cut off. She fought with the utmost gallantry, but the British destroyers closed with her, poured in a storm of shells, accurately directed, which tore open her thin sides and water-line. Clouds of smoke and tongues of flame rose from her as the projectiles exploded and swept her crew away. She sank lower in the water, still firing from a single gun; then the fire ceased, and almost at the same moment she sank. As the V187 went down, the British destroyers of the first flotilla ceased fire and launched boats to save the Germans who

were struggling in the water. This had scarcely been done when a large German cruiser—the Stettin—approached and opened a tremendous fire on the destroyers. Presumably the Germans supposed that the British were intending to board. The destroyers were compelled to fall back before this fire, to which they could make no adequate reply. Two boats belonging to the destroyer Defender were abandoned and left in a situation of deadly peril, in the midst of the Germans and almost under the guns of Heligoland. It seemed as though nothing could save them when suddenly submarine E4 (Lieutenant Commander E. W. Leir) showed near at hand. She had watched the battle through her periscope, and judged that the moment had come to strike a blow. She proceeded towards the German cruiser, which, as she came on to attack, drove straight at her in an attempt to ram, and then made off at full speed. The attack of submarine E4 covered the retreat of the destroyers and saved the boats. As soon as the cruiser disappeared Lieutenant Commander Leir boldly rose to the surface to give them aid. He took on board one British officer and nine men, and one unwounded German officer and two men, and left in the boats one German officer and six men who were unwounded and 18 badly wounded Germans, directing the unwounded to navigate the boats to Heligoland.

Meanwhile the Arethusa, Fearless, and the British destroyers had reformed and made every preparation for renewing the battle, bringing up fresh ammunition, plugging shot holes, and getting collision-mats over their wounds. At 10 a.m. they received a wireless message from Commodore Keyes, to the effect that the Lurcher and Firedrake were being chased by German light cruisers. Commodore Tyrwhitt at once proceeded to their rescue, supported by the Fearless and the destroyers of the first flotilla, but it appeared that the Lurcher had mistaken British ships for Germans. At 10.37 a.m. he once more reached the neighbourhood of Heligoland. He must have signalled to the German light cruisers, for at 10.55 suddenly the German cruiser Stralsund loomed up and opened a heavy fire.

The position at this moment was critical, and signals were promptly made by wireless to Vice Admiral Sir David Beatty, of the battle cruiser squadron, calling for aid and stating that the Arethusa was hard pressed. Simultaneously the first destroyer flotilla sent out the same summons to the powerful British ships

which were waiting in the background. The British light cruiser squadron was at once ordered by Beatty to proceed at full speed to the aid of the flotillas. But as two of its five ships had already been detached to support the destroyers and had not rejoined, only three vessels remained available. Sir David Beatty therefore determined himself to bring up his huge battle cruisers to the help of Commodore Tyrwhitt, and with his flagship Lion leading he did so.

While this powerful succour was on its way to the flotillas, the crisis of the battle had arrived. Commodore Tyrwhitt directed the Fearless to concentrate her fire on the big German cruiser, and the first flotilla to attack her with torpedoes. They closed her, and let go their "fishes," but she eluded the torpedoes and vanished for the time being in the haze. It was not for long, however. Ten minutes later she reappeared and took up a position on the Arethusa's starboard quarter. The Arethusa and Fearless began a furious artillery fight with her, while the destroyers again attacked her with their torpedoes. She concentrated her fire upon the Arethusa, but sustained heavy damage from the Arethusa's 6 in. guns and from the Fearless's 4 in. weapons, while the destroyers maintained a steady fire on her which seemed to take effect. After a quarter of an hour of this pounding she turned away and vanished in the mist towards Heligoland. The British vessels did not attempt to pursue her; their position was too dangerous, and they had expended much ammunition and many torpedoes.

At this juncture yet another vessel was made out coming up through the mist. She was, in fact, the German light cruiser Mainz running south from the fire of the British light cruisers. The Arethusa and Fearless and the destroyers of the third flotilla met her onslaught in the most determined manner, but as they came down she poured a very heavy fire upon them. One well directed salvo detonated the "ready" rack of ammunition in the Laurel and put the after gun out of action. The next astern was hit forward, her mast brought down and her captain killed. Every shot of the next salvo hit the Laertes, and she was brought up all standing with no water in her boilers. It was a fine piece of German gunnery, but it was not to save the Mainz. Slowly, as the British shells swept her, her rapid broadsides died down; fires burst out on board; splinters could be seen flying from her upper works; her shots went wide.

One funnel fell with a tremendous crash. A torpedo struck her amidships, and when the cloud of smoke and foam which rose had vanished it was seen that one of her boilers had been blown right up from the bottom of the ship and flung upon the deck, where it lay visible to the crews of the British ships.

Out of the mist came the large British light cruisers Falmouth and Nottingham, the first of the light cruiser squadron to reach the scene. Their 6 in. guns opened a crushing fire on the shattered and sinking wreck. A second funnel fell with one of the masts. The rain of shells reduced the hull of the luckless German cruiser to a piteous mass, wreathed in black fumes, from which flared out angry bursts of fire, like Vesuvius in eruption. Her resistance ceased. Then Commodore Keyes, in the destroyer Lurcher, ran in alongside her to take off survivors. In all 224 men were rescued. She was sinking fast, and the Lurcher had just shoved astern when she listed over to port, and those who were left slid down the ship's side into the water.

The Fearless and the destroyers were now recalled by signal from the Arethusa and ordered to cease fire and proceed westwards, leaving the light cruiser squadron and the Lurcher to attend to the Mainz. At 12.15 the huge vessels of the battle cruiser squadron arrived on the scene, and proceeded north-eastward towards Heligoland. They came in sight of the Arethusa, engaged with yet another German light cruiser—the Köln—a sister ship of the Mainz, and like her of 4,300 tons, armed with twelve 4 in. guns and steaming 26 knots. She had come up through the mist and opened a long-range fire on the Arethusa, which the Arethusa returned with great spirit, but without visible effect.

Admiral Beatty with his battle cruisers steered at full speed to cut her off from Heligoland, and as she fled, his ships chased her at 27 knots. At 12.37 he opened fire, and, though the range was extreme, his guns inflicted great damage and set her on fire. A few minutes later, while the British battle cruisers were moving at 28 knots, another German ship, the two-funnelled light cruiser Ariadne, came into sight. She was steaming fast on a course at right angles to that of the Lion, which led the line of British battle cruisers. The Lion let fly two salvos from her eight 13.5 guns, which took effect, and the German light cruiser disappeared into the mist in a sinking condition.

There being no other German ships in sight, the battle cruisers circled northward to complete the destruction of the cruiser Köln. The Lion trained two of her turrets, each mounting two 13.5 guns, upon the German vessel. Two salvos were fired, each of four 1,250 lb. shells, and as the smoke of their explosion rose from the Köln it was seen that she was sinking. She went down as a stone sinks, and the four destroyers attached to the battle cruiser squadron, on proceeding to rescue survivors, found no one alive. The whole crew of 379 officers and men had perished. The German Admiralty paid a tribute to the heroism of the British in seeking to assist the wounded and drowning Germans while under fire. "It must be admitted," the report ran, "that the British, without stopping to consider their own danger, sent out lifeboats in order to save our men."

Not a single British ship was lost in the battle, but the Arethusa was badly damaged. She had about 30 holes in her sides, half her bridge had been carried away, and one of her torpedo tubes had been smashed. The total casualties of the entire British attacking force were 32 killed and 56 wounded, while the material damage was so insignificant that within a fortnight all the ships concerned were at sea again. The Germans, on the other hand, had suffered heavily. Two of their most modern cruisers—the Mainz and the Köln—had been sent to the bottom; the Ariadne, which had also been disposed of, was an older and a smaller vessel; the flotilla leader V187 was sunk, the others, though extensively damaged, being saved principally by their high speed. The German losses amounted to over 1,000 men, and included the flotilla admiral and the destroyer commodore. Well might the Admiralty describe the action as "fortunate and fruitful."

In the Mediterranean the anxiety of the French for their transports was intensified by the presence in the Aegean sea of the two modern German cruisers, the Goeben and the Breslau. The former was a modern battle cruiser mounting ten 11 in. guns, and the latter a light cruiser. On the outbreak of war with France they had bombarded the Algerian coast towns of Philippeville and Bona. On August 4, but before the declaration of war with England, they actually passed within sight of the Indomitable and proceeded to Messina, where they coaled. The British intention to trap them here was frustrated by the desire to respect Italian neutrality, and the cruisers were

sighted by the Gloucester slipping out of Taormina. Her captain followed the Germans, reporting his and their positions in the hope that the main body of big British ships would come up. But these were far behind, and moreover were hampered by varied and confusing orders from the admiralty. In the end the Gloucester was obliged by her orders to turn back, and the Goeben and Breslau after steaming east were able to enter the Dardanelles on August 10.

Left to itself the Mediterranean squadron could and would have accounted for both ships, and the brake which was put on their activity was one of the failures of Admiralty staff work—how serious in its effect was only realised later when the stiffening these two ships gave to the Turks weighed heavily in the scale against British operations in the Dardanelles in 1915.

On October 27 the British navy suffered a very severe loss. A German mine layer had got out of harbour with a cargo of mines which she laid on the routes taken by the Atlantic liners along the north coast of Ireland. On that day the ships of the 2nd battle squadron were engaged in gunnery practice near Tory island when at 5 o'clock one of these, the new and powerful super-Dreadnought Audacious, struck one of these mines. Other ships, including the White Star liner Olympic, came to the rescue and the battleship was taken in tow. For four hours there were hopes of saving her, but about 9 o'clock she blew up suddenly and sank. No lives were lost. The news of the disaster was concealed from the public partly because of the delicate tale of the negotiations with Turkey and partly at the request of Sir John Jellicoe.

As the German warships made no attempt to patrol their own North Sea coasts, Britain's far-ranging submarine commanders had little opportunity of displaying their skill. Her light and armoured cruisers, with destroyer flotillas, were spread over the North Sea and down the English Channel, reconnoitring and searching merchant ships for contraband, and guarding both the British and Belgian coasts from a naval raid. The battle cruisers in the second week of September swept the Bight of Heligoland, and found no enemy visible in German home waters.

Many British vessels were thus exposed to torpedo attack by hostile underwater craft. The fast new cruisers were, however, in little danger, as their speed enabled them to elude any sub-

marine, and even at times fight it by quick ramming manœuvres. But in order to police the seas the Admiralty had been obliged to put into commission some slow old cruisers, and these vessels were the natural prey of the German submarines when their destroyer flotillas were not spread round them.

The Germans had already got in the first blow ever delivered by a submarine, and had sunk the British light cruiser Pathfinder. This happened on September 1 when this vessel, the flotilla leader of a destroyer patrol, was lost with nearly all hands off St. Abb's Head. It was afterwards learned that the attack on her was made by the German submarine U21. The Pathfinder's commander, Captain Martin-Leake, was wounded but saved. At the time British underwater craft were blockading the very throat of the Elbe. The German Admiralty was waiting to see what the submarine could actually do. In the meantime Admiral von Tirpitz, imitating British tactics, exposed only his oldest and slowest cruisers to underwater attacks. One of these, the Hela, steaming between Heligoland and the Elbe on Sunday, September 13, was sunk by the British submarine E9 commanded by Lieutenant Commander Max Horton.

The same officer was then sent to a station off Emden, a centre of German torpedo craft. Towards the end of the first week in October he submerged in the enemy's harbour, and kept his crew amused by a gramophone concert and bridge playing. Then taking his first peep through the periscope he found a destroyer too near him to loose a torpedo at her. He let her steam away for 600 yards, and then fired his two forward tubes, with an interval of five seconds between the two shots. The first shot missed, but the second, travelling near the surface of the water, caught the destroyer amidships. The explosion lifted her in the air and tore her in two. It was the S126, a vessel of 480 tons and 27 knots speed, launched at Danzig in 1904. She had a crew of 60. Again the invisible conqueror submerged, while a flotilla of German destroyers cruised above him and found nothing to shoot at. By October 7 E9 and her daring crew were safely back once more at Harwich. E9 was one of the newest and most powerful submarines then existing. She was over 800 tons, with accommodation for a crew of 28 men, and an air-supply enabling them to stay under the sea for 24 hours. Her oil engines and electric accumulators gave her

a range of action of 3,000 miles, and she was fitted with four 21 in. torpedo-tubes and a couple of twelve-pounder guns.

Success in submarine warfare, however, does not always depend upon the efficiency of the boat, as one of the small, old-fashioned submarines in Emden harbour soon proved. This was commanded by Lieutenant Otto Weddigen, and his orders were to cruise round the coast of the Netherlands and Belgium and attack the vessels that the British Admiralty were sending to defend the Belgian seaports. Weddigen travelled on the surface, except when he sighted vessels. He arrived at dawn on Tuesday, September 22, some 16 miles north-west of the Hook of Holland. Here he spied, about six o'clock in the morning, the three old British armoured cruisers, the Aboukir, Hogue and Cressy, cruising in a single line 20 miles from the Dutch coast, without any destroyers to scout for them. It was work for which they were not suited. They were large vessels of 12,000 tons each, and 14 to 15 years old. They needed each a complement of 800 officers and men, and were slow, both in speed and in manœuvring power, and made huge targets for attack above and below water. It was a mistake to employ such slow old ships with large crews, yet the lower area of the North Sea needed to be patrolled in sufficient force to guard Belgium against a cruiser raid, and protect the transport of British troops and material across the Channel from interruption.

Reaching a good firing point Lieutenant Weddigen loosed a torpedo at the middle ship. He was about 12 feet under water at the time, and he got the shot true on the mark. Round the Aboukir rose a fountain of water, a burst of smoke, a flash of fire—and part of the stricken cruiser rose in the air. The victor heard the roar, and felt the shock of the explosion. Through his periscope he could see the crew, with their broken ship sinking beneath them, standing at their posts, ready to handle their guns if an enemy were visible. But none was, for Weddigen submerged his periscope and waited by the sinking ship. He had seen the Hogue and Cressy coming to her aid. As in the case of the Pathfinder, it was thought that the ship had struck a mine.

This misconception of the cause of the disaster led to further loss. For, thinking they were in no danger from an active enemy, the Hogue and the Cressy steamed up to rescue the men of the Aboukir. Weddigen had scarcely to move out of his

position in order to get his firing depth and train his boat on the nearer of the approaching vessels. This was the Hogue. The torpedo got home, and for 20 minutes the ship lay wounded and helpless on the surface. Then there was a second explosion, caused probably by another torpedo hitting near the magazine, and the great vessel heaved, half turned over and sank. The captain of the Cressy at once began to steam a zigzag course by the scene of the double disaster, in the hope of being able to rescue the sailors who were struggling in the water, and at the same time to get an opportunity of sighting and attacking the enemy.

The next German torpedo missed the target, but at half-past seven the enemy got home so deadly a stroke that, in five minutes after being struck, the Cressy turned completely upside down and sank. In all, 62 officers and 1,400 men were lost with the three British cruisers. The Aboukir lost 25 officers and 502 men; the Cressy, 25 officers and 536 men; and the Hogue, 12 officers and 362 men. The saved numbered only 59 officers and 858 men—917 in all. The loss of the three obsolescent cruisers was of no importance, but the heavy loss of good men was an irretrievable blow. The discipline and steadiness of the men provoked the admiration of Weddigen who, peeping at them through his periscope, bore witness to their steadiness and fearlessness. "All the while," he said, "the men stayed by their guns, looking for their invisible foe. They were brave, true to their country's sea traditions." Dutch and British vessels in the neighbourhood tended the survivors, and many of them were conveyed in the cruiser's boats to the rescue ships.

Of the Allied fleets the French was for long the most fortunate in escaping from serious loss. The main French naval force, combined with the British Mediterranean fleet, under the command of Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère, held all the Austrian warships in the blind alley of the Adriatic. To assist the land operations of the Montenegrins the Austrian fortress of Cattaro, on the edge of their frontier, was bombarded by the Allied fleets on September 10. Then the 40 warships steamed to the island of Lissa, where the Austrian navy had won in bygone days a great victory over the Italian fleet.

The signal station on this island was shelled, as were those on Pelegosa and Lesina. All the coast of Southern Dalmatia was searched, and mines, lighthouses, signal stations and wireless

stations were destroyed. This was done with a view to impeding the Austrian fleet in any sortie from its base at Pola, and British and French flags were hoisted over the conquered island, which was made the base of the Franco-British naval operations. The occupation of Lissa was not only good naval strategy, but excellent political tactics.

By the beginning of October the British blockade of the North Sea became even more effective than the Franco-British blockade of the Austrian shores of the Adriatic. For on October 2, moved by the disaster to the Aboukir, Hogue and Cressy, and by the increasing activities of the enemy's submarines, the British Admiralty closed the lower area of the North Sea. A system of minefields was laid between the Goodwins and Ostend, and between Foulness, in Essex, and the opposite coast. The result was that the mouth of the Thames and the northern entrance to the Channel were sealed to any raiding hostile warships. German submarines could, perhaps, creep underneath the mines at considerable peril, but some time passed before they had a conveniently near base at the Bruges seaport for such operations. In the meantime the Grand Fleet kept guard in the north.

Whilst British naval forces were most busily employed in the main work of the Great War, an interesting sea fight occurred in the South Atlantic between a Cunard liner, the Carmania, and the new German liner, the Cap Trafalgar. They met on the morning of September 14 off Trinidada Island—not the West Indian island of a similar name, but a rock, about four miles by two, lying in the South Atlantic some seven hundred miles east of Brazil. The Carmania had been equipped as an auxiliary cruiser, and sent to reconnoitre the little island. Her lookout spied three steamers westward of the lofty, lonely rock. They all fled when the British ship came into sight; but when it was seen that the Carmania was alone, the largest of the three German ships evidently changed her mind, turned round, and steamed up to attack. Then Captain Noel Grant, commanding the Cunarder, saw that the curious liner, which suddenly hoisted the German ensign, was a foe worthy of his guns. For the Cap Trafalgar was the pride of the Hamburg-South America line. Built in 1913, eight years after the Cunarder, for the express purpose of ousting the Royal Mail steamers from passenger and carrying traffic in the South Atlantic, she was now painted to

resemble a Union Castle liner, and had come fully armed and equipped to the usurped German base at Trinidada Island to destroy British shipping.

In size, speed, and fighting power the two armed liners were about equal, and they were both manned mainly by naval reservists. They had no armour, and their triple tier of decks offered such colossal targets as made a miss by a trained gun-layer at fighting range an impossibility. Each had a speed of 18 knots. The Carmania had a tonnage of 19,524 tons, and mounted eight 4.7 guns. The Cap Trafalgar had a tonnage of 18,710 tons, and mounted eight 4.1 guns and six pom-poms. In spite of their somewhat smaller calibre the German guns, being of more modern make, had a low trajectory and were more effective at long distances. It was the first naval engagement of its kind in history between two unarmoured ocean liners. Fire was opened about midday and action took place at a range of 8,000 to a little under 4,000 yards from start to finish.

The object of each ship being to let water into the other as quickly as possible, the guns were laid on the water-line, and an identical portion of it kept as the point of aim every time they were fired. Of the first few shells that hit the Carmania on the port side three made holes, big and small, at and above the water-line; one tore through the stewards' pantry and embedded itself in the sandbagged engine room; another cut the fire main—a casualty that might have had a decisive effect on the action. As the range shortened the effectiveness of the Carmania's fire was to be seen in the slight list to starboard of the Cap Trafalgar. Both ships were on fire; the Carmania's bridge so badly that it had to be abandoned. Soon the Cap Trafalgar turned away, and by 1.30 she was out of range of her foe. But her increasing list showed she was vitally injured, and soon after she capsized and sank bows first. Her survivors were picked up by one of her colliers. The Carmania's loss in men amounted to only nine killed and 26 wounded.

On the day that the Carmania was breaking up the plans of German commerce-raiders on the American side of the South Atlantic, the enemy was vainly trying to interfere with Britain's naval forces on the African coast of the great ocean. In the Cameroon river, leading up to Duala, the principal port of the German colony of the Cameroons, the British gunboat, the Dwarf, was attacked by a German steamboat. In the darkness

of night on September 14 the hostile boat tried to blow up the British vessel by running on it with a spar-torpedo in the bows. The sharp look-out kept on the Dwarf gave the alarm in time, and the steamboat was captured.

Two nights afterwards a German merchant ship, the Nachtigall, got up full steam in the river, and swung up in the darkness against the small British craft. But it was the big steamer that was wrecked, with a loss of 14 men killed and 22 missing, who were probably drowned in the darkness. The old British cruiser of the county class, H.M.S. Cumberland, under Captain Cyril Fuller, came up the Cameroon river to assist the gunboat.

The Germans apparently then turned their attention to the more important ship. Two more steam launches were prepared for a spar-torpedo attack. One carried the explosive machines and the other assisted in the operation. Both were destroyed. Behind the warships was a Franco-British expedition, organized at Freetown and Dakar, and composed of a landing force of infantry and guns. The fine German port of Duala, from which Germany was fed with important tropical commodities, was swiftly attacked, and it surrendered without conditions on September 27. So, without a fight, were captured eight Woermann ships, whose tonnage amounted to 28,016, and a vessel of the Hamburg-Amerika line. All the vessels were in good order, and most of them contained cargoes and considerable quantities of coal. The German gunboat Soden was likewise captured and turned at once to good use by being commissioned for service under the British flag.

The sister ship of the Cumberland, the Berwick, commanded by Captain Lewis Baker, was also successful in a fight against the commerce raiders. On September 12 she ran down and captured the Hamburg-Amerika liner Spreewald, a vessel of 3,900 tons, which had been fitted out as an armed merchant cruiser. At the same time two colliers were taken, loaded with 6,000 tons of coal and 100 tons of provisions for the supply of German cruisers operating in Atlantic waters.

Of all the ships that the German Admiralty scattered about the sea for the destruction of British commerce, only the light cruiser Emden, with Captain Karl von Müller in command, gave a full display of the possibilities of commerce raiding. When war broke out Müller was nominally at Tsing-tau, with the German China squadron, under Admiral von Spee. At the

British China station there was a sufficient force to master all Spee's ships. But the latter slipped out secretly before war was declared, and so the Emden got away, and, hearing that the Indian Ocean was partly unguarded, she suddenly appeared in the bay of Bengal in the second week of September. Accompanied by the Hamburg-Amerika liner Markomannia, acting as collier, the cruiser came up the bay. By intercepting wireless messages she learned the position of all vessels in the waters.

At 9 a.m. on the morning of September 10 she made her first victim of the Indus. Müller transferred the crew to his own ship and then sank the British vessel by gunfire. In the afternoon of the next day the Lovat was sighted and sunk. The day after the Kabinga was taken, and used as a prison ship for the captured crews. On the same day the Killin was sunk, and the Diplomat—quite a good day's work in all. On September 14 the Trabbock was captured and sunk. When all the prisoners had been placed in the Kabinga, which was ordered to proceed to Calcutta, Captain Müller with his collier accompanied the vessel to within 75 miles of the mouth of the Hooghli. He next sank another ship, and sent her crew to Rangoon.

On the evening of September 22 this daring seaman steamed into Madras harbour and began to shell the oil-tanks of the Burma Oil Company. An empty tank was riddled, and another, containing 1,500,000 gallons of liquid fuel, was set on fire. A ship in the harbour was struck, and the telegraph office and some goods trucks on the harbour wall, but only two men and one boy were killed. Getting out into the Indian Ocean, Müller continued his commerce raiding exploits, and in a few days captured and sank the British steamships Tymeric, King Lud, Liberia, and Foyle, and took the collier Buresk. The crews were transferred to the steamer Gryfedale, which was also captured, but released in order to take the British sailors to Colombo.

By this time a large number of British, French, Russian, and Japanese warships—including several cruisers of high speed—were trying to round up the adventurous raider, which met with a slight check when H.M.S. Yarmouth captured off Sumatra the Hamburg-Amerika liner that was serving as a collier. Her captain also retook the Greek steamer Pontoporos, which had been captured and put to the same purpose. This left Müller with a much restricted range of action. For some days he continued to prey on the ocean trade of India; then, when his coal

was running short, he resolved on one of the most daring strokes in his campaign. He knew that the Yarmouth was operating from Penang, the chief port of the Straits Settlements; and as she had made for this gateway of commerce in order to attack his colliers, he answered the attack by a raid on Penang. At dawn on Wednesday, October 28, the Emden stopped some ten miles off Penang and hoisted an additional dummy funnel. In the semi-darkness of dawn, as she steamed towards the harbour, everybody on the watch there thought that she was the Yarmouth returning to anchorage. There was a Russian light cruiser, the Zhemchug, in the harbour, together with three French destroyers and a gunboat. The Zhemchug was an older ship than the Emden, and had only six 4.7 guns against the Emden's ten 4.1 guns of a newer pattern.

The guard boat at the harbour entrance gave no warning, and it was only when the Emden hoisted German colours that the trick was realized. Not one of the Zhemchug's guns was ready for action. Meanwhile, the Emden had trained one of her torpedo tubes on the Russian ship. Delivered at a short range, the torpedo entered the engine room of the Zhemchug, and rendered her quite helpless by disabling her ammunition hoists. Closing in on a zigzag course, Müller fired salvo after salvo at the stricken vessel. A hundred shells were poured in at a distance lessening from 350 to 250 yards, while the Russian cruiser listed. The German then turned and brought her second torpedo tube into play. The torpedo exploded the Zhemchug's magazine, and in a dense pall of black smoke tongued with flame the Russian cruiser sank, after an engagement lasting scarcely fifteen minutes.

The Emden at once made off at full speed, and at the northern entrance to the harbour met a steamer which hoisted the red flag, signifying that she was a powder steamer. This was an especial prize for the Emden, now running short of ammunition. She got out her boats and was about to examine her new capture when the small French destroyer Mousquet appeared. This vessel had no chance whatever against the German cruiser, but her heroic commander was resolved to save the powder steamer Glenturret. He drove his destroyer in at full speed, hoping to get in close enough to use his torpedoes. But almost the first salvo of the Emden struck the engine room and disabled the little vessel. The Emden then ceased fire, expecting the Frenchmen to surrender. But the Mousquet went on firing,

This photograph shows the Mainz, one of the three German light cruisers in the battle of Heligoland, August 28, 1914 sinking rapidly, while the British destroyer retiring on the left carries on board members of the stricken ship's crew.

On October 9, 1914, Antwerp was evacuated and the Belgian army retreated down the coast The Germans tried to counter this attempt and pursued the Belgians over the dunes.

SINKING OF THE CRUISER MAINZ AND GERMAN ARTILLERY IN ACTION

Scapa Flow, a bird's-eye view of which is here shown, is a land-locked harbour in the Orkney Islands. During the earlier part of the war it was the principal base of the British Grand Fleet

The Admiralty Office, St. James's Park, London. The aerials of the wireless installation, for keeping officials in touch with the fleet, are clearly defined Information regarding the enemy's movements was wired to the waiting fleet

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and sent two torpedoes at the enemy. Neither struck her, and the Germans poured down a fire till the destroyer began to sink by the bows. Thirty-six of the French crew were rescued, but three of them afterwards died. Another destroyer was then seen approaching from Penang, and the Emden at once steamed for the Indian Ocean at full speed, and was lost to sight.

Nothing more was heard of her until Monday, November 9, when she appeared off the lonely Cocos Keeling Isles, where the wireless station and the submarine cable connecting Singapore, Australia and South Africa had attracted the attention of Captain von Müller. He sent a landing party of 40 men and three officers, with four machine guns, to destroy the wireless station and cut the cable. But false cables had been put into position for just such an attack as this; and though both the wireless apparatus and all the cables were apparently put out of action by the landing party, submarine telegraphic communication between Africa, Asia and Australia was not interrupted.

The wireless operator had sent out calls for help as soon as the Emden was sighted. By chance the troopships carrying the Australian Expeditionary Force were passing within 100 miles. H.M.A.S. Melbourne, H.M.A.S. Sydney, and a Japanese cruiser were convoying the troopships, and when the wireless call from the Cocos was received Captain John C. T. Glossop, of the Sydney, was ordered to raise steam for full speed and go and attack the foreign warship. In 135 minutes the tops of the coconut trees were sighted, and the smoke of the enemy was seen. Instead of waiting to be attacked, the Emden came driving at high speed towards the Australian cruiser. She got in first shot, but Captain Glossop at once understood Müller's tactics, and kept the Sydney far away from the Emden. The German commander wanted to fight a close action, with a view to annulling the advantage of longer range which the Sydney possessed in her 6 in. guns. All the casualties on the Australian cruiser occurred at the opening of the engagement.

The shooting of the 6 in. British guns began to shake the Emden. Her fire quickly slackened. First her foremost funnel went, then the foremast, and fire broke out in her. Next the second funnel was smashed, and lastly the third, and the flaming wreck made for the beach on North Keeling Island, where she grounded at 20 minutes past eleven—one hour and 40 minutes after the firing of the first shot. The Sydney then

pursued and captured the Buresk, taking off the British crew and the prisoners. As, however, the Germans had opened the sea valves the vessel could not be saved. Returning to the Emden again at 4 p.m., since her colours were still flying, the Sydney signalled her to surrender, and, receiving no answer, turned the guns on her again. Up went a white flag, and down came the German ensign. The condition of the Emden was as terrible as that of the Zhemchug had been. Only 145 of her crew were unwounded, and the dead numbered 115. Four men in the Sydney were killed and 12 wounded. Captain von Müller and Prince Franz Joseph of Hohenzollern were among the unwounded prisoners.

The end of H.M.S. Pegasus came on September 20. She was a light cruiser, a little over 2,000 tons, and was built in 1897, carrying eight 4 in. guns of an old pattern. Stationed at Zanzibar, she made a successful expedition to the German East African port and railway-head of Dar-es-Salaam, where she sank a German gunboat and a floating dock, and badly crippled the enemy commerce raiders by destroying the wireless station. After striking this blow she returned to Zanzibar harbour, as defects in her engine room made a complete overhaul necessary. At five o'clock in the morning the German cruiser Königsberg approached at full speed, disabled a British patrol-boat with three shots, and then opened fire on the Pegasus.

The German warship was armed with 4 in. guns, with a longer range and a greater power than the weapons of the British vessel. She began shooting at 9,000 yards' distance, and though all the broadside of the Pegasus stubbornly tried to reply, her old guns were put out of action in 15 minutes. Shell after shell struck the British cruiser, tearing down the upper works, smashing the guns, around which most of the slaughter of the crew occurred. When the decks were strewn with dead and dying men the Germans ceased firing for five minutes. Thinking that the action was over, all the men who had been able to find shelter came on deck to succour their wounded comrades. But this was the moment chosen by the Königsberg for another terrible bombardment. She battered the Pegasus almost beyond recognition, and caused her to list heavily. Out of the crew of 234 men there were 24 killed and 55 wounded.

Under the enemy's fire the British ensign was shot from the mast and fell on the deck. At once it was seized and held aloft

by two marines in the most exposed position in their ship. It drooped for a moment when one had been killed by a shell. Immediately another marine took the place of the dead man, and the flag continued to show bravely, and it was still flying from the broken Pegasus when the German cruiser fired a last shot and steamed away.

A few days before the Emden was burnt and beached her sister ship, the Königsberg, with little to her credit except the sinking of the Pegasus, was hunted down. On October 30 she was discovered by H.M.S. Chatham, a monitor built for operations on the coast of Belgium, to be hiding in shoal water six miles up the Rufigi river in German East Africa. The British ship, being of greater draught, could not be worked up the densely wooded tropical river. The Königsberg's crew had prepared for siege by landing and digging entrenchments on the banks of the stream, and though the Chatham bombarded the enemy's ship and trenches with her long-range guns, the effect could not be observed owing to the thick groves of palm trees screening the German ship. However, the British captain blocked the river by sinking colliers in the single navigable channel.

Just before the British monitor squadron and destroyer flotilla steamed to the Belgian coast to take part in the great land battle, the work of patrolling the Channel and the North Sea became more difficult and urgent. For the enemy then possessed, in the northern ports of the Belgian coast, new bases for torpedo operations perilously close to England and to France. Submarines were sent in parts by railway to Bruges, mines were laid in the Scheldt, and both destroyers and submarines were ordered to proceed from Emden to the new Belgian bases.

Meanwhile, the German submarine officer, Lieutenant Weddigen, was tracking two old armoured cruisers, the Hawke and the Theseus, in the northern waters of the North Sea. On October 15 the sister ships were attacked by U9. Weddigen released his first torpedo at the Theseus, but missed the mark. Then he turned on the Hawke, and struck her amidships near a ready magazine. The detonation was followed by a second terrific explosion in which a large number of the crew were killed, and in five minutes the Hawke sank with the loss of nearly 500 lives. Only one boat got away, and after rowing about for three hours the exhausted members of the crew were picked up by a passing Norwegian steamer.

It was at this time that four German destroyers, S115, S117, S118 and S119, left Emden and turned south with the intention of operating off Belgium with the submarines. Acting on information received, the newest British light cruiser, with four of the newest destroyers, steamed out of Harwich at the same hour and also made in the same direction—for British submarines were still watching off the enemy's harbour when the hostile destroyers appeared. Captain Cecil H. Fox in the light cruiser Undaunted, was accompanied by the Lance, the Lennox, the Legion and the Loyal. At four o'clock on the afternoon of Saturday, October 17, the German flotilla was descried off the mouth of the Scheldt. They tried to escape, but by good seamanship Captain Fox cut them off, using the superior speed of his flotilla to the best advantage, and then opened the action at a range of five miles. To prevent any of the enemy escaping, Captain Fox ordered the four British destroyers to concentrate against two of the German vessels. This gave the gunlayers in the smaller craft double the fire-power of their immediate enemies.

Then the Undaunted brought her two 6 in. guns and 4 in. guns against the two remaining destroyers. So deadly was the marksmanship of the British light cruiser that in less than a minute the leading German ship was in distress. Clouds of smoke arose from her as the lyddite shells struck home and exploded, rending the thin steel armour-plate of the hull as if it were wood and hurling the metal splinters all about. A shell smashed the machinery and brought the boat to a standstill, and a few minutes after the action opened she was sunk. Soon afterwards the second enemy destroyer was ablaze from end to end, with her funnels, bridge and deck fittings torn from their holdings. As she went down the sea seemed to engulf a length of leaping flame. The British destroyers were equally successful, and at the end of an hour and a half the German navy had lost four useful destroyers and some 250 officers and men, including 32 survivors picked up after the action.

On the whole the naval war of attrition by submarine attack produced no alteration in the comparative strength of the two chief contending navies of the world during the first critical six months of the war. At the end of that time the British fleet was both absolutely and relatively stronger than it had been on the day of mobilization. Against the commerce and industries of

Germany it had exerted an influence so tremendous that the German nation had to be put on siege rations. This was the true cause for the adoption of a policy of German submarine attacks on merchant shipping. The first exploit in commerce destruction by submarine attack occurred on Tuesday, October 20, when the British steamer Glitra, with a cargo of oil and coal, was steaming towards Stavanger in Norway. About ten miles from this destination her captain sighted a submarine, which forced him to heave-to under threat of a torpedo.

Two officers and a couple of men then boarded the Glitra from a canvas boat. They had revolvers in their hands, and they ordered the crew to leave the ship within ten minutes. As the crew rowed to the shore the submarine officers entered the engine room and opened the Kingston valves. Then, returning to the submarine, they fired on the steamer, which took nearly three hours to sink. U17 was the submarine that carried out this work. It was the first recorded instance of a merchant ship being captured or sunk by underwater craft. About a week later, on Monday, October 26, the first historic act of veritable piracy was committed. On that day the French liner Amiral Gauteaume was steaming from Calais to Havre in a heavy sea with 2,500 refugees aboard. She was torpedoed without warning, and about 30 lives were lost, but the Gauteaume got back to port.

On the following day the traffic along the chief Atlantic trade routes was interrupted. A British steamer, the Manchester Commerce, struck a mine off the Irish coast by Tory Island, the captain and 13 men perishing. A minefield had been laid off the island by a vessel showing neutral flags on one of the new trade routes fixed by the British Admiralty and communicated by secret instructions to skippers, shipowners and cargo-owners concerned in the carrying of commerce across the Northern Atlantic. The speed and facility with which the new route had been mined proved that German secret service agents were able to discover the Admiralty's secret instructions and arrange for a neutral vessel to slip out with a cargo of mines.

The reason why the Germans resorted to piracy in the middle of October, barely ten weeks after the outbreak of hostilities, was explained by a statement issued by the secretary of the Admiralty on October 23. At that date only 39 out of 4,000 British ships engaged in foreign trade had been sunk by the enemy. Nearly 9,000 foreign voyages had been undertaken to

and from the ports of the United Kingdom, and in 45 cases only had our ships been interfered with. Moreover, most of these small losses had been occasioned by skippers' disregard of instructions. On all the routes where Admiralty instructions were followed, little damage was done to merchant shipping.

While Britain's overseas trade was thus impeded only by the large number of ships withdrawn for the transport of troops and the carrying of material and supplies to our navy and expeditionary force, the overseas trade of Germany had practically ceased to exist. Among the comparatively few German ships which had put out to sea, 133 had been captured, which was nearly four times the number of those lost by the vast and active British mercantile marine. The government rate of insurance for cargoes, fixed at the outbreak of war at five guineas per cent, was reduced to two guineas without imperilling the solvency of the government insurance fund.

It was on Monday, November 2, 1914, that the German Admiralty received news of the victory of their China squadron over the Good Hope and Monmouth in the action off Coronel. (See Chapter 30.) It was then decided to launch the battle cruiser squadron at once across the North Sea, and to bombard the east coast of England. A new minefield was laid between Heligoland and Jahde Bay, where Wilhelmshaven is situated. The idea was to draw the counter-attacking British ships into the minefield, where a large flotilla of German submarines was also acting. So as evening fell on Monday, November 2, a German squadron of three armoured cruisers and three battle cruisers came out of Wilhelmshaven and threaded the minefield around Jahde Bay, and then made at high speed for the East Anglian coast. There they arrived at dawn on Tuesday morning, November 3. The only British warship in view of the Germans was the old gunboat Halcyon, lying ten miles off the coast on fishing patrol duties. The great German ships rained shells upon the gunboat, which had only two 4.7 in. and four 6-pounder guns. She could scarcely do 18 knots, but her captain, running her on a zigzag course, only had his ship hit eight times. Then a British destroyer arrived and sent up a screen of thick smoke, behind which the battered little Halycon got safely away.

At 7 o'clock the bombardment began, but at so great a range that the damage done was negligible. German destroyers, scattered northward and southward, had got into touch with the

outer guard of the British advancing battle cruiser squadron. A wireless message came to the German admiral, and learning that a far superior force was closing down upon him he turned for home at top speed and the vessels escaped into a thick mist, dropping mines as soon as they left Yarmouth Roads. As the result several trawlers and a British submarine of the D class were sunk. On the return the Germans lost the armoured cruiser Yorck. Built just before the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, she was sister-ship to the Roon, having an armament of four 8.2 in. guns and ten 6 in. guns, with a 4 in. armoured belt and 6 in. turrets. Losing her way in the mist while returning to Wilhelmshaven, she took the wrong path through the minefield, exploded a mine, and sank just in the entrance to Jahde Bay, thereby blocking it. Owing to the fog, the rescue of her crew was impeded, and only 177 men out of 629 were saved.

As their victory at Coronel had provoked the German Admiralty to make their first vain raid on Britain's east coast towns, so their crushing defeat in the battle off the Falkland Islands aroused them to make a more desperate attempt to carry out the scheme for which their battle cruiser wing had been designed. About five o'clock in the evening of Tuesday, December 15, the German battle cruiser fleet steamed out of Wilhelmshaven, and for 14 hours made at a speed of 25 knots for part of the Durham and Yorkshire coast which was known to be unprotected by a minefield. As soon as the battle cruisers had left Wilhelmshaven there was a stir of activity throughout the Grand Fleet. Not only did the 1st and 2nd battle cruiser squadrons put out to sea, but on a remote point of the northern British coast eight of Britain's fastest super-Dreadnought battleships got up steam and turned southward.

The German bombardment began at Scarborough a little after eight o'clock in the morning. The Moltke, with her 11 in. shells, and an armoured cruiser firing 6 in. shells, came up in the morning mist and opened fire at close range, the smaller vessel steaming up to within a quarter of a mile of the beach. The first shell tore up the promenade and foreshore. Then the Grand Hotel and other prominent buildings were struck. The walls of the ancient castle, ten feet thick, were shattered in places, and the keep was also damaged. In all, four children, eight women and five men were killed outright, and over a hundred were wounded. A similar bombardment took place at Whitby,

where a coastguard and a vanman were killed and two boys wounded by two battle cruisers firing 11 in. shells. At the Hartlepools the bombardment began at the same time as at Scarborough. The weather was very hazy, and the three battle cruisers got within a range of about 4,000 yards. But except for one shot that destroyed the gas-holders, little military damage was done. The slaughter of non-combatants in this seaport, however, was serious. A hundred men, women and children were killed, while nearly 450 were wounded.

When the last vessels of the German cruiser squadron steamed away from Whitby about 9.30 o'clock on Wednesday morning, December 16, part of the Grand Fleet was waiting for all the raiders. On one side of the German squadron was Sir David Beatty with the first battle cruisers. On the other side was the second battle squadron with eight super-Dreadnought battleships, all ready for instant attack. It was as complete a trap as could be imagined. The second battle squadron suddenly saw the Germans about eight miles away, coming out of a fog-bank. Our fire-control officers marked the ranges, and the guns were laid. Then just when the British ships were about to open fire the fog came down again heavily and entirely hid the enemy. Apparently the Germans saw the British ships and altered course as they sped away through the fog, for nothing more could be seen of them. But they did not escape quite without hurt. As the battle cruiser Von der Tann was fleeing fast in the thick fog she rammed the light cruiser Frauenlob, damaging herself badly in the bows, as well as half sinking the lighter vessel.

On Christmas day a raid by British seaplanes was directed at Cuxhaven with the Harwich force and some submarines in support. When the planes set off from their parent ships visibility was perfect; but over the land a dense frost fog made accurate bombing difficult. By the time the seaplanes had located their targets and dropped their bombs fuel was running short. Zeppelins and hostile seaplanes were out after them, and five British planes had to come down in the sea. One was rescued by the Fearless, another by a Dutch trawler, and three came down close off Norderney, where they lay in great danger with a Zeppelin approaching. At this moment Lieutenant Commander Nasmith with submarine E11 rose to the surface, took the pilots on board and dived just in time to escape two bombs

which the Zeppelin dropped upon him. The results of the bombing were not very impressive, but the interesting fact remained that the Harwich flotilla and carriers had been close in to the enemy's shores without encountering a single surface craft. An indirect result of the raid was that the German battle cruiser Von der Tann, whilst at anchor in Schillig Roads, on sighting the planes weighed anchor in such haste that she fouled another cruiser and both were severely damaged, the Von der Tann thus being prevented from taking part in the Dogger Bank fight described in a later chapter.

The year closed with a sad disaster to the British ship Formidable, which in company with Admiral Bayley's cruiser squadron was carrying out manœuvres off the Isle of Wight. She was the last of the line, steaming at only ten knots and unprotected by destroyers. Without warning she was struck by a torpedo amidships which, exploding on the starboard side abreast the foremost funnel, gave her a list of 20 degrees. Soon after she was again struck on the port side. Only four boats could be launched and all hands were set to breaking up woodwork for life saving purposes. Two and a half hours after she had been hit she went down with a loss of 512 men and 35 officers of a complement of 780.

From this regrettable and avoidable affair two bright aspects emerged. One was the perfect discipline of the crew of the Formidable who, until she sank, worked calmly and cheerfully. It was in accordance with the highest traditions of the service. The second was an extraordinarily gallant rescue of the ship's launch with 70 men by the Brixham trawler Provident, manned by a crew of only four men. In a full gale and a high sea the skipper gybed his vessel and brought her up alongside the sinking and overloaded boat. A warp was passed, and by this piece of audacious seamanship all the men were taken off as the launch sank. It is pleasant to know that the gallantry of the Provident was recognized by a gratuity of £550 and a life saving medal for each one of the crew.

CHAPTER 18

First Battle of the Aisne

THE battle of the Aisne opened on September 13, 1914, with both sides still hoping to outflank the other and reach an immediate decision ; it ended in a deadlock on this part of the front which was not to be removed for four years. It marked the beginning of that prolonged struggle between armies whose flanks could not be enveloped, resting, as they eventually did, on the frontier of Switzerland on the east and, in the west, on the sea-border.

Like the battles of Mons and of the Marne, the battle of the Aisne began on a Sunday. It was fought on a front of 100 miles from Compiègne to Tahure, east of Reims, which ran approximately east-south-east. On the side of the Allies the following armies were engaged from west to east: French 6th, Maunoury, Compiègne-Soissons ; the British, Sir J. French, south of Soissons to Vauxcéré ; French 5th, Franchet d'Esperey, Vauxcéré to Berry-au-Bac ; 9th, Foch, advancing north near Reims ; and 4th, Langle de Cary, moving down the upper Suippe. These were faced by the following German armies from west to east, forming a group under field marshal Josias von Heeringen: 1st, von Kluck, Compiègne-Soissons ; 2nd, Bülow, Soissons-Craonne ; 3rd, Hausen, Craonne-Reims ; 4th, duke of Württemberg, Reims-Suippe.

The Allies and the Germans had been continually marching and fighting for weeks, and both had just fought the battle of the Marne, in which the losses on both sides had been heavy and the consumption of munitions enormous. It is difficult to estimate the forces engaged ; they were continually changing, as during the battle the Germans brought up large numbers of men set free by the fall of Maubeuge and the cessation of the German offensive in Lorraine, while the French steadily shifted units from their eastern front to their western flank. The British army still consisted of only 2½ corps, as the 3rd corps lacked a division, which arrived during the battle, and half its artillery. Sir John French cannot have had much more than 60,000 men under him

in view of his losses, which had not yet been entirely made good with drafts. The German armies were reorganized during the battle, and Hausen was removed, nominally on account of illness but actually, it would seem, because of defective leadership in the earlier period of the war. His troops were added to Bülow's.

The Aisne is a sluggish river of good average width flowing in a wide valley two miles broad, to the north and south of which rise downs and steep hills to a level of 400 feet or 450 feet. On the north side there is a large tableland between Soissons and Craonne. Among the hills are many caves, woods, and quarries, affording admirable cover to artillery and troops. On their march south the Germans had begun entrenchments on the tableland north of the river, and when they fell back from the Marne these were pressed forward with feverish haste. Peasants and French prisoners were compelled to work on them, and very rapidly a great fortified system was created. The Germans had studied the ground carefully before the war, and German firms and establishments had worked several of the quarries and secured land in commanding positions near Reims.

Germans engaged in businesses at Soissons and Reims were at hand to advise about details of the ground, and help in laying out the entrenchments and gun-sites. On the German retreat a very complete intelligence system was organized, so that the command was kept thoroughly informed of what was happening in the Allied lines. They had learnt the lesson of the Marne when their general headquarters had failed conspicuously to keep in touch with the front line.

The German plan was to allow the Allies to take the offensive against their vast entrenched position and cross the Aisne. At the right moment it was hoped to deal a counter-stroke, precisely as in the battle of Morhange the Germans had allowed the French to attack and had then advanced suddenly. The Germans had still their crushing superiority in heavy artillery, which became more serious as heavy howitzers, 8 in., 11 in., and 12 in., arrived from the siege of Maubeuge, and were able to outrange and outclass everything in the Allied armies. They had a great advantage in machine guns; their numerical superiority in aircraft did not tell so much because the weather was almost uniformly bad—rainy, cold, and stormy. The difficulties of the Allies were greatly increased by the rains, which swelled the river and made the ground a slippery and sticky mass of chalk-mud.

General Joffre was not yet certain as to the exact situation of the Germans or he might not have delivered a frontal attack upon them. They had just been driven back 40 miles on the western section of their front, and it was possible that, if energetically assailed, they might be compelled to make a much more extensive retreat. Unfortunately shortage of ammunition greatly hampered the Allies, while the fall of Maubeuge set free two important railways for the munitioning of the German troops, and this perhaps alone enabled the enemy to hold their ground. The Allies on September 12, 1914, reached the Aisne at the western end of their line; Foch, on September 13, occupied Reims, and Langle de Cary, meeting with ever-increasing resistance, reached the upper Suippe. Maunoury vigorously pressed the Germans west of Soissons, following Joffre's order to harass the German right to the utmost, and opened fire with his artillery at long range against German batteries sited on the high ground north and south of Soissons. He was supported by the British 3rd corps, attacking from Buzancy, which drove the Germans across the river at Soissons, where they broke down the bridges. After this preliminary operation the work of forcing a passage of the river was taken in hand. On September 13 the French 6th army bridged the Aisne under fire at Attichy and Vic, and also at Vic crossed by a girder of a narrow-gauge railway bridge which had not been completely destroyed. They were at once heavily engaged with considerable forces.

It will be understood that though the battle was not in full operation until Sunday, September 13, troops were already in movement the evening before. On the British 3rd corps section a passage of the Aisne was effected on the evening of the 12th, when Brigadier General Hunter-Weston, commanding the 11th brigade, discovered that the bridge at Venizel was not too severely damaged to carry light loads, and was able to throw his troops over in single file. He completely surprised the Germans by a bayonet attack. He was able to occupy a line from the spur north of St. Marguerite to a point two miles north of Soissons. This was a fine feat of arms, following as it did a march of 30 miles through pouring rain by troops who had had no proper food for 24 hours. In the morning the British cavalry was early astir reconnoitring the crossings of the Aisne at Villers and Bourg. Bridges over the river had been destroyed and the dragoons had to content themselves with firing on the Germans

entrenched on the opposite bank. Later, with the assistance of the 1st division, the cavalry was able to effect a crossing by means of a partially destroyed aqueduct.

Sir Douglas Haig had that morning ordered the 1st corps to reconnoitre the river crossings. He intended to order an attack should the enemy actively defend the river passage, but, in fact, the 2nd brigade was able to follow the cavalry division and take up a position on the north bank. Meantime, others of his troops were able to cross at Pont Arcy over a bridge only partially destroyed and cover the engineers in the construction of a pontoon bridge farther downstream.

The 2nd corps, still farther left, met with more severe checks. At Condé, it was reported, the bridge was intact—but it had been left so purposely by the Germans as a trap, being covered by their machine guns and rifle fire. An attempt to build a pontoon bridge at Soissons was defeated by the heavy German howitzers. Near Missy British detachments of the 2nd corps crossed with great difficulty by rafts; farther east the British crossed by a damaged bridge and rafts at Vailly, avoiding the bridge at Condé. The Germans, after sharp fighting, fell back two miles towards their main position. The British engineers worked magnificently. Eight pontoon bridges and one footbridge had been completed by the night of the 14th, while five of the damaged bridges had been made fit to carry foot or heavy traffic. All this work was carried out in heavy rain under severe fire from the German artillery. East of the British, Franchet d'Esperey crossed above Bourg late on the 13th, keeping contact with the British right.

During the day detachments of troops were crossing the river as and when it became practicable. The 12th infantry brigade was able to defile gradually over the damaged bridge at Venizel. The French 6th army were able to make continuous headway at Soissons, although the advance was considerably harassed by the German batteries. When the enemy brought their heavy howitzers into play the British artillery were unable to out-range them.

By about midday, however, the Aisne had been crossed on both flanks of the British army and these passages secured. The centre remained closed. Sir Douglas Haig believed that the gap between the German 1st and 2nd armies had not been closed since the Marne, and the opportunity for a break through was still very promising. Certainly by nightfall the situation was still very encouraging, and the enemy had lost any chance of

driving the 1st corps back over the Aisne. Farther to the left on the 2nd corps front General Hubert Hamilton (3rd division) ordered the advance of the 8th infantry brigade at Vailly. The bridges had been destroyed, but over one the Germans had left a single plank spanning the breach which they had made. About 3 p.m. the Royal Scots and Royal Irish began to cross, under shell fire, in single file over this narrow passage and established themselves on the high ground north-west of Vailly. The rest of the 8th brigade and of the 9th brigade followed and settled themselves in their positions. It seems incredible, but it is true, that such a considerable body of troops should have been moved across with such a precarious foothold on part of their journey. It was not until later that the engineers, working under continuous shell fire, were able to construct a pontoon bridge.

The crossing at Missy (by the 13th infantry brigade) was not possible until nightfall. As has been said this was effected by rafts. These were improvised by the infantry (West Kents) from railway sleepers, with later assistance from the engineers. The West Kents were fortunate in surprising a German patrol, thus preventing news of the crossing reaching the enemy, and allowing the slow passage by these cumbrous means to be effected without molestation. A raft big enough to carry 60 men was also used at Moulin des Roches above Venizel, where two battalions of the 13th infantry brigade crossed the river by this means and were beginning their advance by 3 p.m. This raft was used later by the remainder of the 13th and by the 15th brigade. That afternoon an advance was made on Chivres, but was brought to a standstill by heavy artillery fire.

Benefiting, perhaps, from lessons learnt at the battle of the Marne, the Germans had divisions available to fill their gaps. Their 15th corps and 7th cavalry division had been ordered westward from Alsace, and the 7th reserve corps arrived opportunely enough on September 13 to take up a position north of the Aisne. So narrow was the margin of time that it was only two hours ahead of the British 1st corps when it made its attack. The German 15th corps was able to stop the French advance on the right, and both corps appear to have had forced marches, the 7th reserve corps having been released only shortly before by the fall of Maubeuge. It appears, however, that had General Zwehl obeyed the orders of his superior, General Bülow, and marched to a position 15 miles east of Chavonne to protect his (General

Bülow's) right, the Chemin des Dames would have been left clear for Sir Douglas Haig's advance. General Zwehl, however, considered the danger on the spot too great to be ignored, and prudently kept his corps in a position to resist the British. Had he not done so the issue of the battle might have been very different. The German 7th corps was, in fact, ready when the advance of the British 1st corps made its first passage of the Aisne. It must be remembered also that these new troops who had come up to resist the British attack were comparatively fresh and had not suffered the hardships of the German retreat to the Aisne.

By dawn of September 14 the British cavalry division, the 1st division and the 5th infantry brigade were on a line between Paissy and Verneuil, while a gap of five miles separated them from the 8th and 9th infantry brigades at Vauxelles. A further gap of three miles lay between them and troops of the 13th, 14th, and 15th brigades and the 4th division on


English Miles
Roads
Railways
AISNE: FIRST BATTLE
Allied front before battle
Allied front at close of battle
Extreme points reached by Allies
in battle but not held
Soissons
Vauxelles
Paissy
Verneuil
Missy
Venizel
Crouy
Condé
Braisne
Vauxrot
Machault
Autrèche
Chassemy
Pont Arcy
Chemin des Dames
Ostel
Ostel Ferme
Bourg
Roche
Chivy
Cuiry-les-Chaudardes
Cuiry-le-Chatel
Cuiry-le-Dolleau
Chavonne
Chavonne Ferme
Vendresse
Troyon
Beaulne
Beaulne Ferme
Moulin de Condé
Moulin de Vauxelles
Moulin de Chivy
Moulin de Paissy
Moulin de Vendresse
Moulin de Troyon
Moulin de Beaulne
Moulin de Roche
Moulin de Bourg
Moulin de Ostel
Moulin de Chavonne
Moulin de Cuiry
Moulin de Braisne
Moulin de Vauxrot
Moulin de Machault
Moulin de Autrèche
Moulin de Chassemy
Moulin de Pont Arcy
Moulin de Chemin des Dames
Moulin de Ostel Ferme
Moulin de Bourg
Moulin de Roche
Moulin de Chivy
Moulin de Cuiry-les-Chaudardes
Moulin de Cuiry-le-Chatel
Moulin de Cuiry-le-Dolleau
Moulin de Chavonne

a line St. Marguerite to Crouy. These represented those detachments of the British force which had crossed the Aisne. On the south bank there still remained the 3rd and 5th cavalry brigades, the 4th Guards brigade, and the 6th, 7th, and two battalions of the 13th infantry brigades.

On the 14th it was still uncertain whether the Germans were retreating, covered by powerful rearguards, or whether they meant to stand and deliver battle. During the night Maunoury's troops had pushed forward and carried Autrèches and Nouvron; they were close to the summit of the plateau, but at this point they found themselves in contact with large German forces thoroughly entrenched, and could make no further headway. Maunoury recognized that the Germans were no longer in retreat but were standing. His position became a difficult one. East of him the British had been held in their attempt to capture the heights of Chivres, and could not advance. An advance against Ostel was not more successful, and the troops at that point were driven back across the river.

Sir John French decided on an energetic pursuit on this day. He had been able to assure himself that the German retirement was not strategic, but had been forced on them by ill-success. General Joffre also issued a "Special Instruction," ordering the pursuit to be continued "energetically" in a northerly direction. Accordingly, Sir Douglas Haig, making the Chemin des Dames his first objective, ordered the 1st division to advance to this section from Cerny westward to Courtecon and the 2nd division from Courtecon to the tunnel of the Oise by Pargny. The 2nd and 3rd corps were also ordered to push northward.

At dawn troops of the 1st corps were close to Troyon and a beet-sugar factory near the Chemin des Dames, in contact with the German main line of entrenchments. It was afterwards known that they had pushed forward into a gap in the German line, to which troops were being hurried from the army that had been besieging Maubeuge. About noon the factory was stormed after a fierce resistance, and a little later a general advance was ordered. If there had been a sufficient force on the spot the German line might have been broken with immense results. As it was, not more than 15,000 tired men were available, and these encountered a violent fire and were too few to push the advantage gained. Yet they obtained a firm footing on the upland, captured 12 guns and 600 prisoners, and inflicted heavy loss upon the

Germans. At the critical moment German reinforcements came up, counter-attacked, and stopped all progress. The line which the British had gained was held for three years without any marked change, and the German line confronting it was never again heavily attacked until 1917.

The action was full of incident. Quite early the Sussex began to take prisoners, who were shown no mercy by other Germans in their rear, but shot down. Others who surrendered to the King's Royal Rifles met a like fate. This may have been a deliberate punishment, but in the general confusion it may have been accidental, for a fog lay heavily on the ground, and in one instance the Coldstreams took the Germans around them for British troops and the Germans mistook the Coldstreams for their own men. Fortunately the Coldstreams discovered their mistake first. On the fog-bound battlefield the Germans had an advantage in having their batteries already in position. The British guns, following in the wake of the advance, had to remain silent until they could be certain of the positions which the infantry were occupying.

As the fog cleared the German counter-attacks became more and more energetic, but, though small distances had to be given up here and there, the 1st corps as a whole held its ground. The number of its casualties will show the fierce character of the fighting in which it had been engaged, for on this single day it lost no fewer than 3,500 men.

It was disappointing to the British command, when assessing the progress made on this eventful day, to find that Sir Douglas Haig's corps alone had made any appreciable advance. On the rest of the line the British forces remained stationary, and in the case of the 3rd division the casualties had been very heavy. Nor could Sir John French, at this juncture, feel that his line was in any way secure. There was still a gap of a mile and a half between the 2nd and 3rd divisions, and the 5th and 4th divisions were separated from the rest of the army by the promontory of Chivres. The battle front was far too long for the troops available, and it was impossible to keep any divisions in reserve. It seems certain that had Bülow known the weakness of the force that was attacking him he would have made a more determined effort to crush it, and at this early stage throw it back again on to the south bank of the Aisne. His well-trained military mind could not conceive that every available soldier was being em-

ployed against him or that so hazardous an enterprise would be undertaken without reinforcements being immediately available.

As yet there was no satisfactory bridge over the Aisne, and the incessant rain had swollen that stream to such an extent that the pontoons and other temporary erections of the engineers were endangered. Rations, ammunition, and other supplies had still to be carried over these, and they were all targets for the German fire. They were also the only way open for the evacuation of the wounded. Though the situation looked depressing enough there was no thought but of continuing the advance next day. Had British general headquarters but known it, apprehension was not absent from the minds of the German command, for on that evening provisional orders were issued for a retirement.

These were not destined to be carried out. On September 15 orders were issued by Sir John French for his line to entrench and for artillery action to be undertaken against the heavy German batteries. General Joffre also abandoned the hope of immediate pursuit and ordered "methodical attack." But though the German strategy envisaged a necessary retirement it was not to be without a further effort to dislodge the French and British forces from the north bank of the Aisne. In consequence, on September 15 the "methodical attack" was on the part of the Germans. The day was marked by minor actions, none of which can be said to have been conclusive.

To the east of the British, Moroccan infantry entrenched under a violent fire, but Franchet d'Esperey's advance was generally checked by the forces gathering in his front and the strength of the German fortified position. Without heavy long-range artillery the attack on the German entrenchments was difficult, and the French had no advantage in numbers.

On the next day, the 16th, Maunoury's 6th army, which was precariously clinging to the edge of the plateau north-west of Soissons, was counter-attacked by the Germans under a tremendous fire from their heavy artillery, and in a series of desperate encounters was slowly forced back from Autrèches and Nouvron, both of which places thenceforth remained in German hands. Soissons was bombarded by the German 8 in. and 11 in. howitzers, and great damage was done to it; the French bridges were kept under constant fire.

Maunoury, however, felt for the German right flank, and succeeded in advancing some distance up the Oise valley. The

British 3rd corps south of Vregny held on with difficulty. Its other division arrived that day, and was kept in reserve south of the Aisne. On its right, the 2nd corps, by heavy attacks and constant bombardment, was driven back to Missy, though one of its divisions farther east recovered some ground and advanced north of Vailly after stubborn fighting, in which the British soldier showed all his finest qualities. The 1st corps near the Chemin des Dames was the target of constant attacks, but it held on grimly, though suffering much from the German heavy guns. East of it Franchet d'Esperey made a great attack on the Craonne plateau in the hope of breaking through the German centre, but found the opposition too strong for him.

The close of this day's fighting marked an important milestone in the history of the war. Sir John French's orders for the strong entrenchment of his line turned out to be an official notification of the beginning of trench warfare. This, however, was not immediately apparent, for fighting of a more or less open character continued for some days longer.

It is interesting at this point, however, to note how little any of the armies were prepared for this "siege warfare in the field" which, until the end of the war, was to be the prevailing feature of fighting on the western front. Despite the fact that it had been a phenomenon of the Russo-Japanese war, none of the belligerents appears to have foreseen that it might become an inevitable development of a European conflict. Both French and Germans regarded a quick issue as essential to success. The Germans are said to have allowed themselves 60 days in which to force a victory in France. On the other hand, as they had furnished themselves with all the paraphernalia useful in the reduction of the frontier fortresses (heavy guns, trench mortars, hand grenades, flares, etc.) they were better prepared with material adapted to trench warfare. None of the armies had had much training in the practical science of digging, revetting, and fortifying a trench system, but they were soon to have ample opportunity of bringing this branch of military engineering to a perfection never before known in war.

On September 17 Maunoury continued his efforts to work round the German right, and was informed that Joffre was reinforcing him to strike at that flank. The British did not attempt any further important advance, but on the afternoon of that day the Northamptons in the 1st corps by their effective fire compelled

a German detachment to put up their hands and come into the British line. When the Germans saw how few the British were, they turned on their assailants treacherously and killed or wounded 152 men, but were themselves shot down to a man. That at least is the version of an unpleasant incident which is still generally believed. It was not an isolated occurrence, as the King's Royal Rifles had a similar experience which they were also able to avenge. It is possible, of course, that they may have been signs of surrender made as incitements to troops on the other side to lay down their arms or they may have been unofficial and individual surrenders immediately resented by commanders in the field. The German General Zwehl made the same accusation against the British of pretending to surrender and then firing. After this a considerable German force attacked, but this was beaten back, and the Northamptons succeeded in crossing the Chemin des Dames and reaching Cerny, north of Troyon.

This was the high-water mark of the Allied advance, but Cerny could not be held, for the French on the British right had to fall back as the result of the failure of the attack by the 5th army on the Craonne plateau. Sir John French did not press his offensive, in view of the fact that Joffre had decided to try to dislodge the Germans by turning their right flank. The German position was rightly regarded by the French command as being too strong to be stormed by frontal attack, especially as the forces on each side were about equal and the Germans had the better ground and a great superiority in heavy guns and machine guns. The transference of units from the Allied centre to the left must have been observed by the Germans. They attacked Foch's 9th army north of Reims, and after severe fighting succeeded in recapturing Fort Brimont, a height near Reims from which they had retreated after the Marne. From this they had good observation of the city of Reims, and at once began to shell it. East of the 9th army, the 4th army was held up by German positions north of Souain.

Maunoury was waiting for the arrival of reinforcements in the shape of another army under Castelnau, the 7th. This was to clear his flank by moving on Noyon, towards which point he continued his advance on the 18th. The British force was attacked, but without yielding ground anywhere beat off the Germans; and the Gloucesters even made a slight advance and

captured a section of the German trenches. The 5th army was also attacked, but held firmly. East of it a dangerous attack was made on Foch, apparently with the object of breaking through the French centre, and the situation was for some time critical. The Germans bombarded the cathedral of Reims, from that day onwards maintaining a fire upon it. They reached Nogent l'Abbesse, due east of Reims, and captured Prunay on the main railway and road from Reims to Châlons, thus thrusting between the 9th and 4th armies. This attack was ultimately stopped and Prunay recovered, but the positions dominating Reims remained for four years in German hands.

On the 19th and 20th the Germans attacked at intervals at various points, but in every case were driven back, losing severely. The battle had now degenerated into trench fighting, with no possibility of decisive movements. Both armies were under cover and in the thick mud only isolated attacks were delivered. The British gained in these one or two German trenches, and on September 27-28 the Germans made a determined effort to capture the British position near Troyon, but were repulsed. This virtually marked the end of the battle. Early in October the British army was moved to Flanders, as Sir John French realized the importance of protecting the Channel ports.

The following extracts from letters, written by soldiers who were in the thick of this great battle, give an inside view of the hardships of that long and exhausting trench warfare and show the deadly effect of the German shrapnel. In all the narratives the fighting is described as severe, yet even in the midst of the thickest shrapnel storms the cheery spirit of the British soldier remained with him and enabled him to face every danger with a smile and a joke. The first letter, from a sergeant of the 2nd battalion of the King's Royal Rifles, says:

I was at Mons, and did the famous retreat, but never have I seen anything like the battle of the Aisne. I shall never forget our advance across those fields. The Germans were there in tens of thousands, but our lads still kept going. We lost very heavily, but our men said "no going back." When I got hit, I couldn't say how long I lay there, but a chum of mine, under a perfect hail of bullets and shells, dragged me to safety and said: "Cheer up, Smiler, here's a fag. I'm going back for Sandy." He never got there. Poor Tommy got a piece of shell and was buried that night. If ever a hero lived he was one. I have one relic I prize. It is a German officer's

revolver. He was wounded; I pulled him to a bank, made him comfortable, and went to walk away. He shot at me, so I took it off him. I can't describe what it's like, but with all the hardships our men go through they always seem happy and cheerful. I've seen them lying in the firing line, killing Germans as fast as possible, and at the same time arguing the point about last Saturday's football matches, as cool as you like.

One morning a shell burst close to our trench. We all ducked, and got covered with mud and smoke, and one of them said: "All right, you wait till we've finished breakfast and had a fag, then we'll attend to you." That's the spirit the Englishman has. One instance of a narrow escape: A chap called Smith crawled over and asked me for a light. He was lighting his fag off mine when a bullet went through his head. He just said "Oh!" and rolled over dead. I must tell you a chap who left here yesterday was wounded 25 times, and we all counted the scars before he went away. His last words were: "Buck up, Jack, and I'll meet you in Berlin for Christmas dinner."

Another letter, written by a private in the 4th Middlesex Regiment, gives an exciting account of the British soldiers chasing the Germans back to the Aisne.

When we left Braine on the morning of September 12 we met the Germans again. They were waiting for us, and they started a big fight. We lined the hills over the river Aisne, and dug trenches all night. When we left Braine we marched about two miles and started fighting. It was all in the open here—or we were—and the Germans were on the hills.

As we advanced across the plain they shelled us awful from the hills. Of course, our artillery kept up a good bombardment to cover our advance, and at last we advanced close up to their position and made them retire over the river into Vailly. As we started pushing towards the bridge they blew it up. We brought our artillery nearer under shell fire, and bombarded them to keep them a bit quiet while our R.E.'s made a plank bridge for the infantry to walk across. All our brigade walked over into Vailly and had a bit of a street fight. We drove them out on to the hills and followed them to the ridges, where we stopped and dug trenches. It was now nine on Sunday night and raining. I was sent back into Braine to order our transport to advance up to the bridge with the food, and our men went back and carried supplies across for the next day.

At 12.30 on Monday morning I made a drop of tea in Vailly to warm me up, and dropped off to sleep under some straw. It was still raining when I got up about 3 a.m., and we went out to visit the trenches. At daybreak we caught it hot. The Germans must have had their guns in position and properly

hidden from sight days before, because they opened fire on us from all directions with howitzers and machine guns. We have been going it on and off ever since, night and day, but we have come off best each time, and I think we will always do the same. I am only waiting for the Germans to pack up. If we stop here for good they will have to give in, as they cannot keep it up. They have been living on the country, but they cannot live in one district for ever. At present we are having a couple of days' rest at a village, Courcelles, two miles east of Braine.

A private of the Worcestershire Regiment gives a vivid description of a fight in the darkness. One night whilst on picket duty the sound of suspicious movements was heard all along the front. A report was immediately sent back, but no sooner had it been made than a rustling was heard in the bushes close by. A challenge was given, but as there was no reply the order was given to fire. At once the advance guard of the enemy came rushing out of the darkness, but by this time the alarm had been given, and supports were quickly brought forward from the rear. The incidents that followed are best described in his own words:

In the camp a mile away the men were hastily being got under arms, and away on the left our artillery began to boom, and we could see shells bursting overhead. At the same time the Germans, probably realizing that the attempt at a surprise had failed, opened with their artillery along the whole front, and the searchlights began to play around us in all directions. The bright light served to show us what we wanted to know before retiring on the camp—the strength of the attacking force and its position.

We reckoned that there was at least a whole German army corps engaged, with endless bodies of cavalry and at least ten batteries of artillery, besides over 100 machine guns. From the moment we discovered the presence of the enemy's advance guard we had held them in check by infantry fire, but there was now no purpose to be served by staying where we were, so we cut across to our lines and fell in with our men in the trenches. The main German attack was close on our heels, but in the pitch darkness it was not always possible to see them, and for the greater part of the time we had to fire at sounds or simply lie there until they came close enough.

We had waited about half an hour or more without seeing anything where we were posted, but finally we saw coming out of the inky blackness a long line of white faces, and in response to the quick order we fired right into the line. It wavered for a moment or two, and part of it went down altogether, but soon it reformed and came right on, unmindful

of the hot fire we were pouring in at close range. Just 100 yards off, the first two lines of advancing Germans threw themselves flat on the earth. The first kept firing away at us and the second was fixing bayonets. Then the second fired and the first fixed bayonets. After that all ranks rose and made a rush for our lines. A deadly volley crashed into them as they came on, and then we just had time to fix bayonets and receive them. The force of their onslaught was so terrible that it hurled us back for some yards, but it was only temporary. We quickly steadied ourselves, and while they were standing still for a breather we hurled ourselves on them like fury. It was then I was wounded, but I know that we beat them back for good in that charge.

Many and various were the deeds of valour that were performed in this battle. Some received much deserved recognition, but many were done unknown except to a few. The story of how one man saved a regiment is told in a letter from a corporal in the Northumberland Fusiliers. He says:

We occupied an exposed position on the left of the Aisne, and one night we only escaped being wiped out by a mere chance, combined with as fine a deed of heroism as I have ever heard of. There was a man of the Manchester Regiment who was lying close to the German lines terribly wounded. He happened to overhear some conversation by some German soldiers, and, being familiar with the language, he gathered that they intended to attack the position we held that night. In spite of his wounds he decided to set out to warn us of the danger, and he started on the weary tramp of over five miles. He was under fire from the moment he got to his feet, but he stumbled along in spite of that, and soon got out of range. Later he ran into a patrol of Uhlans, but before they saw him he dropped to earth and shammed death. They passed without a sign, and he then resumed his weary journey. By this time the strain had told on him, and his wound began to bleed, marking his path towards our lines with thin red streaks. In the early morning, just half an hour before the time fixed for the German attack, he staggered into one of our advanced posts and managed to tell his story to the officer in charge before collapsing in a heap. Thanks to the information he gave we were ready for the Germans when they came, and beat them off; but his anxiety to warn us had cost him his life. The doctors said that the strain had been too much for him, and the next day he died.

The battle of the Aisne was a disappointment to the Allies, who failed to drive back the Germans as they had hoped. It left the German army firmly entrenched in the very heart of

France after very heavy casualties had been suffered by both sides. The British loss was 561 officers and 12,980 men, or more than one-fifth of the British force engaged; and it is quite certain that the French and German casualties were on the same scale. Some estimates place the German losses at a very high figure, but it is not probable that they were more than 25 or 30 per cent in excess of the Allied casualties.

The fighting convinced the Allied generals that heavy artillery must be provided on an ample scale, and steps were taken to supply it, though it was not for months that the Allies became equal to the Germans in this respect. Without heavy artillery and numerous machine guns, or without some such weapon as the tank, Joffre's only method of dislodging the Germans lay in working round their exposed flank. This was tried and failed, because the Germans extended that flank as fast as the Allies threatened it. Thus the Aisne positions remained intact almost to the very close of the war. The great plateau near Laon did not fall until October, 1918, when it was assailed on both front and flank.

As a military operation, the battle of the Aisne will remain remarkable in so far that the passage over the river was forced frontally without possibility of manœuvre. The Germans say that their whole theory of war demanded that they should retire to secure a long field of fire, leaving only a thin line to protect their front, but they have still to account for their failure to destroy the aqueduct at Bourg, without which passage it is unlikely that the British would have been able to maintain their positions on the north bank. Certainly if the guns had not been able to use this passage Sir Douglas Haig would have been far more hampered in his attack on the Chemin des Dames.

Summing up one or two real advantages which were gained by the British troops in the way of military experience it may be repeated that it was during this battle that they first learnt the value of careful and conscientious entrenchment. They learnt also to rely still further on their marksmanship, and the days of battle were also very valuable in affording an opportunity of absorbing new drafts by already hardened officers under conditions of active warfare. It was not, however, only the troops in the front line who were beginning at this time to learn valuable lessons in the school of hard experience.

Sir John French afterwards acknowledged that it was at this

time that he began to realize the changing character of the war and the necessity of adapting his strategy to hitherto inexperienced conditions. He wrote:

> As day by day the trench fighting developed and I came to realize more and more the much greater relative power which modern weapons have given to the defence; as new methods were adopted in the defensive use of machine guns; and as unfamiliar weapons in the shape of trench mortars and bombs, hand grenades, etc., began to appear on the battlefield, so, day by day, I began dimly to apprehend what the future might have in store for us. This drastic process of education gradually went on . . . Presently came Maunoury's great effort to turn the German right flank. I witnessed one day of this fighting myself with General Maunoury and came back hopeful; alas, those hopes were not fulfilled. Afterwards we witnessed the stupendous efforts of de Castelnau and Foch, but all ended in the same trench! trench! trench!

In a praiseworthy spirit of confession Sir John French concludes his summary:

> I finished my part in the battle of the Aisne, however, unconverted, and it required the further and more bitter lesson of my own failure in the north to pass the Lys river during the last days of October, to bring home to my mind a principle in warfare of to-day which I have held ever since, namely, that given forces fairly equally matched, you can bend, but you cannot break your enemy's trench line.

The British commander-in-chief's comments on the battle of the Aisne contain little further to illuminate the bare record of its events, but he does tell one story, which every soldier must recognize as bearing the hall-mark of truth. A somewhat significant and rather amusing example of Haig's power of resource, he says, was shown on the 19th, when he arranged with the Zouaves on his right to give them 10,000 rations of bully beef in exchange for the loan of two heavy guns.

CHAPTER 19

The German Campaign in Poland

HINDENBURG lost no time in following up his victory of Tannenberg. The remnant of Samsonoff's army fled across the frontier towards the Narev, and with his main forces Hindenburg turned his attention to Rennenkampf's army massed around and to the west of Königsberg. Immediately after hearing of Samsonoff's defeat, Rennenkampf abandoned his attempt to take Königsberg and began to withdraw his army towards the Niemen. Hindenburg was hot on his heels, and Rennenkampf was forced to fight a rearguard action at Gumbinnen, where only a short time before he had heavily defeated the Germans.

By September 15 Rennenkampf had retreated 60 miles, and was back on Russian territory. Rallying all the forces available in East Prussia Hindenburg advanced into Russian Poland and on September 12 defeated a Russian reserve army sent out from Grodno to oppose him. The left wing of this army marched on in the direction of Kovno on the Niemen, whither Rennenkampf was retiring; its centre moved towards Suvalki and Druskeniki, the latter also on the Niemen; and its right went on from Lyck towards Augustow and Osoviec on the Bobra. In the last-named area and northwards to Suvalki the terrain was a continuation of the Masurian Lakes district.

After its defeat the Russian reserve army retreated from Lyck through Grajevo to the line of the Bobra, and made a second stand against the Germans at Augustow about September 14-15, but was again defeated. This action was in reality nothing more than a stiff rearguard action, the purpose of the Russians being to give sufficient time for the concentration of their main forces behind the Niemen. Pressing their advantage, the Germans occupied Suvalki on September 15, 1914. By September 23-25 Rennenkampf was across the Niemen, where his army was refitted. By September 25 the Germans were laying siege to Osoviec, and higher up were struggling to cross the Niemen. No attempt was made by the Russians to counter Hindenburg's

attack on the Warsaw-St. Petersburg railway line and recover the ground lost in Prussia. Instead, the chief of staff sent up another army to hold the line of the Niemen and Bobr rivers, and there retain Hindenburg as long as he cared to continue attempting vainly to break through. Russia, in short, began that process of stonewalling every German and Austro-German attack which marked her strategy all through the winter and into the spring.

Remarkable as was the talent for war of Hindenburg, he was powerless to make any progress against the new scheme of operations which the Russian chief of staff rapidly organized on the Niemen and Bobr river fronts. General Rennenkampf extricated his troops at Stallupöhnen by the end of September and withdrew towards Kovno. But this withdrawal was only a feint. The Russian commander only moved two miles from the German frontier in order to get into touch with a large reinforcement awaiting him. Then he swung back with a force as heavy and unexpected as that with which Hindenburg had orginally swung forward. The German tried to hold the Russians in the north and to counter at three distant points farther south. He sent one strong army through the forest of Augustow, a second still stronger force against Osoviec, and a third unusually large force was concentrated at Mlava, to the north of Warsaw.

The new battle began about the end of September on a front of about two hundred miles. It extended from the point at which the Niemen enters Prussia to the point at which the Ukra river, a tributary of the Narev, flows out of the district of Plock. All along this line of attack the Warsaw-St. Petersburg railway line continued to occupy the mind of Hindenburg. In the northern section, amid the woods and swamps of the Suvalki government, Rennenkampf turned on his pursuer with a terrible surprise for him. His Cossack forces had been sadly wanting in artillery power, but they were now provided, not only with an abundance of ordinary field artillery, but with heavy siege guns from Kovno.

The German Landwehr and Landsturm troops were lured, in close formation, to attack the entrenched Cossacks close to the concealed positions of the new guns. At the same time Russian aviators, working with their gunners, reconnoitred for advancing columns of German supports behind the attacking line. Then the unexpected bombardment began. The Germans broke and fled, with shrapnel bursting over them for eight miles of

their flight. The light German field artillery which Hindenburg used in this section of the lake country was completely overmastered by the heavy Russian guns, which had taken a week or more to haul into position in the arranged ambush.

As the guns cleared their path, the Cossacks, heading their reinforcements, drove again towards the hostile frontier. The hottest fighting took place on September 30 and October 1 at Mariampol and Kalvaria. Here the Germans were driven back two days' march nearer their own country than they had been at the beginning of the week. Their retreat was conducted in a heavy rainstorm, which, in the marshy country, made the worst possible conditions for fighting against men so practised in guerilla methods of warfare as the Cossacks. In spite, however, of the adverse conditions, Hindenburg held on desperately to the important town of Suvalki by reason of its railway connexions north and south with the Warsaw line. But dearly did he pay for his unwillingness to admit the defeat of his plans.

South of Suvalki was the great dense forest of Augustow, a primeval waste of lakelets and morasses. There were no roads, but only a few narrow winding passages, running between water and bog, with all the approaches screened by the autumnal foliage of brushwood and trees. Only a few hundred Russian woodsmen knew the way through this wilderness.

Led by the woodsmen, the Cossacks and their artillerymen with light guns threaded the unmapped forests where the Germans had entrenched on the principal paths. This was the sort of fighting the Cossack liked. By woodcraft and scouting tactics he quietly discovered the enemy's positions. The Russian guns were hauled up and trained on the forest defences, while companies of Cossacks worked round by unknown ways and got on the flank and rear of the enemy. They were Don Cossacks, men who reckoned themselves the flower of the Russian forces. They were opposed by four or five times the number of Germans; but these were mostly Landwehr and Landsturm men, the latter being often either 17 to 18 years old or over 40. Many of them were armed with obsolete rifles, and they had only had a few weeks' musketry practice before they were entrained for the defence of East Prussia.

Mile by mile the Cossacks worked through the forests, avoiding the easy known paths in their advance, and ambushing rearguard after rearguard, bivouac after bivouac. It was hard, slow

work, scouting for the enemy and encircling him, but the actual fighting was fairly easy. By the end of the first week in October the Don Cossacks had reached the village of Raczka, close to the German border. The river separated them from the forest where a brigade of German troops had retired, with two batteries of guns and eight armoured motor-cars.

In the night the Cossacks swam the river on horseback, and made a turning movement against the hostile brigade, and then at daybreak they charged into their lines at the rear. They took three thousand prisoners, together with the batteries and all the armoured cars. This left a breach in the defences of the German frontier, and the Cossacks, sweeping over the border, seized the German town of Biala on October 7. Three days afterwards the more important town of Lyck was captured by General Rennenkampf, by an outflanking movement on both sides of a German force to the north, which had held too long on to Suvalki.

Meanwhile, the principal German attack was directed against the fortress of Osoviec, and the Kaiser had travelled to the eastern front to be present at its fall. It was not successful. The Germans advanced by a single narrow road running alongside the railway line, with marshes on either hand. They posted their heavy artillery about five miles from the chain of forts, and their infantry entrenched some three miles closer to the threatened fortress. For four days the forts were bombarded night and day by 11 in. and 12 in. howitzers, but without avail. Russian fortress engineers had had experience at Port Arthur, and they had not designed Osoviec in the manner of Liége, Namur, and Maubeuge. The fortress was little damaged by the thousands of great shells hurled at it, and the Russian commander patiently waited until all the German forces available for the operations were concentrated against him, and comfortably entrenched and sited.

He knew exactly what was happening. For a Russian artillery officer, Colonel Martinoff, was hidden with a telephone near the German lines, watching all their movements and directing the artillery fire of the fortress. When everything was ripe for the Russian counter-move, the colonel, who had not slept for eighty hours, telephoned his final observations. In the darkness of night, in a violent downpour of rain, two strong columns of Russian infantry advanced into the swamp on either side of the

road held by the Germans. Guided by shepherds, who used the dry parts of the morasses as pastures, the soldiers picked their way over the winding track of firm land. When daylight came they were well on the flank of the enemy, but still hidden from observation. As they moved out to attack, a force of Russian cavalry crossed the bridge over the Bobr river at Osoviec and, gathering speed as they went through the town, swept between their own forts and charged the German guns.

In the confusion caused by the flanking infantry attack the Russian horsemen got halfway to the guns before the German foot soldiers were ready to oppose them. Meanwhile, the alarmed gunners tried to shatter the charging squadrons. But a siege gun is not a rifle. It takes some time to alter its range. The first salvo of shells flew over the Cossacks. The second salvo was aimed too hurriedly, and fell short. By this time the Cossacks were fully halfway to the batteries. The hostile artillerymen did not try a third salvo, but bent all their energies to getting their guns safely away by motor traction. Their infantry moved forward to hold off the cavalry. But it was too late. For the two flanking Russian infantry movements culminated at this minute as the Russian cavalry reached the foremost guns. Three pieces of ordnance were captured, and the force sent to defend the guns was killed or taken.

Then, breaking through this rearguard, the Cossacks swept for ten miles along the road, overtaking the motor vehicles with the guns and limbers, with casualties remarkably few. The two flanking infantry attacks across the swamps shattered the nerve of the Germans. Their gunners, with a five-mile field of fire to work over, could not place one shell or case-shot amid the advancing squadrons. In all some forty heavy guns, and a far larger number of light quick-firers and machine guns, were taken on the East Prussian front between October 1 and October 7. The battle of Augustow began on September 25 and ended on October 4. The siege of Osoviec began on September 26 and ended on October 1. An attempt to pierce the Niemen defences at Druskeniki, eastward of the town of Suvalki, was made on September 26th, but it failed, too. In less than a week the victorious Russian forces were again operating in East Prussia.

Thus, in spite of the preliminary success of Hindenburg at Tannenberg against the wing of the Russian invading force, he had not been able to save his country from invasion. He had

come up against the Russians with numbers, railways and artillery in his favour, but he had had to give ground in his own country before the new victorious advance of his opponents.

At this point it is necessary to glance at the whole position on the eastern front, for in the mighty conflict between Russia and the Central Powers the campaigns in East Prussia, in Galicia and on the frontier between Russian Poland and Prussia were closely interconnected. As has been shown in an earlier chapter the Russian armies had had great successes in Galicia. Jaroslav had been taken, and siege was being laid to the great key-fortress of Przemysl. Hindenburg, after his success at Tannenberg, had been given the supreme command of both the German and Austrian armies in the eastern field of war. To relieve the situation both in Galicia and in East Prussia a great counter-stroke was necessary, and this was soon arranged. Hindenburg's plan was to advance in force into Russian Poland making its capital, Warsaw, his objective.

By the first week in October Hindenburg had a million and a quarter men on the Polish front, with a quarter of a million Austrian troops immediately joining with them in front of Cracow. Fully another million of Austrian and Hungarian effectives were working against the Russian lines on the Galician battle-front, concentrating towards the upper course of the Vistula and the San rivers. But it was necessary to check the Russian pressure on both flanks. The obvious answer was a strong thrust against the Russian centre in Poland.

Against this centre the Germans had, in fact, concentrated at the opening of the war. They had crossed the border and had captured Czestochowa and Kalisz, and entrenched along the Warta river. Their position formed a long flat curve in Russian territory menacing Warsaw and Ivangorod. The Russian commander had only about 60,000 men operating in the rolling Polish plain—an immense region dappled and belted with forests, scantily provided with good roads, and served only by few railways. The Russian horsemen, with their infantry and light artillery supports, were little more than a reconnoitring and patrolling force, in just sufficient strength to discover any serious forward movement by the enemy. The Russian general staff, indeed, deliberately left its line weak and yielding immediately in front of the main German armies. And the pressure that the Russians exerted on both their enemy's wings was also

Alice Hughes

COMMANDER OF THE GRAND FLEET. When war became inevitable Sir John Jellicoe, later 1st Earl Jellicoe, was second sea lord and vice-admiral in rank. He was ordered to Scapa Flow, the Grand Fleet base, and there received his appointment as commander-in-chief, August 4, 1914. It had previously been arranged that this post should be given to him in the event of war. Jellicoe commanded the British naval forces until November, 1916, when he became first sea lord.

The battle cruiser Australia was the flagship of the Royal Australian Navy It served with the Grand Fleet in the War, rendering splendid service.

The British light cruiser Amphion, which, after helping to sink the German minelayer Konigin Luise, August 5, 1914, was mined and sunk on August 6

Cribb Southsea.

The light cruiser Birmingham was completed in 1914. She won renown by sinking the first German submarine in the war, on August 9.

SHIPS OF NOTE IN THE EARLY DAYS OF WAR

designed to induce the Germans to take the line of least resistance, and to attack from their centre in Poland.

So when Hindenburg advanced the Russian staff was in a great measure prepared. The fact was, the Russians could not afford to attack the Germans on the Warta entrenchments. The Russian railway lines from Warsaw and Ivangorod were not sufficiently developed to supply a Russian army operating near the German frontier. In particular, there was no cross-country railway running parallel with the frontier by which the Russians could shift their troops swiftly and thus concentrate them for a series of feints and frontal attacks. The Germans, on the other hand, had two parallel railway systems running close to the Russian frontier. These railways were designed by the elder Moltke for the purpose of a border campaign with Russia. As a consequence the Grand Duke Nicholas refused to fight near the German frontier railways. He kept his main armies nearly a hundred and forty miles east of Moltke's battle railways. He left all Poland up to Warsaw and Ivangorod open to the enemy, merely occupying the country with reconnoitring forces based on the two Polish railway systems in the bend of the Vistula.

All this was known to Hindenburg. The manner in which he dealt with the situation is a fair measure of his powers. He made a remarkably swift attack, and so far provided against possible defeat that when he was defeated he got away without losing any large number of guns. Russia, six weeks after mobilization, could not put into the field sufficient armed men to win the full advantage of her superior strategical position. She had large numbers of fairly well-trained troops waiting for rifles, artillery and munitions. The Siberian railway formed the line of communication with ordnance works and ammunition factories in Japan and the United States. But it was choked with troops and Russian stores, and before American material reached it this material had to cross the American continent and the Pacific Ocean.

From Memel on the Baltic to Czernovitz near the Rumanian border the Russians had to hold a front of about eleven hundred miles against the two Central Empires. At any point along this immense line there was the constant danger of an unexpected concentration in overwhelming force by the enemy. The wonder is not that the Russians did not advance, but that they were able to hold on to their recovered province of Galicia,

and to compel Hindenburg to attack them at the time and place that they selected. In his first Warsaw campaign Hindenburg divided his forces into four groups. The first army, formed of men drawn from East Prussia, worked up from Thorn, by the left bank of the Vistula. The second came from Kalisz and moved eastward through Lodz. These two armies concentrated against Warsaw. The third army, starting from Breslau, passed through Czestochowa, and, following the southern bank of the the Pilica river, turned towards the Ivangorod region. The fourth army, consisting of Austrians and Germans based on Cracow, moved up towards Kielce and Radom, and advanced north-eastward by the left bank of the Vistula.

Up till October 3 the movement was a strategic deployment rather than an offensive attack. At this date Hindenburg's main forces occupied a line running through Kutno, Lodz, Petrokov and Kielce. This was rather more than halfway between the German frontier and the Russian positions on the Vistula. At this time the German offensive movement against the right Russian flank on the Niemen was being defeated. But, as the Russian commander knew, his victory on his right wing denoted a withdrawal of the enemy's force for a stupendous attack against his centre. There then arose a ticklish problem for the Russian staff. They had to foresee the point at which Hindenburg would hurl his main force. Would he try to cross the Vistula by the bridge at Warsaw or by the bridge at Ivangorod? At one place there would be a strong demonstration; at the other a long and desperate battle, where Hindenburg would launch some three-quarters of a million men on a wide front, strongly supported by artillery.

A victory at Ivangorod would be the more decisive; it would give a larger range for future operations against the Russian forces, and allow a turning movement against Warsaw, and another against the Russian position southward in Galicia. For this and other reasons the Russian staff decided rightly that Ivangorod would be the critical point in their line of defence. But the trouble was that the troops which they were withdrawing from the Niemen front, in answer to the similar withdrawal of Hindenburg from this part of the battlefield, were collecting at Warsaw. This was their nearest point of concentration, and as the light railway between Warsaw and Ivangorod was heavily loaded with war traffic, the new

reinforcement would have to march for a week to get into action at the decisive spot.

Hindenburg's forces made slow but methodical progress towards Warsaw. As they advanced they constructed new roads; they laid causeways able to carry heavy artillery across the marshes; they even altered the gauge of the railways to accommodate their own rolling-stock. Already in Warsaw there were signs of the coming German advance. German aeroplanes and dirigibles dropped bombs on the city to terrify the people. The bombs were followed by showers of leaflets promising the inhabitants deliverance from the Russian yoke.

But the cosmopolitan population of Warsaw became panic-stricken at the first signs of an approaching enemy. A great flight towards Moscow began. It appeared to the people of Warsaw and also to Hindenburg that Warsaw was left practically without defence. But while the people of Warsaw had been leaving the city, the Grand Duke Nicholas had been collecting behind it the Siberian army, strengthened by Japanese guns. The evacuation of Warsaw by the civilian population was known to Hindenburg, but he was unaware of the strength of the Siberian army which the Grand Duke Nicholas had assembled. Hindenburg assumed that the Russian forces defending Warsaw had been sent to assist in the defence of Ivangorod, and he accordingly weakened his main force operating against Ivangorod in order to make an attempt to carry Warsaw by storm. He began his attack upon Warsaw with a quarter of a million men on Sunday, October 11. The weak Russian advance guard fell back, continually fighting, between the Vistula and the northern bank of its tributary, the Pilica. The Russian force was first composed of masses of cavalry, supported by infantry detachments; but at every stand they made the infantry and artillery power increased, especially on their northern wing.

The enemy, however, was always thrusting forward with remarkable impetuosity to find the weak section in the Russian line. This section they discovered far away from Warsaw, by the northern bank of the Pilica. Here they drove in till they passed the town of Yarka, and reached the Vistula at the point where the Pilica flows into it. It was rainy weather ; the roads were in a terrible state ; the rivers were in flood and their valleys turned into morasses. It was not a river but a great lake to which the German army was allowed to penetrate. There it was

permitted to rest, while the decision was being fought out round Warsaw—some days' march northward. There, backed by a converging system of railways and with the only bridge across the river in his hands, the Russian commander played with the enemy; for on his right was Novo Georgievsk, one of the strongest fortresses in Russia, worth an army for the support it gave to the right flank of the Russians.

The Russian advance guard continued to retire till its lines swung back a few miles from Warsaw. It entrenched at just sufficient distance from the city to prevent the large German field guns from bombarding the Polish capital. The Russian artillery had already been sited in sufficient number and power to engage on at least equal terms the guns which the Germans were hauling forward. As the Germans brought up their guns and their ten or eleven infantry divisions, there was a remarkable hardening of the Russian resistance. Every night large bodies of the Siberian army crossed the Vistula bridge and took up their positions in the trenches. The Germans were never allowed to slacken in their attack. If they tried to do so, there followed a tremendous infantry charge against their positions, which compelled them to counter-attack with all available forces. For eight days the windows of Warsaw rattled with the concussion of artillery fire, and the thunder of the neighbouring batteries rolled over the city.

The Russians made their first attack in the middle of October. This brought the Germans out of their trenches in massed formation on Saturday and Sunday, October 17 and 18. Swept by shrapnel, mowed down by rifle fire, and at last driven in by the bayonets of the Siberian troops, the Germans fell back. To strengthen their lines before Warsaw, their commander was obliged to call in part of the army corps resting on the Pilica and the Vistula. He did this on the night of Monday, October 19. About the same time a very strong Russian column marched south along the right bank of the Vistula, while the Germans were marching north on the left bank. The Russian column reached Goura-Kalvaria, a little more than half-way between Warsaw and the Pilica river. Bringing up guns to dominate the crossing of the broad, swirling waters of the Vistula, the troops made a pontoon bridge on Monday night, October 19. On Tuesday morning men and guns crossed the river and attacked the weakened wing of the German northern army. At the same

time another Russian column was sweeping northward round by Novo Georgievsk, and was seriously menacing the right wing of the German army.

The effect of these two movements was to bring the German attack upon Warsaw to an abrupt end; for on the night of October 20 the enemy began to evacuate his position on the Goura-Kalvaria front, and to prepare a general retirement. The elaborate scheme of fortifications, intended to hold the Russians across the Vistula during the winter campaign, was abandoned without a struggle. All that the German commander then hoped and worked for was to get his army back to his own frontier with little loss. He buried many guns and stores of shells as he withdrew. But he could not avoid terrible losses in men, for the Siberians were as deadly in attack as they were in defence. And as the Russian artillery thoroughly prepared the ground for them, they worked forward very quickly.

Two German army corps—the 17th and 18th—tried to make a stand at the villages of Bloni and Pasechno, the first 16 miles west of Warsaw and the second 12 miles south of it. There were 60,000 German bayonets holding the two villages, and fed and munitioned by the railway from Skernievice. But the Siberians got on their left flank, operating from the fortress of Novo Georgievsk. There was only one way for the German commander to prevent his retreat from becoming a rout. He had to throw out continually strong rearguards to enable his heavy guns to be buried or got away before the Cossack horsemen got in front of the batteries. In fact, half the northern German army had to be sacrificed to save the other half and the guns. For the Russians were in such force, and were moving so quickly over the rolling prairies and forests, that a continual enveloping movement went on against each German rearguard.

Every village which the Germans tried to hold was shattered by the light field artillery of the pursuers. And while the shells were falling, the Russians—infantry in the centre and horse at the flanks—advanced, and began to lock round the smaller hostile force. It was something more than a retreat and something less than a rout. It was a race for the German entrenchments on the Warta. There were many places where German sappers prepared extremely elaborate positions along the ridges of the rolling country, with deep trenches, abatis of felled forest trees, and gun sites with a clear sweep for fire as far as field

artillery could carry. Yet the rearguard did not stay one day at many of these points. At the first threat of an outflanking movement they fled to save the guns.

The general method of the Russians in these rearguard actions could be studied at the little Polish city of Skernievice. On a ridge six and a half miles from the town were the German fortified lines; they had been abandoned without a struggle. Half a day's march farther west was another ridge near a forest. A Russian infantry brigade crept forward under the cover of its guns, took the forest at the point of the bayonet, and then turned the German trenches. The victorious troops rested for a day on the field they had won, while another brigade took up the pursuit, with the Russian cavalry spread out before it. In this way each Russian attack was made by fresh bodies of soldiers always on the march. At the same time the more fatigued, victorious brigades and divisions also advanced after a brief rest, in case the enemy should attempt a general stand. But this the Germans did not do, and by the end of October the Cossacks were threatening the frontier of German Poland.

While the northern German army was thus being defeated and pursued from Warsaw to the Warta, the main central German force attacked Ivangorod. The general situation was very interesting. Swift and overwhelming as had been the defeat of the German northern wing before Warsaw, this did not bring about the retirement of the whole German front. The stronger central army of invasion, massed against Ivangorod, still hoped to retrieve the situation by forcing the passage of the Vistula and wedging itself between the Russian lines.

In this part of the field the Russian troops were commanded by General Russky, the victor of Lemberg. His army held more than 150 miles of the winding course of the Vistula, from the point where the Pilica falls into it to the point where the Kamienna flows into the great river near Jozefov. These geographical details are of vital importance, for the distance from Russky's left wing to the battlefield of Warsaw was equal to seven days' hard marching. That is to say, Hindenburg had a week's grace in his operations round Ivangorod, in which he could attempt to force the Vistula with no fear of any attack on his rear by part of the conquering Russian force from the Warsaw section. If Hindenburg won, the retreat of his northern wing would be an affair of no importance. He would still be master

of the whole of Russian Poland, Warsaw being his to take when he liked to concentrate upon it, and the Russians of the southern reaches of the Vistula and the San rivers would be at his mercy.

As a matter of fact, a strong Russian column had set out from Warsaw to reinforce General Russky's army. Marching through the rain and mud at an amazing speed, it came up at the critical point in the central battle, and took the enemy by surprise. An unparalleled vigour of movement in bad weather over bad roads enabled this column to beat Hindenburg at his own game of unexpectedly swift concentration. But whereas the Germans relied on the handling of railways in these strategic feats, the Russians trusted to their feet. It was their physique that enabled them to get the winning move.

Meanwhile, the battle for the central Vistula was conditioned by the dense forests in this region. There were only three large open spaces of nearly level country available for army operations with a clear field for gun fire. The chief of these open spaces was the plain of Kozienice, running 14 miles along the Vistula, with a breadth of less than six miles. It was about a day's march from Ivangorod. Beyond it, in the direction of Warsaw, was the open space of Glovachev, with a clear battle-plain 15 miles long by ten miles broad. Then south of Ivangorod was the open space of Politchna. In all three heavy Russian guns were placed on the opposite side of the Vistula, while troops entrenched on the plains to hold back the enemy. The Germans moved forward under the cover of the forests on the southern bank of the Pilica. They occupied the town of Glovachev and the larger town of Radom, and deployed until their forces formed a mighty semicircle round Ivangorod. Their intention was to clear the plains of Glovachev and Kozienice of Russian troops, and then to force the passage of the Vistula at these points and envelop Ivangorod from the north, while making also a frontal attack and a southern enveloping movement from Radom. Here the open space of Politchna by the Vistula was the principal scene of struggle.

The battle opened with a series of small successes for the Germans. Each of the three open spaces was held by only small bodies of Russian troops, the main defending armies being drawn up on the other side of the great river. The idea was to hold the open spaces as bridge-heads, where the principal Russian forces could cross by pontoons when the army of invasion had

been forced to reveal its attacking dispositions and had been shaken by bombardments from the numerous concealed Russian batteries firing over the river. But small though the Russian advanced bodies were, they did not act passively and simply wait to be attacked. In all the forest paths there were fierce and desperate encounters with each thrusting wedge of Hindenburg's armies. With machine guns, rifle, and bayonet the Russians continually kept the enemy off, until the Germans brought up their field guns and shelled the Russians out of their positions.

Then at Kozienice the Russian troops entrenched and the battle was joined. The small line of advanced troops became a bait to the mighty attacking force, and for nearly 14 days it had to fight against a continual bombardment of shells, varied by infantry attacks in dense, deep lines. But about October 22 reinforcements began to arrive from the opposite bank of the Vistula. The resisting Russian line lengthened out and thickened, and began to threaten a flank attack on the enemy. The Germans retired from the open space into the forest, which was so dense with trees and underwood that a man could hardly see 50 feet around him. In this jungle the Germans had about 42 guns to the mile, and every possible path was defended by rifle pits, with machine guns and abatis defences.

The Russian artillery was no longer able to support its infantry, as it was only wasting shell and shrapnel to search for the hostile positions. The Russian commander could only send his foot soldiers into the forest to drive the enemy out with the bayonet. Day after day brigade after brigade of Russians entered the tangle of trees and vanished from sight. Companies, battalions, regiments lost touch with each other, and in places brigade was cut off from brigade. Few Russian colonels there knew what was going on anywhere, except in the patch of ground on which their men were fighting. But every Russian knew that the only thing required of him was to push the enemy out. This he did yard by yard, and hour by hour, in fierce hand-to-hand struggles. It was a soldiers' battle, won by bullet and bayonet—mainly the bayonet.

The Germans left 16,000 of their dead in the woods and thickets of Kozienice when they broke and fled on October 26. On this day the German retreat from Ivangorod was general. At Glovachev their 20th army corps and reserve corps of the Guards were defeated and driven along the southern bank of the Pilica.

In the centre the Russians carried the forest villages at the bayonet point. At Politchna, on the left wing, the enemy's defences were stormed, thousands of prisoners were taken with many guns, and the invading army thrown back to Radom.

In his withdrawal from Poland Hindenburg had laid the country waste. Railways and the roads which his armies had constructed were destroyed. It was impossible for the Russians to follow up his retreat with any considerable forces. West Poland was, for the time being, a no-man's-land. But to the Grand Duke Nicholas Cracow was an irresistible bait. It was an alternative line to that through Posen for a march upon Berlin. His plan was to make a vigorous thrust at Cracow and at the same time to hold Hindenburg's centre. In the middle of November the Grand Duke Nicholas realized that Hindenburg was preparing a counter-stroke. For this offensive armies estimated at 2,000,000 men, and predominantly German, had been assembled, the chief concentration being at Thorn, whence two armies, commanded by Morgen and Mackensen respectively, advanced into Poland by the railway south of the Vistula.

But the Russians continued their push towards Cracow. Already the cavalry was within 20 miles of the city ; by the beginning of December they were in its outskirts. Until this moment Hindenburg had depended upon his advance into Poland to relieve the pressure upon Cracow. Now it became evident that the Austrians must help themselves, and between December 8 and 12 they forced two passes of the Carpathians and began to pour troops through them to relieve Cracow. The Russians were obliged to retire, and the advance upon Cracow was checked.

In the north the German armies were gradually driving back the Russian forces, and on December 7 the second battle for Warsaw began and continued until December 24. Against the German onslaught the retreating Russians gradually entrenched themselves in a line from the Lower Vistula along the east bank of the Bzura to Tarnow. The Germans were within 35 miles of Warsaw, but the Polish winter was making itself felt. The movement of troops became increasingly difficult, and in the east, as had already happened in the west, there was a deadlock between the armies.

While Russia was attacking Galicia from the east and defending Poland, it was necessary for her to guard other portions of her eastern frontier. From Russian Poland it extended south,

touching Bohemia and, nearer the Black Sea, Rumania. The Bohemian frontier had to be held while Brusiloff was marching on Lemberg from Kiev; if Rumania joined the Allies it was important that her communications with Russia should be kept open. The Russian frontiers to Galicia and Rumania extended to the northern shores of the Black Sea. On the eastern shores of the Black Sea was the Caucasus, bounded on the south by Turkey in Europe, on the east by the Caspian Sea, while to the north of the Caspian Sea the Russian frontier met Persia.

On his march southward from Kiev towards Lemberg, Brusiloff, after taking Tarnopol, detached a part of his force to move southwards into the Bukovina. In his general advance Brusiloff's army occupied Czernowitz on September 15, having five days before seized Kolomea on the railway running through the Bukovina to Jassy, the key to the Bukovina in the west. His cavalry then crossed the Pruth from Czernowitz and overran the Bukovina to the foothills of the Carpathians.

In October the Austrian resistance stiffened, and the Russians withdrew from the Bukovina before superior Austrian forces advancing from the Kirlibaba Pass. Later in the autumn, after their victories in Galicia, the Austrians reoccupied Czernowitz and most of the Bukovina. Besides Austria Russia had Turkey to deal with. In October, 1914, without declaring war on Russia, Turkish warships had destroyed Russian ships in the Black Sea and bombarded Odessa. Turkey's neutrality was only half-hearted. German war material and German gold had been poured into the country. A German general, Liman von Sanders, became military adviser to the Porte, and the army was mobilised.

Apart from action in the Black Sea, the inevitable theatre of war was the mountainous region of the Caucasus. Strategically the frontier could be turned through Persia by either combatant. Militarily Persia was negligible, and in Azerbeijan, her north-west province, both had small forces before hostilities began—the Russians at Tabriz and the Turks in the Lake Urmia (Urumiah) district. Several roads led across the mountains, that from Erzerum through Sarikamish to Kars being the only good one. From Sarikamish a railway ran through Kars to Tiflis, where it connected with the Batum-Baku line; the rest of the route was an old caravan road, which passed west to Erzingan and Sivas, and from Erzingan north to Trebizond.

Urged on by Germany the Turks immediately prepared to advance into the Caucasus, though the difficulties confronting them in a winter campaign were great. The Turks managed to mobilize between Erzerum and Van an army consisting of eight Nizam divisions and eight Redif divisions. The mobilisation was incomplete owing to the difficulties of transport and communication and to the disinclination of 50 per cent. of the men to answer the summons. The exact numbers mustered are not known, but eventually three armies were formed, each consisting of two Nizam divisions and one composite Redif division, and numbering about 55,000 men each. The remainder of this group of divisions, mustering about 15,000 of the Nizam and 25,000 of the Redif, were retained at Erzerum and used on the lines of communication. The plan of the campaign was to advance simultaneously upon the Russian frontier in two columns, a third column being retained two days' march in rear to act as a general reserve.

The Russians, out of an available Caucasian army of 750,000 men, contented themselves with pushing up 100,000 men, commanded by the viceroy of the Caucasus, with Judenitch as his chief of staff, towards the passes and awaiting the results of the Turkish offensive. The two Turkish columns had been timed to advance simultaneously over an exceedingly difficult country where already, in November, the snow lay thick on the uplands. The Turks advanced towards Sarikamish, north of which lay Kars, their objective. Their 11th army corps drove the Russians back from Koprikoi to Khorosan, and held them there, while their 9th and 10th army corps tried to take their opponents in flank and rear and envelop them from Olti, north-west of Sarikamish.

Both season and terrain were decidedly unfavourable to this bold strategical plan. It was the depth of winter, and passes across the mountains, which rise to a height of 10,000 feet, had to be negotiated, yet the Turks succeeded in taking both Ardahan and Sarikamish. They had, however, been unable to move their heavy artillery, and their slow progress gave time for reinforcements and guns to be brought up by the Russians.

At Sarikamish the battle began on December 25, 1914, and lasted till January 3, 1915. In its first stages the Turks took the town and a small part of the railway, the Russians falling back until they were reinforced, when they counter-attacked,

compelled the 9th corps to surrender, and forced the 10th corps to retreat with heavy losses. The 11th corps, to cover this retreat, advanced from Khorasan to Kara Urgan, but was heavily defeated by January 17. In the north the Russians recaptured Ardahan on January 2, and the whole Turkish offensive collapsed. Meanwhile, a subsidiary Turkish column, disregarding international rights, had invaded north-western Persia and entered Tabriz. When the general Turkish retreat set in, a Russian cavalry force marched on Tabriz and, with very little difficulty, drove the Turkish invaders before them, being assisted thereto by the Persian mountain robbers of the vicinity, who joined in the pillage of the convoys and transports which the Turks were obliged to abandon in their retreat.

CHAPTER 20

The Neutral Nations

By the middle of September the progress and steadfastness of the Allies in both theatres of war began to affect the position of many neutral Powers of the world. Some of these were neutral either from inclination or disinterestedness. Others were so from fear of the consequences of siding with either of the leagues of warring nations. Some were decided for action, but irresolute about the date when they would begin hostilities.

Turkey had practically been won over by Germany, and was only manœuvring to draw all the sympathies of Mohammedans with her. The so-called party of union and progress in the Ottoman empire had degenerated into a strong-handed clique of military adventurers, headed by Enver. Apparently one of the chief designs of Enver was to obtain a fighting alliance with the Bulgarians, who had beaten him in the Balkan War, and to induce the Rumanians to remain at least neutral while Bulgaria attacked Serbia in flank, and Turkey used her European army to defeat and destroy the Greeks. This plan of action had been sketched out by the Austrians, who had already shown in the second Balkan War their weak grasp of realities by egging on and backing Bulgaria in a vain struggle for dominion against the Serbians and the Greeks.

BULGARIA HESITATES

Bulgaria, defeated and dispossessed of territory by the combined action of Serbia, Greece, and Rumania in the second Balkan War, still remained sore and sullen and somewhat vindictive. But her ruler, Ferdinand, was resolved not to make another grave mistake. Had he but acted fairly in the division of spoil between the Balkan allies after the successful war against Turkey, it might be argued, there might have been no Great War in 1914. For with Serbia supported by her Balkan allies and less directly by Russia, France, and Britain, there would have been no Balkan problem for the Austrians and Hungarians to settle by a punitive expedition.

During the first month of the war the tsar of Bulgaria and his ministers showed as much favour to the German cause as they dared. They prevented Russia towards the middle of September from sending ammunition supplies to the pressed Serbians. At times they publicly expressed the desire to see the triumph of German and Austrian arms. By the end of the month, however, the attitude of the Bulgarian governing class had changed. The series of victories won by Russian generals over all the first-line troops of Austria-Hungary made the Bulgarian government rather anxious about its own position in regard to Russia. Bulgaria, broken by two recent wars, would lie at the mercy of the great victorious Power that it had begun to offend seriously.

The arrival at Sofia of Mr. Noel Buxton and his brother, who had come to discuss with the Balkan peoples a just and fair proposal for the settlement of all their differences, renewed in the Bulgarians their faith in the disinterestedness of the British government. Then there was the fact that Bulgaria owed her very existence to Russia, and most of the Bulgarian peasants still regarded the Russian tsar as the protector of their race. Their German ruler, Ferdinand, had led them astray by listening to Austria and Germany. A popular revolution was quite possible if he again tried to lead them away from their fighting brother Slavs into the camp of the Germans. In all these circumstances the Bulgarian government became more disposed to remain quite neutral.

Not so their old opponents the Rumanians. The vivacious and passionate people of Rumania did not wait for French and Russian victories in order to proclaim their sympathies and outline their future course of action. The early success of Serbia against the forces of Austria-Hungary was sufficient inspiration

to the Rumanian people. The Transylvanian question, the rule of Hungary over 4,000,000 Rumanians, had led to dreams of a war of liberation, and it was the deep, silent, heart-buried hope of the possibility of waging such a war some day in favourable circumstances that made the Rumanian army of 500,000 men a real force in European politics. For the Rumanian had drilled with earnestness to make himself a soldier of the first class. No tax intended to finance an improvement in the Rumanian army met with any opposition from the Rumanian peasantry. Such was the respect they inspired that in the second Balkan War the Bulgarians had readily yielded territory rather than fight them.

Now, when the day seemed to have come for the war of liberation, the Rumanian soldier was eager for the fray. Unfortunately, a prince of the house of Hohenzollern reigned over Rumania. He was King Carol, who had proved himself a wise, enterprising man of constructive genius. Much did the Rumanian people owe to him, and by reason of his claim to gratitude upon them they were placed in a tragically awkward position. For he would not fight against the Imperial leader of his house. It was said that he had pledged his word to the German emperor not to take part in the struggle.

Towards the latter part of September it looked as though the contest between popular aspiration and dynastic allegiance would end in a revolution. With a magnificent strength of character that compelled admiration, King Carol stood out against the pressure of his people's wishes, until he died at the end of September. His death brought an end to the popular clamour for an immediate war. The new king and his ministers assured the people that nothing but the interests of the nation would guide their policy. The ministers studied the end and measured their means, and having done this concluded that the time was not yet ripe for action.

The statesmen of Rumania remembered the consequences of their action in the Russo-Turkish War of 1878. It was a Rumanian army that mainly helped in the decisive attack upon Plevna, and the Rumanians were rewarded by the annexation of their fertile province of Bessarabia by the men who had come to them for help. The memory of this extraordinary event did not weigh upon the younger generation of Rumanian soldiers; but their old statesmen could not easily forget it. This time they wanted guarantees from the Russian government, and

pledges from France and Britain. Not only Transylvania was claimed by them, but Bessarabia also. Diplomatic discussions dragged on for months.

In the meantime, Rumania entered into an understanding with Italy. Popular aspirations in Italy were identical with those in Rumania. For Austria held two important parts of Italian territory under her rule. The Italians distrusted the French almost as much as the Rumanians did the Russians. Ever since the French occupation of Tunis some Italian statesmen had thought that the two leading Latin nations would have to fight one day for the mastery of the Mediterranean. Even as late as 1912 certain small incidents during the Italian campaign in Tripoli had led the Italians to think that President Poincaré was hostile to the expansion of Italian power. There had also been bitter tariff battles between France and Italy, and partly as a result of this economic strife German finance and German industrial leadership had won very considerable power in the manufacturing districts around Milan. Not a little of this ill-feeling between France and Italy had been provoked by Bismarck, part of his general scheme for keeping France isolated.

With regard to Britain, Italy's situation was clearer and yet difficult. It was very largely owing to the fact that Britain entered into the war against the Germans that the Italians manœuvred for a position of neutrality. As soon as the Italian foreign minister saw, in 1913, that Germany was bent upon an aggressive war, in which Britain would probably be engaged, he withdrew from the Triple Alliance. He did not do so formally, but practically, by refusing to act in any case in which Germany or Austria had not been first attacked. On the other hand, ever since Prussia and Italy had made war together upon Austria, in 1866, the Prussian and the Italian had worked together. German finance and German technical science had helped to develop Northern Italy. Many Italian men of science owed their success to an alliance between their own southern vivacity of intellect and the methods of patient research learned from German universities. The traditional affection for Britain was a main feature of the international relations of Italy; the feeling of respect for German organization in science and industry was another.

Italy's hesitation was increased by another strong current of thought and feeling in Italian life. Modern Italy is not only a

nation; she is also a spiritual empire. Ever since the noble Italian families of the Renaissance period succeeded in winning control over the college of cardinals, the Papacy has remained an appanage of the Italian nobility. All the fields for exercising their undoubted genius for diplomacy—fields lost by French, Spanish, and Austrian conquests in Italy, and scarcely recovered by the democratic movement of national insurrection—were more than replaced by the spiritual dominion they exercised through the Papacy. So long as France remained a professed Catholic Power her political weight on the Papacy was a balance to that of Austria. But when the French republic became a fierce and active anti-Catholic force and the centre of much of the anti-clerical movement that disturbed all the Latin countries, the Papacy was compelled to act in self-defence.

The result was that the great power of the Roman Catholic Church inclined to Austria-Hungary and southern Germany and the Rhineland, and the clerical element in Italy worked strongly to prevent that country from going to war with the central European empires. A desire to see the freethinkers of France overthrown tended at times to prevail over all other considerations. As Russia represented the old, schismatical church of Constantinople, the directors of the policy of the Papacy did not look with much favour on Russian interests. Great Britain also was mainly a schismatical or heretical Power, and her triumph promised to help the old faith but little. With the Protestant part of Germany, on the other hand, the Papacy had come to an arrangement, after beating Bismarck himself in the height of his power. The Catholic party in Germany practically held the balance between the Protestant-Conservative party and the freethinking Socialistic party.

While, however, the organ of the Vatican continued for some time to promote the cause of Germany and Austria-Hungary, the new Pope, Benedict XIV., took a larger and more deeply religious view of the terrible struggle that was rocking Christendom to its foundations. He was a wise, feeling, statesmanlike man, who seemed to reveal a gift for constructive diplomacy equal to that of Pope Leo XIII. Close to his side was Cardinal Mercier, of Malines, who by his sincerity and genius won the Pope over to his side.

There were grounds for a new compromise between the Papacy and the French republic. Such a compromise had ever

been the aim of Pope Leo XIII. and his adviser and true successor, Cardinal Rampolla. Pope Benedict appeared inclined to revert to the statesmanship of the greatest of modern Popes, and, with a view, perhaps, to assisting her ally and to promoting the interests of the large number of Catholics in her dominion, Great Britain took the unusual step of sending a representative to the Church of Rome. This historic renewal of diplomatic relations with the church to which the country once paid Peter's Pence, perhaps in memory of the debt owed to Rome for converting the Anglo-Saxons of England to Christianity, excited distress in certain Protestant circles. Great Britain however, had Belgian interests to protect as well as its own, the interests of four millions of Irishmen, and the interests of old British families that had not changed their faith at the Reformation. From a purely political point of view, the action of the British government in sending a diplomatic representative to the papal court in Rome was sound and statesmanlike. Even Japan followed the example of Britain and sent a representative to the Vatican.

In so far as Pope Benedict followed his natural feelings and used all his influence for peace, he helped the Germans, and so lengthened the period of suffering of the Roman Catholics of Belgium. In the meantime, however, the Italian government was deciding the problem of intervention in its own way. As her prime minister, Signor Salandra, put it, "a sacred egoism" became her guiding principle. In plain words, she was bent on recovering her lost provinces from Austria by any available means. The Germanic Powers could make sure of her remaining neutral by yielding to her, without a struggle, the Trentino and Trieste.

Austria, however, was disinclined to conclude the bargain. Italy therefore turned to the Powers of the Triple Entente. To them she made in effect, if not in actual words, a larger demand. She required not only the two Italian-peopled districts of southern Austria, but also a considerable part of the coast-line of the ancient Venetian territory of Dalmatia. This province was peopled mainly by the Serbian race, but Venice had conquered it in the old days, and had built many of the towns on the coast. About half the coast could be given to Serbia, thus allowing her an outlet to the Adriatic Sea, and the rest was required by Italy.

All considered, the proposal was a fair one. If Italy put an army of a million men into the field, the cost in blood and treasure to her people would be great. All that England had done to promote the national independence of Italy in the old days was partly balanced by what the Germans had done in helping Italy to maintain herself as a great Mediterranean power against France. Italy therefore waited until either of the two contending leagues of nations should accept her terms. In the meantime she armed for the fight. Both her exchequer and her war stores were depleted by the long war against the Turks and Arabs in Tripoli. Months were required in order to bring her army up to a position of strength in which it could venture to engage the forces of a great European military Power with a good chance of success. Guns were needed, and shells for the guns. For, though Italy had some of the best light field artillery in the world, she had not a sufficient number of batteries. Moreover, the war had shown that a large number of heavy mobile howitzers was absolutely necessary. With the Germans standing in their last ditch, all their great guns behind them, heavy artillery and, perhaps, vast stores of shell and shrapnel would be required. Italy was also assisting Rumania in the manufacture of ammunition. In this way months passed without either of the two important neutral powers coming to an active decision.

The position of Greece was more clearly defined. Like most of the Balkan States, she was seriously weakened in treasure and war material by the struggle with Turkey, and the subsequent fight with Bulgaria. Many of the Turks were still anxious for another war with the Greeks, with a view to recovering the Aegean Islands. Both Powers had been making a supreme effort to obtain a naval preponderance. Turkey had ordered two battleships from Britain, and Greece had purchased two battleships from the United States. The action of Great Britain in taking over, at the outbreak of the war, the two ships building in our yards for Turkey was both a stroke of diplomacy and a naval measure. It prevented Turkey from going to war with Greece with any chance of success at sea.

The arrival in the Dardanelles of the Goeben and the Breslau did not alter this condition. For any action by the battle cruiser and her light consort would bring into the field of war the Russian Black Sea fleet and the Franco-British Mediter-

ranean fleets. Greece was thus made strong at sea and bound to the Triple Entente by ties of gratitude and interest. The removal of the Turkish menace left her hands free for her principal work of maintaining peace in the Balkans. As the Greek premier, M. Venizelos, explained to the chamber of deputies at Athens on September 13, Greece was in a position of conditional neutrality. In the general interests of the Balkan people, she had contracted an alliance with Serbia. If either Bulgaria or Turkey tried to take advantage of the difficulties of the Serbians, and assist the defeated Austrians by attempting to stab Serbia in the back, Greece would intervene. As both Turkey and Bulgaria were well aware that the Rumanians would act in such a case in cooperation with the Greeks, the peace of the Balkans was maintained. The Turko-Bulgarian menace, however, had a considerable effect upon the course of the war. For it was one of the main factors that induced the Rumanian statesmen to hold back from joining in the attack on Hungary.

In Switzerland also the central Powers gained a success, owing to the thoroughness with which they prepared for war. The Swiss army was almost entirely officered by men in the closest sympathy with the Germanic powers. Immediately on the outbreak of the war there was established a military censorship solely with a view to Germanising Swiss thought and feeling. Only the French-speaking Swiss, who obtained their information through France, remained truly and stubbornly neutral. For this reason they were often dominated by Germans, who managed the best hotels and controlled some of the important industries in their districts. It is easy to see why the Germans took so much trouble to ensure the active sympathies of the Swiss. Not only was Switzerland one of the two gates into France, but she was also an important back door for evading some of the most vital consequences of the British and French blockades of the North Sea and the Adriatic.

By the end of September, however, the Germanised censorship relaxed, and the French Swiss—always the best journalists of their conglomerate nation—began to make their power over public opinion felt. For months a verbal duel waged between German Berne and French Geneva, while Swiss Italians veered round towards the Allies, in sympathy with popular Italian feeling. The German Swiss, however, retained the bent of mind with which they began, together with the practical

control of the army. President Hoffmann was a figurehead. It was simply downright fear of the consequences of their actions that made the members of the ruling party in Switzerland modify their action. France had a considerable control over the wheat supply of the Swiss, and she naturally used this instrument. By the end of the month Switzerland was more or less effectively neutral.

As a side door for evading the blockade, Switzerland, however, was less important to Germany than Holland. Rotterdam, with its large colony of Germans and German Jews, was a Rhine port controlling the main artery of German commerce. The Germans naturally desired the Dutch to remain nominally neutral but practically favourable to the German cause, and to help them to mitigate the effects of the naval blockade by transforming Rotterdam into a new Hamburg. This placed the Dutch Government in an extremely awkward position. From an economical point of view, the Netherlands had become to a large extent one of the chief transporting centres for Westphalia. Rotterdam was a seaport of the vast German industrial district stretching from Düsseldorf to Essen. The modern prosperity of Holland was largely based upon the German hinterland behind it. The Dutch stood to lose by everything that hindered or diminished German trade, and they stood to gain by everything that favoured and increased it.

In addition to these economical considerations, there was the memory of the Boer war that told against Great Britain. The Boers were Dutchmen who, in their distant settlement by the half-way house on the old route to India, had preserved the spirit of the brave old fighting days, when Holland was able to dispute with Britain the mastery of the seas and the command of all the outlands of the earth. Towards the nation which abruptly brought to an end the independence of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, the Dutch people were not favourably inclined. German politicians were well aware of this condition of things, and exploited it to the utmost of their power. Even the magnanimity with which the Liberal government of Great Britain handled the situation in South Africa after the war with the Boers did not entirely remove the grudge against our country felt by the Dutch. There was something in the soul of the ordinary Dutchman which rebelled against any pressure from any foreign country.

Neither the naval power of Britain nor the military and economic power of Germany daunted his spirit. Placed between the upper and the nether millstones, between the power of Britain to cut off supplies and starve him, and the power of Germany to deal with him as she had dealt with the Belgians, the Dutchman underwent a transformation. Dutch Jews and German Jews and German importing houses continued to dodge or dare the contraband laws. For the rest, the Dutch nation generally kept strictly to the letter and the spirit of international law, and tried to deal fairly between the contending leagues of nations.

The position of the Scandinavian countries somewhat resembled that of Holland. Their economic ties to the German empire were less close. For example, in regard to the agricultural products, Britain had been, and remained, a better market for Denmark than was Germany. In the case of the Danes, moreover, many men still living remembered the war with Prussia and Austria over Schleswig-Holstein, and their memories had been continually refreshed by the treatment meted out to Danes in the conquered territories. On the other hand, there were older memories of the way in which Britain had conducted the great Continental naval blockade in the days of Nelson. For we had then attacked and captured the Danish navy merely to forestall a possible move against Sweden, another neutral nation, by Napoleon. The Danes believed we were quite capable of again acting with the utmost rigour if our national life appeared to be in desperate danger. From a purely theoretical, democratic point of view the Danish nation wished for the triumph of the Triple Entente, and the recovery of the Danish-peopled district of Schleswig-Holstein. In the meantime, they hoped that the blockade of the North Sea would proceed without any rigorous treatment of neighbouring neutral countries, and many of their farmers tried to balance the increasing cost of fodder by selling horses to the German army.

The Norwegians were in a rather more fortunate position. In spite of the comparative smallness of their population, their old genius for seafaring had enabled them to create in modern times an important mercantile marine. Their country was rich in timber and animal produce, much of which was supplied to England and to Germany. The Norwegian sailors were endangered by German mines in the North Sea; but the ship-

owners, at least, reaped a full harvest from the extraordinary rise in the cost of ocean transport produced by the stoppage of German shipping, and the employment of British merchant vessels as troopships and military supply ships. Being intensely democratic, the Norwegians favoured the Allies.

On the other hand, in the early period of the war most of the Swedes seemed to have had a decided bias towards Germany. This was largely due to the preparations that Germany had made for the control of the Swedish press, and other instruments for influencing public opinion. The Germans worked upon the old Swedish grudge against Russia for obtaining, during the reconstruction of Europe in the days of Napoleon, the duchy of Finland. For though Sweden received in compensation the kingdom of Norway, she had since lost this. She still bore ill-will against the Russians, and feared they would end by absorbing the whole of Scandinavia. Groundless as the fear was, it was sufficient for the Germans to work upon. They had the chief share in supplying Sweden with goods, while our country had the chief share of Swedish imports. The result was that the German commercial traveller was a greater force in Sweden than was the British commercial traveller. By combining patriotism and business he greatly helped to influence the Swedes against the Allies.

Germany, moreover, exercised considerable pressure on Sweden by means of her Baltic fleet. It was to diminish this pressure that the Russian Admiral von Essen made a surprise attack on a German cruiser squadron towards the end of August, and sank the Magdeburg and several German destroyers.

By the end of September the only neutral white race that caused any anxiety to the Allies was the American. In 1914 the United States expected to remain indefinitely at peace. On August 4, 1914, President Wilson issued a proclamation of neutrality between the contending groups of European nations. He insisted that as a neutral the United States stood by the principle of the freedom of the seas. She demanded the right to carry on commerce with all belligerents in case of war, subject to the limitations of international law as to contraband and blockade. Her authorized military establishment of 105,000 men of whom some 87,000 were enrolled, was indeed quite inadequate to the needs of modern warfare, and the navy was deficient in submarines. Relief work for Belgium was organized by Americans

soon after the beginning of the World War. Later French refugees, Serbians, and refugees from Asia Minor were cared for, as well as the sick and wounded of the contending armies.

Indeed, it is possible to argue that the existence of a powerful, wealthy, and benevolent neutral, such as the United States, was, in the early days of the war, an advantage to the nations at large. Its riches were spent readily in the cause of suffering, its high position in the world's councils ensured that its voice was heard in such matters as the treatment of prisoners of war and of civilians in the occupied areas. President Wilson could offer an impartial tribunal to inquire into matters upon which the contending nations would have accepted no other decision. He could offer the protection of his ambassadors to refugees and assist in the repatriation of aliens. What immense labours fell upon the American embassy in London may be read in the ambassador's (Mr. W. H. Page) published letters—and it is doubtful if they could have been shouldered so effectively by the minister of any other nation.

To the task of influencing public opinion in the United States the German government had bent the larger part of the energies that it could spare from the actual conduct of the war. There were nearly 11,000,000 persons of German, Austrian and Hungarian stock in the United States, including some powerful financiers and trust magnates of German-Jewish or German origin. For some years before the outbreak of the war the German government had endeavoured to preserve and intensify a feeling of German patriotism in America by a ramifying system of local German associations. During the early months of the war they were intensely active in attempting to sway American opinion over to their side. A battle of propaganda between the contending powers was, indeed, waged for a long period in the United States, with what result the world now knows.

CHAPTER 21

The South African Rebellion

THE Union of South Africa, the scene of the rising of 1914, dates from 1910, before which the district was divided into four separate states. Of these the Cape Province and Natal were old possessions of Great Britain, but the other two, the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, were independent republics until they were annexed after a war with the Boers that ended in 1902. In these two countries, which since 1908 have been provinces of the Union, the Boers largely outnumber the British, and the same is true of the Cape Province. Only in Natal are the British superior numerically to the Boers. This fact was of considerable significance when the Great War broke out.

Bismarck once remarked that South Africa would prove the grave of British greatness. At the time the remark was made the trouble with the Boers was beginning to come to a head, and the British policy of weak force and grudging concessions gave every appearance of rapidly reducing that corner of the British empire to a state of chaos from which nothing would save it. Certain it is that Germany's desire for a "place in the sun" saw in the muddled and far from impeccably virtuous treatment which in the second half of the 19th century Britain was extending to the Boers the beginnings of an opportunity for colonial expansion.

In the result, while no overt act of hostility was indulged in, the kaiser and the German foreign office gave perfectly clear indications of their sympathy with the Boers' endeavour to win independence. In this Germany was only following the trend of European opinion, the rectitude of which was to a large extent proved by the very magnanimity of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's settlement in 1906 of the difficulties in South Africa, which the result of the war had only intensified. The granting of a large measure of self-government to the various Boer republics, and the subsequent wise and admirable formation of the Union of South Africa were diplomatic measures the effect of

which Germany did not correctly gauge. Her foreign office was still convinced of the existence of bitter racial hatred within the Union, and the outcry which was raised by the British South Africans when the results of the Union elections established a Boer majority under a Boer prime minister, tended to confirm diplomatic suspicion that this British dominion was essentially an ill-knit group of two bitterly opposed factions, the stronger of which would eagerly seize the first opportunity to cast off the bond that held her a part of the British empire.

Nor can it be doubted that there was indeed a large and active party among the Boer colonists with whom such a policy was acceptable. Germany's mistake lay in her failure to recognize the effect which twelve years of competent administration, coupled with the spirit of team work that had essentially grown up in that period, had had upon the majority of the Boer colony. It is said that Germany was confident that the Union would remain neutral in the event of a European struggle, or even that it would be passively sympathetic with the German cause. Certainly for many years prior to the outbreak of war German agents, widely scattered throughout the dominion, had worked with considerable effect upon the more bitter sections of the Boer malcontents. Nor is it difficult to gauge the direction of Germany's aspirations. German South-West Africa, conveniently placed upon the western border of the Union, would be a nucleus of inestimable value around which to collect the Boer "republics," and Germany conceived herself winning by strategy and diplomacy an empire in the south of the African continent which she believed Britain had already lost.

Nor were German discernment and German hopes much falsified by the course of events. It is to the influence and abilities of the two South Africans, Louis Botha and J. C. Smuts, rather than to any grave miscalculation in German policy that Britain owed not only the preservation of her own empire in South Africa, but also the conquest of the German colonies.

To an extent, as has already been noted, the perennial problems of industrial and social life calling for cooperative effort in their solution had already begun to create a political unity in the dominion in which interests of class and organization tended to cut across and break down racial differences. But the welding of the races into a homogeneous whole was more than anything the work of Louis Botha. Elected in 1910 as the prime minister

of the newly formed Union, he set to work at once to bring about a spirit of loyalty to the empire and unity within the dominion with skill and resourcefulness. Such a labour is all the more remarkable when it is remembered that only eight years before he had been one of Britain's most bitter and most able adversaries. Replacing Joubert as commander-in-chief of the Boer commandos, he had organized a resistance which all the superiority of guns, men and resources that Britain enjoyed had been for so long powerless to crush. Yet his contribution to the cause of his countrymen during the course of the struggle, great as it was, was exceeded by the value of his services during the subsequent years. His policy of "building up a new state on non-racial lines" and as an equal member of the British commonwealth of nations none the less prevailed.

It was under his leadership rather than under that of General Hertzog and Mr. Steyn, the two great and popular leaders of the nationalist group, that the Union gradually won a great measure of unity and considerable prosperity. In all his work Botha was ably seconded by General Smuts, whose intellectual achievements in the world of philosophy contend for our admiration with his successes in political life and his ability as a military leader. And South Africa no less than the British empire is entitled to congratulate itself that at such a time of crisis the government of the Union rested in the hands of two such figures.

Their success is remarkable, too, when it is appreciated that ranged against them were men who a few years previously had by their unflinching loyalty to the Boer cause won an influence and a prestige second, if second at all, only to those enjoyed by Botha and Smuts themselves. They had to pit themselves against not only the popular enthusiasm for such men as that undefeatable guerrilla warfare leader, Christian de Wet, but also against the esteem in which the Boer colonists held the great national figures of Hertzog, Beyers, Steyn, and Delarey.

With such a combination against them Botha and Smuts would have been entitled to feel considerable pride of achievement had they been able to undertake only the defence of the Union borders against invasion. That they were, in fact, able not only to relieve the British government of this responsibility, but also to carry the great body of the nation with them and undertake the conquest of German South-West and East Africa says more for their abilities than any words.

In 1913 a new and virile manifestation of the movement for national independence was evident in the policies of the Union. The movement originated among some of the leaders of the Dutch people of the Orange River Colony. Chief among them was General Hertzog, who had to leave the cabinet owing partly to a difference of opinion with General Botha concerning the imperial responsibilities of South Africa. It is probable that General Hertzog was moved largely by personal animosity to his colleague. But on breaking from him he gave his animosity a political colouring, and started a new Dutch party which aimed at racial ascendancy ending in absolute independence. General Hertzog was not prepared to declare war against the rest of the British empire. He thought that South Africa might remain nominally part of the empire until the time came for her to lapse, without any show of violence, from the British crown. This would occur, in his view, whenever the interests of South Africa were likely to be sacrificed to the common cause of the empire, as in the case of a war with Germany.

General Botha, on the other hand, took another view of the obligations of his people. He intended to hold by the spirit as well as by the letter of the grant of free government. Quite likely the result of the intrigues of the Germans in the days of President Kruger weighed in the decision to which the South African prime minister came in 1913. The ruling mind in the Union, he was also, as we have said, the old commander-in-chief of the Boers. He had the patience and the tenacity of the race that produced Tromp, de Ruyter and William of Orange. He suspected the intentions of Germany in regard to South Africa, and his efforts to reconcile Boer and Briton in the new commonwealth were animated with a military purpose as well as with a generosity of view. With fine patience he did not go out of his way to seek a quarrel. But, as was seen in his break with Hertzog and De Wet, when he saw that the quarrel would be forced upon him, he began to prepare in 1913 to meet it.

There was an extremely difficult task before him and before his capable colleague, General Smuts, but the prorogation of Parliament on July 7, 1914, was a stroke of good luck. For when war broke out the next month the government was able to arrange its plan of action in silence. The position in some of the country districts was disturbing. For in those places the agents of Germany had long been spreading the idea that when

the time came for the downfall of the British empire by German hands, a larger South African republic would be created with German help. In the Western Transvaal some of the back-veldt Boers were ready to rise, and the rumour ran that the Germans had invaded the Union, and that burghers were being called out on commando to act with them. Only in the large towns was there an instant and passionate demonstration of loyalty to the empire. In districts where settlers of Dutch stock prevailed the general attitude of the people was that of bewildered expectancy. They were waiting to see what action their government would take. Meanwhile, a fierce and decisive struggle was going on between General Botha and General Smuts on the one side, and General Hertzog and ex-President Steyn on the other side. Between them was General Delarey, with Christian de Wet and Beyers trying to win Delarey over to active rebellion.

In attempting to gauge the strain which the declaration of war and Botha's support of the imperial government put upon the loyalties of South Africa, it must not be forgotten that only twelve years before the Boers had been in arms against Britain, and that the ties of a common tongue, tradition and sentiment which united the British element in the land to the mother country were entirely lacking in the case of the Boers, whose feelings were deeply tinged with bitter memories and smouldering resentment. It is not to be wondered at that in such a population a number of active pro-Germans could be found; it is, on the contrary, remarkable that Botha and Smuts together with the great majority of the Union Parliament and the great bulk of the nation should have been prepared to cooperate at all with the British government. Britain's life and death struggle on the continent of Europe would have left little time and slender resources for dealing with a sudden rising in favour of independence in a country so far removed as South Africa. The Great War was the supreme opportunity for nationalist ambition. That its active expression was limited to at most 10,000 or so hotheads is in truth cause for no little wonder.

Pro-German sentiment was always subservient to Boer interests even amongst the hotheads; but at the same time it cannot be doubted that a very large number of the Boer community were never more than lukewarm in their allegiance to a policy of attack on the German colonies. Hertzog and Steyn stood for South African independence, and their interest in the struggles

of two alien and European powers was negligible. A policy of neutrality would have pleased them best, for there is no clear reason to assume that either was a secret participant in the rebellion of 1914, although it is evident from their attitude during and after its progress that both were deeply sympathetic with the aims of the rebels in so far as those aims consisted in an aggressive assertion of Boer nationalism.

In fact, of the Boer leaders who took an active part in the rising, only one, Maritz, was proved to have been in treasonable relations with Germany before the war. The rest simply saw in the war a magnificent opportunity to realize that dream of Dutch supremacy and independence upon which their eyes had been steadily fixed since 1902.

On the outbreak of war in Europe Botha had telegraphed to the Imperial government the intimation that the Union would undertake its own defence, and thereby release the garrison troops for active service elsewhere. There was more than generosity in such a move: there was a deep-seated wisdom. In an already explosive situation the least slip might well cause a conflagration, and the presence of British troops, their movements to and fro across the country and the perpetual threat they would represent to nationalist sentiment might well have precipitated the very event which their presence was designed to check. Secondly, if events should prove that a rising was to take place, then that rising had to be dealt with by South Africa alone. The employment of British troops to crush the rebels would have started a blaze fiercer than more army corps than were ever in South Africa from 1899-1902 could have quelled.

Botha's move was admirable. It combined a gesture that pleased the national vanity of all sections with a far-sighted policy that served the loyalists in good stead. The crisis, however, was not long delayed. On August 7 the British government cabled Botha to the effect that an attack upon German South-West Africa and its eventual conquest would be "a great and urgent imperial service." Three days later Botha replied that he and his colleagues cordially agreed to cooperate with the imperial government, and that military operations would be undertaken.

This decision was communicated to General Beyers, the commander-in-chief of the Union forces, on August 13. At a meeting of the principal officers of the defence force held on August 21, Beyers agreed to the plans outlined, and even proposed

alterations which were accepted. He as general of the forces would himself have had command of the operations in German South-West Africa.

Botha, however, was well aware that the apparently still waters around him were running deep, that in fact Beyers, like Hertzog and other nationalists, was bitterly opposed to any cooperation with England. He had to leave no time for further conspiring, but bring the trouble to a head at once. The nationalists must be made to declare themselves, and public opinion must equally be compelled to declare the direction of its allegiance. Accordingly, on the opening of Parliament on September 9, 1914. he moved a resolution authorizing the proposed expedition against German South-West Africa. It was a declaration of war on the pro-German party, and left the nationalists no choice but to avow their attitude.

It must be remembered that he was speaking to men of a race of born fighters, whose minds were still deeply coloured by the tragic events of a long and terrible campaign in which they had been overpowered by the superior numbers and superior organization of their traditional opponents. After relating the agreement made with the imperial government for the invasion of German South-West Africa, General Botha said:

> To forget their loyalty to the Empire in this hour of trial would be scandalous and shameful, and would blacken South Africa in the eyes of the whole world. Of this South Africans were incapable. They had endured some of the greatest sacrifices that could be demanded of a people, but they had always kept before them ideals founded on Christianity, and never in their darkest days had they sought to gain their ends by treasonable means. The path of treason was an unknown path to Dutch and English alike.
>
> Their duty and their conscience alike bade them be faithful and true to the Imperial Government in all respects in this hour of darkness and trouble. That was the attitude of the Union Government; that was the attitude of the people of South Africa. The Government had cabled to the Imperial Government at the outbreak of war, offering to undertake the defence of South Africa, thereby releasing the Imperial troops for service elsewhere. This was accepted, and the Union Defence Force was mobilized.

In answer to this speech, General Hertzog moved an amendment to the effect that any act that would lead to an attack on German territory in South Africa would conflict with the interests of the

Union and the empire. In the speeches moved by members of the Hertzog party in support of this amendment doubts were cast on the justice of the British cause, bitter personal attacks were made on General Botha, and memories of the South African war were revived with a view to provoking racial hatred. General Botha's government, however, won a decisive victory by a majority of 92 votes against 12 votes. Of the 17 members from the Free State, which was the Hertzog stronghold, only nine, including General Hertzog himself, voted for the amendment, and one of the nine afterwards recanted publicly.

The result was a severe blow to the nationalists, but they still counted on the support of the great body of public opinion. Beyers, who had been preparing for some time, decided to declare for open war. Hertzog refused to participate in any unconstitutional measures. Parliament rose on Monday, September 14, and on the following day Beyers wrote a letter of resignation of his position of commandant-general of the defence force. The letter was written the day before it was dated, and a copy was given for immediate publication, so that it would be read by the people before the original letter reached General Botha and General Smuts in Cape Town. But by means of the press censorship the government prevented the publication of the letter until September 21, when it was published together with the reply of General Smuts as minister of defence.

The letter sent by Beyers ran as follows:

Honourable Sir,—You are aware that during the month of August last I told you and General Botha by word of mouth that I disapproved of the sending of commandos to German South-West Africa for the purpose of conquering that territory. I was on the point then of resigning, but, hearing that Parliament would be called together, I decided to wait, hoping that a way out of the difficulty would be found. To my utmost surprise, however, Parliament confirmed the resolution adopted by the Government, namely, to conquer German South-West Africa without any provocation towards the Union from the Germans. The Government must be aware that by far the great majority of the Dutch-speaking people of the Union decidedly disapproved of our crossing the frontier, and that two conferences of commandants recently held at Pretoria bore eloquent testimony to this. I challenge the Government by an appeal to the people, without making use of compulsion, to obtain another result.

It is said that Great Britain has taken part in the war for the sake of right and justice in order to protect the independence

of smaller nations, and to comply with treaties. But the fact that three Ministers of the British Cabinet have resigned shows that even in England there is a strong minority who cannot be convinced of the righteousness of a war with Germany. History teaches us, after all, that whenever it suits her interests Great Britain is always ready to protect smaller nations ; but, unhappily, history also relates instances in which the sacred rights of independence of smaller nations have been violated and treaties disregarded by that same Empire.

In proof of this I have only to indicate how the independence of the South African Republic and Orange Free State was violated, and of what weight the Sand River Convention was. It is said that war is being waged against the barbarity of the Germans. I have forgiven, but not forgotten, all the barbarities perpetrated in this our own country during the South African War. With very few exceptions all farms—not to mention many towns—were so many Louvains, of which we now hear so much. At this critical moment it is made known in Parliament that our Government was granted a loan of £7,000,000 by the British Government. This is very significant. Anyone can have his own thoughts about this. In the absence of legitimate grounds for the annexation policy of the Government, you endeavour to intimidate the public by declaring that Government possesses information showing that Germany has decided, should opportunity arise, to annex South Africa.

My humble opinion is that this will be hastened if from our side we invade German territory without having been provoked thereto by the Germans. And as to the alleged German annexation scheme, this is nothing more than the result of the usual national suspicion attending such matters. The allegations made in Parliament—namely, that the Germans have already violated our frontier—are ungrounded. See the official report of the Information Bureau, corrobated by Lieutenant Colonel Maritz and his officers, who are on and near the frontier.

Apparently Government longed for some transgression by the Germans of German South-West Africa, but have been disappointed in this, for so far not a single German soldier has crossed our frontier. As you know very well, the report is perfectly correct regarding an involuntary transgression of the frontier some time ago and the tendering of an apology for so doing. Whatever may happen in South Africa, the war will be decided in Europe in any case ; so if Germany triumphs and should decide to attack us, then, even if Great Britain should be unable to help us, we shall at least have a sacred and clean cause in defending our country to the utmost, provided we stay inside our borders meanwhile. In case we are attacked our people will arise as one man in defence of its rights.

Cap Trafalgar, the German armed merchant cruiser which was sunk by the auxiliary cruiser Carmania, September 14, 1914.



The Cunard liner Carmania, converted into an auxiliary cruiser, sank the German cruiser Cap Trafalgar after a memorable engagement.

The German light cruiser Karlsruhe served as a commerce raider and was sunk, October, 1914.

ATTACKING AND PROTECTING COMMERCE

GERMAN NAVAL RAID ON EAST COAST RESORT. On December 16, 1914, the German battle cruisers Derfflinger and Von der Tann bombarded Scarborough, the Yorkshire watering-place. Our illustration shows the wreckage of a hotel restaurant. In this raid the casualties were 18 killed and over 100 wounded.

GERMAN SHIPS THAT SERIOUSLY INFLUENCED THE COURSE OF WAR. The Breslau (left), a German protected cruiser, with the Goeben (right) escaped the Allied fleets in the Straits of Messina, August, 1914. Their arrival off Constantinople largely contributed to the entry of Turkey into the war on the side of the Central Powers. The Breslau was mined off Imbros, January 20, 1918, and the Goeben was taken over by the British after the armistice, November, 1918.

The battleship Iron Duke was the flagship of Admiral Jellicoe while in command of the Grand Fleet, 1914-16. She carried ten 13.5 in. guns, twelve 6 in. and four 3-pounder guns. She displaced 25,000 tons.

The German protected cruiser Königsberg caused serious damage to Allied shipping in the East in the early part of the war. She escaped up the Rufiji river, German East Africa, and was ultimately destroyed.

The British fast cruiser Arethusa took a leading part in the battle of Heligoland Bight and assisted in the naval air raid on Cuxhaven on December 25, 1914.

The White Star liner Olympic was used as a troopship during the war. In October, 1914, she rescued the crew of the Audacious which was sunk by a German mine.

Besides, I am convinced that a commando of about 8,000 Germans, as at present stationed in German territory, will not be so foolish as to attempt an attack on our country. I have always said, and repeated at Booysens recently, that if the Union is attacked, Boer and Briton will defend this country side by side, and in such case I will deem it a great honour and privilege to take up my place at the head of our forces in defence of my Fatherland. I accepted the post of commandant general under our Defence Act, the first section of which provides that our forces can only be employed in defence of the Union. My humble opinion is that this section cannot thus be changed by informal resolution in Parliament, such being contrary to Parliamentary procedure. So the Defence Act does not allow us to go and fetch the enemy over the frontier and to light the fire in this way, but should the enemy penetrate into our country it will be our duty to drive him back and pursue him in his own territory.

In his speech General Botha speaks about the help we had from the Belgians and French after the South African War. That assistance is still appreciated by us and by all our people, but we must not forget that the Germans also were not behindhand and have always been well disposed towards us. So why should we deliberately make enemies of them? As circumstances are, I see no way of taking the offensive, and as I sincerely love my country and people, I must strongly protest against the sending of the Union citizen forces over the frontier. Who can foretell when the fire the Government has decided to light shall end? For the reasons enumerated above I feel constrained to resign my post as commandant general, as also my commissioned rank. For me this is the only way of faith, duty, and honour towards our people, of which mention was made by General Botha. I have always tried to do my duty according to my best convictions, and it sorely grieves me that it must end in this way.—I have, etc.,

(Signed) C. G. L. BEYERS.

That this letter was of considerable weight with a large number of people cannot be doubted, and it was fortunate that the government had been able to withhold its publication until General Smuts' admirable reply had been sent. His letter read:

Pretoria, September 19.

Sir,—It was with regret that I received your letter of the 15th inst., tendering your resignation as the commandant general, Union Defence Forces, and as an officer of the Union. The circumstances under which that resignation took place and the terms in which you endeavour to justify your action tend to leave a very painful impression.

It is true that it was known to me that you entertained objections against the war operations in German South-West Africa, but I never received the impression that you would resign. On the contrary, all the information in possession of the Government was communicated to you, all plans were discussed with you, and your advice was followed to a large extent. The principal officers were appointed on your recommendation and with your concurrence, and the plan of operations which is now being followed is largely the one recommended by yourself at a conference of officers.

My last instructions to you before I left for Cape Town to attend the special session of Parliament were that in my absence you should visit certain regiments on the German border, and it was well understood between us that immediately the war operations were somewhat further advanced and co-operation among the various divisions would be practicable, you should yourself undertake the chief command in German South-West Africa.

The attitude of the Government after this remained unchanged, and was approved by Parliament after full discussion. One would have expected that that approval would make the matter easier for you, but now I find that you anticipated that Parliament would disapprove of the policy of the Government, and that your disappointment in this became the reason for your unexpected action. In order to make your motives clearer, the reasons for your resignation were explained in a long political argument, which was immediately communicated to the Press and came into the hands of the Government long after publication.

I need not tell you that all these circumstances in connection with your resignation have made a most unpleasant impression on my colleagues and myself. But this unpleasant impression has even been aggravated by the allegations contained in your letter. Your bitter attack on Great Britain is not only entirely baseless, but is the more unjustifiable coming as it does in the midst of a great war from the commandant general of one of the British Dominions. Your reference to barbarous acts during the South African War cannot justify the criminal devastation of Belgium, and can only be calculated to sow hatred and division among the people of South Africa.

You forgot to mention that since the South African War the British people gave South Africa her entire freedom under a Constitution which makes it possible for us to realise our national ideals along our own lines, and which, for instance, allows you to write with impunity a letter for which you would without doubt be liable in the German Empire to the extreme penalty. As regards your other statements, they have been answered and disposed of in Parliament. From these discussions

it will be apparent that neither the British Empire nor South Africa was the aggressor in this struggle. War was in the first instance declared by Austria-Hungary, and thereafter by Germany, under circumstances in which the British Government employed its utmost powers to maintain the peace of Europe and to safeguard the neutrality of Belgium.

So far as we ourselves are concerned, our coast is threatened, our mail boats are arrested, and our borders are invaded by the enemy. This latter does not occur, as you say, in an involuntary manner and with an apology, which latter, at any rate, was never tendered to the Government.

Under these circumstances it is absurd to speak about aggressive action on the part of the Union, seeing that, together with the British Empire, we have been drawn against our wish and will and entirely in self-defence into this war. As regards your insinuation concerning the loan of £7,000,000 which the British Government was kind enough to grant us, and for which the public of the Union, as evidenced recently in Parliament, are most grateful, it is of such a despicable nature that there is no necessity to make any comment thereon. It only shows to what extent your mind has been obscured by political bias.

You speak about duty and honour. My conviction is that the people of South Africa will in these dark days, when the Government as well as the people of South Africa are put to the supreme test, have a clearer conception of duty and honour than is to be deduced from your letter and action. For the Dutch-speaking section in particular I cannot conceive anything more fatal and humiliating than a policy of lip loyalty in fair weather and of a policy of neutrality and pro-German sentiment in days of storm and stress.

It may be that our peculiar internal circumstances and our backward condition after the late war will place a limit on what we can do, but nevertheless I am convinced that the people will support the Government in carrying out the mandate of Parliament, and in this manner, which is the only legitimate one, fulfil their duty to South Africa and to the Empire, and maintain their dearly-won honour unblemished for the future.

Your resignation is hereby accepted.

(Signed) J. C. SMUTS.

Before the publication of this correspondence Beyers was already moving. He could count for support upon Maritz, De Wet and Major J. Kemp, another efficient officer. The doubtful point and the most important point for solution was which way General Delarey would move. Delarey was a man of great courage and high personal integrity. His military ability and

his strength of character had won him an honoured place in the esteem of his countrymen. One of the most skilful and brave of the Boer generals in the South African War, he had secured, particularly in the western Transvaal, a very considerable influence, and upon his word a large body of people would be willing to act. His adherence to the cause of open revolt was essential if success were to be won, and Beyers was making overtures to induce him to throw in his lot with the rebels.

Delarey had so far given but little indication of his intentions, and what little he had done was extremely confusing. He was known to be ardently in favour of South African emancipation and bitterly opposed to the proposed invasion of German South-West Africa. On the other hand, he had so far frowned upon active revolt. In the early days of August rumours were everywhere rife that Germans were across the border, and that Boer commandos were cooperating with them. But his words to a meeting of burghers called by himself at Treurfontein on August 15 were in the circumstances amazing. Instead of fiery and impassioned oratory, an incitement to arms and the promise of a speedy victory, he had advised his hearers to go home quietly and await events. His action had done much to increase the mystified uncertainty with which the Boer population viewed the course of events for several weeks.

However, a judicial commission of inquiry into the 1914 rebellion, which issued its report in December, 1916, gave it as its opinion that from the outbreak of war Delarey was plotting a rebellion, the object of which was to restore the Dutch republics, if not to establish a South African republic. Delarey was deeply under the influence of a Dutch seer and prophet, van Rensburg, who had acquired an immense following throughout the union on the strength of one or two remarkable prophecies made during the South African war. In particular he had told of a vision which had persuaded Delarey to attack Lord Methuen, with the result that the Boers had gained a great success and had captured the British general.

As soon as war broke out van Rensburg began again to see visions and to make prophecies. In one vision there was an ocean, and across the ocean five great bulls were fighting, and a blue bull gored a great hole in a red bull. The red bull was Britain, while the blue bull was Germany. In another vision some commandos of burghers were trekking across the Orange

river into the desert northward. There they met the German troops, and talked with them, and came back home without firing a shot. This, being interpreted, meant that the soldiers of the Kaiser intended not only to restore the old republic, but to add Natal and the Cape to it.

It was on Delarey that the prophet of Lichtenburg chiefly worked, and when the famous general came down to attend a special war session of Parliament, his friends found him in a state of mind bordering on religious mania. Delarey was a well-balanced, enlightened man of strong personality; and seeing what an effect the prophet of Lichtenburg produced on him, it is easy to calculate how profound and disturbing was the influence the preacher of rebellion exercised upon the narrow, ignorant country Boers. If the policy of neutrality had been maintained for some months, men like van Rensburg and active intriguers like Beyers might have completely undermined the settlement between Boer and Briton and created a terrible struggle, with German troops and Imperial forces intervening. It was such considerations as this that had spurred Botha to decisive action, that had forced the rebels' hand.

Although it was now clear that Delarey was deeply committed, it is not yet known to what extent he had declared himself to Beyers. Beyers had arranged a meeting with Delarey on the day he wrote his letter of resignation. It would seem that he had received the message from Maritz on the frontier that "all was ready." About 1,000 armed Boers of Delarey's district were encamped at Potchefstroom, and as General Delarey returned from Cape Town on September 15 he met General Beyers and arranged to motor with him that night and visit the camp of the Boers of the western Transvaal.

The two generals left Pretoria by motor-car about seven o'clock in the evening, and took the road that led them through the mining city of Johannesburg. It happened that a gang of bandits, known as the Jackson gang, had been terrorising for several days the Witwatersrand reef, committing burglaries and shooting at sight anyone who interfered with them. On the afternoon of September 15 they had been traced to a house in the suburbs by some detectives; but, on an attempt being made to arrest them, they shot dead one of the detectives and escaped in a motor-car. The armed police patrols were then ordered out on all the highways leading to Johannesburg, and

instructed to stop and examine all motor-cars and fire at once if their challenge were ignored. After nightfall a motor-car resembling that of the Jackson gang was challenged at the east end of the city as it went along at high speed with a powerful headlight. Again it was challenged twice as it flashed through the western end of the town. For a fourth time it was challenged at the western boundary. One of the policemen then fired at the wheel of the car in order to disable it, but the bullet ricochetted and struck Delarey, killing him instantly.

The effect upon the schemes of the rebels was disastrous. By Delarey's death they were deprived not only of assurance of effective support in the western Transvaal, but also of the one man whose military genius might have matched that of Botha. Time was needed for reorganization, and they began to work on a less dangerous policy of passive resistance, inviting the Boers to refuse service in German territory. General Botha replied by stating that he personally would lead the expedition, and made an appeal for volunteers. This statement and appeal coming from the old commander-in-chief of the Boer forces was undoubtedly effective. De Wet and Beyers had, after Delarey's death, publicly protested their loyalty to the union, and Kemp had withdrawn his resignation, which had been tendered with Beyers'. Hertzog and Steyn, the two greatest and most influential voices of the nationalist party, would not commit themselves either for or against active revolt. Botha judged that the crisis had passed, and that energetic measures could be put in hand against German territory at once.

Lieutenant Colonel Maritz was in command of the border force of about 1,600 men. He occupied the anomalous position of holding rank in both the British and the German armies, for he had aided the Germans in their crushing of the Herero revolt a few years before. He was also gravely suspected of being in German pay, and as a result General Botha sent to relieve him of his command. The action precipitated a rebellion.

Maritz issued an impudent ultimatum, dated October 8, in which he demanded to meet General Hertzog, General de Wet, General Beyers, Kemp and Müller. He stated that if he were not allowed to receive instructions from these men he would attack Colonel Brits' force and invade the Union. He added that, in addition to his own troops, he had German guns and German soldiers, and that he had signed an agreement with

the governor of German South-West Africa, ceding Walvis Bay and other portions of the Union territory in return for a guarantee of the independence of the South African republic.

General Botha's reply was a proclamation of martial law throughout the Union. Maritz had arrested all his officers and men who were unwilling to join the Germans, and had sent them as prisoners into German territory. Colonel Brits, with the Imperial Light Horse, at once flung himself on the traitor, and the civil war opened on October 15 with an engagement at Ratedraai, ten miles south of Upington, in which 70 rebels were taken prisoners. On October 22 Maritz attacked the post of Keimos, between Kakamas and Upington. There were only 150 loyalists at Keimos, and Maritz had 1,000 rebels and 70 German gunners. He advanced at dawn, but the small garrison held out till reinforcements arrived, and then the rebels were so severely handled that Maritz offered to surrender if a free pardon were granted. He was wounded, and fled into German territory. Two days afterwards some of the rebels with German gunners were again defeated at Kakamas. The reaction of the loyal Dutch to Maritz's revolt was extremely significant, and should have given to the rebels much food for reflection.

Colonel van Deventer with one staff officer, went to the town of Calvinia, in northern Cape Colony. He called for loyalists to come out on commando for the sake of the honour and good name of the Dutch. In a few days there were 2,000 men ready to take the field. Many of them were fathers and brothers of the rebels. Under Colonel van Deventer they cooperated with the Imperial Light Horse and the Transvaal Horse, under Colonel Brits, and beat Maritz over the German frontier.

News of Maritz's action reached De Wet and Beyers on October 12. A conference was arranged two days later, and plans for extending the revolt were prepared. But De Wet could not organize a force in the Orange Free State until the 23rd, and it was not until the 24th that Beyers and Kemp were in rebellion in the Transvaal. By that time Maritz had been driven into German territory and his commando had been dispersed in scattered bands of fugitives. Cooperation between the rebels and German forces had been foiled before it began. But Botha's position was far from enviable. The thought of a civil war in which father would be ranged against son, brother against brother, was exceedingly painful to him, and he saw that

whichever way the issue went he could not but suffer great loss of personal prestige. He was convinced, however, that his duty allowed him only one course of action, and although he did all that lay within his power to avoid the shedding of blood, he none the less took active steps to stamp out the revolt.

Energetic appeals were addressed to both Hertzog and Steyn to use their great influence to prevent useless bloodshed. Botha's letter to Steyn, in which he referred to an insurrection "headed by men who in the past have been our honoured leaders," and implored the ex-president to persuade those men from the path of destruction where they now stand," was at once an admirable instance of the depth of his feelings and a finely conceived effort to avoid the horrors of civil war.

Both Hertzog and Steyn, however, refused to speak publicly against a recourse to arms. Neither approved of the action of Maritz, but both disapproved of the proposed invasion of German South-West Africa to such an extent that they were compelled to sympathise with any action which might prevent the government from carrying out its intentions.

When at last, however, Steyn realized that a large-scale revolt was imminent, he did consent to mediate. From October 23 onwards he used every endeavour to bring about a cessation of hostilities. It was then too late. The thrill of the adventure had swept the romantic old guerrilla leader, De Wet, off his feet, and Beyers was by then too convinced of success to be open to reason. It was not until successive defeats brought them up against the realities of the situation that either consented to interview the ex-president, and by that time the revolt was almost crushed.

As soon as they saw that their efforts to avoid bloodshed were doomed to failure, Botha and Smuts acted with strength and decision. The total strength of the rebels was approximately 10,000, but within a short time the personal influence of Botha and the energy and resource of Smuts enabled them to command the situation. In a few weeks they had 40,000 men in the field. Of these a few thousand were part of the little army sent to occupy the coast towns of German South-West Africa, and recalled when the rebellion broke out. But by far the larger number were commandos of burghers, who came forth to fight their own kith and kin for the sake of an empire against which they had been fighting only twelve years previously side by side

with the same kith and kin, and it is upon such achievements that the claim of the two loyalist statesmen to distinction rests.

The strain on the loyal Boers was appalling. In the course of the campaign complaints were made here and there by South Africans of British stock that they were bidden to hold their fire—while the rebels were shooting them down—to the last moment. There is no doubt that the Dutch generals and commandants were anxious to spare the lives of their own kinsmen. The loyal Boers themselves often remained for a long time under fire without shooting in reply, in the hope that the rebels would be surrounded and forced to surrender. The loyalists of both races at times suffered casualties, owing to the forbearing way in which they conducted their operations. But the blood that the Boer and Briton shed side by side in the common cause was worth shedding. They died so that the two white races of South Africa should grow into one nation, united by a common tradition of self-sacrifice and of forbearance in the hour of victory. Fortunately, however, the losses were not heavy. On the loyalists' side 132 were killed and 277 wounded in the month and a half's fighting. Of the rebels, some 5,700 were either captured or surrendered. The number killed and wounded was unknown. The proclamation of an amnesty to all those rebels who returned quietly to their homes by November 21 was largely responsible for the extraordinary rapidity with which this rebellion of 10,000 armed men was broken up.

If General Botha by his action in taking the field against his old colleagues forfeited the loyalty of some of the Boers, he won the respect of many others. Moreover, in a battle of conflicting loyalties it was early seen that many, even if in sympathy with Beyers and De Wet, would still refuse to bear arms against their one-time general. In the result, while the rebels' forces gradually melted away or were dispersed, Botha commanded large reserves.

The issue was never in doubt from the moment Botha moved against Beyers. But Botha's reluctance to move before every effort had been taken to avoid bloodshed had given the rebels time to overrun a large part of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. Actually the behaviour of their commandos towards the loyalist farmers alienated as many supporters as their cause attracted. Only three members of the Union Parliament came out in arms, and the amount of support given by the Dutch Reformed Church was negligible.

The rebels' plan of campaign was first to effect a junction between the commandos of De Wet, Beyers, and Kemp, then to march westward and join Maritz. The united forces were to be properly organized, and reinforced by German troops. Particularly they were expecting supplies of ammunition and guns, in which they were sadly lacking. Then with a well-equipped army they would march on Pretoria. The instant defeat of Maritz foiled this plan; but Beyers and Kemp, who were together in the Transvaal, still hoped to effect a junction with De Wet and then to operate in force against Pretoria.

But Botha never gave them a chance to link up their forces. Moving with great speed and decision, he came up with Beyers on October 27 near Rustenburg. In the action on the following morning Beyers' commando was dispersed. Efforts were at once made by Botha to avoid further fighting; but Beyers had crossed into the Free State, and a second engagement was fought at Gruis Drift, on the Vet river, on November 7. Over 400 rebels were taken prisoner. At last Beyers consented to see Steyn. The belated conference was doomed to failure, and although Botha gladly gave permission for Beyers to pass and return through the loyalist lines, no result was achieved.

De Wet, meanwhile, had been rather more successful. On November 7 he defeated a small force of loyalists at Winburg and proceeded to overrun the Transvaal. His commandos proved far from gentle in their methods of foraging, and Botha had little difficulty in raising troops. Although reluctant to move against his old comrade in arms, Botha realized the force of General Smuts' remark that unless de Wet were "convinced by force" he would not listen to reason.

At Vrede on October 29 De Wet had issued a rather ridiculous manifesto referring to the "ungodly policy of General Botha," roundly denouncing the "miserable, pestilent English," and describing the South-West Africa expedition as "a dastardly act of robbery." Its effect had been, from his point of view, singularly disappointing, and only the confirmed malcontents and the irresponsible hotheads had joined him, his main commando amounting to few more than 2,000 men.

Suddenly Botha struck. By a clever concentration of forces he almost surrounded De Wet at Mushroom Valley, 18 miles south-east of Winburg, on November 12, and although De Wet himself escaped, his commando was broken. Many prisoners

were taken, and De Wet found himself leader of a small fugitive band, harried across country by pursuing forces. He now signified his willingness to see Steyn, but the time had passed when the rebels could, as Botha said, "extort peace terms." De Wet's course was run, and he made for the comparative security offered by German South-West Africa. He never reached it. Although by skilful doubling and redoubling and by rapid division of his forces he showed once again that elusive and energetic spirit by which he had eluded the British in the South African war, he was this time up against veldt riders who knew his country as well as he did himself, and were as skilful in detecting a false trail as he in laying one. For just over a fortnight he continued to dodge his pursuers, but finally with some 50 followers he turned west, hoping to reach the border by a trek across the Kolahari desert. On December 1, 1914, he was overtaken at a farmhouse about 100 miles west of Mafeking—his tired horses hopelessly outdistanced by the fast motors—and surrendered without a struggle.

General Beyers came to a more terrible end. He remained in the northern districts of the Orange Free State with about 70 men, while loyal commandos harried him from every side and tried to force on an action, from which he continually escaped by scattering his force. At last, after an engagement near Bothaville on December 7, he split his party into two small groups. With one of these he fled towards the Vaal river along the tributary stream of the Zandspruit.

He was pursued by Captain Uys and Field Cornet Deneker, with a small loyalist force. At daybreak on December 9 the rebels were trapped in the angle between the Zandspruit and the Vaal, and after a sharp fight of fifteen minutes Beyers with some of his men tried to swim their horses across the Vaal to the Transvaal. They were fired on, and it was seen that Beyers fell from his horse, but managed to grasp another animal by the tail. This horse was swimming back to the Free State side. Beyers called for help; but fighting was still going on between the loyalists and some of the rebels, and he was swept away and drowned before anybody was able to rescue him.

This death, following on the capture of De Wet and the flight of Maritz and Kemp, practically brought the rebellion to a close. During the first week in December General Botha continued to conduct operations in the northern district of the Orange Free

State, where fogs and heavy rains veiled the movements of the last main forces of the revolt. But in a few days the rebels were hemmed in on all sides, 550 being captured and 200 surrendering to a single loyalist, Commandant Kloppers, who had been previously taken prisoner but released.

By Christmas the prime minister of South Africa was able to enjoy a week's holiday at his farm, in preparation for the campaign in German South-West Africa. From a military point of view the delay caused by the rebellion was fortunate. As originally planned, the expedition was dangerously inadequate in numbers; many of the men were imperfectly trained; they had not sufficient artillery, and were entirely without aircraft. All these defects were made good by General Botha and General Smuts. Moreover, the members of the first expedition consisted almost exclusively of South Africans of British extraction, but when finally the expedition started it was composed of almost equal numbers of Boers and Britons.

Botha's conduct throughout the rebellion had won universal admiration. His treatment of the rebels when the revolt was crushed was to win him more. The fact that only one, Fourie, an officer of the Citizen Defence Force who appears to have deserted while on active service, paid the extreme penalty, proves the leniency with which Botha acted. De Wet was sentenced to six years' imprisonment and fined £2,000. Kemp was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment and fined £1,000. Most of the others were even more lightly treated, and few ever served their full term. De Wet and 118 others, for example, were released before Christmas, 1915.

It cannot be doubted that this leniency was politic. Botha's popularity, which had suffered severely, rose again to a new height. And gratifying as that was to the prime minister himself, its consequences to South Africa were even more important. For he was enabled to carry the great body of the nation with him in his conquest of South-West Africa, and in spite of the fierce though constitutional opposition of General Hertzog and the nationalists, bring about a closer cooperation and understanding than ever before between Boer and Briton.

CHAPTER 22

The Attack on German Africa

IN 1914 Germany's African possessions consisted of Togoland, Cameroon and South-West Africa on the west coast of the continent, and German East Africa on the east coast. This last colony was, to quote the words of a prominent German writer, the "jewel of all her foreign possessions." About twice the size of Germany, and some 60,000 square miles larger than German South-West Africa, it covered an area of over 368,000 square miles, 20,000 of which were water; for the territory, which stretched away from the Indian Ocean between British Uganda and Kenya Colony on the north and Rhodesia and Portuguese East Africa on the south, was bounded along its western border by the length of Lake Tanganyika, and includes in its area the southern half of Lake Victoria and the northern end of Lake Nyasa.

Over this vast region Germany first flew her flag in 1890, but it should not be forgotten that this region was part of an enormous tract of land usually and compendiously described as East Africa, which had had an interesting history long before her traders ever touched its coast. There can be little doubt that the Phœnicians and their allies in southern Arabia sent their questing ships thither more than 2,000 years ago, and it is on record that about the commencement of the Christian era the Arabs had posts and stations on the island of Zanzibar and the mainland behind it.

Coming to later dates, both Arabs and Persians in the twelfth century were settled at Zanzibar, Mombasa and Kilwa. At the last-named place, which was situated in what very much later was called German East Africa, an Arab state, with all the characteristic features of Arab civilization, flourished for a lengthy period. All along the coast from Somaliland southwards the Arabs held sway over the blacks, and, favoured by the monsoon, dispatched gold, ivory, slaves and other merchandise to India and the East. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the Portuguese, the daring navigators of their day, arrived upon the scene and, ousting its Arab sultan, made Kilwa their

headquarters. But in their turn they were deprived of a large share of their conquests by fresh incursions of Arabs from Asia, and afterwards by hordes of negro warriors—the Jagas from the Congo—who laid Kilwa in ruins. The Portuguese were pressed back to the south side of the Rovuma river, which, however, remained their northern boundary; above it the Arabs gradually regained all the ground they had lost to the blacks.

It was not till the beginning of the nineteenth century that the British paid any particular attention to East Africa. By that time, bent on frustrating certain schemes of the French, who had garrisons in Madagascar and then owned Mauritius, they had occupied the Cape of Good Hope. The British government fitted out an expedition which in 1804 sailed round the cape and up the east coast of Africa for the purpose of entering into diplomatic relations with its Arab rulers. Later an important British consulate was established at Zanzibar. At that period Zanzibar and all the other Arab possessions in East Africa were governed from Muscat, the capital of Oman, at the mouth of the Persian Gulf, and the British were on friendly terms with its sultan.

Very little then was known to the outside world of what lay behind the coast, and one of the most fascinating chapters of all history is that which narrates the adventures and experiences of the explorers who, from about the middle of last century, penetrated into the interior. It starts in humble, evangelical fashion with the opening of missions at Zanzibar and on the littoral of the mainland, by representatives of the Church Missionary Society of England, and they, curiously enough, were men of German birth. But they heard from the Arabs amazing and well-nigh incredible tales of gigantic snow mountains far within that torrid land, and of enormous lakes hundreds of miles to the west. Fired by what they had been told, two of these missionaries, Krapf and Rebmann, natives of Württemberg, travelled inland, and were rewarded by the discovery of the majestic mass of Kilima-Njaro, one of the greatest mountains in the world and, for the most part, a wonderland of beauty. Their accounts of what they had seen inspired other explorers, among them Burton and Speke, the latter of whom discovered Lakes Tanganyika and Victoria Nyanza. The remaining portion of the chapter is glorious with the names of Livingstone, Stanley and Commander Cameron, but French and German travellers also played a worthy part in the discovery of the hinterland.

THE SULTANATE OF ZANZIBAR

In the second half of the nineteenth century Great Britain was fortunate in having a really remarkable man as consul-general at Zanzibar—Sir John Kirk, G.C.M.G. Known and trusted by the sultan of Zanzibar and the Arab chiefs, who governed themselves by his advice, he became the virtual ruler of the whole immense area from Somaliland down to the territory of the Portuguese. His main preoccupation was the extension and consolidation of British influence, and next to it was the suppression of the slave trade. To a large extent he was successful in attaining both objects. He induced the sultan of Zanzibar to prohibit the traffic in slaves, but in the purely political field he encountered the opposition of France, who had established a rival consulate at Zanzibar; and with her there were treaties in existence which tied his hands.

Great Britain and France, in the period of the Second Empire, had agreed, in order to avoid a conflict, that neither of them would bring under her control politically the Muscat territories in East Africa or the lands which belonged to the sultanate of Zanzibar. There was, however, a good deal of competition between the two Powers, but no disturbance of the existing *status quo* took place, and the Arabs retained their possessions. Then another Power stepped in and soon brought about a radical change in the situation. That Power was Germany, eager for her "place in the sun," and not too particular as to the means of getting it.

German traders appeared at Zanzibar as far back as 1846, but it was not till some years after the unification of Germany was accomplished that William II. and his ministers entered on that policy of expansion which aimed at the establishment of a great German colonial empire. All the globe had been already parcelled out with the exception of Africa, and it was natural that Germany should turn her attention to the opportunities presented by that continent. A move was made in 1884 by sending Dr. Karl Peters to East Africa, where he acquired some treaty rights from the native chiefs, and in the following year the German government gave him and his associates in this enterprise an imperial charter of protection. In 1885 Germany declared a protectorate over the independent state of Witu. In 1886 Great Britain and Germany came to an understanding that the sultan of Zanzibar's dominions included Zanzibar, Pemba and the Lamu archipelago, in addition to a ten-mile belt along the coast

from Tungi Bay to Kipimi and some northern towns—much less, in fact, than these Zanzibar princes had claimed.

Meanwhile, the British had formed a chartered company, the British East African Association, to offset the activities of Dr. Peters' company. In 1887 the sultan of Zanzibar granted a lease of his mainland possessions between the Umba river and Kipimi to the British company, but in the succeeding year he made similar concessions to its German rival with respect to his territories south of the Umba. As was to be expected, there was much jealousy and considerable friction between the British and the Germans, and with a view to terminating this unsatisfactory state of things a treaty was signed on July 1st, 1890, by Great Britain and Germany, to which France was also a signatory.

This treaty created German East Africa. By its terms Germany withdrew from Witu and resigned her claims to other lands north of her new colony, but now she received its definite cession. Great Britain established a protectorate over Zanzibar and Pemba and the regions north of the new German zone up to Somaliland, reaching westward from Mombasa as far inland as Uganda. By the treaty Germany recognized this British sphere. France obtained recognition of her claims to Madagascar, the Sahara, and the Nigerian Sudan. Great Britain afterwards organized three protectorates in the area assigned to her—the East African Protectorate which included Witu, the Uganda Protectorate, and the Zanzibar Protectorate. The governor of the East African Protectorate was high commissioner for Zanzibar, but in other respects their administrations were separate and distinct.

Situated on the island of the same name, the city of Zanzibar was by far the greatest town, and its harbour was much the best in East Africa. Nothing in the country given over to Germany was of anything like the same immediate importance or value, and there was no little discontent among the colonial party in Berlin and Hamburg when the details of the treaty were published. But the Germans at once went to work to find other ports, and discovered them in Tanga and Dar-es-Salaam. Although Germany had set such store by this, her premier colony, settlement had gone into it very slowly. It was estimated that in 1913 its entire white population was under 6,000, or only about a third of the white population of German South-West Africa.

RAILWAY LINES BUILT

Topographically the country is everywhere mountainous, except for a narrow strip of coastal plain. In the north-east the mighty summits of Kilima-Njaro and Meru tower above the surrounding highlands, the former the highest mountain in the continent, rising in a beautiful double peak to 19,325 feet, the latter to 14,953 feet. The chief feature of the country, however, is the "bush," which covers a large area. Sometimes more or less open, but generally very dense, it consists of a thick undergrowth of low shrubs and elephant grass from which isolated small trees rise to a height of 30 feet. Covering hills and valleys and even spreading across dry deserts, it develops into luxuriant tropical jungle in the low-lying coastal region. From the European point of view the climate is highly unfavourable. Except in the mountainous region round Kilima-Njaro the river valleys are swampy and infested with malaria. The heat is intense, and in the bush the tsetse fly is prevalent. Away from the rivers water is often scarce, and in the dry season it is completely lacking. During the season of the rains vast areas become inundated.

Such factors, although they represent great advantages of defence from a military point of view, are grave obstacles to colonization, and the strides which Germany had made in that direction by 1914 reflect the greatest credit not only upon her industry and enterprise, but also upon the wisdom and skill with which the territory was administered.

To augment the transport facilities on the lakes and the few navigable rivers the Germans had constructed two great railway lines. The larger, which crossed the centre of the colony from Ujiji on the eastern shore of Lake Tanganyika to the capital, Dar-es-Salaam, on the coast, measured some 780 miles and provided the backbone of the whole country both politically and commercially. The smaller ran from Tanga, second in importance only to Dar-es-Salaam, to Moshi on the southern slopes of Mount Kilima-Njaro. This railway, some 270 miles long, followed the line of the Usambare and Pare mountains, which run unbroken from the coastal plain to Moshi. Protected throughout its course by the chain of mountains, the railway linked up the centre of European colonization around Moshi with the coast. Besides the railways, an excellent network of roads had been laid across the country, harbours had been equipped, and towns built with characteristic Germany efficiency.

The chief wealth of the country lay in its enormous agricultural resources. The presence of the tsetse prevented the development of cattle farming except in the highlands, but everywhere tropical products flourished. Plantations had been started in suitable localities, and numerous experiments had been made which increased the commercial and agricultural possibilities of the whole country. Native production had been systematized and encouraged, and nothing had been left undone to ensure that German East Africa should merit its title of the "jewel of her foreign possessions."

But above all German administration of the colony was most to be admired. Under a succession of governors whose ability was exceptional, the natives had been won over to a friendliness and loyalty to their masters which contrasted strangely with the feeling natives generally entertained for Germany in her other colonies. Nothing, however, could prove the essential wisdom of German administration more conclusively than the loyalty of the askari regiments which were raised in the war. While it is true that after the tide had set in favour of the British the natives as a whole began to show a coolness towards the Germans, the askaris showed until the very end of the struggle a consistent loyalty to their commanders. African natives, as all primitive people, display remarkable acumen in gauging the real and potential strength of Europeans. Such acumen generally determines the help they will give and the loyalty they will show. And it is remarkable that even in her darkest hour Germany was never quite deserted by her native population. From friendly and willing they became cold and unhelpful; but seldom were they hostile, nor could they easily be persuaded to take up arms against their former rulers.

No small part of the achievement is due to one man, Lieutenant Colonel Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, the commander of the forces in German East Africa. One of the romantic figures of the war, he combined in a remarkable way military ability amounting almost to genius with a power of winning his men's affection and loyalty. No more than a bare recital of his achievement is necessary in order to describe the nature of his personality. Surrounded on every side by enemies, cut off from contact with his own country, and dependent entirely upon his own skill and resources, he not only inflicted heavy reverses upon his enemies for two years, during which time he maintained his territories

inviolate, but when at last he was pressed back by the sheer weight of superior forces he defended himself with such skill that November 11, 1918, found him still undefeated.

Like the other combatants in East Africa, Germany was quite unprepared for the outbreak of hostilities. Indeed, one of the little ironies to which that fateful August of 1914 gave grim point was that the Germans had planned and advertised far and wide a large exhibition which was to be held in that very month at Dar-es-Salaam, its capital, to exhibit the products of their new possession, announce its facilities for settlement, and draw attention to it generally as an example of the power, adaptability and persuasiveness of German colonization. Lettow-Vorbeck, however, who had taken over his command in January, 1914, was convinced that the "universal war" was imminent. Since his arrival, therefore, he had been steadily preparing for the struggle which he felt was bound to come.

Lettow-Vorbeck was a realist. Unlike many German commanders, he foresaw that whatever might be the outcome of the war in Europe, the fate of the colonial empires of the various countries would depend upon the control of the sea. Nor was he under any delusion as to with whom that control would ultimately rest. He realized quite clearly that the British navy would not only cooperate with the land forces of his enemies against his coasts and ports, but would quickly establish a blockade which would cut him off from his country and rob him of regular supplies of stores and ammunition. He was compelled to face the prospect of a long struggle in which, while the manpower and supplies of his opponents were gradually increased, his own would gradually be exhausted.

His first difficulty arose from the attitude that the German governor of the colony, von Schnee, adopted towards the coming struggle. Terrified by the openness of his coasts to attack, he was prepared to go almost to any lengths to avoid bombardment of his chief ports. In spite of this timidity of his superior, Lettow-Vorbeck was determined to engage as many of the enemy for as long as he could. His second difficulty was the attitude of some of his officers. Long before hostilities had commenced, Lettow-Vorbeck had drawn up his plan of campaign. He realized that if he was to exploit to the full the advantages of his position an offensive was his best means of defence. With this object in view he planned to strike at and paralyse the Uganda railway running

from Mombasa to Lake Victoria. But in the beginning many of his officers were reluctant to obey his orders on the ground that to attack the enemy was to violate their obligations under the Congo Act which, in their view, required them to be neutral. It is interesting to recall that Germany so early as August 27, 1914, submitted neutrality proposals in respect of African colonies to the Allies. The proposals were summarily rejected.

Lettow-Vorbeck's third difficulty was his shortage of ammunition and his lack of modern rifles. He possessed a fair number of machine guns, but here again ammunition was scarce, and if he became involved in any heavy and prolonged fighting it would make very serious inroads on his small stock. His plans, therefore, had to be based upon the idea of lightning blows rapidly delivered. There had to be few pitched battles. It can be mentioned here that two successful attempts were made to run the blockade of the coast by the British navy, both of which brought invaluable supplies of guns and ammunition to Lettow-Vorbeck. The task of watching such a long coastline of excellent natural harbours was prodigious, and it is remarkable that so few ships managed to evade the vigilance of the British gunboats. Further mention of these attempts to run the blockade will be found in due course.

Lettow-Vorbeck's supreme advantages were in the nature of the country he had to defend, and in his central position. In military terms he occupied the "interior lines," his opponents being compelled to move round him. To this fact he owed largely his ability to strike so rapidly at different points within short spaces of time. But more than anything he was favoured by the "bush," which, as has been said, covered so large a part of the territory he was defending. In General Smuts' words, "In the African bush, with its limited visibility, it is practically impossible to enclose an enemy determined to escape."

A resolute commander with well-trained forces can fight a number of heavily contested skirmishes, and at a given word he and his troops can completely disappear. The method consists in "lining for bush," as it is called. When the point of a battle is reached at which further resistance means destruction for one party, the whole force divides into small groups of three or four, which make their several ways in different directions through the bush to a prearranged concentration point. With an enemy scattered in this way pursuit is hopeless. Moreover, so thick is

the bush that large bodies of troops may be on the march within a mile or two of each other, both quite ignorant of the other's nearness. Small parties can pass within a few yards of a pursuer and quite escape detection. With troops trained to such warfare a commander need never fear encirclement. And Lettow-Vorbeck was wise enough to see that his troops were so trained. In this he avoided a mistake of the British which was to cost them dear. Distrustful of native troops, Britain preferred to rely upon Indian regiments and white troops recruited in Africa. Not only were such troops in the last resort ill-suited to African bush warfare, but white and Indian troops alike suffered terribly from the climate, malaria accounting for many more of the British forces than ever did the rifles of Lettow-Vorbeck. It was not until West African regiments were brought from Nigeria and the Gold Coast that General Smuts was able to make really effective counters to Lettow-Vorbeck's advantages.

On the outbreak of war Lettow-Vorbeck had a force, including the police, of about 5,000 men, of whom 260 were Europeans. This force, more than sufficient to defend the country against any combination of Belgian and British forces which then could be brought against it, was insufficient to conduct an offensive, and would prove inadequate for defence as soon as mobilization and equipment of the reserve man power of his enemies became effective. His energies were bent upon recruitment and careful training of his forces, a task which he accomplished with the greatest skill. In its place more will be told of the various efforts made by both sides to increase their forces, but it is sufficient to point out that at the beginning of the war Lettow-Vorbeck enjoyed a distinct advantage over the Allied forces in numbers and preparedness.

On the British side so unexpected was the declaration of hostilities that it found the major part of the protectorate force, the King's African Rifles, at the other end of the country engaged in a punitive expedition against recalcitrant natives in Jubaland. In effect, the British territory was entirely unprotected. Lettow-Vorbeck, however, was not concerned, as we saw, to waste his energies upon major operations. He knew only too well that the British would be reinforced. He was eager to strike a blow at the unprotected British railway, but von Schnee, the governor, refused to sanction such a move, despite his protests. Britain had the command of the sea, and the governor

was acutely conscious of his helplessness. He would do nothing, sanction nothing that would expose his ports to bombardment. Lettow-Vorbeck found his hands tied.

On August 8 two old British cruisers in the harbour of Zanzibar, the Astrea and the Pegasus, steamed across to Dar-es-Salaam. Von Schnee was panic-stricken. Without Lettow-Vorbeck's knowledge he at once negotiated for the surrender of the port. The British commander appears to have been unprepared for such a reception. His orders had been to close the port and dismantle the powerful wireless station. He lacked any forces to garrison the port. In the result he landed some bluejackets who destroyed the wireless station, and dismantled or sank one or two vessels. The Germans themselves sank a floating dock and so closed the entrance to the harbour. In place of the bombardment he contented himself with a signed agreement which in the words of Lettow-Vorbeck "forbade us to take any hostile act in Dar-es-Salaam while the enemy were not so bound." The British flotilla sailed away, and the same day von Schnee departed for a pleasant hill station at Morogoro, leaving Lettow-Vorbeck more or less free to conduct his own affairs. He at once prepared to secure his lines of advance into British East Africa. Vanga, the most southerly port on the coast, was seized, and by a rapid march from Moshi through the gap between the northern end of the Pare mountains and the slopes of Kilima-Njaro, he seized the British frontier post of Taveta.

Half-hearted and ill-supported attacks were made by the small local German forces on Abercorn, a little town on the border of northern Rhodesia and on Karonga, a port on the northern shore of Lake Nyasa. These movements were quite secondary, the sideshows of the major campaign, and were fairly easily beaten off. Any operations in districts other than the frontier of British East Africa were regarded by both sides as subsidiary. Here lack of forces compelled the British to take the defensive, all energies being concentrated upon the raising of troops. Volunteers were called for and the response was cheering, but the rawness of the recruits and their lack of training were not set off by their eagerness. Two regiments, one of which was mounted, were formed from white settlers, and an Arab force was raised by Major A. J. B. Wavell. This force was of great utility. Major Wavell had made the pilgrimage to Mecca, and commanded the loyalty and devotion of his troops in a remarkable

manner. But his untimely death in action in January, 1916, led to the dispersal of the force, which all along was largely a "one man" affair. Such troops, however, were quite inadequate to resist the well-trained and well-equipped levies of Lettow-Vorbeck, who was known to be planning a raid on Mombasa, and the government of India was approached with a view to supplying reinforcements. In consequence, the first units of the force officially known as the "Indian Expeditionary Force B" arrived at Mombasa on September 3. They consisted of the 29th Punjabis, and with them came Brigadier General J. M. Stewart, who took over the command of all the protectorate's forces.

Plans for an attack were at once prepared, but before they could be carried out Lettow-Vorbeck had launched his own attack. It was quite a failure, and convinced him finally of the stupidity of wasting time, men and materials upon large offensives. He had been tempted to the venture by an unexpected piece of good fortune. The German cruiser Königsberg, which had been in African waters just before the commencement of hostilities, and, in fact, had sailed from Dar-es-Salaam immediately before war was declared, returned quite unexpectedly. Her arrival gave Lettow-Vorbeck temporary command of the sea, and he decided to strike a large blow before he was finally bottled up. He conceived the idea of a combined land and sea operation whereby a force should march on Mombasa while the cruiser attacked it from the sea. Between the two the port should be held long enough to enable the Germans to wreck the harbour and destroy the great railway bridge connecting the island on which the port is built with the mainland.

On September 20 the land force set off from Vanga, while the Königsberg steamed out from Dar-es-Salaam. Mombasa was to be reached on the 29th, and meanwhile the cruiser was to disable the opposing flotilla. She arrived outside Zanzibar on the same day as she left Dar-es-Salaam, and came upon the Pegasus, which lay in the roadstead undergoing repairs. A few rounds from the German heavy guns and the British ship was sunk, any resistance or effective reply being impossible. The Königsberg made for Mombasa. But she was destined never to reach there. Rear Admiral King Hall in command of some ships of the Cape squadron reached the coast of East Africa the next day and headed the German boat off from the British port. Only the superior speed of the Königsberg saved her from the guns of the

British, and although she escaped destruction she was compelled to fly. After a chase lasting for the best part of a fortnight Captain Looff, the German commander, despairing of forever avoiding the persistence of the British pursuers, ran his ship as far as he could up the shallow waters at the mouth of the Rufigi river, and there beached it. Useless to the Germans so long as the British ships were in those waters, it was better to ensure as far as possible its immunity from attack and to preserve its valuable stores, guns and men than to lose all in a glorious but hopeless and ridiculous fight. For the time at least the cruiser was safe. Of her eventual fate more will be heard at a later stage.

Meanwhile, the land party had itself got into difficulties. Although only a distance of 50 miles separated Vanga from Mombasa, the route was for the most part across difficult country covered with jungle swamps and undergrowth. By the 23rd it had reached Gazi, a small town on the coast 25 miles from Mombasa. A small force of the King's African Rifles, supported by an Arab company, was defending the town and, although the Germans attacked with great courage, defended their position so well that the attackers were repulsed. The fighting was desperate, all the British white officers being wounded, but the admirable coolness and great fighting qualities of the African troops never failed. For a week the Germans were held at bay, until on October 2 some Indian troops hurriedly dispatched from Mombasa reached the town. The weary Germans could do no more, and they slowly retired, reaching Vanga, which had been their starting point, six days later.

During this same period a series of daring but on the whole ineffectual raids had been carried out by the Germans against the Uganda railway, particularly at Kisii near Lake Victoria, and at Voi some miles east of Taveta. Counter raids by British forces were equally abortive, and it became clear to both combatants that without a period of preparation little could be done. The Germans still held Taveta and Vanga, but that was the extent of their gains. On the other hand, Britain had secured the control of the sea, and the only German vessel had been rendered useless. On the great lakes conditions were about equal, the Germans having secured control of Tanganyika by aid of the steamer Hedwig von Wissman, and the British having obtained command of lakes Nyasa and Victoria.

REINFORCEMENTS FROM INDIA

The British authorities, however, heard that further reinforcements were arriving from India, and they were induced to launch a large scale offensive. The plan was to make a demonstration against Taveta and to sweep round north of Kilima-Njaro by Mount Longido and attack the western end of the Usambara railway with the troops already available, while the troops from India should be directed straight at Tanga, which they would capture, and then proceed to advance westward up the railway to join hands with the force from Longido. General Stewart was in command of the Longido expedition: Brigadier General A. E. Aitken was to command the Tanga expedition.

The transports arrived off Tanga on November 2. As well as Indian troops they contained a white unit, the 2nd battalion Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, which brought the total strength of the force to about 7,000. Their arrival was expected, for the Germans had captured some Indian mails, and Lettow-Vorbeck had given Auracher, the German commissioner, instructions that whatever were von Schnee's orders the port was to be defended. At the moment of arrival of the British forces the final arrangements for defence were incomplete. In response therefore to the summons to surrender, Auracher asked for time to communicate with his superiors. The request was granted, but the delay was used by Lettow-Vorbeck to hurry down reinforcements by rail. In the evening some British troops were landed two miles east of the town at Ras Kasone. Advancing through heavy jungle they encountered stiff opposition, and, unable to make headway, they retired. Reinforced the next day, they again advanced, and although still unable to make much ground, convinced the German commander, Captain Baumstark, that Tanga could not be held against a determined attack. With the close of the indecisive fighting towards evening he drew off his troops four miles west of the town, leaving only patrols.

Later in the evening Lettow-Vorbeck arrived, and passing through deserted Tanga reconnoitred the situation. He saw at once that the British forces had thrust themselves into a very dangerous position. Ignorant of the lie of the land, obscure as to the strength and disposition of the enemy, impeded at every step by an almost impenetrable jungle which foiled their method of attack and completely prevented the full deployment of their strength, they were quite unable to make effective provision against surprise, and in any event were outclassed by native

troops quite in their element under such conditions. Reinforcing the garrison of the town with European troops, Lettow-Vorbeck disposed most of his forces along the Ras Kasone-Tanga Road.

The next day the fight was resumed. The British and Indian troops pushed their way forward without much opposition and entered Tanga itself. At once the fighting became severe, the few Germans defending themselves with great skill and courage. At 3 p.m. Lettow-Vorbeck launched his surprise attack. Supported by machine gun fire, the attack was pushed home. Taken on their unprotected flank, the British were thrown into a confusion that rapidly became a retreat, and although they continued fighting in the bush until after midnight, Lettow-Vorbeck perpetually outflanked them, and they were compelled to retire to their camp. On November 5 they were re-embarked and taken back to Mombasa, the disastrous attack on Tanga having cost the British forces 795 casualties and 16 machine guns.

Ill conceived, it was worse executed; valuable lives had been sacrificed and nothing had been gained. The method of attack adopted was the worst possible under such conditions. It was proved conclusively that for short engagements in the bush a small well trained force, provided it be well handled, is more than a match for many times its own number. According to Lettow-Vorbeck the German forces engaged were "about 1,000." Had they been 500 the result would probably have been the same.

Meanwhile, the Longido expedition had fared no better. The country across which the attackers had to march was a waterless desert, and the operation confirmed the lesson to be learnt from the failure of the Germans at Gazi. Such country gave all the advantage to the defenders. In this instance the attacking force numbered about 1,500. The Germans, about 800 strong, had posted themselves in a strong position covering the only available water supply. The action, which began on November 4 and lasted until 7.30 p.m., is best described in the few short words of one of the British officers: "We marched all night, fought all day, and then having failed to turn the Germans out came back here as we had no water." Thus ended the first British offensive. But the lessons learnt were taken to heart. No further offensive was undertaken until the early months of 1916, the intervening period being one of intensive preparation. Lettow-Vorbeck for his part was equally willing to play the waiting game. He contented

himself with the gains he had already won, and devoted all his energies to the task of raising, training and equipping an army. Until 1916, except for small frontier skirmishes, raids and counter-raids, the East African theatre of war remained in a state of outward calm, despite a feverish activity that presaged a struggle in which two forces of gallant men sought to kill each other over some of the most difficult country in the world.

On the west coast of Africa, meanwhile, conditions had been very different. Neither of the two German colonies there, Togoland and Cameroons, was fortunate enough to be under the command of a Lettow-Vorbeck, and the end of 1914 was to see the complete conquest by French and British troops of the little colony of Togoland, and the almost complete conquest of the larger region of Cameroons.

In neither of these spheres had Germany pursued the enlightened policy which in East Africa had won her the loyal support of the inhabitants. On the contrary, particularly in Togoland, her harsh methods of exploitation had won her bitter enemies. A number of governors whose view of colonial progress did not extend beyond the narrow vision that is associated with the most intense and limited aspects of German "Kultur" and imperialism, had alienated all loyalty by their repressive and criminal treatment of the natives. The notorious W. Horn, who was governor from 1902-5, was responsible for a policy the effect of which was a steady emigration of the natives from Togoland to the neighbouring French and British colonies of Dahomey and the Gold Coast. So serious did the position become that the Imperial government was compelled to take the matter up. Horn was dismissed for misconduct, and Count von Zech was appointed in his stead.

The change of command, however, brought little relief, for although the new governor was more conciliatory towards the natives his methods of economic exploitation were fiercely resented. Nevertheless, the colony began to develop under his administration. Roads and railways were built, harbours were opened and trade was rapidly expanded. But the enmity aroused by the early years of German occupation was little allayed, and for several years before the war energetic steps were taken to reconcile the natives to German rule. The reversal of the previous policy was, however, too long delayed. By the time war broke out little had been done, and the German governor found

himself in the unenviable position of having to fight enemies who outnumbered him considerably in a country which was bitterly hostile to his cause and in active sympathy with his opponents. The difficulty of raising any troops at all was not the least of his troubles. The desertion and the treachery of his native soldiers made his position hopeless from the beginning.

Such facts, however, do not in the least detract from the achievement of the French and British forces which by a model little campaign completed the conquest of a country, admirably adapted to defence, within four weeks of the outbreak of hostilities. Togoland was a country 33,700 square miles in extent, or about the size of Ireland, and it lay between Dahomey, belonging to France, and the Gold Coast Colony, a British possession. It became German in 1884, 30 years before the war, when the traveller Gustav Nachtigal landed at Lome from a gunboat, and by an arrangement with the local chiefs declared the land to be a German protectorate. In shape it is not unlike a pyramid, tapering down to its coastline on the Gulf of Guinea, where it is only 32 miles from end to end.

The capital of the colony was Lome, on the coast. Other stations were Bagida, also on the coast; Togo on Lake Togo, Misahöhe about 100 miles inland, Bismarckburg on the high lands in the centre of the country, and Sansanne Mango and Yendi in the north. The population consisted of about 1,000,000 Hausas, and before the war there were less than 400 white folk there. A railway ran along the coast from Little Popo to Lome and thence inland to Misahöhe, another from Lome to Atakpame, and there were about 800 miles of good roads.

At Kamina, near Atakpame, the Germans had built a high-power wireless station which maintained direct communication with Berlin. The importance of this station, by means of which news of the situation in Africa could be quickly received by the Imperial government, was considerable, and its possession was even more valuable to Germany than the possession of the whole of the colony.

In 1912, in pursuance of the new policy of conciliation, Germany had departed from her general rule in staffing her colonies, and had appointed as governor of Togoland a member of one of the reigning families, Duke Frederich of Mecklenburg. The leader of a Trans-African expedition, he had acquired considerable insight into native affairs, and his influence had begun to

count. When the war broke out, however, the duke was on leave, his place being filled by the acting governor, Major von Döring. During the critical days of July, 1914, he had been in touch with Berlin. At that time it was not expected that Britain would be involved, and von Döring was instructed to prepare to attack French Dahomey. As soon, however, as it became known that Britain was ranged on the French side, the governor was ordered to make neutrality proposals to both the French and the British authorities. The proposals were rejected and, although defence of the whole colony was impossible, von Döring was ordered to defend the Kamina wireless station.

A plan of campaign was prepared by the French and British authorities. On August 6 a British cruiser was dispatched to Lome to demand the surrender of the colony. Twenty-four hours' delay was granted, but on the next day it was found that von Döring had retreated with his little army, numbering 60 Europeans and about 400 natives, northwards towards Atakpame. The official left behind had instructions to surrender the colony as far as a line 75 miles north of Lome. The following day cooperation between the French and British was arranged. The plan was for a concerted advance from three directions upon the German forces. British troops were to invade the colony in the north and west, a French detachment was to approach from the east, and a combined expedition to move up from the coast.

This last was under the command of Captain (later Colonel) F. C. Bryant, the senior officer available on the Gold Coast. With a force consisting of 57 Europeans and 535 natives he reached Lome on August 12, and at once set off north along the railway to Atakpame. On the 18th he was joined by Captain Castaing and a French contingent, numbering three Europeans and 155 natives, and the combined force moved on Kamina.

Where the railway to Atakpame crosses the small river known as the Chra, the Germans decided to make their first stand. Having blown up the railway bridge, they took up a strong position on the north side of the stream, their three machine guns trained upon the only practicable approaches. The river valley was covered with a thick jungle, in most places quite impenetrable except by the laborious method of cutting a path yard by yard through the dense undergrowth. Under such conditions the defending force was almost entirely screened from the attackers, who were themselves exposed in the open

to a murderous fire to which no reply could be made. Time and again with great gallantry the British officers and their native soldiers rushed forward to reach the enemy. Time and again they were checked by the river banks and the undergrowth and driven back by the well-directed fire of the Germans. As things stood the position was impregnable, and the Allied troops were compelled to retire.

This, however, was at once the first and the last serious fight in the campaign. During the night of August 22 Major von Döring received information that a French force approaching from Dahomey was within two days' march of Kamina, and that a second British column was advancing from the Gold Coast. Hastily evacuating the Chra position he retired on Kamina. Two days later, Colonel Bryant and his force reached the town. Preparations for an attack were at once begun, but during the night of August 24-25 von Döring blew up the wireless station. In the morning he sent an envoy to ask for terms, and on these being refused he surrendered unconditionally on the 26th.

The Allied losses had been, for the size of the force engaged, very severe, the casualties amounting to 73, of whom 23 were killed. Of the Germans, five had been killed and 32 taken prisoner after the fall of Kamina. Almost all the native troops joined the Allied forces.

In Northern Togoland, meanwhile, the Allied cause had met with equal success. Yendi had surrendered to a handful of British troops on August 18, and the western part of the country was rapidly reduced. The fighting was limited to sniping and skirmishes, the Germans having practically no available forces, their troops deserting as soon as they were able to the Allied ranks. Elsewhere a French column of 630 rifles was completing the subjugation of the country and swelling its ranks with the disaffected German askaris. This force in the height of the rainy season had completed a forced march of 310 miles from Upper Senegal in 20 days. They occupied Sansanne Mango, and moved southward to unite with the rest of the Allied forces. The conquest of Togoland was complete.

Gratifying as were the speed and neatness with which the country had been reduced, it was more pleasing still to reflect that the operations had been carried out entirely by local forces. And in this respect the little campaign in Togoland was unique. Great Britain and France agreed to govern the country between

them, and officials of each nationality were appointed to look after the part adjacent to their own possessions. Trade was resumed, private property was not interfered with, and there is no reason to suppose that the natives had any cause to regret the change of rulers.

Cameroons is a larger country than Togoland, from which it is separated by French Dahomey and British Nigeria, and its conquest was a bigger proposition. The name comes from a Portuguese word meaning prawns, and its coast was discovered by Fernando Po towards 1500. Either he or some other Portuguese navigator gave the name Rio dos Camaroes, or river of Prawns, to the big estuary there; and later, the interior was called Cameroons.

German colonization dated from 1884, Nachtigal, the founder of Togoland, taking possession in the name of Germany and calling the territory Kamerun. Expansion was rapid, and by 1911 some 191,000 square miles of the interior had been included within the protectorate. It was in that year that the international tension over the question as to which of the European nations should control Morocco reached its climax. The Agadir incident, as it is called, nearly provoked war, but a compromise arrangement kept the peace for another three years. By this arrangement, which is known as the Franco-German treaty of 1911, Germany agreed to renounce her claims to a share in Moroccan territory in return for the cession of two large slices of French Equatorial Africa bordering on the Cameroons.

As the result of this grant of territory, the German protectorate was increased to an area of 292,000 square miles. Roughly triangular in shape, it stood on a base stretching from the valley of the Sanga river in the east to the Muni river estuary in the west. The eastern boundary was an arbitrary line running from Bonga at the confluence of the Sanga and Congo rivers to Lake Chad. On the west the territory had a coastline of some 200 miles on the Bight of Biafra as far as the mouth of the Cross river in British Nigeria. From there the boundary, settled by an Anglo-German agreement of 1913, ran in a fairly straight line north-east to Lake Chad again. By the Franco-German treaty, Germany had secured a valuable port on the Congo river, and farther north, another on the Ubangi. The most curious result was the total inclusion within the boundaries of German Cameroons of the small territory of Spanish Guinea. Elsewhere

the country adjoined French and British territories, touching the Belgian Congo at two points. The transfer of the ceded territory took place in 1912 ; but although the Germans established trading posts on the Congo and Ubangi rivers they had not sufficient time to develop the rest of the newly acquired lands before the outbreak of war robbed them of their possession.

This country, about five times the size of England and Wales, is typical of central West Africa. Much of it is mountainous, and sloping down to the sea is the magnificent Cameroons mountain, called by the natives the mountain of greatness. It is over 13,000 feet high, and is the highest point on the western side of Africa, being a volcano, by no means extinct, and from top to bottom it is covered with dense forests. On the rest of the coast there is a level strip of land, and at the back of the colony there is a good deal of low-lying country.

Cameroons has many rivers and several good harbours. Into the great Cameroons estuary, which is 20 miles across, flow the rivers Wuri and Mungo, and through the centre of the colony the Sanaga runs to the sea. The hinterland is watered by the Logone and the Shari, which unite before they fall into Lake Chad, and the Sanga, a tributary of the Congo. The population consisted of about 2,500,000 negroes, mostly of the Bantu race, but some belonging to the Fula and the Hausa tribes live in the north. Before the war there were less than 2,000 whites in the colony. Buea, on the slopes of Cameroons mountain, was the official capital, but Duala on the Cameroons estuary was the largest place, and a trading centre of some importance. Other considerable towns were Victoria, Batanga, and Campo on the coast, Garua on the Benue river, and near the Nigerian frontier, Ngaundere, the largest town in the interior, and Yaunde, about 100 miles from the sea. The soil is fertile, and produces rubber, cotton, cocoa, and coffee, as well as a great number of palms, the oil and kernels of which are exported in large quantities. Ivory and copra are also exported, and the land grows much excellent timber, notably ebony. Many cattle are raised, and in some parts the natives grow corn, maize, and rice.

The centre and south of the country are covered with the tropical jungle forest of West Africa. Fringed on the seaboard with innumerable creeks and a strip of dreary and deadly mangrove swamps, it stretches eastward in monotonous impenetrability for over 150 miles. Farther east it gives way to some

Highflyer, British second class cruiser, which sank the German cruiser Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse, August 27, 1914.

The British cruiser Hawke, a warship that was torpedoed and sunk by the German submarine U 9 off the Scottish coast, October 15, 1914.

The German steamer Konigin Luise, sunk while laying mines off the English coast on August 5, 1914.

Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse, German auxiliary cruiser which was sunk off the West African coast by the Highflyer, August 27, 1914.

BRITISH WARSHIPS AND GERMAN STEAMERS

FRENCH TROOPS IN ACTION ON THE AISNE. The long drawn out battle of the Aisne in October, 1914, was the result of the German stand on that river following their retreat after the battle of the Marne. It was fought on a long front of 150 miles from Compiègne to Tahure, east of Reims. The illustration shows French infantry advancing to the attack.

STIRRING EPISODE OF THE GREAT RIVER BATTLE. French infantry driving the Germans from their trenches near Morains, on the road running north from Fère Champenoise to Vertus and Epernay and Reims. The battle of the Aisne left the Germans firmly entrenched in the very heart of France.

From a sketch by Frederic Villiers

SCENES IN POLAND'S CAPITAL. 1. Cathedral of S. Alexander Nevski, completed in 1912. 2. Former royal palace, under Russian regime the palace of the governor-general of Poland, later the residence of the president of the republic; right is the column and statue of King Sigismund III. 3. City Hall, rebuilt in 1870. From 1914 onwards Warsaw was an important objective of the Germans on the eastern front.



savannah-like lands, very largely covered with thick bush. In the north the country becomes more open, except in the immediate neighbourhood of Lake Chad, but is everywhere broken and mountainous.

A number of fairly good roads had been built in the southern and western part of the territory, but the greater part of the north and east was still badly served in 1914. Railway construction was not very far advanced, two short lines radiating north and south from the Cameroons estuary, linking up the major trading centres in the region near the coast with the sea. The northern line ran from Bonaberi on the north side of the estuary, through Susa to Nkongsamba; the southern linked Duala with Iseka through Edea.

Such was the nature of Cameroons colony the year war was declared. German occupation of the country was firmly fixed, and the worse abuses of administration, which had resulted in a series of insurrections of the natives, were gradually being removed. Here as in Togoland, German imperialism had run

away with itself, and although conditions were never quite so bad as in the smaller colony, the authorities had never succeeded in winning the confidence of the natives. Under Dr. T. Seitz, who was governor from 1907-10, serious attempts to conciliate the natives had been made, particularly among the northern Moslem chiefs. This policy, which was continued by his successors, Dr. Gleim and Herr Ebermeier (who was governor in 1914), produced little result, and after the declaration of hostilities the Germans found themselves, on the whole, surrounded by unfriendly natives. They were able none the less to recruit a number as askaris, and although their efforts to start a jihad, or holy war, amongst the Fula chiefs in the north were unsuccessful, they suffered from treachery and desertion to nothing like the same extent as they had done in Togoland.

The German military force in the colony on the outbreak of war numbered, including the police, about 3,100, of whom 240 were Europeans. Besides the natives recruited as askaris, some hundreds of German settlers were enlisted together with a number of sailors from ships which had taken refuge in the Cameroons estuary. The command of the force was in the hands of Colonel Zimmermann, who proved himself a capable and resolute officer. Such was the German colony which the British in Nigeria and the French on the Congo prepared to invade in August, 1914. For this purpose the British had the West African regiment, stationed at Sierra Leone, and the West African Frontier Force, consisting of the several battalions of the Northern Nigeria and the Southern Nigeria regiments. The French had their troops in Equatorial Africa, the whole being composed of natives officered by white men.

The first shots were fired by the French on August 6, a small force attacking and capturing Bonga, the trade post on the Sanga-Congo confluence. The next day another small force took Zinga, the post on the Lobaye-Ubangi confluence. This prompt action was directed by General Aymerich, and was designed to prevent an offensive which was known to have been planned by the Germans. The French general at once reorganized his forces and formed them into two columns. The first, commanded by Colonel Hutin, was ordered to advance up the Sanga valley and strike at Lomie ; the second, under Colonel Morrison, was to move west from Zinga and strike at Dume. In the north, the French, under General Largeau, had attacked Kusseri near

Lake Chad, but were beaten off. The attack was renewed on September 21, and after some sharp fighting the place was captured. On August 25 a British column, under Captain R. W. Fox had entered the country from Nigeria and had attacked the strongly defended and strategically important hill fort of Mora, some miles south-west of Kusseri. The surrounding district was occupied, but all efforts to dislodge the Germans, under Captain Raben, from the fort failed.

After Largeau captured Kusseri, he dispatched Colonel Brisset and a French column to cooperate with Captain Fox. Brisset captured Marua to the south of Mora, and by the end of the year the whole of the Lake Chad region had been occupied by the Allies. Fort Mora still held out, and, indeed, held out until the close of the campaign in 1916. Captain Raben held a very strong position with an excellent water supply. Frontal attacks were too costly with the small forces available, and the British settled down to invest the place.

Farther south, the British had also attacked. The first attempts were not conspicuously successful, doubtless because they were undertaken in the rainy season. On August 25 some mounted infantry belonging to the West African frontier force left Yola, in Nigeria, crossed the frontier and, after a fight in which two British officers were killed, seized Tepe, a German post on the Benue river. Lieutenant Colonel P. R. Maclear commanded the detachment, and on the 29th he led it against the bigger station of Garua. One fort was captured, but on the 30th the Germans brought up reserves and totally defeated the British. Lieutenant Colonel Maclear and four other white officers were killed, while nearly half the native force was destroyed. The excellent work of the German Maxims was mainly responsible for this disaster, which ended in the retreat of the remainder of the frontier force to Nigeria.

Two more expeditionary forces, meanwhile, had entered Cameroons from Nigeria. One marched from Ikom to Nssanakang, a few miles from the border, which was occupied without trouble, and the other from Calabar seized Archibong with equal ease. A week later, at the beginning of September, came the German counter-stroke. A large force marched against Nssanakang, where the British resisted until all their ammunition had gone, and then attempted to cut their way out with the bayonet. Three British officers and many native soldiers were killed, while

a large number of the latter became prisoners of war; but the remainder, like those from Garua, managed, after some hardships in the bush, to get back to Nigeria. The force at Archibong did not give much trouble, and in return the Germans crossed the border and seized the Nigerian station of Okuri.

So far the operations had been conducted independently by the French and British. But at the end of August the French and British authorities had agreed to a plan of concerted action. An expeditionary force was to be organized, and in conjunction with the navy was to make a serious attack upon the coastal district round the Cameroons estuary, where the major part of the German forces was concentrated. Major General Sir Charles Dobell was put in command. Some 2,100 British native troops were available, and were embarked mostly at Freetown. The French force, under Colonel Mayer, numbered about 2,200, and embarked at Dakar. The expedition set off for Duala about the middle of September. Several German ships were in the Cameroons estuary, and outside watching them were Cumberland and Dwarf, the former a cruiser and the latter a gunboat. On September 14 an attempt was made to blow up the Dwarf, which had made her way into the estuary, a launch and an infernal machine playing the leading parts in this abortive enterprise, and a little later an armed merchantman, the Nachtigal, tried to ram the same vessel. On this occasion the Nachtigal was set on fire and wrecked, and a further attempt to destroy the Dwarf made by launch and spar torpedo also failed.

It was now the turn of the Allies to take the offensive. The Germans had sunk ten or twelve steamers in order to block up the channel leading to Duala, but the British cleared away some of the obstructions and swept up the mines for about three miles. Challenger, escorting six troopships, arrived to join the Cumberland and the Dwarf, and on September 26 Duala was approached and bombarded. An attempt to get a small landing-party on shore was abandoned, but on the 27th the Germans intimated their wish to surrender the town. Bonaberi, on the other side of the river from Duala, also capitulated, the surrender in both cases being unconditional. Brigadier General Dobell landed on the 30th and took over these places. The Germans had destroyed their wireless station at Duala and had withdrawn most of their troops, but several hundred prisoners, including a company of Europeans, were taken by the British. About the same time a

French force, having come by sea from Libreville, in French Congo, under the escort of their warship, Surprise, attacked Ukoko on Corisco Bay, in the south of Cameroons, while the Surprise sank two armed vessels, the Khios and the Itolo.

Lying in the river above Bonaberi, the British found nine merchant steamers belonging to the Woermann line, of Hamburg, and the Hamburg-Amerika line, which had taken refuge there on the outbreak of war. A small party was sent to take possession of them, and in one of them were found about 30 British prisoners. All the ships were in good order, most of them containing general outward and homeward cargoes and considerable quantities of coal. The German gunboat Soden was salved and commissioned for the British navy, and later on the governor's yacht, Herzogin Elisabeth and a floating dock were also raised.

The Allies now controlled the coast, and the first stage of the campaign was over. The second, however, was still before them, and this was by far the more difficult of the two, for it meant warfare in a mountainous and almost roadless country, under climatic conditions unfavourable to white men.

Before the fall of Duala, Colonel Zimmermann had withdrawn to Edea, his new headquarters. But German forces were spread fairly widely over the whole area, and General Dobell organized his troops into three columns. One moved northwards along the railway to Nkongsamba, the second up the Wuri river towards Jabassi, and the third, under Colonel Mayer, moved on the southern branch of the railway towards Edea.

Colonel Zimmermann had destroyed the railway bridge at Japoma in his retreat to Edea, and had taken up a strong position covering the crossing. On October 6 the French infantry, aided by some British marines and with the assistance of light draught warships, attacked the German position, and after a severe fight forced the passage of the river. German resistance was, however, continued and progress was slow. The road led through dense forest peculiarly favourable to snipers, who paid special attention to officers, but the advance continued. A new column was moving rapidly up the Sanaga river by boat, and eventually on October 26 the Germans retired to Jaunde, about 100 miles farther inland, and Edea was occupied without resistance.

Colonel Mayer's force was too weak to continue the advance and, therefore, proceeded to complete the occupation of the

ground it had won. The new German base had been skilfully chosen, and presented a formidable obstacle that could only be taken by a powerful and well-equipped column.

General Dobell, therefore, held his position and concentrated on the task of clearing the country of the enemy between the Cameroons estuary and the Nigerian border. Another party of Germans was followed by a British force, containing both naval and military contingents, under Colonel E. H. Gorges, D.S.O. With four field guns this sailed up the Wuri in launches, and landed about four miles from Jabassi, where the Germans were entrenched. An accurate fire met them as they advanced, and they did not get very far. A flank attack was equally unsuccessful, and the order was given to retire. This was on October 8, and after a day's rest the force returned to Duala.

On the 14th the Allies returned to the attack. Additional troops were employed, and lighters, specially constructed, carried two 6 in. guns, which soon silenced the German batteries. Then the infantry made for Jabassi, and this time they got there. After a sharp engagement the place was occupied, and ten Europeans were made prisoners. A few days later the column under Lieutenant Colonel A. H. W. Haywood, R.A., which was pushing along the northern railway, came up with a German force at Susa, and, after a sharp fight, dispersed it.

About a fortnight later, following up its success at Susa, the column took Mujuka, a station about 50 miles from Duala. From Mujuka, Haywood's column marched to Lum, about 20 miles farther north, meeting with opposition almost at every step. At Lum there was a sharp skirmish, but on December 10, Nkongsamba, the railway terminus, was seized. There five locomotives, some rolling-stock, and two aeroplanes were captured, as well as about 60 white men. An advance was at once made to Bare, about six miles from the railhead; but beyond this point progress was not easy, owing to the rocky and mountainous nature of the country. Haywood's task had been made easier by the operations of another force, moving along the valley of the Mungo, which had seized Mundame, an important post, on November 21.

By this time General Dobell had completed the capture of the German capital Buea and its seaport Victoria. The French cruiser Bruix and the yacht Ivy, belonging to the Nigerian government, bombarded the latter place, and then some marines were landed. In a very short time it was in their possession,

and on November 14 detachments advanced from different points up the hills which lead to Buea. There were no strong forces of the enemy in the region, and without much opposition the place was captured on the next day.

Meanwhile, the French were winning some success in the hinterland. The authorities of the Belgian Congo lent General Aymerich a steamer and 130 men, and the united force soon drove the Germans from the greater part of the territory given up to them in 1911, the so-called Congo-Ubangi region. At the end of October, after fierce fighting which lasted for two days, the German post at Numen was captured by Colonel Hutin's column, as well as the post at Nola, where several officers, some guns, and ammunition were taken.

Colonel Morrison, however, had been checked, and after the fall of Nola, Hutin was only able to advance slowly. In the north the position remained the same, and along the Nigerian border German raids were still continuing. At various points small parties crossed the border line, and at Danare, 25 miles from Ikom, there was a skirmish on November 8, when the British leader, a colour sergeant of the Royal Sussex, was killed. A little later, 300 natives, led by eight Germans, made two additional attacks on a station in the same district, but were repulsed with some loss.

In order to check these raids a small force was organized in Nigeria. This left Lagos on November 22 and sailed up the Cross river to Ikom. It marched to Nkami, on the boundary between Nigeria and Cameroons, crossing no fewer than 23 rivers, and then made its way towards Ossidinge, or Mamfe, a German post. When that place was reached it was found that the Germans had evacuated it, but there was a little skirmishing with parties of them in the neighbourhood before its possession was quite assured.

At Edea the French were attacked on October 26, when there was a somewhat sanguinary engagement. The Germans, having lost 20 whites and 54 natives, were repulsed; the victors had two officers and 29 native soldiers killed. In the north an encounter was reported on November 17 between a British and a German patrol. Intermittently the Germans continued their raids into Nigeria, but these were now more easily repulsed, the skirmish near Bakundi being perhaps the most serious of all those that took place.

At the end of the year Cameroons was not conquered, but the work was well forward and the position of the Germans therein was not pleasant. Nothing whatever could reach them from the outside, and slowly, but surely, they were being driven off the railways and into the interior, while in the more inhospitable northern and eastern parts of the colony they were quite powerless. The surrender or capture of Colonel Zimmermann and his remaining forces was only a matter of time. From the point of view of the Allies the position was so satisfactory that on December 21 the port of Duala was opened to trade, this being allowed only with those parts of the colony which were in the occupation of the Allies.

By the end of 1914, the Allies might well congratulate themselves upon the extent of their progress in Africa. Togoland had been conquered completely and the Germans in Cameroons were all but rounded up. Elsewhere, although the Cape rebellion had put off till 1915 the expedition against German South-West Africa, the rebellion had been stamped out with remarkable speed and efficiency, and already Luderitz bay, on the German coast, had been occupied. In the east the position was not so satisfactory, but, even though the British attacks on German territory had been severely repulsed. Lettow-Vorbeck's own position was far from enviable. A blockade of his coast was almost complete, and although he was still in possession of two corners of British territory he had been unable to make any serious incursions. On the balance of gains the British and French might well feel satisfied with the year's work; and, although the course of the struggle in France and Russia was at that time disappointing, the war in Africa might legitimately be looked upon by the Allies as outstandingly successful.

CHAPTER 23

The Loss of Antwerp

After the fall of Brussels, as we have seen, the Belgian army had fallen back upon Antwerp, to which the royal family and the government had already removed. The Germans, busy with their designs in the south, and under the necessity of completing the conquest and efficient organization of the country, were content to leave Antwerp temporarily undisturbed. A force was stationed from the Dutch border southwards through Louvain to Brussels, to hold the Belgians in check, and von Kluck turned his attention to the major scheme of his march on Paris.

But the Belgians were still undaunted. In response to representations from the French a vigorous sortie was carried out by their troops on August 24-26. The objects of this sortie were twofold. The first and minor purpose was to hold back the Germans at such a distance from Antwerp that their long range siege artillery would be unable to reach the fortress. The second and main objective was to strike hard at the German flank and rear, thus threatening their communications and so compelling them to draw troops from their victorious southwards rush on Paris to the defence of their northern lines. Only by some such diversion could the pressure on the French be eased, and it fell once more to the lot of the remnants of the Belgian army to fling themselves again upon the might of Germany's arms in defence of a country not their own.

The German commander, believing that both the spirit and the power of Belgium's resistance had been broken, was taken completely by surprise. The cordon thought to be holding the Belgian forces in check consisted only of second line troops, and moreover was too weak. Long before hastily summoned reinforcements could be collected and flung against the onrush of the victorious Belgians, the latter had swept away the surprised and outnumbered line of German troops, recaptured Malines and struck dangerously at Cottenburg on the main line from Brussels to Louvain. Had that fallen, German communications would

have been cut, and in a fever of panic three divisions of first line troops were recalled from France and rushed northward to the defence of Louvain. Their weight turned the tide, and the weary but elated Belgians retired on their defences round Antwerp. But they had achieved more than could be expected of them, and there can be no doubt that by so materially weakening the German attack at such a critical juncture they produced just that balancing of forces which enabled the weary British and French troops to resist the blows of von Kluck.

The extent to which the Belgians were successful can best be judged, as has been previously said, by a consideration of the atrocities perpetrated at Louvain, Malines and Termonde immediately after their attack. The German high command was panic-stricken, and its plans were deranged. Fear and a deep resentment were the root of the terrible revenge which Germany took upon the defenceless cities and peasantry of Belgium. No surer testimony to the valor of Belgian arms could have been given than that which was offered by the corpse-strewn streets of Louvain and the smoking ruins of Malines and Termonde.

Once more the Antwerp army was to make a sortie. After the repulse of the Germans at the battle of the Marne it became clear that von Kluck in his endeavours to turn the French left flank had possibly overreached himself. On his extreme right were the British, on his left and centre were the French, and on his right flank and rear was the still undefeated Belgian army. A concerted attack from all three quarters might turn his dangerous encircling movement into a veritable death-trap for himself. Again the French command exhorted the tired Belgians; again they prepared to respond gallantly. And on September 9, as the battle of the Marne, which continued in the advance to the Aisne, was raging outside Paris, the Belgian forces round Antwerp launched themselves against the Germans.

The fighting in that region was desperate, and the enormous pressure in the south did not readily permit of reinforcements being despatched this time against the Belgians. But the very danger of the Germans' position lent them a desperation and a bravery which delayed the Belgian advance. Termonde was reoccupied on the 9th, and on the same day the Belgians entered Aersehot. The fiercest struggle occurred, however, at Weerde, between Malines and Brussels. Slowly the Belgians pushed the Germans back, and on the 10th had captured Kessel just

outside Louvain. The German position was desperate, but just when all seemed lost reinforcements began to arrive from the east in a steady stream. The Belgians could do no more. They lacked reserves and ammunition, and before the accession of German strength were forced sullenly to retire to their defences behind the Nethe river, their withdrawal being marked as on the previous occasion by a fresh outburst of German atrocities.

It became clear to the German command that to leave such a hornets' nest so perilously near their vital communications was to court disaster. Antwerp must be reduced, and that, too, without delay. As matters now stood in the south, nothing more could be done, and the incidental manœuvres of the early campaign now became the primary objectives. Germany still hoped to turn the Allies' left flank by pushing on farther west through Belgium. Any further advance while the Belgian army remained unbroken in front of the Antwerp defences was, however, out of the question. The fall of the French frontier fortress Maubeuge had released the heavy siege guns that had already reduced Liége and Namur, and the fate of Antwerp was sealed.

General von Beseler was placed in charge of the siege and ordered to expedite the capture of the city. The troops he would employ were urgently needed for advance farther west. He had at his disposal a terrifying battery of siege artillery, including four 16.2 in. naval guns and four 12 in. Austrian Skoda mortars. Compared with these monsters the guns of the Antwerp forts were mere toys. In the matter of troops conditions were more equal, von Beseler having four to four and a half divisions under his command, amounting to approximately 120,000 men, while the garrison of Antwerp consisted of some 80,000 soldiers, the field army in support numbering 65,000.

But Antwerp was in no condition to withstand a siege. The fall of Liége, Namur and Maubeuge had shown beyond all doubt that the only two possible conditions under which such forts could be successfully defended were (a) that their weight of metal and range of fire should exceed the available armaments of an attacking force, or (b) that the field army in defence should prevent the approach of the enemy to within a distance from which their guns could reach the fortifications. As in other instances, both of these conditions remained unfulfilled at Antwerp. The Belgian artillery, which was old and badly positioned, had a maximum range of 5 or 6 miles, while the

German artillery could make excellent practice at a range of 9 miles, and could be directed with perfect precision up to 7½. The fortifications at Antwerp were, however, more numerous than and differently disposed from those at Liége. And the presence of the large field army further encouraged the defenders to believe that with a little Allied support in the form of troops and heavy guns the fortress would prove more than a match for even the howitzers of von Beseler. Without that support there was little to be done, except to delay the German forces as long as was humanly possible.

The strategical importance of the city was considerable. After the fall of Namur the shortest line of Allied defence ran from Antwerp south-west to Mons and thence south-east to Longwy. With the fall of Brussels the Germans were already across this line and had split the Belgian army from the French. A circuitous contact could be established through Courtrai and Ghent, but once the German host was liberated by the fall of Antwerp that area of country and more would be speedily overrun. The hard-pressed French and English divisions on the Aisne could spare not a single soldier, and the difficulty of finding reinforcements for the defence of the city was considerable. But so long as Antwerp held out it was a constant menace to the German right wing. So soon as the easing of the pressure in the south should enable the Allies to transfer troops northwards, a blow might be struck at the German rear which might well prove decisive. With the fall of Antwerp, apart from the enormous loss of prestige and moral which would be sustained, any further hope of a crushing offensive on the German flank and rear would have to be abandoned.

For its defence the city relied upon the difficulties of the country which an attacker would have to cross to approach the walls and extensive fortifications. These were in three lines; first, the walls and ramparts of the city, impregnable to infantry, but useless against heavy artillery. Second, a close ring of forts 1½ miles from the city boundaries defending the southern and eastern approaches. Third, an outer ring of forts from seven to nine miles from the city defending the same approaches. Across the whole southern and south-eastern front ran the river Nethe to join the Schelde some five miles south-west of the town. The western face was protected by the parent stream. Any attack, however, was to be expected only from the east and south-east.

The strength of the position lay in the difficulties of approach, for von Beseler had to move his troops and enormous howitzers across heavy and marshy ground, impeded everywhere by many streams and rivers. The first barrier was the outer forts south of the Nethe, between which the Belgian army had entrenched itself. While those forts held the city was safe from bombardment. Even should they fall, before the city could be bombarded the way had to be cleared of the Belgian army, the river Nethe had to be crossed and the siege guns carried over, a task presenting no little difficulty. Even then the city was immune until the inner forts had fallen. There was every reason to suppose that the Germans would be at least three weeks in capturing the city, and in that time reinforcements and guns could be assembled.

The weakness of the position, however, was even more marked. To the north-west of the city lay the Dutch frontier, and the gap between it and the approaching Germans was perilously narrow. Should the Germans succeed in crossing the Schelde that gap, only 14 miles at its widest, might well be closed and the Belgian army would be trapped. At all costs the way must be kept clear for retreat.

In the circumstances it is not clear why von Beseler chose, as he did, to attack from the south-east. His obvious course was to strike with all his weight at the Schelde and trap the city by closing the gap to the Dutch frontier. Only half-hearted thrusts at Termonde and Schoonaerde, the Schelde crossings, were in fact made, and they were easily repulsed. The explanation would seem to be that he was misled by false reports as to the existence of a British force at Bruges, and hesitated to expose his flank to an attack from that quarter.

On September 27, again in cooperation with French movements in the south, the Belgians made another thrust against the German position. This time, however, the Prussians were ready, and although some progress was at first made, the Belgians were soon driven back with considerable losses. On the 28th the bombardment began, the heavy guns being concentrated upon Forts Wavre Ste. Catherine and Waelhem in the outer ring, due south of the city.

In the short time at their disposal the besieged had done whatever they could to improve the defences. Houses had been levelled in front of the forts, trees and hedges had been cut down:

In a sense these preparations were disastrous, for they unmasked the position of the forts, which now stood up like so many small hills from the flat Flanders plain. Moreover, the lack of smokeless powder among the Belgians led to further disadvantages. Every time a gun was fired in ineffective reply to the German shelling its position was at once marked by the panache of smoke which hung above it. The German howitzers, safely out of range behind Malines, made marvellous practice, admirably directed by observers from captive balloons. By 6 p.m. on the 29th, Fort Wavre Ste. Catherine, battered beyond recognition, had to be abandoned, and the Germans had made their first breach in the outer ring. About 2 o'clock on the same day a shell reached the magazine of Fort Waelhem and reduced it to ruins, only ten men, severely wounded, surviving out of a garrison of over a hundred. The following day the German gunfire burst the huge reservoir supplying the city with water. The Belgian trenches were flooded and the city was reduced to dire straits, the risk of conflagration and of the rise of an epidemic being greatly increased. Meanwhile, the neighbouring forts in the outer ring had shared the fate of the first two, and the Germans had secured a wide gap through which their almost untouched infantry could be poured.

The Belgian authorities made arrangements to evacuate the city, and on October 2 an order was given to this effect. The previous day von Beseler had ordered an attack upon the breach in the outer forts, and after an intensive bombardment the German infantry attacked with magnificent courage. By the next day Forts Wavre Ste. Catherine, Dorpveld, Waelhem and Boschbeek were in the hands of the attackers. The Belgian army was withdrawn across the Nethe, which still barred the way to further advance. On October 3 the redoubt guarding the Duffel crossing of the river was destroyed, and Fort Kessel, protecting the crossing at the village of Lierre on the left of the gap, was put out of action. The Germans were free to attempt the crossing, and were almost within shelling distance of the city.

The danger to Antwerp was a matter to which no British government could be indifferent. As early as September 7 Mr. Winston Churchill had called the attention of his colleagues to the necessity for action, and on September 20 Lord Kitchener sent a staff officer to Antwerp to report to him on the position. The reports were not reassuring, and on October 2 a request for help

was sent to the French government, then at Bordeaux. At the same time Lord Kitchener told his representative "to be very careful not to raise hopes of British and French forces arriving quickly to relieve Antwerp."

October 3 was a critical day. On the previous evening Mr. Churchill was in a special train on his way to Dover. When about 20 miles out of London, about 11 p.m., the train stopped and then returned to Victoria station where the minister was asked to go at once to Lord Kitchener's house. There he found Lord Kitchener himself, Sir Edward Grey, and two high officials. They showed him the following telegram from Sir Francis Villiers, the British minister in Antwerp, which had been received in London at 10 p.m.

> The government have decided to leave to-morrow for Ostend, acting on advice unanimously given by superior council of war in presence of the king. The king with field army will withdraw, commencing with advance guard to-morrow in the direction of Ghent to protect the coast line, and eventually, it is hoped, to cooperate with the Allied armies. The queen will also leave. It is said that town will hold out for five or six days, but it seems most unlikely that when the court and government are gone resistance will be so much prolonged. Decision taken very suddenly this afternoon is result of increasingly critical situation. I have seen both prime minister and minister for foreign affairs, who maintain that no other course was possible, in view of danger that the king's government and field army will be caught here.

This meant the fall of the city, so the British ministers decided that the Belgians must be encouraged to hold it. Accordingly, the following telegram was sent:

> The importance of Antwerp being held justifies a further effort till the course of the main battle in France is determined. We are trying to send you help from the main army, and, if this were possible, would add reinforcements from here. Meanwhile, a brigade of marines will reach you to-morrow to sustain the defence. We urge you to make one further struggle to hold out. Even a few days may make the difference. We hope that government may find it possible to remain and field army to continue operations.

Half an hour later another telegram was sent to Brussels. This was in the following words:

> It is hoped that the first lord of the Admiralty, who is fully acquainted with our views, may have the honour of an audience with the king before a final decision as to the departure of the government is taken.

On its receipt the order for the evacuation was suspended. Mr. Churchill arrived in Brussels at three in the afternoon, and while he was crossing Lord Kitchener was making arrangements to collect and dispatch a relieving army. The same day the first lord, after an interview with the Belgian prime minister, described the situation in the city as follows:

> The outer forts were falling one by one. Five or six shells from the enormous German howitzers were sufficient to smash them to their foundations, to destroy their defenders, even in the deepest casemates, and to wreck the platforms of the guns. Now the forts of the inner line were being similarly attacked, and there was no conceivable means of preventing their destruction one after another at the rate of about a fort a day. The army was tired and dispirited through having been left so long entirely upon its own resources without ever a sign of the Allies for whom they had risked so much. Material of every kind—guns, ammunition, searchlights, telephones, entrenching materials—was scanty. The water supply of the city had been cut off. There were many rumours of German sympathisers in its large population of 400,000. At any moment the front might be broken in under the heavy artillery attack which was then in progress. But this was only half the danger. The life and honour of the Belgian nation did not depend on Antwerp, but on its army. To lose Antwerp was disastrous; to lose the army as well was fatal. The Scheldt was barred by a severe interpretation of neutrality. The only line of retreat was by a dangerous flank march parallel to the Dutch frontier and the sea coast. Two Belgian divisions and the cavalry division were staving off the Germans from the only remaining line of retreat. But the pressure was increasing, and the line of the Dendre was no longer intact. If Ghent fell before the Belgian army made good its retreat, nothing would be saved from the ruin.

On the next day, October 4, the promised reserves arrived and at once went into the line, where they were soon joined by some British sailors with naval guns. On the evening of the 5th two naval brigades arrived from England and were sent at once to the front, where they were interspersed with the Belgian divisions, and, although only partly trained, they played a worthy part in the later days of the defence. The British 7th infantry division and a division of cavalry under Sir Henry Rawlinson were disembarking at Ostend and Zeebrugge and 8,000 French marines and an infantry division were also on the way.

The position, however, was getting worse, and on the evening of the 6th the final decision to evacuate the city was taken. At

7 p.m. a council of war was held in the palace, and the Belgian ministers decided that this course was the only one open to them. Mr. Churchill and Sir Henry Rawlinson, who were present, urged them to wait for the reinforcements that were on the way, but they considered that any further delay would endanger the whole Belgian army.

Early in the morning of the 6th, preceded by intensive shelling, two battalions of German infantry crossed the river undetected a mile below Lierre. Although assailed by superior forces and subjected to heavy artillery fire, they bravely hung on to the position they had won until reinforced at nightfall. At the same time, despite strenuous resistance on the part of the Belgians, the Germans had crossed at Lierre. The carnage was frightful, and the crossing was effected more by means of the bodies of the advance troops, victims of the concentrated rifle and machine gun fire of the Belgians and the British, than by the pontoon bridge which the artillery practice of the Belgian field guns never permitted the German engineers to complete. But at all costs von Beseler had to hasten. His troops were urgently needed in the west, and while his heroic men were damming the stream with their bodies in order that their comrades might cross, he was

subjecting the exposed Belgian and British line to a murderous concentrated fire from his heaviest batteries. It says much for the courage and endurance of the raw British troops that they stood their ground as they did. But heroism was useless against 11 in. shells, and the troops had to retire or suffer annihilation. With the retreat of the Belgian line, the forts of the outer ring on the east were defenceless, their right flank being turned. The next fort on the line north, Fort Broechem, was bombarded and demolished on October 7, and the Germans under urgent representations from headquarters to hasten their operations, transported the major part of their siege guns across the Nethe, an operation which for efficiency and engineering skill it is hard to parallel. Antwerp was within reach of German shells. And at 11.25 p.m. on the same day, after due notice had been given, 6 in. howitzers began to shell the city.

While these operations had been taking place in the south and south-east of the city, the Germans had been making strenuous endeavours to rectify their initial mistake. During the 5th and 6th energetic attempts were made to force the passage of the Schelde, and so cut off the retreat of the Belgian army. Both at Termonde and at Schoonaerde the Belgians were compelled to fight desperately to prevent the crossing, and only the lack of adequate artillery support prevented the Germans from achieving their aim. Although the attacks were unsuccessful, such warnings could not be disregarded. Moreover, the expected reinforcements had failed to materialise, and with every day the invaders were creeping slowly farther westwards. The fall of Antwerp was a matter of a few days at the best, and if the Belgian army was to escape through the narrow corridor still open on the west it was time for it to move. Accordingly on the 6th and 7th the Belgian field army was moved to the west bank of the Schelde and the defence of the city was left to the garrison and the British brigade.

On the morning of the 7th, helped by a fog, two battalions of German infantry crossed the Schelde at Schoonaerde, and for two days defied all the efforts of the Belgian 6th division to dislodge them. In the evening of the 8th they were strongly reinforced, and the Dutch corridor was narrowed to less than 12 miles. Only just in time had the Belgian army moved, and its position was even now far from safe. In consequence it was decided to withdraw it to the north of Ghent, and on the 8th the major

part of the army was conveyed to a position behind the canal running north from Ghent to the Dutch frontier.

In Antwerp, meanwhile, the Belgian 2nd division and the British troops were doing all they could to hold up the German advance. As yet the bombardment of the city was not serious, only shrapnel shells being directed upon it. The weight of the German attack was turned upon the inner ring of forts, the foremost objective being forts No. 3, 4 and 5 on the eastern side of the town. The forts were quickly silenced, and with their fall Antwerp was doomed.

On Wednesday the 7th the Belgian government left the city, and all that day and the next over 250,000 terrified townspeople sought to reach safety. Then began the immense, tragic flight of the inhabitants of Antwerp. Only three avenues of escape remained open—westward by road to Ghent, Bruges and Ostend; north-eastward by road into Holland, and down the Schelde by water to Flushing. Anything that could float was crowded with the fugitives—merchant steamers, dredgers, barges and canal-boats, ferry-boats, tugs, fishing-smacks, yachts, rowing-boats, scows, and even hastily made rafts. There was no opportunity of maintaining order and discipline. The terrorised people at times crowded aboard until there was not even standing room on the decks. Very few of them had brought food and warm clothing with them, or had space in which to lie down. For two nights and two days they huddled together, chilled and famishing on the open deck, while the German guns bombarded the great, beautiful old city from which they had fled. On the roads leading towards Ghent and the Dutch frontier the scenes of anguish and misery, hunger and fatigue were even more appalling. In many places civilians and soldiers were mingled in inextricable confusion.

In the afternoon of October 7 the highway from Antwerp to Ghent was jammed from ditch to ditch. Every footpath and lane leading away from the invading army was so closely packed with fugitives that they impeded each other's movement. Young men could be seen carrying their frail old mothers in their arms, or helping their worn-out fathers by a pickaback ride. Wheelbarrows were sometimes used for this purpose, but more often they were packed with children too young to walk. There were monks carrying wounded men on stretchers, and white-faced nuns shepherding along groups of war-orphaned infants.

Women still weak from childbed tottered along with their newly-born babes pressed to their breasts. Grey-haired men and women helped themselves along by grasping the stirrup-leathers of troopers who were so exhausted from days of fighting that they slept in the saddle as they rode. Here a society woman, who had dressed at noon for a visit of fashion, stumbled along carrying in a sheet on her shoulders her jewels and rich and heavy articles of precious metal. By her side was a frail old lace-maker from Mechlin, whose bundle contained the simple, homely treasures of a cottage that no longer existed. The noise and the confusion were beyond mere imagination. The clamour was made up of the cries and shouts and moans of a nation in its agony. Men cursed their neighbours just to save themselves from weeping like women, and, amid their cursing, turned to help the poor creatures pressing against them.

It will never be known how many people perished from hunger, exposure and exhaustion in the flight from Antwerp. The fields and ditches along the westward road were strewn with the prostrate bodies of outworn women, children and old men. For miles around the countryside was as bare of food as a sand desert is of flowers. There was not merely a scarcity of provisions —there was absolutely nothing to eat. The fugitives stopped at farmhouses and offered all they possessed for a loaf, but the farmers' wives, weeping at the misery of their own people, could only shake their heads. It was on raw turnips that the richest and the poorest stayed their hunger; and many who did not profit by the opportunity when passing the turnip fields had nothing. Near one small town on the Dutch frontier twenty children were born on Wednesday night in the open fields. The mothers were without beds, without shelter and without medical aid. This occurred at a spot where an American observer chanced to be. At hundreds of other places along the lines of flight there were similar piteous scenes.

As the fugitives were sleeping in the open air on the night of Wednesday, October 7, the bombardment of their city began. The first shell fell at ten o'clock, striking a house in the southern Berchem district, killing a boy and wounding his mother and his little sister. A street sweeper had his head blown off as he ran for shelter. All through the night the shells fell at the rate of five a minute. Most of them were shrapnel shells, which shrieked over the house-tops and exploded in the streets.

On the 8th, however, while the remnants of the Belgian army and the few British troops were seeking a way of escape through the dense masses of fugitives on the Ghent road, the bombardment began in earnest. In the darkness before the dawn incendiary bombs rocketed across the wild and smoky sky and fell upon the houses. By this time the Germans had got some of their great howitzers within striking distance of the streets around the centre of Antwerp. As the great shells hurtled through the air they sounded at first like an approaching express train; but their roar rapidly increased in volume till the atmosphere quivered as before a howling cyclone. Then came an explosion that seemed to split the earth, and a tall geyser of dust and smoke shot high above the stricken port. When a large high-explosive shell struck a building it did not tear away its upper storeys or blow a gap in the walls. The entire house collapsed as though flattened by a monster's hand.

When the 11 in. shells exploded in the open streets they made pits as large as the cellar of a good-sized house, and badly damaged any building within a radius of two hundred yards. The earlier shrapnel fire seemed harmless in comparison. It appeared as if in a few minutes the whole of the city would be wrecked as though by an earthquake. The thickest masonry crumpled up like cardboard; buildings of solid stone were levelled as a child levels things he makes with playing-bricks when he has tired of them. By Thursday night there was scarcely a street in the southern part of the city which was not barricaded by the wreck of fallen houses. The pavements were sprinkled with fallen glass. The streets were littered with tangled telephone wires, shattered poles, twisted lamp-posts and splintered trees. More than 2,000 houses were struck by shells, and more than three hundred of these were totally destroyed.

Flames roared from many of the smitten dwellings. A hundred and fifty could be seen blazing away at the same time, and as the water supply was cut off there was no means of fighting these fires. Had there been a wind everything in Antwerp would have been consumed, and nothing but the charred wreckage of one of the most beautiful and busiest centres of industry would have remained in the hands of the conqueror.

By night the scene was one of infernal splendour. The oil-tanks by the river had been fired by the retreating Belgians to prevent the conqueror making use of the large stores of petrol. The glare

of the blazing oil illumined the streets of this city of dreadful night. The lurid, wavering pillars of fire from the burning tanks, the flames of the bombarded houses, the flash and thunder of the exploding shells, turned lovely, romantic Antwerp into a spectacle of volcanic sublimity and terror. In the river the falling shells threw up columns of water a hundred feet towards the pall of smoke, which, rising from the tanks, overhung the city like a cloud of death, such as Vesuvius flung over Pompeii and Herculaneum.

Meanwhile, the British naval brigade and a small force of Belgians had been covering the retreat of the main forces and the escape of the fugitives. Fortunately for the Belgians, von Beseler appears to have been in ignorance that the evacuation of the city by the Belgian and British forces was almost complete. This delusion was heightened by a premature infantry attack delivered by the Germans before the main bulk of the garrison had removed. The oncoming infantry were met by a withering fire and retired in disorder, thus confirming the German belief that the city was still strongly defended. As a result von Beseler refrained from pushing on. Certain it is that had he so chosen he could have entered the city almost without resistance at any time after 9.30 p.m. on the night of October 8. He preferred caution, and trusted to the effects of the bombardment to induce a surrender of the city. To this prudence the Belgians owed the comparative success of their escape. There can be no doubt that the evacuation was delayed too long. Energetic thrusts earlier by the Germans at the Schelde would have cut off the escape. Even the belated endeavours which were made to surround the city were in time, had they coincided with strong thrusts at the city itself, to prevent the escape of all the troops still in the city after the departure of the main Belgian divisions. As it was, a great number were forced across the Dutch frontier and interned or captured.

The difficulties confronting the withdrawal of the rearguard were enormous. In the horrible press of fugitives along the roads troops could not be kept together, communications between one body and another were almost impossible, and the rate of progress seldom exceeded one mile an hour. In the circumstances it is remarkable that so many escaped. Actually, of the British, about 1,000 were captured and over 1,400 were interned in Holland. The loss in killed and wounded was comparatively

small, not exceeding 200. Of the Belgians the major part of the army escaped, but probably 30,000 were forced across the Dutch frontier, and a considerable number were captured, killed or wounded.

In the city, meanwhile, the bombardment had continued, but on the morning of the 9th, on finding some of the minor forts abandoned, von Beseler ordered the shelling to cease. On the same day the civil authorities signed the capitulation of the fortress and of such forts as were still holding out. Under threat of renewed bombardment the military governor the next day for his part accepted the terms, and the Germans made their formal entry into a well-nigh deserted city. The Germans had got their "pistol pointing at the heart of England," but, like Napoleon, were to learn that without command of the sea that pistol could never be fired.

The fall of Antwerp was a severe blow to the Allies' cause. They lost control of the Schelde thereby, and had to abandon any hopes of a turning movement of the German flank and rear. The British effort to save the city had come too late and had been too weak. And it is doubtful whether the arrival of the British forces had not done more harm than good. For their arrival postponed the evacuation of the city and involved the capture or internment of a considerable number of troops as well as the bombardment of the town. On the other hand, there can be no doubt that by aiding the Belgians to hold up von Beseler for a further five days in front of the city they materially aided the operations of the Allies in western Belgium. For had the 120,000 troops in front of Antwerp been released earlier there is every reason to suppose that not only Ostend and Zeebrugge, but also Nieuport and possibly Calais would have fallen into German hands, and they might thereby have effected that turning of the Allies' flank on which their whole strategy was so strongly bent during the early days of the war.

CHAPTER 24

The Race to the Channel Ports

THE battle of the Aisne, which faded away into an artillery duel about September 18, proved conclusively to both combatants that the section of the western front from Soissons to Verdun was established. Stalemate had resulted, neither side being able to break through the position defended by the other, and, in consequence, both began to dig themselves in to the lines which they retained with little alteration until the autumn of 1918. The long struggle of trench warfare was setting in, a struggle which was to sap the resources and the man power of both combatants to the point of exhaustion, and only the arrival of a new and fresh force tipped the balance in favour of the Allies.

In the west, however, the front was still fluid. The success which had attended General Maunoury's flanking movement at the battle of the Marne had, to an extent, been repeated by him at the Aisne, and it suggested to General Joffre a change of strategy. The defended lines in his centre could well be left to the care of garrison troops, and the risk of weakening that point was small and certainly worth taking. Accordingly, he began to form two new armies, the 7th and the 10th. The former was given to General Castelnau, who handed over the command of the 2nd to Dubail, and the latter was entrusted to a new general, Maud'huy, who, like Foch, was at one time a professor of military history. With these two new armies Joffre planned to strike northward against the German right flank and execute a turning movement. The defended lines in his centre could well be left to the opposing forces.

But the Germans were not blind to their peril. Such a move was only to be expected. Moreover, they themselves were far from reconciled to the idea of a stalemate, and belatedly remembered their original plan of turning the Allied flank to the west of Paris, a plan which had been ruined earlier in the month by the premature south-east turn of von Kluck in front of the capital. They enjoyed the advantage of position, for they occupied

the inner side of a segment and could direct reserves easily to any point. In effect, the German line consisted of the rough arc of a circle from Verdun to Soissons, its centre being at Namur. To extend that arc farther west and north the Germans had only to travel along direct radii: but the Allies were compelled to move along the perimeter.

Part of the advantage was, however, surrendered by the tardiness with which the Germans moved, and the resistance of Antwerp undoubtedly detained large masses of troops which, but for their operations in front of the city, would have been free to flood the country west and south-west of Brussels. In the end, what began as a series of vicious thrusts from both sides to turn the flank of their opponent, became, in fact, a clashing together of new armies, the only question of interest being at which point they would strike the sea. It is from this fact that the movements in western France and Flanders during the end of September and the beginning of October have been called the race to the sea, but it must be remembered that such was never their intention. Although they resulted in the establishment of a continuous front of over 400 miles, running south-east from Nieuport to the Swiss Alps, they originated from simple outflanking operations carried out by both sides. In the early part of the race, the Allies were more successful and managed to carry their line slightly east of north from Compiègne to Ypres. There, however, the Germans began to win, and the line was bent back to Dixmude and the Yser.

By October 15 the line was established—that is, about a month after Maunoury had begun the movement by attempting to turn the German flank on the Aisne. But the story of that month involves the movements of a great number of troops and numerous battles. Wherever the opposing armies touched there they settled down to terrible fighting, the line of advance north and west being carried on by new troops on either side, who, in their turn, were speedily involved in fierce struggles. The battles were more or less continuous along the whole front, and in the result a confusing medley of overlapping engagements and hurried movements presents itself, a medley in which chronological succession is almost lost.

The culmination of the struggle came with the efforts the Germans made at various dates after October 15 to break the line at different points: Dixmude, Ypres, and La Bassée,

between the coast and Arras, or to smash in the French resistance south of Arras and thus drive a wedge between the British and French forces. And with the failure of the Germans to break through, the line from Switzerland to the sea rested almost unchanged for four years, the maximum movement either way, except for the big pushes of the Allies in the summer of 1917 and the Germans in the spring of 1918, never exceeding six miles.

The position on the extreme left wing of the Allied forces at the end of the battle of the Aisne was that Maunoury's 6th army ran roughly northward from a point near Compiègne to Lassigny, his left flank on the north protected by a cloud of cavalry. The fighting was severe, and he was unable to move northwards without either losing contact with the British on his right or by making his line too thin to resist the German attacks. His cavalry, closely engaged with opposing Uhlans, were insufficient to offer a severe threat to the German flank. Here, too, the line was rapidly settling down, and both sides were preparing to throw new forces into the scale. Through the valley of the Oise, at least, no movement could be made. Both sides could hold their positions, but neither could extend.

The arrival of Castelnau and the newly formed 7th army permitted the French a further extension. But an outflanking movement proved to be impossible. The most that he could do was to prevent any westerly advance by the Germans, on a line running north from Lassigny through Roye and Chaulnes to Peronne. Within a few hours Castelnau found himself fighting heavily even to retain his position. His front covered a distance of 20 to 25 miles, and advance northwards would simply have left a dangerous gap between his own and Maunoury's army. The resulting battles raged until the end of September, one side and then the other securing advances and losing them again.

But gradually in the south the lines became much more clearly defined, as each side discovered the strongest line of defence, and began to entrench itself with all possible speed. In the north the contact was still fluid, General Brugère in command of a mixed territorial and cavalry division fighting a series of eastward moving skirmishes round Peronne still in a vain endeavour to outflank the enemy. The Germans so far had secured the advantage of position if not a westerly advance. From Compiègne to Lassigny they defended the eastern bank of the Oise; from Lassigny north to Peronne the country is mainly undulating

plains ill suited to defence, but here again the Germans had secured the possession of the Somme river, which from Peronne south to Ham provided an effective natural barrier.

Already it was clear that the Germans were profiting from their admirable surveys of the whole terrain made during peace-time, and were revealing a skill in the selection of military positions which left the French at a decided disadvantage. On September 24 the French attacked Peronne itself, and, after some terrific fighting, drove the Germans from the town; but the same day the Germans launched a counter-attack, and, heavily supported by artillery, once more drove the French back towards Bray. Peronne itself is hidden in a hollow and possesses no military advantage. The point at which the French should have aimed was the heights of the Somme north of the town. The Germans had seized at once upon the strategic value of this line of hills commanding as it does an extensive view across the plain, and, since it faces eastward, presenting an efficient barrier to advance across their line of communication. Before the end of the month they had occupied the heights and begun the construction of a line of fortifications in the Corbie salient which for two years was a terrible obstacle to the Allied advance.

In this they were aided by the arrival of Prince Rupert of Bavaria's 6th army which had been directed to the west from Lorraine. Castelnau, like all French commanders in the early days of the war, was short of ammunition, and this, coupled with superiority of numbers, enabled the Germans to drive him back, not without desperate fighting, over a large front. On the 26th the French held a line from Lassigny through Roye, Lihons, Chaulnes and Bray to the high ground east of Albert. Here again they were attacked. Thiepval was occupied and batteries were emplaced on the high ground to the north of the village, and along what was afterwards to become the Somme battlefield. From there the German gunners proceeded to shell Albert. The French left flank was in danger of being turned. Moreover, although after a desperate struggle Castelnau held his position at Lihons to the west of Chaulnes, and inflicted heavy losses on the Germans, a dangerous salient was formed in his front farther south at Roye, which threatened to give under the German pressure. Had the Germans succeeded in breaking through, Castelnau would have been isolated and Maunoury would have found his position untenable. But the thin French

line hung on desperately, and the German forces were held. General Joffre realized the gravity of the position, and hastened the movements of Maud'huy's 10th army. By the 30th of the month they had got into position on Castelnau's threatened left wing, and the race to the sea was continued northwards. The wings of the two opposing armies, like two doors on the same hinge, were slowly swinging together and flattening out on a line running northwards. The old city of Arras, with its citadel now half destroyed, naturally suggested itself as the centre for the operations of Maud'huy's army. But the 25 miles which separated it from the Somme presented several features upon which a line of defence could be built, and as early as September 1 the Germans had realized the strategical importance of the town, and German cavalry had occupied it. These were subsequently reinforced by infantry; but with a tardy recognition of the significance of flanking towns on the German line of march, a strong French cavalry force was detailed on September 18 to occupy the place and hold it until reinforced. They succeeded in driving out the Germans after a stubborn fight, and flung out patrols as far as Douai.

Arras stands only 50 miles from the English Channel, and on the direct line of march of any force moving from Belgium south-west to the Channel ports. It is, besides, the junction of five large railway systems, and its value to an attacking force would be difficult to overestimate.

The Germans had realized towards the end of September that they could use Arras either as their new pivot upon which to turn the flank of Castelnau's army, or as the next point northwards on the line of defences they were gradually building from the Aisne towards the sea, and its reoccupation by the French threatened a derangement of their plans. Accordingly no less a regiment than the Prussian Guard was dispatched, towards the end of the month, with the other troops whose orders were to recapture the town and use it as a base for operations towards the coast and against Castelnau's flank.

By the 30th, however, the French cavalry in possession had been reinforced by the advance troops of Maud'huy's 10th army, which was moving up from Amiens. Despite the fact that Castelnau was being severely pressed, it was decided not to reinforce his line but to attempt to outflank the German right, which was thought to be in the neighbourhood of Bapaume,

south-east of Arras. General obscurity prevailed as to the disposition of the enemy, and the existence of the powerful reinforcements collecting on the line Peronne-Cambrai-Valenciennes was unsuspected. The troops of the 10th army, which had not yet arrived, were directed to Lens and ordered to make a sweep south-east, covering Douai and cutting the German flank further in the rear. Meanwhile, the available troops were moved out from Arras towards Bapaume. On the morning of October 2 they began to concentrate on a line south-east of the town, but before all the positions were occupied unsuspected forces of the enemy were flung upon the left flank, and the line was hurled into disorder.

Although Maud'huy rapidly swung his position round from south-east to north-east he lost much ground, and the delay in the arrival of the forces from Lens permitted the Germans to seize Douai and push on towards a point north of Arras, driving a wedge between Maud'huy's two forces. The position was serious, but the Germans failed to exploit to the full the advantage they had gained. Maud'huy was compelled by October 3 to abandon Lens and swing his left back behind Arras. On the right things were going no better, and a dangerous salient was gradually being made in the French line south of the town and threatening its connexions with the 2nd army.

Coordination of the Albert-Arras front was vitally necessary, and Joffre despatched General Foch to take over the command of the French armies in the area, and on the 5th he moved his headquarters to Doullens. The Germans were still attacking heavily, and in the north the cavalry and territorial divisions of General Brugère, now commanded by General D'Urbal, were fighting desperately to maintain their position. Prince Rupert of Bavaria, who had command of the German armies in this quarter, was still bent upon securing Arras, which the French were rapidly transforming into a formidable fortress, and launched attack after attack upon the town. With great difficulty they were held; but the defenders were forced back on to the town itself, and had to surrender the commanding heights of Vimy ridge, which dominated not only the town but the western communications of the French armies. Once again the German military eye had seized upon the value of position, and while the French were forced to defend the lowland, the Germans had secured an excellent place on the heights, from

which they commanded an extensive view of the country, and were able to shell Arras itself, which from this time onwards was subjected to a bombardment that destroyed the famous belfry of the town hall and severely damaged many of its beautiful old streets and fine buildings. In spite, however, of the weight of the German attack the French line round the city held, and after October 6 the Germans began to consolidate their position and to seek by extending northwards an easier path through the French flank. The race to the sea was being continued, and the centre of the struggle was shifting away from the town.

Two more attacks were, however, delivered on Arras before the fighting in the western front settled down to desultory trench warfare. Von Bülow superseded Prince Rupert later in the month, and realizing that if the French line could be broken at Arras, the armies to the south would be rolled back, and the British, who by then were in position at Ypres, would be driven into the sea, concentrated all his forces and launched them on October 21 at the French line. Once more the superiority of German artillery and number of troops made itself felt, but although the French line sagged dangerously to the north and south of the town it still held, and the Germans were eventually repulsed. They had, however, secured valuable territory which commanded the French position, and two days later, on the 24th, began a terrific bombardment of the French trenches which was followed by a second and heavier attack.

The Germans subsequently described the fighting as some of the fiercest which had been encountered to that date, but in spite of all their efforts they were unable to take Arras. They were, however, rapidly in process of enveloping it; they had secured Vimy ridge and their line ran in a close semicircle round the town. Only a recovery of lost ground could make the defenders' position tenable, and in consequence the French counter-attacked. The movement took place at a time when the fighting round Ypres was at its height and the Germans were steadily drawing troops from farther south to reinforce their attacks on the Ypres salient. Maud'huy was therefore able to make some progress and to straighten his front considerably. By the end of the month, when the fighting in front of Arras died down, the French held a line running from west of Ablain through a point east of Arras, to the west of Hébuterne.

Meanwhile the fighting had extended northwards. As early as the end of September Sir John French had suggested to General Joffre the idea of withdrawing the British Expeditionary Force from its position on the Aisne to Flanders, where it could carry on the enveloping movement against the German flank. General Joffre had at once agreed. Still another French army, the 8th, was being formed under General D'Urbal, but the problem of finding troops was considerable. The remnants of the cavalry and the territorials were the nucleus, and they were augmented by such troops as could be spared from the east, some fresh territorials brought up from the south of France, and a number of marines from the French ports. The numbers were still small and the constitution was unreliable.

Such a force could not do more than keep the country free from German patrols in the early part of October, and as the opposing lines grew steadily northwards it became clear that still another force would be wanted to hold the line from Arras to the sea, or more importantly to win the long race of turning the enemy's flank. That need would be met admirably by the B.E.F., whose strong position on the Aisne could now be safely entrusted to reserve and second line troops. A second and more important reason for this move to Flanders lay in the fact that the British lines of communication from the Channel to the Aisne crossed those of the two French armies, Maunoury's and Castelnau's. In Flanders their communications would be shorter and free from other traffic. Moreover, they would be operating much nearer their base.

St. Omer and St. Pol were chosen as the centres of concentration, and on October 3 the transference was begun. Reinforcements had reached Sir John French and he now had three corps, the 1st under Sir Douglas Haig, the 2nd under Sir H. Smith-Dorrien, and the 3rd under General W. P. Pulteney. The transfer began with the two cavalry divisions, which set off by road and arrived in Flanders on the 9th, where they were formed into one cavalry corps under General Allenby.

The 2nd corps was the next to move, and five days later detrained at Abbeville. The difficulties of carrying the troops to their new stations were considerable. The French railway system was already being strained to its utmost to provide for the needs of the three French armies fighting on the British left, and the fact that at such a time a whole army corps was carried almost

150 miles right across those lines of communication, in the short space of five days bears witness to the efficiency of the organization.

Before the arrival of the British at Abbeville the front, north of General Maud'huy's left wing, was quite fluid. Nothing but a series of isolated patrols stretched between Lille and the sea, and had the Germans used their cavalry with more determination there seems reason to suppose that even at this late hour the country could have been overrun and the Channel ports down to Calais might well have been captured. As it was, the French cavalry under generals De Mitry, Conneau and Moussy were able to hold the raiders in check. These final days of October were to mark the end of cavalry warfare on the western front, but before the cavalryman changed his sabre for a rifle and the freedom of his movements on horseback for the confinement of a trench, the soil of north-west France was to witness a number of engagements which can rank with any of the epic examples of warfare which this romantic arm of the fighting services has created.

With the immobilization of the southern front of the German advance, the masses of German cavalry on the Aisne were transferred to Flanders with the object of holding the country until its effective occupation by infantry. The concentration of these forces was completed by October 5, and a surprise raid on the region west of Lille towards the coast was planned for the next day. Probably nearly 15,000 troopers set out by night towards St. Pol and Calais. But word of the concentration had been received, and the Allied cavalry forces in the area were hurriedly collected. Belgian, French and British cavalry to the number of 12,000 were rushed eastwards to meet the oncoming Germans. The forces met on the banks of the river Lys, and after a terrific hand-to-hand encounter the German squadrons were pushed back to their base.

This, the greatest of the cavalry pitched battles, was by no means the most important. Throughout the end of September and the first weeks in October, skirmishes were occurring everywhere along a front stretching from Arras to Antwerp. The Allied cavalry, although handled with great skill, were insufficient to cover the whole of the area, and at one time it was feared that they would be driven back to the coast. But new forces were pouring up from the south on both sides, and

B.N.A.

General Victor Dankl led the Austrian 1st army, 1914-15. Heavily defeated by the Russians in Poland, he was transferred to the Italian front, where he remained until 1918.

General Alexeieff, the Russian military leader was chief of staff to General Ivanoff on the Austrian front at the beginning of the war.

Przemysl, the fortress city of Galicia, seen from the east. It was prominent in the fighting on the eastern front in 1914 and later.

A GREAT FORTRESS AND TWO LEADERS ON THE EASTERN FRONT

Imperial War Museum

MEN OF THE BRITISH NAVAL EXPEDITION AT ANTWERP. On October 4, 1914, the British naval division and brigades of marines were hurriedly equipped and despatched to aid the beleaguered Belgians in Antwerp. This photograph shows a trench being dug at Vieux Dieu.

although German patrols occupied Hazebrouck and Estaires that was the farthest they were able to penetrate before the solid lines of infantry began to meet. One great advantage the Germans did gain. Lille was captured on October 13.

The importance of this town both strategically and commercially is considerable, and bitter controversy raged round the question whether energetic steps should have been taken while there was still time to protect it. Lille is a large and populous manufacturing centre, and its possession gave to the Germans not only a splendid base and rest-centre for their troops in Flanders, but, more important, a large warehouse of valuable commodities, particularly woollen goods, and a busy factory for the production of more.

The fall of Lille, like the fall of Antwerp, was a hard blow to the Allied cause. In the retreat to the Marne every soldier who could be collected was flung in front of Paris. Towns like Lille, even though they bordered upon the German line of march, were left with but a small garrison. In this case the garrison consisted of a territorial brigade of 4,000 soldiers equipped with some light guns. The town had no fortifications of value against anything more than raiding parties, and such a garrison was powerless to resist a determined attack in force. One surprise raid by a German armoured train and a force of cavalry was in fact carried out on October 4, but was beaten off with great gallantry. Later attacks by garrison troops and flying columns of cavalry met with a similar fate, but on the evening of the 11th the German 19th corps arrived outside the town. This corps had been detached from the 3rd army in the Reims area to aid the German operations in the west, and had covered 147 miles by a forced march in the astonishing time of seven days. There was no chance to counter the blow, and although the garrison made what resistance was possible the Germans entered the town on the 13th after a sharp bombardment, and took prisoner most of the defenders.

The resistance Lille had offered was, however, by no means useless, for it gave time for the British 2nd corps to consolidate its position in front of Armentières. Had energetic measures of defence been taken by the Allied command, the line of defence in Flanders might have included the town and have been carried, therefore, some 12 miles farther to the east. But not only would its defence have required a large body of well-

equipped troops which at that time were simply not available, but, moreover, the fate of Liége, Namur, Antwerp and Maubeuge did not encourage a belief in the ability of a town even when defended by a field army to resist the advance of the enemy. Finally, with the capture of Lens, the Germans had already crossed the direct line from Arras to Lille, and its attempted defence would have involved the creation of a huge salient which would have been a perpetual point of weakness. In the result, taking into account the fact that Lille was saved from the horrors of intensive bombardment, it can be concluded that although its fall was a grave blow to prestige, it represented a tactical advantage.

The events preceding the first battle of Ypres involve a great number of troops extending along a front of over 70 miles, and a clear appreciation of the fighting in that salient and the objects it was hoped by both combatants to achieve requires a detailed understanding of the position of the various forces of the engagements which had previously been fought, and a rough knowledge of the lie of the land. Across this small corner of France and Belgium some of the fiercest fighting which even the Great War produced was to take place during the next four years, and it is essential, therefore, if the nature of that fighting is to be understood, that the reader should realize the significance of this particular territory.

On October 11 the position of the opposing forces was approximately as follows: The French left had reached Vermelles, some few miles north of Lens, and remained stationary there throughout the fighting round Ypres and La Bassée. The British 2nd corps had detrained at Abbeville and was moving up into position behind Armentières, driving before it the small German cavalry patrols which had occupied such places as Estaires. The 3rd corps was in course of transit from the Aisne, but was not due to arrive for several days. The 1st corps was still in position on the Aisne front. Meanwhile, a 4th corps, of which mention will be made later, was covering the retreat of the Belgian army from Antwerp, and itself slowly moving back on Ypres. On the 11th it was in the neighbourhood of Ghent. A French army under General Dubail was hurriedly being formed behind the Yser, and in cooperation with the remnants of the Belgian army was preparing to hold the line from the sea at Nieuport to Dixmude, if such should prove necessary.

On the German side four reserve corps had been hurried to the seat of the new struggle in the west, and von Beseler's divisions, which had been held up by the resistance of Antwerp, were preparing to move towards the coast. Lille was occupied on the 13th, the same day as von Beseler reached Ghent. On the 14th he was in Bruges, and two days later in Ostend. The dream of the Allies of a front extending from Antwerp to Arras was shattered. In the latter part of the race to the sea the Germans had done the outflanking with uncomfortable rapidity, and already the outcome was beginning to reveal itself. Opposing lines which already faced one another as far as Lens were in rapid process of formation in a line running north-west from that point to the sea at Nieuport.

The district called Flanders on which for the second time British and German forces were to meet is of all lands the most unsuitable for modern warfare. The level of the land is generally below that of the sea, and everywhere the existence of surface water makes trench digging almost an impossibility. Every hole, whether dug by spade or blown by shell, becomes half full of water within a few hours, and in winter months conditions are appalling. The main roads had shallow foundations and were not fit for heavy vehicles, and though in Belgian Flanders a narrow centre part of the road was paved with granite sets, this left a soft track on either side. Quite unsuitable for even moderate traffic, they broke down completely under the enormous volume of transport vehicles with which the pressing demands of a large army covered them. On the Allied side, at least, the troops were often in severe want during the first winter of the war owing to the impossibility of getting up supplies through the ditches of thick mud into which the roads had been turned.

Off the roads conditions were, if possible, worse. The soil, naturally heavy, is everywhere cut by numerous dykes, canals and ditches, and the cross-country movement of large bodies of troops was a task which taxed the ingenuity and resource of commanders even more than it tried the stamina and the patience of the troops. What was bad for infantry and worse for cavalry became almost impossible for artillery. The intensive cultivation in small holdings and the number of villages dotting the flats and few low hills added to the difficulties of the situation. Apart from the huge manufacturing centre round Lille, Flanders is an agricultural district given over to the cultivation of

beetroots (for sugar and alcohol), tobacco, hops, corn and vegetables. And towards the end of the year when the stubborn and imperturbable French peasant began to fill the roads with enormous wains piled high with the produce of his harvest, the difficulties of transport, heavy enough before, were almost insuperable. The available accommodation for troops not in the line was poor. The luckier ones secured farmhouses, but the majority had to endure the discomfort of iron-roofed sheds built of planks, through the interstices of which the cold winds sweeping across the dreary flats penetrated with heartbreaking ease. Finally the wells were tainted by the enormous heaps of manure kept in the farmyards and elsewhere, the smell of which contended with the sickly odour emanating from the piles of beetroot used for winter fodder. It is not surprising that endemic disease was present in every village on the plain: it is surprising that it was kept so well in hand.

Viewed retrospectively, it is remarkable that a country which would have taxed to the limit the resources and ability of an army service corps to provide for the needs of a few divisions in peace time manœuvres, was none the less the scene of some of the fiercest fighting of the war between two huge armies which, although sometimes short of food or ammunition, were on the whole provided for with astonishing regularity.

Such is the land of Flanders, ill-suited in the last degree to the deadly purposes of modern armies, yet destined by the clash of strategy to be the scene of the culmination of the struggle of 1914, and thereafter the scene of a number of titanic struggles beside which the mightiest efforts of Napoleon and his adversaries pale into insignificance.

We can now return to the British 2nd army corps, which detrained at Abbeville on October 9, and the same day rejoined the newly created cavalry corps which had preceded it by road from the Aisne. On the next day General Foch had a conference with Sir John French at Doullens, and it was decided that the British should endeavour to achieve farther north what Maud'huy had failed to do south of Lens—to strike at the unprotected German flank which was thought to be behind Douai. With this object the B.E.F. was to advance north of Lille and sweep south-east in a movement which should be timed to coincide with a united attack by the French armies south of Arras. Once again the French Intelligence had grossly

underestimated the number of German troops in the area, and the existence of the four new corps would appear to have escaped notice altogether.

The 2nd corps was the only force of British troops which had yet arrived, although the 3rd corps under General Pulteney was detraining at St. Omer on the 11th; but in accordance with Foch's request Sir John French decided to move forward with what troops he had, as time was of the greatest importance.

On Sunday, October 11, the German cavalry holding some woods north of the canal running from Béthune to Aire felt a new force of opposition working against them. They were engaged in surrounding Hazebrouck from the south, while another large German mounted force was creeping round the town from the north by the heights of Mont des Cats. The weather was misty, making aerial scouting almost useless, and some time passed before the Germans knew what was happening. They had entrenched outside many of the villages and had placed machine guns in the centre of the rooms of the cottages so that they commanded the streets from the windows. In the woods north of the canal they held their ground more lightly, with Jägers and riflemen collected round the paths that the French cavalry might take, while machine guns were held ready to open fire upon them. But not a glint of the French uniforms was seen.

Half-invisible figures in khaki, carbine in hand, were moving between the trees. They were the 4th Hussars and the 15th and 16th Lancers, forming part of General Allenby's cavalry corps. As the Germans never expected to meet the British army so far north, they were unprepared for an advance from such a direction, and, unobserved, the British general was able to plant his guns and Maxims with a view to getting a sweeping fire on the Germans when they moved in the direction in which it was intended to force them. Then the surprise attack opened, and the Germans broke and fled eastward. The 3rd brigade swept the woods, and then joined hands with another body of British cavalry in the neighbourhood of Hazebrouck. In the night more British cavalrymen crossed the reconquered canal and moved in a north-easterly direction. Meanwhile, the infantry battalions had been moving north-east along the Lys in the darkness to link on to the left of the 10th French army, and then swing against the German flank at La Bassée.

The action opened on Monday, October 12. The 5th division, under Sir Charles Fergusson, advanced along the southern bank of the canal, while the 3rd division crossed the waterway and battled towards Lille. The ground was very flat, which made it extremely difficult for artillery practice, but steady progress was made. Mining works, factories and houses covered the land, and as the Germans held every building commanding the path of advance, and had machine guns in the windows and on the roofs, it was costly and slow work for infantry to advance against such opposition. But by Tuesday, October 13, the 5th division struck against a little German Gibraltar which was to prove a permanent obstacle in the path of the Allies. It consisted of the small industrial town of La Bassée, lying on a line of canals some 16 miles south-west of Lille. The canals formed a splendid system of moats in front of the German trenches, and to the south of the town there was some high ground on which the defending artillery was placed. The German guns swept all the flat country around for miles, and there was no site from which the British artillery could effectually operate in reply.

The 2nd corps pivoting on the French left at Vermelles was advancing along an eight mile front, but the impossibility of capturing La Bassée by a frontal attack necessitated an enveloping movement, and accordingly troops were pushed out northwards. But a determined counter-attack by the Germans on the village of Givenchy, due west of La Bassée, which compelled the British to retire, threatened to drive a wedge between the south and north sections of the troops, and until the line behind Givenchy was consolidated further advance was extremely dangerous. The line in the centre held firm, however, and during the next four days considerable progress was made in a north-east direction towards Lille, the 3rd division capturing Aubers and Herlies on the 17th. On the previous day a determined attack was made on Givenchy, and in spite of severe losses the 15th brigade carried the village and pushed on to Cantelaux, halfway between Givenchy and La Bassée.

The capture of Herlies, a particularly brilliant affair achieved by the 1st Lincolnshire Regiment, gave the British a position north and east of La Bassée and threatened an envelopment of the German position. The losses, however, had been extremely heavy, and the troops were worn out by a week of continuous fighting. On the right they still made contact with the French

position at Vermelles, and on the left, having advanced against deadly opposition for several days, they were in touch, through Conneau and de Mitry's cavalry, with General Pulteney and the 3rd corps which had moved up from St. Omer. Up to this point, moreover, although the Germans had had the advantage of defending strong positions, they had been definitely outnumbered. Now, however, the reserve divisions pouring into the area were to redress the balance, and the Germans were able to launch a counter-offensive.

No progress was possible on the 18th, although next day on the extreme left the 2nd Royal Irish, in conjunction with the French cavalry, had carried the hamlet of Le Pilly north of Herlies, and retained their position throughout the night. Sir John French meanwhile had realized that the high-water mark of the British advance had been reached, and ordered a withdrawal to a stronger and more defensible position which was in course of preparation in the rear. Unfortunately, however, before the orders to retire reached the Royal Irish the Germans found out they were isolated, and after a heavy bombardment surrounded Le Pilly. Until 3 p.m. the Irish resisted with amazing heroism, but by that time the 300 survivors, nearly all wounded, had exhausted their ammunition and were compelled to surrender. The total loss to the battalion in the two days' fighting in killed and prisoners was 578, only 30 men managing to rejoin the British lines.

The turning point in the attempt of the 2nd corps on La Bassée had been reached, and British troops were on October 20 nearer that town than they were to be for the next four years. The turning movement had failed here as it had failed at every point from Soissons northwards, and Sir John French issued orders that the 1st corps under Sir Douglas Haig, which had arrived from the Aisne on the 19th, should seek to achieve north of Ypres the success which the 2nd corps had failed to win at La Bassée. In the meantime, the 2nd corps was to hold its position and link up strongly with the 3rd corps to the north-west.

The story of the 3rd corps is similar to that of the 2nd. We last heard of it detraining at St. Omer on the 11th, but on account of transport difficulties it was not ready to advance from its concentration point, Hazebrouck, until the morning of the 13th. The orders of that day were for an advance to the line Armentières-Wytschaete. But on the left of such a line of

advance lay a ridge of hills extending from Mont des Cats to Kemmel. These hills, although only 400 feet high, offered a commanding position to any force defending them, and represented a perpetual threat to any force operating below them. General Allenby's cavalry were in consequence ordered to clear them of the enemy, it having been ascertained that only one German cavalry corps was in the neighbourhood. This task was accomplished after some very stiff fighting by the evening of the same day, the Germans losing a considerable number of prisoners, amongst whom was Prince Max of Hesse, who subsequently died of his wounds.

The two infantry divisions, the 6th and 4th, comprising the 3rd corps had meanwhile advanced eastward from Hazebrouck, and by the evening of the 13th had driven the Germans out of Meteren. Reconaissances were made, and the fall of Lille was reported together with the movements of the German 19th corps, one division of which was moving westward on Ypres. Time became pressing, and Sir John French ordered a renewal of the attack before the German cavalry corps could be supported by much of the 19th corps. Throughout the next day or two the Germans remained entirely on the defensive, abandoning their previous attitude of semi-offensive tactics. This change was brought about by the German high command, which was planning a crushing reply to the British advance. Von Beseler had captured Antwerp, and, as we saw, he was directed not to the seat of fighting south of Ypres, but to the Belgian coast.

From there he was ordered to strike south upon the remnants of the Belgian army on the Yser, to break through to Calais and thus turn the flank and rear of the British forces concentrated on the Ypres-Armentières line. The farther east that the British could be tempted, so long as the German front held firm, the less chance of escape they would have in the event of von Beseler breaking through. The result of this strategy will appear in due course, but it may be mentioned in passing that only the flooding of the Yser valley by the Belgians and the effective action of British monitors off the coast prevented at the eleventh hour the success of a manœuvre which would have rolled up with disastrous losses the whole of the Allies' front in the west.

As a result, however, of the German plan, the British 3rd corps was able to make slow but steady progress, and on the

14th had occupied Bailleul and Messines without opposition. In the south contact had been established with the French cavalry of Conneau and de Mitry, and through them with the 2nd corps south of Estaires, and the Allies' line ran unbroken from Vermelles to Wytschaete. On the next day Allenby's cavalry on the left of the 3rd corps joined up at Ypres with the 7th division and 3rd cavalry division under Sir Henry Rawlinson, which had fallen back from Ghent. The same day they established contact with General Dubail's new army of French marines and territorials which, with the remnants of the Belgian army from Antwerp, was holding the line of the Yser from Nieuport to Dixmude. The race to the sea was over, for the Allied line though thin ran unbroken from the sea to Arras, and thence solidly to the Swiss border.

Before proceeding with the further operations of General Pulteney's 3rd corps, it is necessary to trace the course of events in Belgium from the fall of Antwerp to the consolidation of the Allied line to the sea. During the siege of Antwerp Mr. Winston Churchill, as we have seen, promised Allied support. The intention was to organize a mixed British and French force in the neighbourhood of Bruges and push eastward against the flank of von Beseler's besieging army. With this intention the British 7th division and the 3rd cavalry division under the command of Sir Henry Rawlinson were landed at Zeebrugge and Ostend on October 7-8 and concentrated at Bruges.

The expected French support was not forthcoming, and it was evident that the plan to relieve Antwerp and extend the Allied line south to Arras was doomed to failure. Von Beseler's howitzers had already decided the fate of the city, and before Rawlinson reached Bruges the evacuation was begun. The British divisions were accordingly moved up towards Ghent to cover the retreat of the Belgian army, which reached the canal running north of Ghent to the Dutch border on the 10th. Up to this time Sir Henry Rawlinson had been operating independently under orders from the War Office, but on the 9th he was placed at the disposal of Sir John French, and his divisions, which were for convenience renamed the 4th corps, were included in the British expeditionary force.

Large enemy forces were closing in on Ghent, and the German cavalry corps was known to be approaching Ypres. General Rawlinson was therefore directed to fall back slowly on that city,

covering the retreat of the tired Belgians and protecting the left flank of the British 3rd corps, about to begin its operations round Armentières, and acting as a shield against von Beseler who, it was thought, would strike south-west. Luckily, however, von Beseler, in accordance with later German strategy, was directed to the coast, and although he was so close on the rear of the 4th corps that he occupied Bruges on the 14th, the day after it had left, he veered slightly north and proceeded to the coast where Ostend and Zeebrugge, from which the garrisons had been withdrawn, fell into his hands. The British 4th corps was meanwhile moving south, shepherding the Belgians before it. A German cavalry corps had drawn off to the south-east, leaving the road open for the retirement of the 4th corps to Ypres, and the 3rd cavalry division under General Byng got into touch with General Allenby's cavalry north of Messines on the 15th, the same day as the rest of the 4th corps reached Ypres, having been unmolested throughout its journey.

The Belgian army had withstood a mighty adversary for over two months. It had suffered terrible losses, and had endured great hardships, not the least of which was the moral suffering consequent upon the perpetual loss of national territory. None the less it had by heroic efforts baffled its opponent; but time was needed by the 48,000 survivors for rest and reorganization. It was therefore proposed that they should retire to a line running west of St. Omer. Such a retirement would have involved the abandonment of the remnant of Belgian territory, and this the Belgians, weary of fighting though they were, would not accept. Accordingly the army made its base at Dunkirk, and the Belgians began to cooperate with General Dubail's 8th army of fusiliers, marines and territorials in the construction of the line of defences behind the Yser, from which the Germans were never able to eject them. Their right extended as far as Houthulst Wood, north-east of Ypres, and there on the 16th they were attacked by superior forces of the enemy and driven back to the river. Although the wood was recovered next day by four French cavalry divisions with conspicuous gallantry, it was rapidly becoming evident that the massing of forces on either side was destroying the fluidity of even this extreme north front, and that virtually the swing doors of two stupendous armies had clashed together along the whole of the enormous front from Switzerland to the North Sea.

But neither side was even now ready to accept a stalemate position, and both were preparing for strenuous attacks which, it was hoped, would discover a weakness in the opposing lines. As in former cases, Sir John French was not well served by his Intelligence, and in the result he underestimated the forces opposed to him in the area. He believed that with the arrival of the 1st corps under Sir Douglas Haig, which was expected from the Aisne on the 19th, he would have a marked superiority in numbers and would therefore be in a position to deliver a crushing blow on the thinly held German line. The arrival of four new corps mostly from Bavaria and Württemberg was overlooked, and the movements of von Beseler were apparently hidden in obscurity. In actual fact the superiority Sir John French believed he enjoyed was a decided inferiority, and his subsequent belief that he was really attacking when in truth his men were barely holding their own placed him in a position from which only the magnificent fighting qualities of his troops rescued him.



The position on the night of October 15-16 was approximately as follows:

The 2nd corps occupied a line running from a point on the La Bassée-Aire canal through Festubert up to Pon du Hem. Conneau's cavalry division extended the line to Estaires. The 3rd corps held a line running from Estaires through Nieppe to Romarin. The British cavalry corps and the 3rd cavalry division

held the banks of the river Lys from Armentières to a point near Comines, and thence the canal to Ypres. The 3rd corps in the Ypres area had its front on a line encircling the east face of the city from Voormezeele to Wieltje. Dubail's 8th army stretched between Ypres and Poperinghe, and the Belgian army held the line of the Yser from Dixmude to Nieuport.

The 1st corps was about to detrain at Hazebrouck and could be used as a reserve for any threatened point, and the main units of the growing French 8th army would reach Hazebrouck on the 23rd. Sir John French felt justified in ordering a general movement eastward. The 3rd corps was therefore ordered to move on Armentières and occupy the crossings of the river Lys, Allenby's cavalry were directed to advance farther north against Commines, and Sir Henry Rawlinson to push towards Roulers, paying special attention to his left flank, which was menaced by enemy concentration north of Ypres. The 2nd corps in the south, as has been described, was advancing against La Bassée.

By the 17th the 3rd corps had reached and occupied Armentières, the Germans in accordance with their plan falling back unhurriedly before it. Elsewhere, except on the front of the 2nd corps, little progress had been made, and in particular Allenby's cavalry floundering in the marshes round Comines had been unable to make the passage of the Lys. Gradually, as the concentration of the German troops neared completion, their resistance was stiffening, and the checks met later by the 2nd corps were only part of the carefully planned offensive which the Germans were about to launch on the whole Allied position. On the next day, however, the 3rd corps pushed on, the 4th division operating against Houplines on the Lys, the 6th striking eastwards towards Lille. By the evening of the 18th the Germans had been pushed back on a line from Frelinghien on the Lys to Verlinghem and thence south-west to Premesques.

On this line, further advance being impossible, the 3rd division began to entrench, its left joining up with Allenby's cavalry at Ploegsteert Wood, its right meeting the French cavalry filling the gap between it and the 2nd corps at Zunetières. The weakness of this position was that the British front extended on a salient with its left flank exposed to enfilade fire and attack from the German line between Frelinghien to Verlinghem. Had the cavalry corps been able to force a crossing of the river north of Frelinghien, the Germans defending that village would have

been compelled to retire, and the British line could have been straightened. As it was, during the whole of the 18th the cavalry corps could make no progress, and although they attacked Deulemont with great courage the German position was too well defended to permit of capture without adequate artillery support.

The movements of the other British corps, the 4th in front of Ypres, on this day were equally disappointing, for owing to a misunderstanding of G.H.Q. orders the advance was not pushed with any vigour until midday. The mistake was then rectified, and the 4th corps prepared to strike strenuously at Menin. Information as to enemy concentrations was, however, received, and it was decided to postpone the attack until next day.

Yet this failure to advance was to prove a blessing in disguise, for October 18 was the final day of concentration behind the German lines before they launched their attack, which was to herald the battle of Ypres, and had the 7th division pushed on too far it is probable that the next day it would have been cut off and surrounded. As it was, it was enabled to fall back steadily into line with the other forces on the Ypres salient.

To complete a description of the movements on October 18 it is necessary to add that the Germans on that day for the first time seriously showed their hand and launched an attack on the Belgian position, which was continued uninterruptedly for the next eight days in the battle of the Yser. Further description of that battle will be found elsewhere, but for the moment it is sufficient to point out that here if anywhere was the real objective of the German attack, and although they exerted enormous pressure along the whole front from the sea to the south of Arras it was undoubtedly upon the Nieuport-Dixmude line that they based their hopes. And it is easy to see that had that line been broken, what the Germans had failed to achieve on the Marne might well have been gained as a late attack in Flanders. Boulogne, Calais and the control of the Channel would have fallen into their hands. The British, cut off from their base and supplies, would have been paralysed; the French line from Soissons to Arras would have been taken in the rear, and Paris would have been at the Germans' mercy.

In considering the great battles fought in Flanders during the end of October and the beginning of November, a sense of proportion is apt to be lost. Thus to the British the attack on Ypres must for ever stand as the decisive moment in the whole autumn

campaign, as well as the greatest memorial to British valour. To the French the culmination of the struggle and the decisive point of the campaign is equally clearly the defence of Arras from October 19 to October 26. There is much to be said for such a contention when it is realized, as has been pointed out, that a break at that point would have split the Allied forces, driven the British into the sea and turned the French flank. But the defence of the Yser will rank even above the defences of Liége and Antwerp as the culmination of Belgian heroism and their greatest contribution to the salvation of France.

From October 19 onwards the whole Allied line from Nieuport to La Bassée was exposed to fierce attacks. But the battles of Ypres and the Yser can most clearly be understood if they are treated in isolation, and it is convenient to fix the geographical limit of those struggles at the right wing of Pulteney's 3rd corps. On such an analysis the British 2nd corps is excluded from the field of action, and before proceeding to a description of the major battles it is necessary to record the operations of that corps from October 21 to the time when the opposing armies had settled down to trench warfare.

This corps, as has been told, had battled slowly eastwards for over a week from Bethune to La Bassée. Advance beyond that point had proved impossible: the Germans had secured an excellent position defended along its face by a network of canals, and possessing in its rear a ridge of low hills from which artillery fire could sweep the country. Attempts to envelop it on the north had failed disastrously, the loss of the Royal Irish being an example. Casualties had been heavy on each day, and the death of General H. Hamilton, the commander of the 3rd division, killed by a shrapnel bullet on October 14, was a severe loss. No more could be done, and time was needed for rest and reorganization. Nor did it prove possible to hold the ground already won. The massed German forces in the area heavily outnumbered the British troops.

Sir Charles Fergusson's 5th division was driven out of the village of Violaines, two miles north of La Bassée, and though by a terrible counter-attack made by the Worcesters and Manchesters the Germans were held back, Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien had to retreat. It was on the night of October 22 that he withdrew to Givenchy, just out of range of the La Bassée guns. Northward his line stretched to the village of Neuve Chapelle,

and here the first battalion of the Royal West Kents made a stand that ranks among the highest achievements of British troops. When at last they retired from their trenches, led by Lieutenant Haydon, one of their few surviving officers, both divisions of the 2nd army corps hailed them as the heroes of the terrible fight. The Wiltshires also distinguished themselves in repulsing the attack against the 7th brigade, while the Middlesex Regiment, by a splendid charge, recaptured the trenches out of which the Gordon Highlanders had been driven.

On October 23 part of the battered 2nd corps was withdrawn from the south of the line in front of Bethune, and its place was taken by the Lahore division of the Indian troops which had arrived from Marseilles. Thereafter as succeeding divisions of Indians reached the area they took over the line from other sections of the 2nd corps. The whole relief was not, however, completed until October 29, and during that time the German attacks from La Bassée, although scarcely so fierce as the attacks at Ypres, were none the less both energetic and continuous. Until November 2 the line swayed to and fro, the bitterest struggle being waged around Neuve Chapelle, as has been recorded. On October 26-27 the Germans launched a furious attack upon the village, which at the time was held by the terribly depleted 2nd Irish Rifles. Although reinforcements had been promised, they did not arrive, and by 9 a.m. on the morning of the 27th all that remained of this regiment had been driven from the village, leaving four-fifths of their number killed, wounded or prisoners. The taking of the village drove a wedge into the British line.

By this time the losses of the corps were frightful, whole regiments being reduced to a mere handful, and even the reservists failing to bring the strength beyond two or three companies of 100 men each. Fortunately, however, the Germans were also almost at the end of their resources.

After October 29 both sides were too exhausted for further effort, and although desultory sniping and shelling continued to herald small attacks by both combatants until November 2, the great battle of La Bassée was virtually over, and the Germans had been foiled here as they were foiled at Arras, Ypres and on the Yser in their attempt to smash through the Allied position.

CHAPTER 25

Japan and Turkey in the War

WHEN the Great War came, Japan honourably fulfilled the obligations she had undertaken in her treaty of alliance with Great Britain. Early in August her government announced that the country was prepared to do its part to aid Great Britain. The Japanese army and navy made ready, and on August 15 an ultimatum was presented to Germany requiring her withdrawal from the Far East. No reply being received, war was declared, and a Japanese expedition set out to capture the German protectorate of Kiao-chau, in China. To find the cause and significance of this step, one must go back to the end of the Chino-Japanese war (1894-95) when Japan found herself, in the very hour of victory, robbed of its fruits by the intervention of Russia, France, and Germany, who advised her, "in the interests of peace," to restore the captured territory and to evacuate Port Arthur. Japan, in no position to risk war with the European powers, gave way.

Two years later Germany grasped at the excuse, offered by the murder of some missionaries, to extort territory from the Chinese; and Prince Henry of Prussia was sent with a fleet to put forward a series of demands, among which was the occupation of Kiao-chau and the recognition of Shantung as a German zone of influence. In March, 1898, Kiao-chau, a territory of 193 square miles, was leased to Germany for 99 years, and the fortress of Port Arthur was leased to Russia. In the Russo-Japanese war, 1904-5, the Japanese took Port Arthur from Russia.

Germans regarded the ownership of Kiao-chau with great satisfaction. There was a good harbour, with an entrance about two miles wide, which could be well defended from the high hills around. It was a natural outlet for the trade of Shantung, one of the richest provinces in China. Everything was done to make Kiao-chau an example of what Germany could accomplish in Imperial colonization. It was placed under the control of the German navy, and vast sums were spent on it each year. The little old town of Kiao-chau itself, on the inside of the bay, was

made secondary to Tsingtau, a modern city which the Germans erected at the harbour mouth. Tsingtau became one of the show places of China. It was a delightful holiday resort, with fine bathing sands, and was known as the Brighton of the Far East. It was kept distinctively European. The houses were in European style. All the luxuries of civilization abounded, from the best hotel in Asia to model schools. The trade grew by leaps and bounds. Factories and works began to arise. The harbour was improved, with breakwaters and dry docks, repairing yards, floating docks, and as good a mechanical equipment for the loading and unloading of ships as could be found east of Suez. The bare hills around the city were planted with trees, and nursery establishments flourished, sending trees and bushes by the thousand throughout China.

In the early summer of 1914 the Germans were very proud of what they had done at Tsingtau. Here was a model city, with wide streets, fine public buildings, abundant gardens, and comfortable houses. Tsingtau had been built on a system. It was as orderly, as exact as any new town in Germany itself. Above all the place was a fortress, under the command of a naval governor, Captain Meyer-Waldeck. There were two strong forts, called after the kaiser and Bismarck, on the hills overlooking and commanding the city. Bomb-proof batteries and concealed entrenchments abounded, making the place a fortified zone. In addition to the land fortifications, there were naval works, and there were generally several warships in the harbour.

The Japanese ultimatum presented to Germany on August 15 demanded the immediate withdrawal of German warships from Chinese waters, and the handing over to Japan of the complete territory of Kiao-chau for eventual restoration to China. The Japanese, as though to remind Germany that they had not forgotten past wrongs, drew up their note in exactly the same style and with the same phraseology as the note delivered to Japan by the three Powers in 1895.

The text of the ultimatum was as follows:

We consider it highly important and necessary in the present situation to take measures to remove the causes of all disturbance of peace in the Far East, and to safeguard general interests as contemplated in the agreement of alliance between Japan and Great Britain. In order to secure firm and enduring peace in Eastern Asia, the establishment of which is the aim of the agreement, the Japanese Government sincerely believes it to

be its duty to give advice to the German Government to carry out the following two propositions:

1. To withdraw immediately from Japanese and Chinese waters the German warships and armed vessels of all kinds, and to disarm at once those which cannot be withdrawn.

2. To deliver on a date not later than September 15 to the Japanese authorities, without condition or compensation, the entire leased territory of Kiao-chau, with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China.

The Japanese Government announces at the same time that in the event of its not receiving by noon on August 23 an answer from the German Government signifying unconditional acceptance of the above advice offered by the Japanese Government, Japan will be compelled to take such action as it may deem necessary to meet the situation.

The intervention of Japan in the war, welcome to the Allies as it was from many points of view, had its embarrassing aspects. In Western America a strong anti-Japanese feeling existed, and in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand the same suspicion of Japanese ambitions existed. To reduce the risk of any dissension, a formal statement was issued by the British government that, with a view to protecting the general interest of the Far East and particularly as regards the integrity of China, Japanese action would not extend beyond the China Seas except so far as the safety of her shipping made it necessary, and to no foreign territory except that in German occupation.

The Japanese plan of campaign was twofold—to drive the German warships from Eastern waters and to capture Tsingtau. The latter would give the army once more an opportunity to prove its mettle. At the first sign of war, orders were issued for all German reservists in the Far East to report themselves at Tsingtau. Many women and children left, and before the final bombardment the remainder were sent out of the place, and very few civilians remained. The garrison numbered between 5,000 and 6,000 men all told, including the new arrivals and the crews of some gunboats and destroyers in the harbour. The entire waters for a radius of eight miles around the place were thoroughly mined. All tall structures in the protectorate which might afford assistance to an attacking fleet by giving them sighting points were dynamited. The railway bridge at the boundary of the German territory was blown up, all houses or woods offering shelter to an enemy approaching from the land side were razed to the ground, and feverish work was begun on three lines of defence works for

which thousands of Chinese coolies were pressed into service. Barbed wire entanglements were erected at many spots and were connected to the local electricity works so that they could be charged with current whenever necessary. When the Japanese called for the surrender of the place the governor, Captain Meyer-Waldeck, replied: "Never shall we surrender the smallest bit of ground over which the German flag is flying. From this place we shall not retreat. If the enemy wants Tsingtau he must come and fetch it."

The Japanese were willing, and it is believed desired to undertake the fighting against Tsingtau by themselves, but it was thought better that the operations should be carried out by a combined Japanese-British force. Two British vessels, the battleship Triumph and the destroyer Usk, shared in the sea fighting in cooperation with a number of Japanese ships. The Japanese expeditionary force numbered 22,890 officers and men and 142 guns, under the command of Lieutenant General Kamio, with Major General Yamanashi as chief of staff. The force was mainly composed of the 18th division, the 29th brigade of infantry, the siege artillery corps, marine artillery and a flying corps. The British force under Brigadier General Nathaniel W. Barnardiston, commander of the British troops in North China, included 910 South Wales Borderers and 450 men of the 36th Sikhs. The blockading fleet took up position on August 25, and a blockade of the coast was declared as from August 27. It was hoped to bottle up the German fleet in the harbour, but some of the ships slipped out. Several vessels, however, were left behind, including five gunboats, a destroyer and a minelayer. The Austrian light cruiser Kaiserin Elisabeth was ordered to join the force at Tsingtau, and succeeded in doing so.

The early operations of the fleet were greatly hampered by the minefields, and extensive mine-sweeping operations were necessary. The Japanese suffered some losses in attempting to get near the coast, and two torpedo boats and one cruiser were reported as blown up or sunk. When, however, the ships got within reasonable range they maintained a constant fire on the forts and on some outlying redoubts. The Japanese force landed at Laichow Bay, to the north of the Shantung peninsula, and advanced through Chinese territory on to Kiao-chau. Their progress was exceedingly difficult owing to phenomenal floods—heavier, it was said, than Shantung had known for 60 years. The

floods hindered the landing of the heavy guns and supplies, and made it impossible to move them forward quickly. The Japanese troops advanced to the town of Weihsien, and from there spread through a large part of the province, even taking possession of the town of Tsinan-fu. In spite of formal Chinese protests they seized the Shantung railway, and dealt with a large part of the Chinese province as though it were conquered territory. The Japanese advance guard at times scarcely succeeded in marching eight miles a day. Streams were swollen to torrents impossible to cross; fields were turned into seas of mud; there was nothing to do but to wait for a few days. By September 13, however, the Japanese scouts reached and attacked the railway station of the little town of Kiao-chau itself, 22 miles from Tsingtau. Japanese aeroplanes began to soar over the German positions, and day after day they dropped bombs on the fortifications, the electric light works and the harbour.

The battle started on September 26. Guns were hurried into position, and a very heavy bombardment opened on the German front. Three Japanese warships—the Suwo, Iwami and Tango—assisted by the British battleship Triumph, bombarded Tsingtau from the sea, and then came an advance on land. The Japanese set themselves to clear the outer works of Tsingtau, and completely succeeded. Point after point was stormed. Two gunboats in the harbour—the Jaguar and the Kaiserin Elisabeth—poured shell fire on the troops as they rushed forward. At one or two points the Japanese were caught by heavy machine gun fire and in one case, according to German accounts, a large body of them were swept down as they came unexpectedly under enfilading fire. By the morning of the 28th the Germans had been driven right into the inner fortified position in Tsingtau behind the line of hill forts.

On September 30 the Germans made a desperate attempt to drive back the Japanese, attacking from land, sea, and air. Their effort was unsuccessful. Their troops were driven in, one of their destroyers was sunk, and it was clear that they were completely held. The Japanese were now content to wait for a few days while some of their heaviest siege artillery was brought up into position. At the first approach of the Japanese the Germans opened a very heavy artillery fire which was maintained day after day, but much of the gun fire was mere aimless shooting. Thus, in 24 hours alone, early in October, the forts on the three

hills fired 2,015 shells, and correspondents with the Japanese force declared that the entire firing during that 24 hours inflicted no damage on the Japanese. This waste of ammunition is difficult to explain, and undoubtedly was a leading factor in the early surrender of the place. The besiegers noticed in the second week of October that artillery fire fell off in surprising fashion; some forts that had formerly been keeping up an almost incessant bombardment now allowed hours to go by without a single shot.

The Japanese captured with comparative ease a position, Prinz Heinrich Hill, on which they could mount their guns to bombard the forts. During the latter part of October the Japanese hold on the city steadily increased, and the artillery fire grew daily in intensity. The British contingent left Tientsin on September 19, and after calling at Wei-hai-wei for transport mules, landed in Shantung on the 21st. The weather was very trying, a strong southerly gale blowing, heavy rain falling, and a very heavy sea running. The men set out on a 40 mile march, and came up behind the Japanese as they were driving in the German advanced positions. It was intended that they should participate in this attack, but the German resistance at this point was so slight that their help was not wanted. On October 30 the entire British force moved up to the front, and now occupied a part extending to about five miles. There they took part with the Japanese troops in the work of digging an approach by sapping right up to the German redoubts.

The bombardment with the heavy siege artillery opened at dawn on October 31, the birthday of the emperor of Japan. One of the first shells set fire to enormous oil tanks in the naval docks, sending up a pillar of smoke that spread like a pall over the city. Then shells burst over the forts, and under the almost ceaseless rain of heavy metal the gun emplacements seemed to melt and to crumble. The barbed wire entanglements were scattered into fragments; the trenches were broken, filled in here, expanded there, and blurred elsewhere by the high explosive shells constantly falling among them. Under the shelter of this fire the infantrymen continued to push up their saps and trenches. Supporting the shore artillery were the naval guns of both the Allies.

For seven days an incessant artillery fire continued. Almost every German position, save the bomb-proof casements in which

the guns stood, was knocked to bits. The ground was everywhere pitted and torn. The troops in the trenches between the forts were in many cases wiped out by the rain of bursting shrapnel and high explosives. Meanwhile the Japanese and British infantry had advanced by means of their trenches to points right under the forts. To add to the horrors in the place Japanese aeroplanes were constantly soaring overhead dropping bombs on every possible position. The Japanese fire destroyed the electric light works so that for the last few days the people had nothing but candle light. The wireless apparatus was rendered useless.

It soon became evident that the end was very near. The warships in the harbour were blown up and sunk in order that they might not fall into Japanese hands. The big guns in the forts were fired many of them to the last shot, and then destroyed with explosives. There was no shortage of food, and when the city was captured provisions were found there sufficient to feed five thousand persons for three months. But provisions without ammunition were of no use. Bismarck Fort, one of the most powerful of all, had been destroyed at the beginning of November. Other forts became less and less active. On the night of November 6 some troops advanced to attack a redoubt, and entered it with comparatively little difficulty. Encouraged by this success, the Japanese commander ordered a general advance. Japanese and British battalions crept up silently in the darkness to point after point. The two great mountain positions of Iltis and Bismarck fell into the hands of the Allies with a minimum of opposition.

When dawn broke the Japanese found themselves in command of some of the forts dominating the city. Now was the moment for a grand final assault. They made ready, but before the whole line moved forward a white flag was seen fluttering from the observatory, followed by white flags raised at other points. It was seven o'clock in the morning of November 7 when the white flag was raised, and as the Japanese soldiers saw it they set up a loud shout of "Banzai! Let great Japan live for ever!" —the national cry. As they looked around their ranks they saw that even though the capture of the city had been very much easier than they expected, yet some parts of the army had paid a heavy price. In the various land operations the Japanese lost 236 killed and 1,282 wounded, the British casualties being

12 killed and 61 wounded. On November 10 the fortress was formally handed over to General Kamio.

Other outlying possessions of Germany in the Pacific were occupied by the Allied forces without resistance. The Caroline Islands, an archipelago in the N.W. Pacific, bought by Germany from Spain in 1899 for £840,000, and the Marshall Islands were occupied by Japan in October, 1914. On the outbreak of war, plans for the capture of German Samoa were carried out by the Australian and New Zealand governments. The expeditionary force was composed of New Zealand troops to which were added some islanders from Fiji. This force left Wellington on August 14, 1914. Arrived off Apia, an ultimatum was conveyed under flag of truce demanding the surrender of Samoa. The deputy governor replied that though in the temporary absence of the governor he could not accept the responsibility of surrender, no opposition would be offered to the landing of troops. The troops thereupon disembarked, and on that day, August 29, the British flag was hoisted. The governor and officials surrendered.

The group of islands in the Pacific, lying off the east coast of New Guinea, acquired and named Bismarck Archipelago by Germany in 1884-5, was captured on September 11 by an Australian naval and military force. Placed temporarily under military rule, they were later administered by Australia as mandatory of the League of Nations. Two days after, Australian forces captured the Solomon Islands, lying 120 miles east of the Bismarck Archipelago. Of themselves the operations were inconsiderable, but in occupying harbours and wireless stations a stranglehold was got upon the activities of commerce raiders, which was of great value to the Allies.

We now turn to a very different field of operations. At the beginning of November, 1914, the Allies—Great Britain, France and Russia—declared war upon Turkey, and thus Asia Minor and north-east Africa became potential areas for the waging of the Great War, which hitherto had been confined to Europe and the immediate vicinity of German colonies in Africa and Asia. The declaration came as a surprise to no one; indeed, the only surprise was that the Porte had been allowed to defy for so long the first international principles of neutrality.

The circumstances which led to the declaration of war are detailed in the white paper (Cd. 7628) issued on November 13, and in the dispatch of November 20 from Sir Louis Mallet, the

British ambassador in Constantinople. When war began in August the Turkish government, although aggrieved by the detention in the British dockyards of the warships there building for the sultan's navy, expressed its intention of remaining neutral. Nevertheless, the army commanded by Enver Pasha, whose German sympathies were notorious, was mobilized, and the number of German officers in the capital increased rapidly.

On August 10 the German warships, the Goeben and the Breslau, entered the Dardanelles. The Goeben was one of the latest Dreadnought cruisers. Completed in October, 1912, she had a displacement of 23,000 tons and a main armament of ten 11 in. guns. On her steam trials she attained a speed of 27 knots, but she had since attained a speed of 28.4 knots on several occasions. The Breslau was a light cruiser, completed in April, 1912, with a displacement of 4,550 tons, carrying twelve 4.1 in. guns, and was capable of steaming 27.5 knots. To these two swift cruisers had been allotted the task of cruising the Indian Ocean and holding up the British main trade routes to the East beyond the Suez Canal, in the event of Britain joining the Entente Powers in the war. Owing to the miscalculation of German statesmanship these vessels were still in the Western Mediterranean on their way to the Suez Canal when Britain declared war on Germany. In the Straits of Messina, as has been told, they successfully evaded a British squadron commanded by Admiral Sir A. Berkeley Milne and Rear Admiral Troubridge. It was common knowledge that the Goeben, at least, was manned entirely by a crew of skilled ratings and petty officers. Her stokehold was worked exclusively by chief stokers, and her boats' crews consisted entirely of petty officers. It had been the intention of the Goeben to put the majority of her crew ashore at Smyrna and there pick up a substitute crew of less skilled German sailors who had been sent out

beforehand for the purpose in two merchant vessels. The skilled ratings were then to have proceeded to the Golden Horn and staffed the whole Turkish fleet. The German battle cruiser, however, was obliged to alter her programme. Chased by the British fleet she raced at her highest steaming power for the Dardanelles, and, with her consort, gained the protection of the Turkish forts. In exchanging shots with H.M.S. Gloucester the Goeben had been damaged, and had sustained several casualties. The Turkish military authorities stage-managed a most cordial reception for the two fugitive war vessels. The captain of the Goeben was received in special audience by the sultan, and the crews were fêted (by order) by the whole population, military and civil, of the Turkish capital.

The ambassadors of the Allies pointed out to the Turkish authorities that by international law the ships must leave within 24 hours or be interned. The Turkish reply was that the sultan had bought them, and they remained. Soon it was reported that the Breslau was interfering with British shipping, and it was evident that the Germans were making every effort to secure Turkey as an active ally. The ambassador describes the situation at this time (September, 1914) as follows:

> However difficult it would have been for the Ottoman government to regain their control over the armed forces of the state after the arrival of the Goeben and Breslau, the insidious campaign carried on with their encouragement by means of the press, the preachers in the mosques, and the pamphleteers, is evidence that its most powerful members were in sympathy with the anti-British movement. I had, indeed, actual proof of the inspiration by Talaat Bey and Djemal Pasha of articles directed against Great Britain. Every agency which could be used to stimulate public opinion in favour of Germany and to inflame it against the Allies was set at work with the connivance, and often with the cooperation, of the Turkish authorities. All the Turkish newspapers in Constantinople became German organs; they glorified every real or imaginary success of Germany or Austria; they minimised everything favourable to the Allies.
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> The enclosures in an earlier dispatch will have shown to what depths of scurrility some of the more corrupt and unbridled of them descended in their onslaughts on Great Britain, and how unequally the censors of the press held the balance when exercising their practically unlimited powers. The provincial papers were no less enthusiastically pro-German; the semi-official telegraphic agency, which is practically worked by the ministry of the interior, was placed at the disposal of German

propaganda. Through these agencies unlimited use was made of Turkey's one concrete and substantial grievance against Great Britain as distinguished from other European Powers, that is the detention of the Sultan Osman and the Reshadie at the beginning of the European war. Other grievances, older and less substantial, were raked out of the past; and the indictment of Great Britain and her Allies was completed by a series of inventions and distortions of the truth designed to represent them as the enemy, not merely of Turkey, but of the whole of Islam. Attacks of the latter kind became especially frequent in the latter half of October, and were undoubtedly directly inspired by Germany. My urgent representations to the grand vizier and to Talaat Bey, both verbal and written, had hardly even a temporary effect in checking this campaign.

Meanwhile, earlier in September the Turkish government had abolished the capitulations which gave protection to foreign residents. There were constant rumours that preparations were being made for an attack on Egypt, and that the two German warships were becoming more active. In the last days of the month Admiral Souchon took the German-Turkish fleet to sea, and the first intimation the Turkish ministers received of his doings was a wireless message to say that he had been treacherously attacked by the Russian fleet and in retaliation had bombarded Russian coast towns. The truth was that after steaming east for about 100 miles, Admiral Souchon, with a minelayer, headed for Sevastopol. The Russian fleet had just returned to coal, and he proceeded to mine it in. He then drew in to bombard the port; but after 15 minutes retired with three Russian destroyers in chase who, before they were shaken off, had damaged the Goeben slightly and killed 14 men. On his way to the strait of Kertch, where he intended to lay another minefield, he attacked the Prut, an unarmed transport, which saved itself by running ashore.

While the Goeben was thus engaged, some of the destroyers were raiding Odessa, where they destroyed the electricity works and sank a gunboat before being driven off. The Breslau and the Hamidieh, meanwhile, after bombarding the open town of Theodosia, in the Crimea, proceeded to Novorossisk, an oil port on the Circassian coast. A summons to surrender being refused, they bombarded the place for two hours and practically demolished it. Having by this unpardonable outrage hopelessly compromised the Turks, the ships returned to Constantinople.

On land the officers of the German military mission displayed a ubiquitous activity. Acting in conjunction with other agents

of their own nationality, they were the main organizers of military preparations in Syria which directly menaced Egypt. Emissaries of Enver Pasha were present on the frontier bribing and organizing the Bedouins; warlike stores were dispatched south, and battalions of regular troops were posted at Rafah, whilst the Syrian and Mosul army corps were held in readiness to move south at short notice. The Syrian towns were full of German officers, who were provided with large sums of money for suborning the local chiefs.

In Constantinople the sultan and the grand vizier were evidently in favour of peace, but the Germans continued their pressure. A good deal of bullion was sent to the German ambassador, and the British ambassador had every reason to believe that

> a definite arrangement was arrived at between the Germans and a group of ministers including Enver Pasha, Talaat Bey, and Djemal Pasha, that Turkey should declare war as soon as the financial provision should have attained a stated figure. My information establishes the fact that a climax was reached about the middle of the third week in October, when it had been decided to confront the grand vizier with the alternative of complicity or resignation, and that only the Russian successes on the Vistula, or some other more obscure cause, prevented this plan from being carried out.

On the morning of October 29 the British ambassador received intelligence from Egypt of the incursion into the Sinai peninsula of an armed body of 2,000 Bedouins who had occupied the wells of Magdaba and whose objective was to attack the Suez Canal. On the same day Odessa and the Russian ports in the Black Sea were attacked. The Russian government at once instructed its ambassador in Constantinople to ask for his passports, and on the next day the British and French ambassadors took the same step. The grand vizier tried to persuade them to stay and a majority in the council of ministers declared for peace, but German influences were too strong: the sequel was that on November 1 Sir Lewis Mallet and his staff left Constantinople and a state of war prevailed.

Tewfik Pasha, the Turkish ambassador in London, remained at his post until the 4th, when in a final interview with Sir Edward Grey he asked for his passports. Sir Edward then explained that unless German military and naval missions and especially the crews of the Goeben and the Breslau were dismissed, hostilities with Turkey must continue.

The reason why those who sought to involve Turkey in the European war failed so long to achieve their object was the strength of the party which stood for neutrality, and the realization by many that, even in the event of Germany being victorious, the fact of Turkey having fought by her side would not necessarily ensure any advantage to the Ottoman empire. Furthermore, while the Germans might any moment have compelled Turkey to march with them, to do so before every means of suasion had proved useless would not have been politic. Only in the last resort would the monarch whom the pan-Islamic pro-Germans acclaimed as the hope of Islam run a risk of scandalizing the Moslem world by using force against the sultan-caliph.

It is now known that the Turkish executive during this period was upon the horns of a dilemma. With that love of intrigue which is the essence of Oriental diplomacy, the Young Turk Party had flirted and coquetted with Imperial Germany to such an extent that at the crucial moment it was unable to extricate itself. By allowing thousands of German officers, soldiers, and sailors to take up duties in the Ottoman army and fleet, and by purchasing vast supplies of war material from Germany, Turkey hoped no doubt to be able to threaten Greece with war unless Greece abandoned the lost Aegean Islands, while at the same time the astute Turk hoped to sail a middle course between the two groups of belligerent Powers—borrowing money from Germany, while putting off the Entente Powers with endless prevarications and subterfuges.

Since his appointment on September 20 to the Mediterranean command, Admiral Carden had been watching the Dardanelles. With the Indomitable and the Implacable, two French battleships, Verité and Suffren, and the light cruisers Gloucester and Dublin, he had an adequate force supported by three submarines and 12 destroyers. In the hope that a strong demonstration might swing back the vacillating Turkish cabinet to sanity, Admiral Carden was instructed to bombard the forts of the Dardanelles. On November 3 he opened long range fire on the batteries at Sedd el Bahr and Cape Helles, and did considerable damage to both. The Sedd el Bahr magazine blew up and the fort was in ruins. At Kum Kaleh, too, the Turkish casualties were severe. The approaches were heavily mined and as a closer engagement would evidently have been dangerous, the admiral withdrew.

For some time matters at the Dardanelles were quiescent. Destroyers were constantly on patrol, but little activity could be observed, and it became desirable to find out if possible the condition and disposition of the forces behind the minefield. For this purpose B 11, commanded by Lieutenant Commander N. D. Holbrook, was detailed. The task before B 11 seemed on the face of it impossible. There were five lines of mines and nets to be passed, a channel to be negotiated against a considerable and uncertain current. On the inside were patrol boats watching the floats, so that if by good fortune the mines were penetrated the submarine would come up among hostile surface craft. Yet on December 13 he dived under the nets, rose to the surface, and obesrving the Turkish battleship Messudiyeh he launched his torpedoes at her. Both struck, and the Messudiyeh sank. Pursued by heavy gunfire, B 11 submerged; and after hairbreadth escapes and a long underwater vigil—in one case lasting nine hours—she returned safely, her commander receiving the first naval V.C. of the war.

When Turkey, flattered, cajoled, and perhaps threatened by the kaiser's emissaries, threw down the gage of battle to Great Britain and her Allies in November, 1914, she jeopardised not only Constantinople, but also her Asiatic possessions which, since the end of the Balkan War, had formed the greater part of the decaying Ottoman empire. From the Mediterranean, across Asia Minor, the Turkish possessions spread southward until they reached the Persian Gulf. In the narrow strip of land between Persia on the one side and the Arabian desert on the other, the rivers Euphrates and Tigris flow towards the Gulf, their waters making this region one of the most fertile in the world. Above Basra, about 60 miles from the sea, they unite, and make their way together under the name of the Shat-el-Arab.

Two years before the war, Great Britain added to her interests and responsibilities in this region. At the head of the Gulf very valuable oil-fields were discovered, and these were soon opened and worked by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. In 1913, when oil began to be extensively used as fuel for the navy, it was announced that the British Admiralty had secured a controlling interest in these oil-fields, and evidently they were intended to furnish a great proportion of the oil required by British ships. Germany's great scheme for bringing this district under her authority was the construction of a railway—the Bagdad

Railway—which should connect the Mediterranean Sea with the Persian Gulf. To this the Turkish government had assented, and a German company, behind which was the Deutsche Bank, had been formed to carry out the work. The question of the railway was being discussed by the representatives of the two countries when the Great War broke out.

It did not require a genius to point out the advisability of sending a British force into the Persian Gulf in November, 1914. The army detailed for this expedition was provided by India, and consisted of a division of infantry and certain auxiliary troops—pioneers, sappers and miners, and light cavalry. The division was commanded by Lieutenant General Sir Arthur Barrett, and consisted of three brigades, each of which contained one battalion of British troops, the remainder being native regiments. The British battalions were the 2nd Dorsets in the Poona Brigade, the 1st Oxfordshire Light Infantry in the Ahmednagar Brigade, and the 2nd Norfolks in the Belgaum Brigade.

On the date when war was declared the Poona Brigade under Brigadier General Delamain was at Bahrein, while the remainder of the division was ready to sail from Bombay. On November 7 General Delamain left Bahrein for the fort of Fao, which stands at the mouth of the Shat-el-Arab. With him were H.M.S. Odin, an armed launch, and some marines with a Maxim gun from H.M.S. Ocean. For an hour the guns of the Odin bombarded the fort, and then, the Turkish fire having been silenced, the soldiers and marines were landed. Fao was then occupied, and without loss of life a base for further operations was secured. Leaving the marines at Fao, General Delamain's brigade was taken up the Shat-el-Arab, and was disembarked at Sanijeh, about 30 miles from the sea, where the men prepared an entrenched camp and waited for the arrival of their comrades from India before advancing to Basra.

Meanwhile, General Delamain's task was to clear the Turks and their Arab auxiliaries from the neighbourhood, and thus to facilitate the coming advance. On November 9 the Turks attacked the camp at night, but were repulsed, and on the 11th two Indian battalions drove them from a village. On the 15th there was a fight in which the Anglo-Indians were not quite so successful, as they retired without driving the Turks entirely from the neighbourhood of Sahain. However, supported by the gunboats on the river, they shelled the enemy out of his trenches,

suffering on their part some 35 casualties. Two days previously the brigades from Bombay had reached the mouth of the Shat-el-Arab. Crossing the bar they steamed up the river on the 14th, passing Abadan, the headquarters of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. At Sanijeh, where the Poona Brigade was, they disembarked, a difficult feat owing to the banks of the river, which are here about eight or ten feet high, being very muddy and slippery.

While the troops were resting in the camp at Sanijeh, news reached General Barrett that a Turkish army was advancing from Basra against him, and so on the 17th he ordered the Anglo-Indians to move forward to meet it. They found Sahain deserted, and the fight took place near Sahil, a few miles farther up the Shat-el-Arab. The Turks were entrenched among date groves, and between the forces was a bare plain, which, in addition to its lack of cover, had been turned into a quagmire by recent rain. In spite of these disadvantages the British advanced steadily, as soon as the artillery, both from the batteries and from the gunboats, had prepared the way for them. In the face of a punishing fire the Turkish position was carried in about three hours; the Turks fled in disorder before the final charge with the bayonet could be delivered.

The Turkish force engaged in this battle was estimated at 4,500 men, and its losses were stated to have been over 1,500. Many wounded, eight guns, and much ammunition fell into the British hands. The Anglo-Indian troops had 353 casualties, 38 officers and men being killed. Of these 130 were sustained by the Dorsets, which battalion had the place of honour in the attack on the Turkish trenches. On the same day a storm sank many of the British boats, with heavy loss of rations and kits.

A day or two after this engagement word was brought to the British camp that the Turks had evacuated Basra, and that the Arabs had begun to plunder the place, in which were a few British residents. Accordingly, on the 21st, General Barrett with the 2nd Norfolks and the 110th Mahrattas crowded on board two paddle steamers, the Medijeh and the Blosse Lynch, their embarkation being very difficult owing to the mud and rising tide. The rest of the division was ordered to march across the desert to the same objective. To impede an advance up the river the Turks had sunk some steamers, and at the same place had stationed a battery of guns. These were silenced, the other

obstacles were also overcome, and on November 22 the two battalions and General Barrett entered Basra—to find that the custom-house had just been set on fire. No opposition was offered to their entrance, and soon the British flag was flying over the German consulate. During the night the remainder of the force, having accomplished a march of 30 miles, encamped just outside Basra.

During the remainder of the month a camp was prepared outside Basra, and attention was also paid to Kurna, a town on the right bank of the Tigris, where a Turkish force was collecting. To ascertain its strength, Lieutenant Colonel Frazer was sent out on December 3 with some Indian troops, a detachment of the Norfolks, some artillery, and other units, his small force being supported by gunboats and armed launches. The enemy was encountered on the left bank of the Tigris, nearly opposite Kurna, and there the troops were landed, while the warships went ahead and shelled the town. The Turks were promptly driven across the river, with a loss of 70 prisoners and two guns, but this was all that could be done as Kurna was evidently strongly defended. Accordingly, word was sent to Basra that further assistance was necessary. In this engagement the Espiègle and the Lawrence silenced some of the enemy's guns, but the latter vessel and also the armed launch Miner were damaged by shells. On December 6, Brigadier General C. I. Fry arrived with the 7th Rajputs and the rest of the Norfolks, and the attack was renewed. Mezera, a town on the left bank of the Tigris, was occupied, and for the second time the Turks were driven across the river to Kurna ; but, for the second time, the British were compelled to retire after reaching the river bank.

Another plan was then tried. To the north of the town some sappers swam across the Tigris, and, having got a steel hawser across, constructed a flying bridge. Across this the 104th Rifles and the 110th Mahrattas were ferried, and as soon as they were entrenched, Kurna was practically enveloped. The Turkish leaders realized this, and on the 8th they offered to surrender. The town and garrison were given up to the British, and in it were 1,100 soldiers and nine guns. The British losses in these operations were about 160 killed and wounded. Entrenched camps were established at Kurna and Mezera, and the whole district between those places and the sea was securely held by the British.

BRITISH AID FOR ANTWERP. 1. Naval brigade going to take up positions, October, 1914. 2. Armoured motor-car on scouting duty. 3. Armoured car with men of the R.M.L.I. 4. Armoured train in action.

YPRES BEFORE AND AFTER. The 13th-century Cloth Hall in the Grand Place, one of the finest Gothic buildings in Belgium, as it stood before the war. In the Ypres salient took place some of the fiercest fighting in 1914 and onwards, and the picture inset shows the shattered belfry standing among the ruins after the German bombardments

CHAPTER 26

Battle of the Yser

THE Allied forces on the morning of October 19 covered in Flanders a very fluid front stretching some 50 miles from the sea to Arras. Fighting had already been severe south of Ypres where the British 3rd and 2nd corps were advancing eastwards against Lille, and on the previous day the Germans had given a glimpse of their plans, which up to that time they had concealed, by delivering a sudden attack upon the Belgian positions along the Yser. In front of Ypres the fighting had not as yet been heavy. The British 4th corps, shortly to be reinforced by the 1st corps (on this day detraining in the area), had engaged the massing forces of the Germans in some sharp pushes, but the fighting had never become extensive.

The stage was set for the crisis of the campaign of 1914, and the titanic clash of two enormous masses of men in the battles of Arras, La Bassée, Ypres, and Yser was about to begin. Over a wide front for a period of three terrible weeks the greatest battle the world had ever seen was beginning. Until the middle of November the whole available resources of Germany in the Flanders area were to be flung in wave after wave upon the Allied line. The struggle was never localized; it was fierce everywhere. From Nieuport to Arras the contending armies rocked to and fro in one long line of battle.

It is impossible to envisage the battle as a whole, and certain points in the line have been selected to give their names to that part of it which was fought round them. Thus Yser, Ypres, La Bassée and Arras are accepted as four separable and distinct battles, and for the purposes of understanding the course of events are admirable divisions. But it cannot be too strongly emphasised that those four battles all began and ended about the same time and were, in fact, one whole.

The battles represent the culminating endeavour of the German command to smash in the whole of the Allied left wing before winter and the urgent situation in East Prussia should nullify their victory or rob them of man power with which to achieve

it. But so rapidly had this front been formed by both sides that there had been no time for strategy and a calculated plan of attack. The Germans struck as heavily as they could wherever they found opponents. The Allies retaliated, and the result was stalemate.

Two of these battles—that fought at Arras by Maud'huy and the French 10th army, and that fought at La Bassée by the British 2nd corps—have already been described. Although both those battles were of vital importance and involved very heavy fighting, it is generally recognized that the peak of the German attack fell upon the Allied line from Nieuport to south of Ypres, and the two battles of Yser and Ypres indicate the high-water mark of the German thrust.

Before proceeding to a description of these battles, it is necessary briefly to review the movements of troops which preceded them, and to show the objects for which both sides were striving. It will be remembered that the race to the sea had virtually ended with the retreat of the Belgian army from Antwerp to the line of the Yser and of Sir Henry Rawlinson and the British 4th corps from Ghent to the neighbourhood of Ypres. As the result of these movements a thin line of Allied troops extended from Nieuport through Dixmude, Bixschoote, round the east side of Ypres, to La Bassée and Arras. Alternate bodies of cavalry and infantry occupied the whole of that line continuously. Thus the Belgian infantry held the line of the Yser from the sea to Dixmude, where was a force of French marines. Mixed French and Belgian cavalry and the 89th French territorial division continued the line between the Yser and Houthulst Forest, where they touched the 3rd cavalry division and the 7th division of the British 4th corps that held a position running from Langemark through Zonnebeke to Gheluvelt and Zandevoorde, where General Allenby's cavalry corps (which it will be remembered had vainly been endeavouring to force a passage of the river Lys) continued the line to Frelinghien. From there the British 3rd corps stretched as far as Fromelles, where Conneau's cavalry filled the space between the 3rd and the 2nd corps, the latter making contact with the left wing of Maud'huy's 10th army near Cuinchy just south of the Bethune-La Bassée canal.

This was roughly the position on October 20 just before Sir Douglas Haig and the British 1st corps moved into the line. Of the reserves which were moved up during the progress of the

battles the chief were the 1st corps, already referred to, the Indian Brigade which, as has been told, relieved part of the 2nd corps at the beginning of November, and various detachments of French troops which were originally destined to form the 8th army under d'Urbal, but which, in fact, were flung into the line one by one at the point which was most threatened at the time of their arrival.

The Allied troops were opposed by the German 4th and 6th armies. The latter of these had been moved from the east to the area round Lille, and the scope of its attack extended from Menin to La Bassée. The former was a new army composed of four new reserve divisions, the 22nd, 23rd, 26th and 27th, which the Germans began to form on August 16. The German official statements describe these corps as being composed of 25 per cent of regular troops drawn from various battalions and 75 per cent of untrained men over or under military age. Their period of training was extremely short, and the number of batteries supporting each division was only nine in place of the usual twelve. Falkenhayn's decision to employ such raw and untrained troops in such a vital part of the front as the Flanders area had become was severely criticized in Germany.

Under normal conditions such troops would have been employed in a quiet sector where they would not have been exposed to contact with first line troops, and where the amount of fighting expected of them would be the minimum. Actually they were pitted against the remnants of the Belgian and British regular armies who had proved their ability to repel with ease the attacks of the finest German regiments. The employment of such untried troops in such an area was in itself dangerous ; but these troops were asked to engage with no previous training in some of the most terrible fighting there had yet been, and to fling themselves against naturally strong positions defended by massed artillery and machine guns and held by some of the most indomitable troops in the Allied armies. Their inexperience and lack of discipline were probably worth an army corps to the Allies. General Balck, who was in command of one division of the 26th corps, remarked that " boundless enthusiasm could not compensate for insufficient training," and the course of events in Flanders would appear to corroborate such a view.

Falkenhayn's justification for their employment is shortly that they were insufficient to turn the scale in the east, where at least

thirty divisions were necessary before defence could be turned into attack, but that their weight might just be sufficient to turn the scale in Flanders. Secondly, the time factor prevented any other course. The Allies were known to be planning an attack in Flanders, and calculations proved that that attack would be well under way long before the new troops could be "exchanged" for tried formations then occupying a quiet sector. But the weightiest reason was the prize to be won. These reserve divisions would outnumber the available Allied troops very considerably. Every day's delay added to the reinforcements pouring up from the south; but if the Germans struck at once they might break through the thin Allied line and Calais and the Channel ports would be in German power, while the whole Allied flank was threatened. Such a bait proved irresistible. Falkenhayn stretched out his hand to seize it, thus sending to their deaths thousands upon thousands of young boys, and inflicting upon the German nation losses the effects of which it was to feel for the rest of the war.

Von Beseler, who took Antwerp, and two of the four corps under his command at the siege were added as a backbone. He was directed to strike at the Belgian left wing at Nieuport. The 3rd reserve corps, which had followed the retreating Belgians from Antwerp, and had occupied Bruges and Ostend, had been ordered to advance along the coast, drive the defending troops across the Yser mouth, and so prepare the way for the attack of the 4th army, which had wheeled south-west in order to attack the flank of the French and British round Ypres. The attack was delivered by the 3rd reserve corps on the 18th, but although it made some progress it was held by the Belgians, and the first moves of the Germans were foiled.

It is not easy to understand why the Germans chose to attack as they did along such a length of front. A minute's study of a map will show quite clearly that the weakest point of the Allied line was Arras. If the line were broken there the Germans secured a magnificent line of advance well served by railways to the Channel ports. More important, the Allied flank from Soissons northward would be turned, and only a retreat on Paris more precipitate and disastrous than the retreat from the frontier in August could have saved what was left of the French armies. But most important of all, the British, French and Belgian troops north of Arras would have been cut off from their base

and driven into the sea. In that way a large part of the Allies' strength would have been destroyed. The obvious course for the Germans would have been to deploy just sufficient troops against the whole Allied line to keep it in check, and to have used their enormous superiority of numbers in a concentrated attack upon Arras. Had they concentrated that attack at La Bassée the same objects could have been achieved, except that the number of Allied troops cut off would have been smaller, and the increased distance from Paris would have given the French more time to recover. But a terrible blow could have been struck at the Allies' cause.

The third weak point was the Belgian position on the Yser. Although it suffered from the lack of adequate transport facilities, the road down the coast from Ostend was the shortest route to the Channel ports. A concentrated attack on the Belgians would, if successful, have driven the Allies from the last corner of Belgium and secured for Germany the control of Calais and Boulogne, and although such a result would not have been the disaster for the Allies that a break through at Arras or La Bassée would have involved, it would still have been sufficiently serious. In fact, the Germans chose specially none of these plans. Their weight was flung equally along the whole front from Arras to the sea, the peak of their attack if anything falling upon the least strategically valuable point, Ypres, in the Allied line.

It is one of the rules of war most strongly insisted upon by Napoleon that each attack should be delivered on the enemy with the full strength of the attacking army. In this way superiority of numbers is nullified, the enemy's weakest spot being broken before he can protect it adequately. The Germans in failing to choose any one of the three weak points in the Allied line for a concentrated attack surrendered all the advantage of their position and overwhelming numbers.

There appear to be three reasons why the Germans attacked the Yser front. In the first place, Germany was anxious to drive the Allies from Belgian soil, to defeat finally the remnants of the Belgian army, and to proclaim a complete conquest of Belgium which would arouse popular enthusiasm in Germany and give pause to small neutral nations like Rumania which were known to be arming. In the second place, the direct route to the Channel ports, which were the declared objectives of the German autumn campaign, was so attractive as partly to blind the

Germans to the essentially weaker points in the Allied line. Finally, in order to maintain the popularity of court generals it was considered essential that one of them should produce a spectacular success.

Duke Albert of Württemberg, who had been appointed to the command of the new 4th army, was thought to be assured of an easy success over the desperately wearied Belgians, and while the hard work could be done by the tried Beseler of Antwerp fame, who was operating along the coast line, the duke with his enormous masses of fresh troops could drive the Belgians from their country and win an open road to the Channel ports. Certainly the presence of the kaiser in this area of operations would seem to point to a desire to focus public attention upon the Yser front.

Granted the attack on the Yser, the attack on Ypres follows. Not only did the salient which the British army occupied appear to offer a chance of surrounding and destroying its defenders, but also until Ypres fell the Allies were still in Belgium. Finally, the British were always in a position to attack the flank of any troops advancing against the Belgians on the Yser. The attacks on La Bassée and Arras were delivered for obvious reasons. These places were recognized as key positions. But once the other factors influencing the German command are realized it is less difficult to understand why the Germans failed to see how much more vital such positions were than either Ypres or the Yser.

Probably the chief reason for the waste of German strength all along the line was simply the fact that there was no real plan of campaign and no time to evolve one. The race to the sea had produced a stalemate which threatened to nullify all that the Germans had won by their progress in August, and the terrific attack delivered all along the extended left wing of the Allies demonstrated their exasperation. The fruits of their early successes appeared to be eluding them just at the moment when they were apparently within their grasp. But whatever be the reason, Germany wasted her strength. The Allies, although heavily outnumbered, were able to hold their position, and the German war machine was foiled round Ypres and Arras as it had been foiled at the Marne.

The country from Ypres to the sea is invariably flat. The canalized Yser flows in a semicircle—with the bulge facing east—to its mouth some two miles from Nieuport. Many dykes

cut through the fields, and low hedgerows limit visibility in some places to half a mile. The only elevations from the surrounding plain are the creations of man—houses and artificial embankments. Behind the river a single-line railway runs from Dixmude to Nieuport in a straight line, linking up the little villages of Pervyse and Ramscappelle. The former is the centre of a rough semicircle, a radius of which is formed by the railway, the perimeter by the river. The railway embankment, although only about six feet high, provides a line of defence which the nature of the surrounding country makes remarkably strong.

The river is crossed by bridges in four places—at Dixmude, at Schoorbakke just north of the point where it makes a sharp loop near St. Georges, and finally at Nieuport. From there it runs in a dead straight line to the sea, while the railway and the road swing north-east and follow the line of the low sand dunes which characterize the seashore to Ostend. Lombartzyde, Westende and Middelkerke are the three villages on the route, the first named being the most important strategically as it is the key to the winning of the Yser mouth. On the eastern bank of the river lie Schoore and Keyem. Each of these villages stands on a little knoll which rises slightly from the sodden marshland lining the banks of the river. Nowhere except on the sand dunes can sites be found for gun emplacements, and the country is quite ill-fitted for the movements of troops

On this ground the Belgian army was to make its final stand. There were scarcely more than 40,000 effectives left of the original field army when it gathered amid the fenland and dunes in the last nook of unconquered Belgian territory. To add to their difficulties they were short of munitions. Near at hand to help them were only 7,000 Breton marines under Admiral Ronarc'h. Then between Dixmude and Ypres were some French territorial troops. Thus, while the British troops from Ypres to La Bassée were holding their own against the Germans, twenty miles north the flank of the Allied position coastward was extremely weak.

The operation opened on Friday, October 16, when two German army corps advanced upon the Yser. It was a reconnaissance in force, undertaken with a view to ascertaining how the canalized river was defended. The Belgian army was found to be holding not only the river but the villages north of it such as Lombartzyde, Mannekensvere and Keyem, while French

marines occupied Dixmude. Thereupon the Germans brought up their guns and bombarded all the Allied line. The next day strong infantry forces were launched against all the outlying villages. Overwhelmed by numbers and lacking ammunition for their field guns, the Belgian 1st division was driven out of Mannekensvere, and the 4th division was forced out of Keyem. They both retired across the Yser. But in the night the dauntless 4th division returned over the river, and by a furious bayonet attack in the darkness recaptured all its positions at Keyem.

This was a surprise for the duke of Württemberg. Expecting only the task of keeping the Belgian army moving before his guns and infantry columns, he had made no preparations against the counter-attack. But a considerable number of men who had first fought the German army at Liége had survived to meet their foes on the last line of Belgian defence. Dirty, unshaven, tattered, beggarly figures they looked after ten weeks of campaigning and trenchwork. But the fire, skill and stubbornness with which they battled disconcerted the plan of the German commander. He had to bring up more troops in order to drive home his attack. He resumed his forward movement with increased vigour on Monday, October 19, but he selected as his objective the coast village of Lombartzyde, a couple of miles north of Nieuport. Only a single Belgian division—the 2nd—held the village when Beseler and his division attacked them with a view to hacking his way down the coast to Dunkirk, and so turning all the Allied line. Backed by their light and heavy field guns, the German infantry came on in dense masses. Three

times the Belgians had to give ground under the terrible shell and shrapnel fire, but when the bombardment ceased they fought the German troops back with bullet and bayonet.

Then suddenly the tables were turned. The under-gunned Belgian army, rapidly running short of artillery supplies, unexpectedly won a great advantage over their enemies. Three grey shapes drove in from the open sea towards the shore. An observation balloon went up with wireless apparatus, a protecting flotilla of destroyers spread out towards the river, and a squadron of aeroplanes swept high above the German gun sites. Then came six claps of thunder from the sea and half a dozen 6 in. shells exploded with deadly marksmanship amid the German batteries. In a second, as the 4.7 in. stern guns came into play, there was another broken roar from the sea and six 4.7 in. shells came screaming over Middelkerke and crashed down among the German cannon.

The British navy had come to the help of the Belgian army with a strange type of warship. At the outbreak of the war Messrs. Vickers had just completed three river warships for use on the Amazon, to the orders of the Brazilian government. The ships were flat-bottomed, with a draught of only 4½ feet, but they carried armoured turrets with two 6 in. guns forward and two 4.7 in. howitzers aft. The Admiralty at once bought these monitors. Their value as off-shore batteries in land operations was obvious, and the course of events in the early days of the war pointed quite clearly to a campaign along the coast at no very distant date. As the battle-front extended near to the coast, the monitors—renamed Severn, Humber and Mersey—anchored at Dover under the command of Admiral Hood, stripped and ready for action. On Sunday, October 18, they were ordered to Belgium, and by that night were steaming, lights out, along the Belgian coast, their young gunnery lieutenants measuring the ranges and watching the Germans digging coast trenches by flarelight. Sailors with machine guns landed from the monitors to assist in the defence of Nieuport, but it was mainly the naval guns that saved the situation.

The effect of the shelling, according to German reports, was more upon the moral of the troops than upon their bodies. The big naval shells burst into large fragments which did little execution amongst troops. The German batteries, however, suffered severely. Their only possible reply was to haul up

their new long-range cannon and their heaviest siege howitzers and place them amid the dunes. By this means they managed to make matters for a day or two a little more exciting for the British monitors and destroyers and for the French destroyers that joined in the coast battle. The position of affairs then was that the German howitzer batteries were in the same fix as the forts of Liége, Namur, Maubeuge and Antwerp, over which they had so easily triumphed. They formed a fixed mark which was clearly discernible by aerial scouts and by observation officers in tethered balloons.

The ships, on the other hand, continually changed their position with the speed of an ordinary railway train. They zigzagged about the sea at high mobility, and only by the most extraordinary luck could a hostile battery straddle them with a salvo of shells. And all this was only the beginning of the naval element in the great land battle for Calais. For on October 27, when the Germans had diminished their artillery power at other critical parts of the lines of trench warfare in order to concentrate their heaviest ordnance along the shore, their 11 in. and 12 in. howitzers were mastered by a new naval unit. H.M.S. Venerable, with a broadside of four 12 in. guns and an additional armament of twelve 6 in. quick-firers, came into action outside the shoals which protect the coast. The great naval guns reached farther inland, and places at which Germans had gathered to escape the fire of the monitors were blown up and wrecked by the terrible 850 lb. shells.

The fleet dominated all the coast as far as the inland village of Slype. Ramscappelle, over four miles from the coast, remained at last the only point which the Germans could attack without coming under the fire of the fleet. And, as a matter of fact, even this village was not secure. For the range of the big naval guns was somewhat over eight or ten miles, and at flood-tide even a battleship could get closer to the shore than usual.

At the urgent request of the duke of Württemberg the submarine flotilla at Emden speeded south with a store of torpedoes and attacked the monitors. Usually, however, a torpedo strikes at a depth of about twelve feet under the water. As the monitors had a draught of only 4½ feet, the great missiles passed harmlessly beneath their flat bottoms.

Moreover, the presence of German submarines merely added to the difficulties of the enemy's coast army by bringing a strong

force of British destroyers to the scene of action. And when the destroyers were not engaged in chasing submarines their 4 in. guns helped to bombard the German batteries and trenches.

The whole naval operation was that deadliest kind of attack—a flank attack. The Germans had brought their guns up against the Belgian lines, and sited them with a view to getting a wide traverse of fire on the Belgian positions. In many cases the hard, firm, close coast road running from Ostend to Nieuport had been chosen for gun positions in preference to the dyked and marshy fenland. Then, on a sudden, the devastating and overwhelming bombardment of 6 in. and 4 in. British shells struck the German gunners when they thought they were at the point of victory. It was the first time in German history that military operations had been interrupted by sea power, and it took the German commander by surprise. He was jerked out of his orbit of action in somewhat the same way as Napoleon had suddenly been brought up at Acre by British sea power when he was marching through Syria intent upon the conquest of the Orient.

The Germans were compelled by this sea attack on the land to take enormous precautions against any repetition. The mere expense in war material involved in the subsequent fortification of the seaport of Bruges and the building of the huge battery at Knocke seriously diminished German artillery power on the actual battlefield. And the large number of men mobilized in trenches on the coast as a protection against the possible landing of a British raiding force was another item of loss. British ships shelled Zeebrugge, attacked Ostend, drove the Germans out of Middelkerke, and with long-range fire swept the country for six miles inland. The only effective means of defence was to attack the monitors and destroyers with light and armoured cruisers. But the German fleet, hemmed in its ports by the British navy, was powerless to help. And the Germans were in consequence compelled to look for a way through the Belgian lines which was not protected by British naval guns.

On land the artillery on both sides fought at a disadvantage. The gunners had many difficulties to contend with. There was no good siting to be found in the flat fenland, and the banks of the dykes and the lines of willows and osiers intersecting the country made it as impenetrable to the eye as if it were close-wooded. It was generally impossible to see more than half a mile ahead, and thus very difficult to discover where the enemy was, and what

effect was being produced upon him. Then the autumnal haze that spread over the marshes frequently during the long battle rendered aerial observation very uncertain. The gunners, therefore, had to rely largely on their infantry in the firing-line and to fight their guns at short ranges. On the whole, this diminution of the power of the artillery was a great benefit to the Belgians. For though on their left flank the friendly naval guns more than redressed the balance, yet on their centre and right wing tremendous pressure was exerted against them by the Germans.

On Monday, October 19, the little village of Beerst, just north of Dixmude, was shattered by a terrific bombardment of German shells, and the Belgian 4th division, entrenched among the ruins, was driven out by a violent and steady massed attack of infantry. The neighbouring village of Keyem, which the 4th division had recovered by a splendid bayonet charge, was also assailed, and many of the Belgian troops were in danger of being cut off. But the Belgian bayonet again won all that the heavy German field howitzers had partly conquered. When night fell and the mist thickened the brave Belgian division crept northward out of Dixmude with some thousands of the tall, tanned Breton fishermen forming the French marine division. There was not much shooting, but with the silent steel the Belgians and Frenchmen thrust their way into Vladsloo and got again into Beerst. But as it was discovered that fresh strong columns of the enemy were pouring out from Roulers and striking westward, the defending force retired on the Yser, evacuating all the villages up to Keyem.

It was on this day that Sir John French threw his 1st army corps north of Ypres and began his astonishing advance against the German forces between Roulers and Thourout. As a result of the British movement the new German reinforcements did not come into action against the Belgian front on October 20. The Germans merely kept up a furious cannonade upon the Belgian line which lasted all night and continued the next day. On the coast a farm was taken from the 2nd division, then recovered by the Belgians and again lost. But this only brought the fire of naval guns on the captured farm, wrecking it completely and killing and wounding most of the troops which held it. At night the misty plain had a strange and terrible picturesqueness. Far through the light sea mist shone the glow of the burning villages; tongues of fire came from warships and land batteries, and the

incessant and widespread rain of bursting shells, flowering out upon a nocturnal sky dimly lighted by the burning villages, made the scene of destruction look something like an enormous display of fireworks.

In this strangely lighted darkness the German infantry concentrated an attack upon Dixmude. They had been thrown back from the same place in the daytime, but, increased in numbers, they crept up again in the gloom, only to be again shattered by rifle and machine gun fire, followed by the inevitable bayonet charge. Though routed, they re-formed with the reinforcements continually pouring in from Thourout, and in the grey misty dawn made a third attack in massed formations. But the weary and half shattered Belgian 4th division and the Breton marines still held their own. As a matter of fact, the Belgians seem to have owed a considerable part of their power to resist the German massed attacks to a new instrument of battle. It was a small, light and very handy machine gun of American invention with a simple air-cooling device that did away with the use of the cumbersome water-jacket. It had been offered to the British government, but refused by them; the German government had also rejected it; and when the war broke out the defenders of Liége, thanks to the enterprise of their military authorities, were the only troops possessing the new gun. In the artillery battles it lost some of its importance as the German field batteries dominated the field. But in the mists, marshes and polders round the Yser the new machine gun, although in the hands of men with only six weeks' experience in its use, had a deadly importance.

After their fourth repulse at Dixmude the Germans left in peace for a while this beautiful old Flemish town which their guns had battered into ruin, and concentrated for a new effort on the centre of the Belgian line. Half way between Nieuport and Dixmude the Yser bulges northward, forming a salient loop between the village of Schoorbakke and the village of Tervaete. The Belgian trenches, following the loop of the river, constituted a sort of bastion of earthworks that could be shelled from three sides by the hostile batteries. And while getting this cross-fire effect for their guns, the Germans could bring up on the outer radius of the loop a wider front of attacking infantry than the Belgians possessed in their narrower space. It was not a question simply of the density of the attacking force, but of their wider

front and of their consequent heavier fire power. The Belgian position formed what is known as a salient, and the breadth of it was so small that all the German guns surrounding it on three sides could reach any section of it. It was thus the weak point in the Belgian line, and it is surprising that the Duke of Württemberg and his staff should only have discovered the natural and inevitable weakness of this point in the defending line after four days and nights of continual battle. Only when the Germans had been continually repulsed at the seashore and at Dixmude did they concentrate in force against the weak Belgian centre.

From the beginning the Belgians knew they could not defend it, and prepared a new line. This lay some two miles in the rear, by the railway from Nieuport to Dixmude, and the cobbled, tree-lined highway running between the two towns, with the red roofs of Pervyse rising at the cross-roads. Pervyse was the centre of the Belgian operations, for through it a cross-road led to Furnes, the last town in Flanders and the Belgian headquarters. Furnes was only five miles from Pervyse, so the loss of this latter little town would involve the complete conquest of Belgian territory by the invaders. For even though the British held on to Ypres, which would have been doubtful if Furnes had fallen, the Germans would have been able to claim that they had driven the Belgian army out of Belgium.

For this reason the Belgian troops held their weak salient on the river loop as long as possible. The Germans attacked them there in the afternoon of Wednesday, October 21. They drove in on the left at Schoorbakke, where there was a bridge across the canalized stream. But the bridge was blown up, and no German who had crossed the Yser at this point returned alive. In the night many additional hostile batteries were hauled towards the loop, over which the enemy's guns of all calibres played with terrible rapidity for many hours. Had the Belgians possessed long-range, heavy guns the continual spurts of flame from the German lines would have enabled them to mark down the enemy's gun positions, and then bring a concentrated fire in turn upon each German battery. Unhappily the defenders had only a few light field guns, and the limbers were nearly empty. For the ammunition had been needed in rearguard actions in the long retreat from Antwerp, and the five days' battle along the Yser had exhausted the remaining supply. The Belgian gunners, therefore, could not protect their infantry against the terrible

6 in. shells of the enemy's howitzers. All that the defending artillerymen could usefully do was to wait until the enemy's mass attack began, and then open upon the large, close, living target with the last shrapnel shells in the limber.

After battering and wrecking the Belgian trenches with high-explosive shell, the duke of Württemberg launched his infantry over the river at the village of Tervaete on Thursday, October 22. The attackers then got their first foothold on the left bank of the Yser. The 1st Belgian division, worn out, hungry and drowsy after sleepless nights of combat, counter-attacked. They failed, and their continually lessening numbers were still further decreased by the hail of bullets from German machine guns in the lost village. Yet with superb spirit the Belgians rallied after their repulse, again counter-attacked, and recovered Tervaete at the bayonet point.

But this was the last success. For the Germans, still swelling with reinforcements and intent on driving through the weak Belgian centre, came on in the night with fresh forces and regained Tervaete and the passage of the Yser. Terribly exhausted were the Belgians. They had been continually marching and fighting since the opening of the attack on Antwerp, but still they held on in the loop of the river, entrenching between Tervaete and Schoorbakke. There the 1st division, on Friday, October 23, strove to keep back the German advance on Furnes, while the 4th division, with the Breton marines, clung to the trenches round Dixmude. Between Friday night and Saturday morning the German commander swung his forces fourteen times against Dixmude, but every time they broke.

"Seven times we crossed the Yser," said a German officer afterwards, "and seven times we were beaten back. At last our dead formed bridges over which we again tried to pass, only to be repulsed once more." But this achievement was not gained at a slight cost. One-fourth of the remnant of the Belgian field army fell, and the rest were exhausted. For seven days along the Yser they held off four times their number of Germans, while the British army was fighting for its life a little to the south at Ypres. The chief difficulty with the Belgians had all along been the shortage of ammunition. The seven German divisions which had been massed against the five Belgian divisions were less of a danger than the 400 well supplied German guns against the 350 badly munitioned light Belgian field pieces. At the end of a

week's fighting the 350 were reduced to 180 with less than 200 rounds of ammunition apiece. It was at this critical juncture that the batteries of French artillery dispatched to the relief of the Belgians arrived. For a week the Belgians had been hopelessly outranged and outweighted by the German ordnance. Frequently their batteries were obliged to cease fire and draw away to a fresh position to avoid the tremendous shelling of guns and mortars massed upon them. Both the entrenched infantry and the convoys proceeding to the front were severely bombarded, and the German howitzers enjoyed complete immunity from attack while they pounded Dixmude, Pervyse, and Nieuport to ruin from a distance which prevented the Belgian batteries from replying. But the new French howitzer batteries had quite as long a range as the German pieces, and with the batteries came a superb force of French infantry, the 42nd division under General Grosetti. It at once relieved the Belgian 2nd division in front of Nieuport, and turned to help the Belgian 1st division at Pervyse.

With the capture of Tervaete the Germans had secured the passage of the Yser, and the Belgians prepared to retire to their fortified position along the railway embankment. The Germans were to discover that it was one thing to capture a bridge-head and another to deploy beyond it sufficient troops to continue an attack. Concentrated cross fire swept away the head of any column that endeavoured to penetrate beyond the village, and the pontoon bridges which the Germans attempted to build at various points were destroyed by the new French artillery.

From the point of view of the defenders the railway, with the Nieuport and Dixmude road behind it, was a more comfortable position than the marshland. By the river and canal it had been impossible to dig a three-feet trench without getting 18 inches of oozing water to stand in. All that the Germans had won was a series of drains calculated to cripple an army with rheumatic fever. They came, moreover, within the field of operations of a novel but deadly weapon. Since Lord Fisher invented the first modern armoured train in the campaign against Arabi Pasha, British naval men had specialized in this instrument of warfare. In Flanders they drove to the assistance of Belgian, French and British troops wherever there was a track available for their queerly coloured armoured locomotives and trucks. A British naval officer usually commanded, with expert gunners and Belgian sharpshooters on the train.

A surprise effect was always designed. The train was held, manned and under steam, with loaded guns, a few miles from the scene of combat. When the struggle was at its fiercest and all the enemy's batteries were disclosed and all his men deployed, then the armoured train would come in answer to a telephone call—almost invisible by reason of its wide stripes of crude colours, blending in the distance into a neutral tint, and almost unheard in the thunder and rattle of the fight. More than once its guns, opening unexpectedly at short range, silenced a hostile battery, and its shrapnel shells brought down five of the captive balloons used by the Germans for observation purposes. Worked with the dash and courage that distinguished the British seaman either on land or sea, these trains ran with impunity under the fire of hostile guns, as their great speed made them difficult to hit. At the end of a month's campaign only one engine had been damaged, without being put out of action, and of the crew one Belgian rifleman only was wounded.

But no ingenuity could for long keep back the enormous numbers of German infantry, ably supported by artillery, and fighting with magnificent bravery. The regiments were largely composed of young Berlin recruits, officered by the intellectual élite of Germany—pale, spectacled, earnest faces glowing with high spiritual courage. Though little trained in war, these university men rose to a height of dauntlessness exceeding the great traditions of the fighting scholars of Prussia in the War of Liberation. They went on till they dropped, and until they were brought down they kept all their men going, too.

Gradually the Germans won their way forward; concentrated artillery fire preceded attacks by massed infantry. The sheer weight of numbers was irresistible; the Belgian infantry, tragically reduced in numbers, were showing signs of exhaustion. Reinforcements were far away, all that could be spared already having arrived. The German attack showed no signs of weakening, and the general situation seemed to the Belgian command to justify extreme measures. At 4 p.m. on October 25, acting, it is said, on the suggestion of Foch, the Belgian authorities ordered the sluices of the Yser to be opened. Once again the Low Country was calling to its aid the sea which had saved it from the might of Alva's Spanish hosts. The water would inundate the whole of the low lying country east of the Nieuport-Dixmude railway and put an impassable lake between the Germans and the Belgians' position.

Unfortunately it appears that the wrong sluices were opened. The water rose very slowly and very little, and the German host still pressed on. At dawn on Monday, October 26, the Germans made their grand effort to hew their way along the coast. Their troops, concentrated on the Mannekensvere road, advanced under cover of a hail of shell and shrapnel, and threw three pontoon bridges over the river and canal. The infantry poured across and made a resolute attempt to carry Nieuport by storm. A French brigade operating beyond the town was in peril of being surrounded. But the men held, and Belgian supports returned in haste from Furnes to aid their allies.

In the meantime the Allied artillery shelled the pontoons, and the French brigade retired on the trenches in front of Nieuport, and there headed off the Germans. The enemy then turned and swept south on the villages of Ramscappelle and Pervyse. The gradual but steady progress he made could be marked by the way the bursting shells fell nearer and nearer to Furnes. Between ten and eleven o'clock in the morning the situation became critical. Orders were given for Furnes to be evacuated. The wounded were carried to the station, and a large number of the townspeople began to leave. Belgian soldiers, shelled out of their trenches, made their way to the rear, but fresh columns of their comrades who had been resting in the villages between the lines pushed along to the front, where King Albert, with cheerful, smiling, indomitable strength of soul, was holding his battered army together.

Pervyse was the storm centre, just midway between Furnes and the German concentration point, with a highway running through it from the two opposing camps. By the ruined church in the flaming, shell-swept village, General Grosetti, smiling, genial and gigantic, sat in an armchair with shrapnel bursting over him. There he encouraged his division to press on through the bombardment and attack the advancing German infantry columns. His men—Arabs, negroes, French colonials and Frenchmen of France—cheered him as they passed. The big man, sitting gay and confident in a rain of shell, inspired them with his own laughing heroism. On they swept, beyond the zone of the enemy's gun fire, into the safer belt of his rifle and Maxim fire. And there they held him.

The Germans had crossed the Yser merely to be brought up against the railway embankment. At all costs the French and

Belgians had to hold this line until the slowly rising water should protect them. It was expected that fed by successive tides the inundation would flood the country by October 31. The Allied troops had been finally forced back to the railway embankment on the 28th. For three days the resistance must be prolonged, for three more days the wearied Belgians and French had to hold their position against an enemy who was pressing forward in overpowering numbers, elated by the prospect of a victory which seemed imminent. At terrible cost the Germans had won their way across the Yser. At terrible cost they had thrust the Belgians from their strongest defences. One more effort should carry them over the railway embankment and Furnes would be in their grasp. Once that was lost Belgium was doomed, and with it the Channel ports. No wonder the Belgians were anxious. No wonder Foch himself encouraged them by every means at his disposal to hold the enemy.

As for the Germans, their elation was correspondingly great. At the eleventh hour victory seemed theirs. Their policy and their strategy had been justified. The new troops of the 4th army, in spite of their lack of training, in spite of their inexperience, had attacked with a heroism that was proving irresistible. The advance down the coast, in spite of British monitors, in spite of the terrible country over which it was made, had found a weakness in the Allied line, and at last Calais was within reach of their hands. It remained only to make one more effort, to strike, to sweep the Belgian army and its few French supports on one side and the objects of this fierce campaign which had begun at Soissons and extended through Lille and Antwerp would be realized.

If they took Calais they would secure the central link in the chain of Allied cooperation. It would provide them with a perfect submarine base that would be a constant source of danger to British shipping. Convoys of munitions, of troops, of supplies would be almost at their mercy. Moreover, it was a menace to England itself. Fast boats could reach England in less than an hour. An army might be landed in Sussex or Kent within a few days. Even if this should prove impossible, public opinion in England would inevitably be panic-stricken by the possibility of such an invasion, and as a result the young levies feverishly training all over England for immediate service on the battlefields of France would be kept at home.

All these possibilities were in the minds of the German high command on the Yser front in the final days of October, as all of them were bitterly realized by the Allies. If the Belgians were broken, Ypres and Arras were lost and the Allied line, even if it escaped the attack on its unprotected flank, would be flung back on Paris. If only the Belgians could hold until the Yser floods decided the issue once and for all! The Belgians, all that were left of them, were weary to death. Since the beginning of August they had been pitted, with scarcely a moment's rest, against a mighty and implacable enemy. For two weeks on the Yser they had endured a pitiless rain of shells and faced innumerable attacks. Their spirit might yet be unbroken, but their bodies could stand no more. Heroism had reached its limits, and had they turned and fled at the final German attack their name would still rank in history with the bravest of any nation. But they did not break. Stubbornly for two days on their embankment they waited while the German shells fell ever faster. Desperately they drove back every attack. But on October 30 came the supreme test.

Duke Albert of Württemberg was anxious about the rise of the water. The story of Spain and the Netherlands was for ever in his mind. Nor were his anxieties lessened by the tales of his spies, who reported that the Belgians were examining the ancient plans of the great French engineer Vauban, who had constructed the network of dykes across which the German army was battling. Vauban, who knew so well the strength of any position, had built these canals with an eye to the defence of northern France. The portent was obvious. But while the duke was hesitating the kaiser arrived on the field. Attracted by the success which had already attended the German arms, fascinated by the prize that was to be won, he had come himself to inspire his generals with renewed confidence and spur his troops to greater heroism.

As yet the floods were not serious. A few inches of water covered most of the fields, and the troops were suffering acute discomforts. But progress, though impeded, was not impossible. Men could still splash through the mud and water, guns could still be dragged through the slime. A supreme attack was ordered. The 3rd and the 22nd reserve corps were ordered forward. Gradually they extended their patrols towards the embankment, brought up their guns over the river, and made

their final preparations for the grand assault. Quietly the front towards Nieuport was denuded of troops, only a bare handful being kept to hold the ground already won. By October 29 everything was ready, and that evening the emperor himself addressed his troops and called for volunteers to lead the attack. Two Württemberg brigades were eventually selected, two brigades of young, eager troops who had proved their dash and their courage.

The key position of the Belgian line was Ramscappelle, and at 6.30 a.m. on October 30, preceded by a terrific bombardment, the Württemberg brigades raced across the watery fields towards the village. On the top of the embankment the Belgians waited. They knew that the crisis was at hand, and they knew, too, that their agony was nearly ended. Belgian engineers had at last discovered the main sluices, and at that very moment were flinging them open to the muddy waters of the turbulent channel. A few more hours and the German host would be drowning before their eyes; and with this new spirit of hope burning strongly within them, they prepared to meet the rush of the Württemberg brigades.

But nothing could stand against the impetus of that charge. Up and over the embankment swept the remnants of those two brigades in a mighty wave. The Belgian 2nd division swayed, bent and broke, and the Germans were through. Ramscappelle and Pervyse fell into their hands and a huge gap was torn in the Belgian line. Behind the German lines the kaiser, watching the scene through field-glasses, smiled. The whole of Belgium and Calais were, he thought, in his power.

But the heroism which had held the Germans for so long was not to desert the French and Belgians now. Desperately they rallied, contesting every inch of the ground, and the German advance was gradually slowed and finally halted. The fighting was terrific, continuing all day and into the night. German reserves were pouring up; the Belgian line was reeling. But now the French 42nd division swept up from Furnes, the Belgian 2nd and 3rd divisions rallied and, abandoning the desperate defence, rushed into more desperate attack.

It was now the turn of the Germans to face a charge of men inspired. Through the streets of Pervyse and Ramscappelle, streets choked with masses of tumbled brick, mortar and wood, the struggle rocked to and fro.

From house to house, street to street, the French and Belgians gradually pushed the Germans back. All day the fight continued, but still the Germans held the villages and retained their position on the embankment. The Allies could do no more. But the German advance had been held, and now a mightier force than bayonet and rifle was rushing to their aid. From the direction of the sea was heard a dull, low sound that rose monotonously above the crack of rifle and the burst of shell. The North Sea at flood tide was bursting through the broken dykes and spreading across the country. It was no longer a question of inches of water over the fields – it was feet!

The German troops, who had faced the fire and attacks of Belgians and French unflinchingly, now broke and fled. Panic-stricken they ran, casting away rifles and accoutrement, their only thought to escape the water which by now was lapping coldly round their waists. Hundreds were drowned, hundreds were shot down as they huddled defenceless on the spots of higher ground which formed little islands in the surrounding inundation, hundreds rushed to safety and captivity behind the Belgian lines. That night, full of the bitter knowledge that the coast road was barred and that the last corner of Belgium was safely immersed under several feet of water, the emperor left the field. It was round Ypres that he would have to look for the success which had just slipped from his grasp along the Yser.

Most of the troops of the 4th army were moved south. Two miles of muddy water stretched between the Germans and the Belgians, and while the Germans were safe from Belgian attack it was equally clear that the Germans could not reach the Belgians. Only along the coast, still protected by British and French warships, and at Dixmude was there a dry route. Already the Germans had been driven from the west bank of the river, the few dry spots where guns and troops could still maintain themselves being useless. The floods reached from Nieuport to Dixmude, and spread across the country from the railway embankment to the village of Schoore. For all real purposes the battle of the Yser was over, but intermittent fighting still continued. In the first days of November the Belgians made a surprise attack on the Westende-Middelkerke line, taking Lombartzyde and pushing on northwards. Strong forces of the enemy were at once hurried up, and in spite of the help given by the ships off the shore, managed to check the Belgian

advance, retook Lombartzyde on the 7th, and drove the Belgians back on their strongly fortified positions at Nieuport.

The Germans had practically abandoned all intentions of continuing a thrust against the Yser. But Dixmude still seemed to offer possibilities. Here was a valuable bridge-head across the river, and its capture would drive a dangerous little wedge between the Belgians and the French and British at Ypres. For three weeks Admiral Ronarc'h and his French marines had stubbornly resisted attack after attack. Foiled in their major objective, the Germans turned upon Dixmude. Actually its possession was now of very little value. It gave too narrow a front seriously to endanger the French round Ypres, and between it and the Belgians stretched a vast lake. Little could be done in its defence. The direct route to it from the Belgian position lay along the edge of the inundations. Its value to the Belgians had disappeared, and it was folly to waste men and materials in its defence.

The critical days had passed. While the Belgians were still defending the banks of the Yser, Dixmude was the rock upon which rested their right flank. Had it fallen on any day before October 31 then the whole Belgian position was turned. Its defence from October 16—November 1 must rank as one of the most valuable in the early days of the war.

Ronarc'h's position was far from enviable. He had moved into the town with his 7,000 marine fusiliers in early October. At that time attack rather than defence was thought to be the keynote of Allied strategy, and the town was simply a concentration point. Nothing was done to prepare its defences, and when finally on the 16th the first German attacks were delivered but little had been got ready. On that day Ronarc'h had had some terrible fighting; but as a result he won a few days' respite, and hastily completed his preparations for defence. From the start of the Yser battle it was clear to him that he was holding a key position. Nor was he under any delusion as to the amount of support he might expect. The outnumbered Belgians would everywhere be too desperately engaged to spare many troops for the defence of the town.

To the west of the town a slight ridge gave him an admirable gun site, and here he placed his batteries. Not only did they command all the approaches, but they could bombard the town itself in the event of the Germans gaining a footing. And he was also lucky in the possession of a huge flour mill which towered

above the surrounding houses and made an excellent artillery observation post. His men he could rely on. Recruited from the hardy Breton fishermen, they could endure the worst rigours of the waterlogged trenches without flinching. The Breton brigades in the Franco-Prussian war had won renown for courage and endurance: the descendants of those men were to become the talk of every bivouac in northern France for their defence of Dixmude. It is said that they first evolved the method of concentrated machine gun fire. Four guns were grouped together and their united fire was directed on one point. Certain it is that the heads of the German columns which swept forward to the attack withered away under the terrible cross fire that was brought to bear. An observer is reported to have said that the massed columns were like strips of soft metal pushed against a grindstone. They melted away.

On October 19 the Germans delivered their second heavy attack, and although they drove the marines back on the town were unable to penetrate into it. Dixmude itself was a scene of desolation and terror. The German commander ordered that every house should be levelled to the ground. On the first days of the struggle the field guns and howitzers of an army corps were massed against it. Then some of the 12 in. Austrian mortars were brought up by railway. The artillery general tried to obtain also two of the 16½ in. Krupp howitzers, but, much to his disappointment, they were needed on the coast to reply to the British warships. Even without these gigantic instruments of destruction the town was quickly battered into mounds of rubble.

There was not a yard of it unswept by shell fire, not a house in it that was not shattered. The square, where the venerable town hall stood flaming, was a region of death and thunder. High explosive shells and shrapnel continually burst over it, and a rain of German bullets, aimed at the marines in the trenches near by, whistled across the square when they missed the nearer mark. Amid the crash of falling chimneys and the roar and clatter of shell-stricken houses, the reserves of the little defending force sheltered behind the gapped and ragged walls while the wounded rested in the cellars. Sometimes the houses above the cellars would be set on fire and the maimed or dying men beneath the flames had to be taken out hastily under the fierce bombardment and carried to some fresh retreat till the overworked motor ambulances could convey them to Furnes.

Then, as each Red Cross motor passed through the town, a cyclone of shells followed it beyond Oudecappelle. The crisis of the attack came on the night of October 23-24. As has been related, on that night no fewer than 14 successive attacks were delivered against the Breton marines and part of the Belgian 5th division, which temporarily came to their aid. Still the town was held, still the batteries on the hill rained shrapnel on the oncoming Germans, still the massed machine guns tore away the head of every column. But by now the constant fighting was beginning to tell on the Frenchmen for all their hardiness. Their ranks were terribly thinned, and their ammunition was running low. For a few days they had a blessed respite while the Württemberg brigades swept to the capture of Ramscappelle. But the shelling of their position continued, and attacks were made with monotonous regularity.

After the flooding of the Yser had brought safety and relief to the hard-pressed Belgians, the value of Dixmude was much diminished. And well that it was so. The marines could do no more, and when on the morning of November 10 a bombardment more terrible than any yet endured smote the town, Admiral Ronarc'h prepared to retire to his defences on the other bank of the river. Suddenly the rain of shells slackened and a dense mass of infantry poured towards the town. Once again machine gun and field gun smote the columns, once again the Breton used his rifle with deadly effect upon the packed battalions. But this time they could not be stayed. The weight of their numbers was too great, and led by Württemberg troops the Germans swept into the town. Outnumbered and overwhelmed, Admiral Ronarc'h and his marines were driven out of the town by nightfall, leaving behind them some hundreds of prisoners.

All that men could do the marines had done, and the loss of Dixmude was now of no consequence. Eight hundred yards of impassable floods stretched between the Germans and the right wing of the Belgians. From their new position on the farther bank of the river the marines held the German advance with ease, and as the fighting in this area settled down to desultory trench warfare they evolved a new weapon—a boat armed with a quick firing gun which they used with remarkable effect over the flooded marshes of the Yser front.

With the fall of Dixmude the great battle along the Yser relapsed into the old-fashioned circumvallation warfare of the

age of Vauban and Turenne and Marlborough. Both sides returned to the medieval method of warfare from which the Grenadiers had obtained their name. Hand grenades were thrown from ditch to ditch, and the ancient trench mortar was resurrected from military museums and employed once more. The sap and the mine came into general use, and the trench system, with its traverses and covered ways, was developed to an extraordinary degree.

In these winter months some five millions of men were entrenched against each other from the sand dunes of the North Sea to the edge of the mountains of Switzerland. It was an apparent deadlock, and the cost in men and materials to both combatants had been frightful. Winter set in, and with it the titanic battles of the western front died down. Even round Ypres the fighting, which for many weeks had seemed as though it would never end, was becoming less severe. But the story of that fighting is the story of the culminating clash of the contending forces that marked the final locking of the two armies which had swung together from Switzerland to the sea.

CHAPTER 27

First Battle of Ypres—(I)

THE little town of Ypres stands at the corner of the coastal plain of Flanders. To the north and the west the monotonous levels stretch away unbroken to the sand dunes along the sea. But to the east and south a straggling line of low hills rises above the surrounding plain. These hills nowhere exceed 500 feet in height, and they average not more than 200 feet; but so level is the rest of the country that they offer a commanding view across it for many miles. The hills are never sudden rises, the ascent being so gradual as scarcely to be perceptible, yet the summits stand like great ridges that loom across the marshes of Flanders. Sheltered behind these spurs, Ypres lies in the plain, 17 miles direct north-north-west of Lille. An old-world town with a proud history, it was once the great centre of the Flanders' wool trade, its magnificent

Cloth Hall attesting to its pre-eminence. An important road centre, it is also the junction on the Bruges—Lille railway that connects through Poperinghe with St. Omer and Calais. An old and unused canal links the town with the river Lys at Comines, and the small river, the Yperlee, runs north and west to connect with its parent stream, the Yser. Chief of the cobbled roads which radiate from Ypres are those to Poperinghe on the west, to Dixmude and Nieuport on the north, to Passchendaele and Bruges on the north-east, to Bethune on the south-west, to Lille on the south-east, and most famous of all, the road to Menin, on the east.

The concentration of the British forces in this area was achieved by October 19, when Sir Douglas Haig and the 1st corps completed their detrainment from Abbeville, and moved up to support the extended British line. Sir John French, in consultation with Foch, had decided upon an offensive. It will be remembered that the chief object of transferring the British troops from the Aisne front to Flanders was to turn the German flank, which two French armies had only been able to extend. The Allied command was reasonably confident of success.

The B.E.F. was, however, not the only available force in the area. Farther west and north a growing body of French troops —for the most part territorials, cavalry units and marines at that time—was available, and it was expected that the Belgians on the Yser would cooperate. In all, the British and French commanders were convinced that their superiority of numbers entitled them to plan a large-scale offensive. So far as they could discover, the only forces which opposed them in the area were the German 19th corps, the 4th cavalry corps, and some two or three of Beseler's Antwerp divisions. These last were known to be on the coast near Ostend, and the two former were being held by the British 3rd and 2nd corps south of Ypres. The German centre was thought to be almost denuded of troops, and the following plan was accordingly evolved.

Sir Douglas Haig and the British 1st corps were to strike north at Roulers and Bruges, cut the communications of Beseler and leave him helpless before the French and Belgians, who would pin him on the coast. Meanwhile, cooperating with the 1st corps, the 4th, under Sir Henry Rawlinson, was to push east to Menin and, while making its movements conform with those of the 1st corps to the north and keeping contact with

the 3rd corps on its right, fall upon the unprotected flank of the enemy south of Ypres. Were these operations successful they might well start a movement similar to that which had driven the Germans from the Marne to the Aisne. The German 19th corps and the 4th cavalry corps would be flung back in disorder, leaving the British 3rd and 2nd corps free to advance, and exposing to their attack the flank of the troops which, under Prince Rupert, were holding up Maud'huy's 10th army in front of Arras. By this means of alternating flanking and frontal attacks the whole German line might be rolled up.

The Allies were reckoning without the Germans. The few troops opposing the various British and French divisions were merely the advance screen of two armies which were pouring up in overwhelming numbers. Reference has already been made to the new 4th army, the right wing of which so nearly succeeded in smashing in the Belgian position on the Yser. On October 19 its left wing was preparing to deliver an equally heavy blow on the French and British positions just north of Ypres. Farther south the 6th army, of which the 19th corps was but a forerunner, had completed its detrainment, and was about to launch itself upon the British 4th and 3rd corps to the east and south of Ypres.

General Galliéni described graphically the character of the "race to the sea" when he declared that the Allies "were always 24 hours and an army corps behind the enemy." Round Ypres they were 36 hours and a whole army behind the Germans. Instead of outnumbering the enemy comfortably, they were themselves outnumbered by sometimes as much as four to one. At the commencement of the struggle the French and British troops numbered about 100,000. At no time did that number exceed 200,000. Opposing them were two armies at full strength which totalled over half a million men. In one respect the Allies had the advantage: most of their divisions were first line troops, excellently disciplined and experienced, while a large part of the German 4th army and many of their reserve troops were men of peace-time training only, either under or over military age. Time and again this advantage was to save the Allied line. The powers of disciplined recovery which the Allied troops showed whenever the line was temporarily broken were as remarkable as the lack of finishing power in the German troops, and their inability to withstand counter-attacks. In attack the

German levies were magnificent, but they were too loosely bound together ever to press home the advantage which their bravery won. This lack of orderliness and cohesion proved a great weakness, for they were never able to stand together against the counter-attacks which the trained British regiments delivered with perfect precision and characteristic élan. What had been proved times without number by British troops at Plassey and elsewhere was confirmed at Ypres. The fighting qualities of British armies are never in question; but it is their discipline and steadiness that have won them such successes.

Even so, the defence of Ypres must for ever remain one of the crowning achievements of British arms. The Allied plans went hopelessly astray. Bruges was not captured, Beseler was not pinned on the coast, the German flank was not turned. Instead, the British troops found themselves thrust into the defence of a weak salient on a front many miles too long, and pitted against forces which were enormous. Yet the men stood firm; the leaders never lost courage. Time after time the Germans were thrust back until, after four weeks of terrible fighting, they sullenly withdrew. "I venture to predict," said Sir John French in his despatch, "that the deeds during these days of stress and trial will furnish some of the most brilliant chapters which will be found in the military history of our time."

From the German point of view, to waste on Ypres the strength that could have been directed with so much more profit against Arras or the Yser, was just folly. Nor is it easy to understand why a command which up to that time had made so few mistakes should suddenly commit such a tactical blunder. What was to be gained here that could not be gained more easily elsewhere? To break the Allied line at Arras was to destroy the British and Belgian armies. To break it at Ypres was merely to compel them to retire. To force the passage of the Yser was to threaten the British army with envelopment and to win the Channel ports. To capture Ypres was merely to make a dent where previously there had been a bulge in the Allied line. Yet the Germans attacked the British troops on the heights to the east and south of the city more persistently and with greater strength than they attacked the Allied line anywhere beween Nieuport and Arras.

It is to be conjectured that lack of time was partly responsible for the failure to evolve a plan that would have been

more in accordance with the nature of the Allied position. Secondly, it would seem that although the Germans were concerned to break through to the sea, they were even more concerned to smash the left wing of their opponents, absolutely and utterly; they relied upon their great advantage in numbers, and strove, by attacking everywhere, simply to exterminate the Allied forces. Finally, the salient which the British occupied appeared to fascinate them. A salient is always a weakness, and seldom has any advantages. It permits the enemy to mass a greater number of troops and guns on the outside than can be accommodated on the inside; it exposes the defenders to envelopment if either of the two angles on which it rests are broken in. The Germans were obsessed with the idea of destroying the British Army and to that end devoted energies which, had they been used elsewhere with intelligence, might have achieved the same result with one half the effort. Dearly as the defence of Ypres cost the British, the Allies none the less had cause to congratulate themselves that the Germans so eagerly attacked them. By distributing their forces equally along the whole of the line from Arras to the sea the Germans to an extent helped the consolidation of the Allied position. The defending forces were locked more firmly together, and their flanks rested but the more solidly upon their neighbours'.

On October 19 the first encounter battles were fought. The 23rd, 26th and 27th reserve divisions of the new German 4th army began to move up into line with the units of the 6th army to the south. In that area the British 3rd corps, it will be remembered, had begun to entrench on a line east of Armentières that stretched from Frelinghien, on the river Lys, through Remesques to Ennetières and Radinghem. Conneau's cavalry divisions continued the line to a point just north of Neuve Chapelle, where the left wing of the 2nd corps rested. North of the 3rd corps General Allenby and the 1st and 2nd cavalry divisions were holding a long line extending from just north of Frelinghien to the little village of America. For two days the cavalry had been endeavouring to force a passage of the Lys, which ran north and south across the whole of their front, but without success, and their inability to advance had held up the progress of the 3rd corps to the south.

Opposing these British troops were the 7th, 19th and 13th divisions of the 6th army in front of Lille. They extended in

that order, from Fournes, south-west of Lille, along a line that ran through Perenchies, Frelinghein, Warneton, Comines and Wervicq to Menin. North of that point the units of the 6th army already referred to were moving into line, but the front was still fluid. For on the Allies' side General de Mitry's cavalry had pushed on as far as Roulers, while spread throughout the country to the south and west of that town were the British 3rd cavalry and 7th divisions, which formed the 4th corps. As yet, apart from patrol encounters, the solid lines of infantry had not come together. On this day, the 19th, Sir Henry Rawlinson had reached a line that ran from Kruiseik in the south, through Ferhand and Moorslede to Oostnieuwkerke, west of Roulers.

North of the British, the 87th and 89th French territorial divisions and some further units of cavalry held the country in the neighbourhood of Houthulst Forest, Langemarck and Bixschoote, which, at that time, was free of all enemy concentration except cavalry patrols. The stage was set, and with the advance of the British 1st and 4th corps the great battle of Ypres had begun. It was destined to rage for three weeks.

The story of the battle is involved. Fighting was continuous along an extended front, and was everywhere terrible. In the result position and continuity became obscure, and before proceeding to a description of the battle in detail, a brief sketch of its general features is desirable. It began with the attempt made by Sir John French to turn the German flank. The British 4th corps advanced towards Menin, but was held up before it reached its objective. For 19 days it maintained itself upon the ground it had won against concentrated shell fire and attack after attack of the massed German infantry. To the north the 1st corps had advanced well towards Thourout, and although fiercely resisted, was still making progress when the retreat of the French cavalry on its left compelled it to withdraw to a position that conformed with the troops on its flanks.

Entrenched on that line, it stubbornly maintained itself against overwhelming forces of the enemy until it was relieved by French troops, when it moved to the assistance of the 4th corps. Farther north still, in the angle of the salient at Langemarck and Bixschoote, the French territorials under de Mitry, although driven back to the defence of the Yser line, succeeded in repelling all the attacks of the 46th reserve division of the new

German 4th army. This was one of the great danger points, for had the French broken, the British would have been taken in flank and rear. But the peak of the attack was delivered at the southern angle of the salient where the cavalry corps and the left wing of the 3rd corps maintained themselves over a far too wide front. Here the Germans were more nearly successful, capturing Messines and once breaking the line at Hollebeke. The crisis of the battle was reached on October 30-31, and only the arrival of French reinforcements saved the situation. Fighting was continued until November 14, the Germans making another great effort to break the line with the Prussian Guard on November 11, but after that date both combatants were exhausted, and the lines settled down to the winter campaign. This bare outline of one of the greatest battles in history may serve to fix its main features in the mind; its heroism and its horror can only be grasped by following the fortunes of the British army in detail.

The chief units upon which the brunt of the attack was to fall were, from south to north, the left wing of the 3rd corps under General Pulteney, the cavalry corps (1st and 2nd divisions) under General Allenby, the 4th corps (7th division and 3rd cavalry division) under General Rawlinson, and the 1st corps (1st and 2nd divisions) under General Haig.

By the morning of October 20, the British troops already in line had come up against the German reinforcements. The 2nd corps round La Bassée, and the 3rd corps east of Armentières had both been held. General Allenby was unable to advance over the Lys, and the 4th corps' progress towards Menin had been gradually slowed up by increasing pressure from a growing force of enemy on its extreme left in the neighbourhood of Roulers. The success of the British advance to which Sir John French was committed was dependent upon the rapid capture of Menin, and although the position of both the 3rd and the 2nd corps gave rise to some anxiety, the commander-in-chief decided to take the risk of leaving them unsupported, and to utilize the 1st corps, which had detrained at Abbeville on the previous day, in the north.

The force commanded by Sir Douglas Haig was therefore ordered to Ypres, and was directed to push on northwards towards Thourout and Bruges, the latter of which was given as his objective. On his left he would have a body of French

THE GRANDE PLACE, LOUVAIN, AFTER ITS DESTRUCTION BY THE GERMANS, IN AUGUST, 1914

THE HOTEL DE VILLE AT ARRAS, BEFORE THE GERMAN BOMBARDMENTS

Shells falling in Arras during one of the German bombardments. Arras gave its name to five battles in the war.

Further evidence of the ordeal of Arras in the war. A heavy bombardment on the outskirts of the city.

View of Czernowitz, the capital of the Bukovina, showing the railway station, an important junction. It was occupied by the Russians, September 15, 1914

Elliott & Fry

Central News

Russell

VICTOR AND VANQUISHED AT CORONEL AND FALKLANDS. Left, Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock who was blown up with his flagship Good Hope at the battle of Coronel, November 1, 1914. Centre, Count von Spee, defeated Admiral Cradock at Coronel and himself was worsted and lost his life at the Falklands. Right, Admiral Sturdee, the victor of the Falkland Islands December 8, 1914. He commanded the fourth battle squadron at Jutland.

cavalry under de Mitry, and on his right, the British 3rd cavalry division under Byng. By this means it was hoped to relieve the pressure on the 7th division, which would thereby be enabled to push on to Menin. The 2nd and 3rd corps would meanwhile have to take care of themselves; they were therefore told to give up any immediate thought of an offensive and to do their best to retain the positions they had already won.

It is clear that even at this late hour the idea of attack was still foremost in the minds of the Allied commanders. The new concentrations of the enemy were apparently unsuspected, and the existence of the 4th army seems quite to have escaped notice. This ignorance was fostered by the experience of the 1st corps during the 20th. Steady progress was made, and no serious forces of the enemy were encountered. But both the French and British cavalry on its wings were engaged in heavy fighting. During the afternoon a force of French territorials occupying Poelcappelle was driven from the village. This necessitated the retreat of Byng's cavalry, which were compelled to fall back towards Langemarck. On the left, Bidon's French territorials and de Mitry's cavalry had made better progress, pushing northwards through Houthulst Forest.

Haig continued his advance the next day, and by 2 o'clock had occupied Koekuit and reached Poelcappelle. Suddenly he received the news that the 87th territorials and the French cavalry on his left had been driven pell-mell from the forest and forced back many miles. With great skill he swung back his left wing, comprising the 1st division, until it again made contact with the French at Bixschoote. At the same time he learnt that farther south the 7th division and the cavalry corps had been heavily attacked. Further advance was out of the question. In fact, the high-water mark of the British advance had been reached all along the line from La Bassée to Bixschoote, for by this time the German armies were in line and were about to launch an attack on the Allied position that extended from Arras to the sea. During the day the German 23rd and 26th reserve corps had moved south-west from Thourout and Roulers, and the 27th corps had moved up from Menin. Farther south the new units of the 6th army had begun to press energetically against the position held by the cavalry corps.

Then, at last, Sir John French realized the menace to the whole of the extended British front. He acted with commendable

speed. The proposed advance had to be postponed indefinitely; the position he already held must be retained. In view of the strength of the enemy it became increasingly doubtful whether that could be done. The obvious course was to shorten his line by at least half, but such a shortening could only have been achieved by withdrawing to the west of Ypres; the major part of the last corner of Belgium would have had to be surrendered, and the moral effect of such a blow was grave. He decided to hold on, and dispatched urgent requests to Foch for reinforcements. The 42nd, the 9th and the 16th divisions were shortly expected in the area to join the forces under General D'Urbal in the formation of the new 8th army. Foch had hoped to use this for a decisive attack upon the German flank; but it was becoming more and more clear that the need for reinforcements along the whole line would soon be so acute that the army as a unit would never be formed. The 9th corps was expected to arrive on the 23rd, but before that date no further troops could be looked for. Sir John French possessed few reserves of his own. Neither the 2nd nor the 3rd corps could be called upon to support the 1st and the 4th. Both were fully occupied with their own battles; it was more than probable that they themselves would be in serious need of support. A few territorial troops of unknown quality were the only forces immediately available. Some Indian troops were on their way, but could not arrive for several days. In consequence the British troops were left for three days to stand the full weight of the German attack. They acquitted themselves magnificently.

The French troops on Haig's left had been driven behind the Yser at Bixschoote. From that point the 1st division was on a line running almost due east to Langemarck. Then came the 2nd division, swinging the line back south-east to Zonnebeke. Haig's divisions were thus arranged as two sides of a triangle, the apex of which was at Koekuit. In reserve on the right rear was Byng's 3rd cavalry division. South of Zonnebeke, the 7th division continued the line to Kruseik, where it bent back suddenly through Zandevoorde to Hollebeke. South of that village the cavalry corps continued the line in a slightly western curve to join at Frelinghien with the 3rd corps in front of Armentières. The two obvious points of weakness were the angles of the salient at Bixschoote in the north, and Hollebeke in the south. German pressure on those points was heavy during

the 21st, but the most serious fighting occurred along the front of the 7th division.

A determined attack by the 52nd division of the German 26th corps on the Zonnebeke cross-roads drove back the wing of the 22nd brigade, and created a dangerous gap between the 2nd division and its neighbour. For a time it seemed as though the flank of the 22nd brigade was turned, but the 2nd division moved against the flank of the German attack, and compelled the 52nd division to retire. Contact between the two British forces was made again late in the afternoon at the railway crossing just west of the village. The danger was averted; but the German attack had only been held by the aid of Kavanagh's 7th brigade, which had been detached from the 3rd cavalry division in general reserve.

In the centre another wedge had been driven into the British 21st brigade at Becelaere. The fighting was particularly heavy, but, by a splendid counter-attack, delivered by the Royal Scots Fusiliers and the Yorkshires, the breach was partly repaired. But the chief danger was experienced in front of Zandevoorde. The left wing of the 2nd cavalry division under General Gough defended a wide front from Hollebeke across the canal, north and east towards Zandevoorde. An ominously wide gap was left between the flank of this force and the 20th brigade round Kruseik. Towards the middle of the day, a large force of Germans made a furious assault on Zandevoorde. The Bavarian cavalry division pushed resolutely forward in face of a heavy cross-fire and began to penetrate the gap. Makin's 6th cavalry brigade was hurried south and just in time filled the interval between Gough's wing and the 20th brigade. The pressure was still severe, and during the course of the afternoon the rest of the 3rd division was moved down to the Hollebeke—Zandevoorde angle. In consequence, Haig was compelled to strengthen his right wing supporting the left of the 7th division at Zonnebeke.

The length of front which the Allied commanders had to defend was a perpetual source of danger and difficulty. From Dixmude to the Lys the line traced by the various troops was fully 30 miles, and the available troops did not permit of many more than 3,000 men to the mile. The British general staff conferred anxiously with the French generals Bidon and de Mitry. In Ypres were some forces of French territorials. It was decided to reinforce the Bixschoote angle with these troops,

and thus strengthen Haig's left. He would thereby be enabled to give more support to the hardly pressed 7th division in the centre. The rest of the troops must stand firm, maintaining their positions as best they could.

All day long on the 22nd the fighting grew heavier. The chief pressure was brought to bear upon the 7th division, and Haig was compelled to support it. His own position was none too secure; but until late in the day the defence was not severely shaken. At nightfall the fighting lulled; the attack for the day seemed over. Suddenly a hail of shells smote the trenches of the 1st division, and before the troops had recovered from their surprise, the Germans had attacked and broken the line between Bixschoote and Langemarck. In their advance they succeeded in isolating a number of the Cameron Highlanders. Violent counter-attacks were at once launched on the German advance, and although all the lost ground was not recovered, the advance was stayed.

During the 22nd the 7th division tried without success to straighten the dents in its line which had been made in the previous day's fighting. The retirement of the 21st brigade had created a sharp angle on its right where it joined with the 22nd. This point, held by the Wiltshires, had been heavily shelled and had been the objective of several fierce attacks, and the Wiltshires had distinguished themselves for the gallantry with which they had beaten off their attackers. But all efforts to bring the 21st brigade back into position had failed.

The gap which had been driven between the Royal Scots Fusiliers and the Yorkshires had never been completely filled; for three days the gap remained, and during that time both battalions were compelled to fight on two faces, a position particularly trying, and one which made the defence of their position twice as difficult.

Hollebeke, the danger point of the British salient, had curiously enough been more lightly attacked on the 22nd. The position had been subjected to heavy bombardment and a group of clever snipers caused considerable trouble. But the infantry attacks had not been pressed home. The weakest stretch of the British line was undoubtedly that held by the cavalry. They occupied an extended front which they were quite insufficient to defend. Had the Germans attacked as vigorously against Messines and Hollebeke as they did against Polygon Wood they could almost certainly have broken through. The only possible supports for the cavalry in those early days would have had to come from the British 3rd corps to the south, and General Pulteney would have been absolutely unable to assist. For several days he had been severely tried. All along his front superior forces of the enemy had delivered attack after attack. Particularly severe was the pressure on his left wing. On the 20th the 12th brigade had been driven from the little village of Le Gheer, which lies just north of Frelinghien on the Lys.

This advance of the Germans threatened the centre and right of the 3rd corps, which suffered the disadvantage of being divided into two by the river. A counter-attack was ordered and was carried out with great success and gallantry by Lieutenant Colonel Anley of the Essex Regiment, and Lieutenant Colonel Butter of the Lancashire Fusiliers. The enemy were driven back with heavy loss, and the village was recaptured. The centre was saved from a flank attack, but on the 22nd a violent

cannonade preceded a massed attack on the 16th brigade at Frelinghien. Although this attack was beaten off, the difficulties that had been experienced on account of the fact that the river cut through the British force made it increasingly necessary to move as much of the 3rd corps north of the river as was possible. Accordingly arrangements were made for Conneau's cavalry corps, which at that time filled the gap south of Armentières between the British 3rd and 2nd corps, to move up to that city, and permit the 3rd corps to move gradually across the river.

The two days' fighting had produced little result from the German point of view. A dent had been made in the line of the 1st division; in front of Becelaere a weak salient had been created by the driving back of the 21st brigade, and the Royal Scots Fusiliers and the Yorkshires. Elsewhere the British had held their position unchanged.

The sag in the 1st division and the ugly salient at Becelaere were obvious dangers. While they existed the line might be pierced at either of those points. Energetic steps were taken on the 23rd to remedy affairs. Early in the morning of that day a brilliant charge by the West Surreys, the Northamptons and the King's Royal Rifles, led by Major General Bulfin, drove the Germans off the Bixschoote—Langemarck road, and carried the attackers well past the point at which on the previous day the Germans had first attacked the Camerons. The fighting was desperate, but the British eventually won back all the ground that had been lost, and took over 600 prisoners.

Not only were the lost trenches recovered, but 54 of the captured Camerons were liberated. The Germans were considerably alarmed by the success of this attack, which they described in official reports as a planned attempt, supported by large reinforcements, "to break through our line and roll up the part of the front lying to the north of it as far as the sea." The welcome effect of this misconception was to divert strength from the centre to the wing of the German position. To that extent the pressure on the weakened 7th division was lessened.

This division, during the day, had been striving to close the gap in its line. The Bedfords and the Scots Fusiliers had managed to make contact on the previous evening, and the British line was restored. But the dent still remained, and during the 23rd was a constant source of trouble to the 7th division. Fierce attacks were delivered by the Germans, parti-

cularly on Kruseik, the most advanced and the weakest point in the line. Intense shelling inflicted severe losses upon the Grenadier Guards, who held the corner, but at the end of the day the British position was still intact. Farther north, the Wiltshires were once more exposed to the heaviest of the German attacks, but in cooperation with the Warwickshires and the Green Howards they fought steadily all day. At one moment the position became grave as a force of Germans managed to penetrate a gap between the Green Howards and the Scots Fusiliers. A small wood gave the attackers both a screen and a cover, and the position of the Green Howards grew serious as they were threatened from the rear; but the reserve company of the battalion swept forward and after sharp encounter drove the Germans from their vantage point.

Although the depleted 7th still held on its position was precarious in the extreme. The length of front it held was far too long, and concentration to repel attack on any point immediately caused gaps in the line elsewhere. It was, in consequence, a welcome relief when the advance cavalry of the French 17th division, which began to arrive in the evening, placed a regiment of cuirassiers at the disposal of the British division. But for the day the attacks had ceased except for shelling and rifle fire, and the French troopers were not called upon.

Farther south during the 23rd, the 6th cavalry brigade waged a stubborn fight on the Hollebeke sector. Opposed to them were the 7th and 3rd German cavalry divisions, and the day was spent in alternate attack and counter-attack. So heavy was the shelling of the British reserve trenches that the relief of the 6th by the 7th brigade could not be carried out until nightfall.

By the evening of the 23rd the French 17th division was in line. It had moved up and taken over the trenches held by the British 2nd division during the afternoon, but in order to keep the British 1st corps together it was arranged that it should also relieve the 1st division to the left. This was accordingly done on the next day. The result of this relief was that the 2nd division was able to move south and take over part of the trenches held by the 7th division, while the 1st division went into general reserve. The access of strength was very welcome. It had shortened the British line considerably and permitted the formation of a small reserve. Temporarily, at least, the arrival of the French evened things up for the Allies, and on the 23rd it would appear

that the opposing forces were nearly equal, 12½ divisions being pitted against 13½ German divisions.

Both General Foch and General D'Urbal were convinced that it was now possible to resume the offensive which had been postponed a few days earlier. Although the French 18th division (the remainder of the 9th corps which had been ordered to Ypres) was not yet in line, orders were issued for an advance along the whole front. Sir John French was willing to cooperate now that he had been able to mass his 1st and 4th corps, and the whole Allied line prepared to move forward on the 24th. General Grossetti and the 42nd division on the Yser, together with the French marines and territorials between Dixmude and Bixschoote were to cooperate on the left and the British 2nd and 7th divisions prepared to conform on the right.

The only section of this attack which became effective was that by the 17th division. General Grossetti was desperately engaged in the defence of the Yser as soon as he was in position. Far from being able to advance he was hard put to it to maintain his position. A fierce attack on the Allied line from Dixmude to Bixschoote prevented any forward move by the French troops defending it, and on the right the British had their own troubles. But General Dubois and the 17th division (later in the day supported by the newly arrived 18th) made considerable progress. After an initial check, the whole line advanced from one to three miles, recapturing Zonnebeke and pushing almost as far as Poelcappelle. There the advance was halted. In view of the serious attacks on their right and left further movement was dangerous, and the troops proceeded to dig themselves in on the ground they had won.

Sir Douglas Haig had not completed the transfer of the 2nd division into line on the left wing of the 7th, before that wing was heavily attacked. At 5.30 a.m. on the 24th an intense bombardment broke over the centre of the British trenches at Reutel. Dug in loose sand they offered but little protection and were rapidly blown in ; here it was that the gallant Wiltshires, who had been so prominent in all the previous fighting, were defending the "dent" in the British line. A sudden attack by a strong force of Germans drove in the companies of the Scots Fusiliers who were acting as the flank of the Wiltshires. While the latter were busily engaged in repelling a frontal attack they were suddenly taken in the rear, and the point of the

salient which had resisted the enemy attacks for so long gave way. Over 450 of the Wiltshires were captured, and the regiment as a regiment ceased to exist. An ugly breach was made in the British line and the Germans poured over Reutel spur into Polygon Wood. The position was desperate, and in a last-minute effort to re-establish the line the Northumberland Hussars and the 21st Warwickshires were launched against the German 27th reserve corps, which was pushing rapidly through the wood towards Hooge. The Northumberland Hussars thus became the first territorial regiment to engage in any serious fighting in the British line, and they performed their task efficiently. Admirably supporting the Warwickshires they helped to hold up the German advance and to recapture the southern part of the wood. The Warwickshires lost heavily, Lieutenant Colonel Loring being killed, and over 300 casualties were sustained.

This check gave time to the 2nd division to move up. The 5th brigade was hurried forward, and reached the corner of the wood about 11 o'clock. It was at once ordered to clear it of the enemy, and the Highland Light Infantry and the 21st Worcestershires led the charge immediately. The position was extremely involved, German and British troops being mixed up everywhere. Large units of both forces were surrounded and bullets were fired in all directions by both sides alike. The 5th brigade was ordered to attack with the bayonet, as any shots they fired would endanger British troops to the north.

The wood was covered with thick undergrowth and difficulty was experienced in keeping contact, but it was not until the Worcestershires had got some way forward that they came upon the Germans. The encounter was dramatic, both sides being taken by surprise. A few rifles were fired from the hip, but for the most part it was a desperate hand-to-hand struggle. The experience and coolness of the British regular gradually made themselves felt and although the Germans fought bravely they were eventually broken and retreated precipitately. The wood echoed to the cheers of the victorious Worcestershires as the last German was pushed beyond the edge of the trees, but a cross-fire from machine guns met the British forces as they advanced into the open and they were unable to pursue farther. The Worcestershire charge, a very gallant affair worthy to rank with the famous charge made by the same regiment the following week at Gheluvelt, had proved once again that the Germans were

unable either to exploit the advantages they won or to resist the counter-attacks of their enemies.

With the repulse of the Germans from the wood the left of the 7th division was secured. During the day the rest of the 2nd division moved up into line and carried out a surprise attack on the Zonnebeke Broodseinde road which succeeded in carrying the British line over half a mile forward. The right flank of the 7th division in front of Gheluvelt had been exposed during the afternoon to strong infantry attacks, but had held its own without much difficulty. The whole division was, however, rapidly becoming exhausted. Already 45 per cent of its officers and 37 per cent of its men had been lost, and the remainder were worn out with incessant fighting. The cavalry unit, the 3rd division, had luckily had a quiet day. Their position appeared to the Germans too strong to be attacked with the troops at the latter's disposal.

After the repulse of the attack upon Le Gheer the British 3rd corps to the south had been left in comparative quiet for two days. But on the 24th a violent attack was launched on the 16th brigade south of the Lys by the 26th division of the German 13th corps. Lucky shots from batteries demolished the British trenches, and the 1st Leicestershires lost heavily. The German attack carried them into the British trenches, and there was some fierce hand-to-hand fighting before the invaders were driven out. Arrangements were made to withdraw the 16th brigade if the attack were pressed, and as on the morning of the 25th the Germans again advanced in great numbers the brigade retreated to a line some 500 yards to the rear. The new position got rid of a dangerous salient, and the British line south of the Lys then ran almost straight from Fauquissart through Touquet to Frelinghien. During the 26th and 27th, apart from heavy shelling, the 3rd corps was not troubled. But a violent bombardment on the 28th presaged a heavy attack. This was launched on the same day and continued on the 29th. The situation was serious for a time, as the Germans broke through the trenches held by the 10th brigade south of La Boutillerie and held their position for some hours. They were eventually driven out after dark by a charge of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, and the line was restored.

The desperate attacks which were at this time being delivered north of the 3rd corps began to have their effect. The Germans

made no other serious attempt to force the line south of the Lys, and General Pulteney was able to mass his reserves quite safely on the north bank of the river to aid the 4th division, which was being heavily attacked again at Le Gheer. The culmination of the attack was reached on October 31, when only a desperate charge by Major Prowse and the 1st Somerset Light Infantry prevented the Germans from breaking right through.

The 4th division was, nevertheless, able to extend its left, which eventually reached Messines. This could be done with comparative safety, for the weight of the German attack fell to the north of the line held by General Pulteney. This line had become longer and longer, but no reinforcements had arrived. On the contrary Pulteney had been compelled to assist both the cavalry corps on his left and the 2nd corps on his right, round La Bassée. By November 1 the position was causing him grave anxiety, and he reported to French that he doubted whether his exhausted men could hold their long front against any renewed attack. Units from the 2nd corps, which had, by then, been relieved by the Indian troops, were dispatched to his assistance, and he was warned that he must be prepared to retire in the event of overwhelming attack.

The rest of November, luckily, passed quietly. Active shelling and sniping continued, but no large offensive was launched, and the British 3rd corps was eventually relieved, after weeks of incessant fighting. The stubborn way in which it had stood firm against repeated attacks had been of the greatest possible value not only in the defence of Ypres, but in that conducted by the 2nd corps in front of Bethune.

The battle of Armentières officially came an end on November 2, although from the soldiers' point of view but little difference could be observed from that day to the next. The attacks which were delivered on the 4th division north of the Lys are more properly to be treated in the major battle which was fought round Ypres. South of the river only active trench warfare remained to tell of the fierce battles which had been fought across the face of the country in front of Lille.

To complete the story of events in the Ypres salient up to October 25 some mention must be made of the cavalry corps which had been directed on the 21st to hold a line reaching from the canal at Hollebeke to Messines. Attacks upon this sector had not been unduly heavy, but they had been continuous,

and the men were worn out through lack of sleep. On the 23rd the Ferozepore brigade of the Lahore division arrived to reinforce the cavalry. (For purposes of convenience the 3rd cavalry division was transferred from the 4th corps and put under the orders of General Allenby). The line was still weak, and the cavalry were quite unable to do more than fight on the defensive; but although they were attacked by six cavalry divisions and supporting infantry they held their own with the rest of the British line.

On Sunday, October 25, the Allied position round Ypres was very little different from what it had been on the 20th. The line ran roughly over the same ground in the shape of a semicircle to the east of the city. The British held the southern part of this arc, the French occupying the northern. The line was continued north and south by French and British troops respectively.

At this time a certain optimism was evident amongst the Allied generals. A little ground was being won on a large front, and everywhere else the line was firmly held. They had the whole of the British 1st division, most of the French 18th, and units from the British 2nd and 7th divisions in reserve, while all the German forces near Ypres had apparently been put into the line. The prospects of the offensive so well begun on the previous day seemed rosy.

Unfortunately for the Allies, the method of advance chosen was badly suited to the prevailing conditions. The movement was begun on the left with the French 17th division, and the troops on the right were to advance as and when their neighbours on the left made progress. Thus the 2nd division moved after the French, and the 7th division after the 2nd. The Germans were able to concentrate their troops and guns on the threatened points, and the Allied forces were prevented from assisting each other. In consequence, the result was disappointing. The French made some progress, but very slowly. By noon they had not even got up to the British left at Broodseinde, and it was not until 3 p.m. that the 2nd division moved. Its objective was Reutel, but the fierce resistance and the short hours of daylight left for attack quite prevented the capture of the village. Some advance was made by both the 4th and 6th brigades which, by nightfall, had crossed the Becelaere-Passchendaele road.

This advance did nothing to relieve the pressure on the indomitable 7th division in the south. It had been ordered to push forward its left, pivoting on Kruseik as the 2nd division advanced; but so late was the movement in beginning that practically no ground had been gained by nightfall. Kruseik, just north of Zandevoorde, was the angle of the salient. A particularly weak position in itself, it was exposed to a double cross-fire from east and south. This section had been subjected all day to a heavy bombardment, and the 20th brigade had suffered severely. At 8 p.m. on the 25th, under cover of the storm of wind and rain which had closed the day, a resolute body of Germans rushed the trenches held by the Scots Guards, and forced a gap in the British line.

The position was truly desperate. Luckily, two companies of Scots Guards were available in reserve, and they counter-attacked with great gallantry. After an initial repulse the trenches were recovered, 190 Germans being captured. The Germans renewed the attack on the morning of the 26th. A terrible massed artillery fire broke out about 9 o'clock, and grew in intensity. The trenches of the Scots Guards were completely destroyed; many men were buried alive, many others were suffocated. For an hour the shelling continued, and then the German infantry swept on the shattered trenches in waves. The Scots Guards were broken and scattered, with terrible losses, the Grenadier Guards were cut off and only escaped in handfuls, and the Germans pushed beyond Kruseik. Once again they seemed unable to exploit their advantage, and were held up by the desperate resistance of the 2nd Border Regiment, until a new line had been formed behind the Kruseik angle. The position, which was serious, was later improved by a charge of the 7th cavalry brigade.

Little fighting occurred during the rest of the 26th and 27th. It had become clear that with the loss of the Kruseik salient the 7th division was dangerously advanced. Efforts were made all along the line to strengthen the position, but little ground was gained. On the left the French had been held, and it became increasingly obvious that deadlock had been reached. With the present distribution of forces neither side could hope to gain more than temporary and local successes. Reorganization was imperative, and the lull continued. The chief anxiety in the British ranks was felt concerning the 7th

division. Nearly 50 per cent of its effectives had been destroyed and it had practically ceased to exist as a unit. Accordingly, it was decided by Sir John French on October 28 that the remnants should be incorporated with the 1st corps under Sir Douglas Haig, and Sir Henry Rawlinson returned to England to supervise the formation of his 8th division, which was in process of mobilization.

Air reconnaisances of the German position had revealed no new concentrations. In this the Allied commanders were sadly misled, and when a wireless message was intercepted, and it was learnt that the Germans were preparing to attack the Gheluvelt-Kruseik sector on the morning of the 29th, no undue alarm was occasioned. The British line, tried as it was, had successfully resisted the attacks of their equally wearied opponents up to that time, and there was no reason to suppose that it would fail now. Actually the three days' calm in the fighting were simply the lull before the storm. Fierce and horrible as that fighting had been up to October 28, it was to be far surpassed in the days to come.

As early as the 24th the German commander of the 4th army, Duke Albert of Württemberg, had begun to doubt the possibility of breaking the Allied line at Ypres with his available forces. Falkenhayn, who visited him in person on the 27th, concurred, and in consultation with Prince Rupert, the 6th army commander, had agreed to the formation of a new army group. This unit consisted of the Bavarian 2nd corps, the 15th corps, the Bavarian 6th reserve division, and the 26th division of the 13th corps. These six divisions were placed under the command of General von Fabeck, and put into the line one by one between the 4th and 6th armies. The weight of the attack was to be directed against the southern re-entrant of the salient occupied by the Allies, that is, against Hollebeke and Messines; in order to cover this attack the 27th reserve corps was to assault in full force Gheluvelt, which was the centre of the line, on the 29th.

Apart from the superiority of over three to one in numbers which this new formation gave to the Germans along this section of the front, they enjoyed a huge advantage in artillery. For several days batteries had been collected, until on the morning of the 29th, opposing the British 18 heavy and 8 light guns the Germans had massed over 250 heavy guns.

The attack on Gheluvelt was launched in the early hours of Thursday, the 29th. In overwhelming numbers the Germans pushed along the Ypres—Menin road, driving back the weak defence troops round Gheluvelt cross-roads. Almost before the battle had begun the British line was driven in at this point over half a mile. The dent threatened the troops on either flank, and desperate efforts were made to recover the lost ground. The whole of the 1st division was in danger, and reserves were rushed up at speed. For a time the advance was checked, and the battle swung to and fro in front of Gheluvelt.

Gradually the superior marksmanship and the better training of the British began to tell. The German levies faltered, and their attacks became half-hearted. By midday the British were able to begin an advance and, ably led by the 20th brigade, began to push the Germans farther and farther back. Although the cross-roads were not recovered, Kruseik ridge was rushed during the afternoon, and the fighting for the day ended on this front with little to show for the German effort other than 500 yards of road. The British losses had, however, been particularly heavy, the Black Watch and the Scots Guards suffering badly. This in itself was serious, but the confusion amongst the troops, on account of the way in which reinforcements had arrived, took many hours of night to correct. The British line had little sleep, which, on top of their considerable exhaustion and severe losses, was very poor preparation for the three days of crisis that were coming.

Elsewhere on the 29th the fighting had not been very intense. The French had been unable to advance far, and the British 1st corps to the north of Gheluvelt, being under the necessity of making their movements conform to those of the French, were correspondingly retarded. South of the Menin road, Fabeck's new army group had not shewn its hand. Not all the divisions were in line, and in consequence, no attack was pressed on the cavalry round Hollebeke and Messines. The only other fighting during the day was the sharp attack on the 4th division at Le Gheer which, as already related, was effectively repulsed, and the night attack on the 19th brigade, which the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders drove back.

During the night of the 29th-30th Fabeck had completed his concentration both of troops and artillery. From this night onwards deliberate shelling of Ypres was carried on from all

positions in the German line which commanded the city, although it is difficult to see what the bombardment was expected to achieve. Sir John French was satisfied with the progress of the counter-attack on the 29th, and as the French had recaptured Bixschoote, he felt reasonably confident that the general advance he had ordered could be continued. To this end he took steps to transfer the 2nd corps, which was in process of being relieved in front of La Bassée by Indian troops, to the Ypres area, but by the evening of the 29th only an untried Territorial battalion, the London Scottish, had arrived. Orders were issued during the evening that the advance should be continued next day; but October 30 was to see a transformation of the conditions round Ypres as rapid as it was serious.

Just before dawn broke Fabeck launched his attack. The point he chose was the Zandevoorde ridge and the length of the canal running past Hollebeke. This part of the line was held by Byng's 3rd cavalry division, but as the Allied commanders in the north were quite ignorant of the massing of the new troops behind the German line, no special precautions had been taken to augment the defence of the southern re-entrant of the Ypres salient, the point of the Allied line which, strategically, was the most important and tactically the weakest.

The early successes which the Germans had gained on the previous day at Gheluvelt were repeated. The thinly scattered cavalry were overwhelmed in an avalanche of heavy shells to which their artillery were pitifully inadequate to reply. The shallow trenches were blown in, whole troops were buried, and the casualties grew and grew. Extermination or retreat were the only alternatives, and the cavalry retired to its second line of defences in front of Klein Zillebeke. This retreat of the 3rd cavalry division, as every other similar retreat in the British line, uncovered the flank of the troops on the immediate right and left. The 2nd division on the right was forced to fall back, and the right of the 7th division was exposed. This also had to be withdrawn, and the salient in front of Gheluvelt became all the sharper.

While this critical situation was developing in the south, the Germans were fiercely attacking the left wing of the British, where were the 1st and 2nd divisions. Here, however, the British held their own. The German attack appears to have been designed more to mask Fabeck's efforts in the south than

to win any definite advantage. In this it largely succeeded, for the 1st and 2nd divisions were fully occupied until nightfall, and the difficulty of sending reinforcements to the cavalry became correspondingly greater. By the time hostilities died down at nightfall, the Germans had gained a few hundred yards, but the position had remained unaltered.

Not so round Hollebeke. By 10 a.m. the 7th cavalry brigade had been driven out of Zandevoorde with heavy loss, and the Germans were in possession. They at once began to extend their front, and although reinforcements were sent up by General Allenby from the south and General Haig from the north, these did not arrive in time to save the 1st Royal Welch Fusiliers, who were in position just north of the village. Their trenches were in full view of the enemy, and for three hours had been under heavy fire. With the loss of Zandevoorde they were enveloped on three sides, and their trenches were raked from end to end with shrapnel fire. The sand which the shells kicked up from their trenches jammed their rifles and machine guns, and eventually their ammunition began to fail. For two hours and more they fought on with quiet and desperate courage, but at last were overwhelmed. Eighty-six survivors, many of whom were wounded, answered the roll call in the evening, and one more irreplaceable battalion of the British regular army had been destroyed.

Their resistance had given time to the troops on the left to retire and, warned in time, the Scots Fusiliers and the Green Howards retreated to the line which was hurriedly being formed with reinforcements behind the village. This line, stretching from Klein Zillebeke, north of Zandevoorde, to Gheluvelt, was held desperately all day. The fighting swung to and fro, but the new Fabeck army group was no match in fighting qualities for the young reserve corps which had been battling elsewhere. Caution and reluctance were the keynote of the German advance, and although their superiority in numbers told time and again, the British regulars were able to hold on. Nevertheless, all attempts to recapture Zandevoorde failed, and the position of the Scots Fusiliers and Green Howards holding the bulge of the salient north of the village became hourly more critical. Farther west the 2nd cavalry division had been unable to hold Hollebeke, and both the village and the chateau on the canal had fallen to the German attack. In the south the 1st cavalry

division and the 4th division of the 3rd corps defending the line through Wytschaete and Messines had been heavily shelled all day, but not until evening had the Germans attacked with infantry. They then advanced with spirit, but the rifle and gun fire of the British troops drove them back repeatedly.

In spite of their lack of progress round Messines and in the north at Polygon Wood, the Germans had good cause to feel satisfied with the progress made. A terrible bulge had been made in the Allied line at its weakest point, and all efforts to correct it had failed. German troops had penetrated to within three miles of Ypres itself, and there was reason to suppose that one more energetic attack would break the line. But they were still seriously deceived as to the strength of the British troops. So desperately had the latter fought that the German command over-estimated the numbers opposed to it by at least 100 per cent. In this the British were aided by the nature of the ground, which hindered vision and made aerial scouting extremely difficult. To a large extent this factor had hidden the movements of troops from the Germans, and concealed the much more serious fact—the lack of reserves.

The British position at nightfall was grave in the extreme. The centre of the line between Messines and Gheluvelt had been forced back over a mile and a half, the salient round Gheluvelt had been made so acute that it was almost indefensible and, worst of all, every man was already in line. General Dubois had been informed during the day of the critical nature of the situation, and three French battalions under General Moussy had been dispatched from the French 9th corps to the assistance of the British. During the night of the 30th-31st these were put into line on the Hollebeke front, the remnants of the 3rd cavalry division moving up to support the troops on the Zandevoorde sector. Little more could be done, and the wearied troops lay down to snatch what sleep was possible before another day should usher in the fighting which everyone instinctively knew would mark the crisis.

Saturday, October 30, broke over the Ypres front in mist. A low ground fog had prevailed throughout most of the previous ten days' fighting, but the mist on this day was lighter. Indeed, by 10 a.m. it had quite dispersed and for the first time the Germans were able to use their captive observation balloons to direct their artillery. This increased visibility gave the

superior German guns a further advantage, and its effect was to be felt throughout the day. But over an hour before dawn the Germans attacked Messines, where shelling had continued all night. At the moment of attack the British troops were in process of being relieved by wearied Indian troops moved up from La Bassée, and in the confusion the Germans penetrated some distance into the line. But the 1st cavalry brigade rallied magnificently, and as dawn broke the attack was beaten back with heavy loss.

As the Germans drew off a terrific shell fire broke over the village. Houses and other buildings were demolished as if they were pasteboard, and the 12 weak British squadrons defending it were in danger of annihilation. A retirement became imperative, all the more so as the line north and south of Messines had sagged and the cavalry found themselves defending an exposed salient. Accordingly they retired from the eastern to the western end of the village, where a little later they were attacked by 12 German battalions. The fighting was of that most deadly type, house to house fighting, and slowly the British were forced back by weight of numbers. Towards midday help began to arrive; a battalion of the King's Own Scottish Borderers and another of the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry moved up in support on the left.

Later in the day while the need was still urgent the London Scottish were sent to Messines in motor buses. These troops had never before been under fire, but they advanced into the heart of the battle and although they held a position almost entirely without cover and were heavily shelled all day, hung on with great coolness and materially assisted the cavalry to beat back the further German attacks. By nightfall, however, most of the village was in the hands of the Germans, and their line was not 50 yards distant from the British cavalry. In spite of this proximity the 1st brigade was relieved after dark by the 2nd brigade, the operation being carried through without a hitch.

Farther south during the same day the German advance had been held, but north of Messines at Wytschaete a number of heavy attacks had been delivered on the 2nd cavalry division. These continued throughout the day, but the division was able not only to hold its own but even to assist the London Scottish in repelling the attack on Messines.

Thus south of the canal during the 31st the British line, with the exception of the partial loss of Messines, remained intact. In the north, however, things had been very different. About 6 a.m. an enormous force of infantry poured out on to the Gheluvelt salient. Although it was checked after its initial rush, much ground was lost. The Germans held their ground in spite of violent counter-attacks and commenced an artillery fire which was so heavy that the 1st and 3rd brigades of the 1st division began to melt away. A second and sudden attack forced the line south of the village, and the Queen's, in a desperate delaying resistance, were wiped out. Two officers and 12 men were all that rejoined the ranks of the 3rd brigade. Everywhere the line gave, and in spite of the most heroic efforts the British were forced from the village.

There can be no doubt that the presence of the kaiser on the scene of operations inspired the German troops with much enthusiasm. Their attacks were as impetuous and courageous as previously they had been tardy and cautious. But it is interesting to recall that the speed and perfect precision of the British rifle fire led the Germans to believe that not only were the British armed with automatic rifles—English prisoners were asked what make of automatic rifle they used—but also that new supplies of machine guns had arrived on the British front.

The new line taken up by the remnants of the troops that had been defending the salient stretched across the front of the woods between Hooge and Veldhoek. The losses had been frightful, as the annihilation of the Queens had led to the envelopment of several companies of the Loyal North Lancashires and Royal Scots Fusiliers, who had all been killed or taken prisoner. North of the Menin road the German attack had been pressed on Gheluvelt chateau with equal vigour. The companies of the Welch, the South Wales Borderers and the Scots Guards defending the line were rapidly overwhelmed and in danger of being exterminated. At the critical moment a magnificent counter-attack made by the survivors of the gallant companies took the Germans completely by surprise, and although they outnumbered the British by at least four to one they fled precipitately, flinging away their arms and accoutrements as they ran. The position was restored, but by that time Gheluvelt had been lost, and the chateau was in danger of being surrounded, and could no longer be held.

By one p.m. news of disasters all along the line was pouring into the G.H.Q. of the 1st corps. Gheluvelt was lost, counter-attacks had failed, and the gap in the line had been widened by the destruction of the Queen's and other units. The position north of the village was untenable and the Germans were still pushing on. Sir Douglas Haig issued orders that the new line Hollebeke-Veldhoek must be held at all costs by the remnants of the 1st and 2nd divisions, and sent off orders to the Worcestershires in reserve to prepare for a counter-attack to retake Gheluvelt. Scarcely had this been done when news was received that the headquarters of the 1st and 2nd divisions at Hooge château had been hit by successive shells, and that nearly the whole staff had been killed or wounded.

By 2 p.m. Sir John French had arrived at Sir Douglas Haig's headquarters, and the position was put before him. He had no reinforcements to offer, and nothing could be done. So far as could be seen the Germans could walk through the thinned and undirected ranks of the 1st division almost without opposition. The hour from 2 to 3 on the afternoon of October 31 marked the crisis of the whole battle. For that one hour the British were almost helpless; their only hope was in the French, who were too far away to offer much protection. Sir John French promised to seek General D'Urbal, and set off to ask his aid. But hardly had he gone when the news reached Haig that the Worcestershires had recaptured Gheluvelt.

The charge of the Worcestershires turned the tide in the Allies' favour once again; but before it is described a short account must be given of the situation north of Gheluvelt and south of Veldhoek. The loss of the village had turned the flank of the 2nd division, which had to swing its right round precipitately to resist German attacks. On the right of the 2nd, Bulfin's 2nd and 4th brigades and what remained of the 7th division had been heavily engaged all day. By 3 p.m. the situation was critical, as the troops had been driven to their last line of prepared defences; but the appearance on the scene of about 80 men of the 2nd Gordon Highlanders encouraged Bulfin to order a counter-attack. After one "mad minute" of rapid fire the whole line, led by the Highlanders, rushed on the advancing Germans. Only a few of them stood: the rest broke and fled, pursued by the British. Over half a mile was gained before this wild charge ended, and by the end of the day most of the lost ground had been won back.

South of Bulfin's force at Hollebeke, General Moussy and the French had been desperately pressed. In the nick of time they had arrived to support the exhausted 3rd cavalry division, but although they managed to hold the line they were unable to do more. In fact, at one critical moment, only by organizing his own escort and collecting every man he could lay his hands on, including cooks, engineers and Army Service Corps men, and leading his 250 assorted soldiers in a wild, yelling bayonet charge in which there were few bayonets, did General Moussy drive back the attackers.

In the north, round Polygon Wood, the day had fortunately been quiet, only some shelling marking the continuance of hostilities. General Fanshawe, in command of the 2nd division, had been ordered—after the loss of Gheluvelt—to withdraw every man he could into divisional reserve. This had been done, only a thin screen of troops being left in the trenches. But the charge of the Worcestershires and the recapture of Gheluvelt avoided the necessity of employing Fanshawe's men.

When the Worcestershires were ordered to counter-attack on Gheluvelt only three companies were available. One had already moved up to support the 1st brigade. Seven officers and 350 men under Major Hankey had to advance across 1,000 yards of ground entirely devoid of cover to attack an enemy flushed with victory and at least six times as numerous. But, undeterred, the Worcestershire companies swept forward in a body from the south east face of Polderhoek Wood, and although 100 fell before they reached the outskirts of the village, few of the Germans awaited their arrival. Back they fled through Gheluvelt, leaving the Worcestershires master of the field. The British line was secured. Linking up with his 4th company, which was in line on his left, Major Hankey extended his position until it touched the remnants of the troops that had so valiantly defended the château.

By nightfall on October 31 the British line was almost where it had been the previous day. It was decided, however, in view of the hopeless nature of the salient, to evacuate Gheluvelt and retire to prepared positions to the west. French had conferred with Foch during the night of October 31-November 1, and it had been arranged that while the British line should be held the French would move up reinforcements and attack to the north and south of the British position. The situation of the cavalry

at Messines was giving rise to grave anxiety, and General Foch promised to send the 32nd division to the relief of Allenby's hard-pressed troops.

After nightfall the shelling of Messines and Wytschaete had been continued, and at 1 a.m. a heavy German attack was launched. Before the French division had arrived Messines had fallen and the London Scottish had been enfiladed and driven back, badly cut up. Farther north the Germans had also penetrated through Wytschaete, and all efforts to dislodge them had failed. But with the arrival of the advance companies of the French the village was recaptured, although the Allies were unable to press far beyond its confines. By the evening the line was solidly held by the French 32nd division. Several fresh attacks had been launched on Wytschaete by the Germans, but all had been beaten off.

Round Hollebeke, General Moussy, supported by General Bulfin, had had to resist a sharp attack by the enemy at midday, but reinforcements from the 3rd cavalry division (now in general reserve) had turned the scale, and the Germans had been driven back with some loss. Elsewhere the day had passed anxiously but quietly, only sniping and shelling breaking its serenity.

For the next four days the battle of Ypres slackened into an artillery duel. Periodical skirmishes occurred from time to time, but except for the loss or gain of a few yards of trench here or there the line remained stable from Bixschoote to Le Gheer. The French offensive was continued, but no marked success was gained. The British troops were therefore able to enjoy a well-earned rest, and some reinforcements which arrived also improved the position. The losses of the 1st and 4th corps had been frightful, and the cavalry had suffered as badly. The 4th corps had been reduced from a fighting strength of 12,000 men to under 3,000.

By November 5 it was thought that the Germans had abandoned their effort to break through. Their exhaustion probably exceeded that of the Allies, for although their troops were considerably more numerous, they had been employed in almost continuous attack for over ten days, and their losses must have been correspondingly heavier. But the Germans still had another card to play, and while it is true that the first stage of the battle of Ypres contained both the crisis and the fiercest fighting, the second stage, from November 6-15, was to prove by no means a small affair.

CHAPTER 28

First Battle of Ypres—(II)

The only serious change which occurred in the Allied line in front of Ypres on November 5 was the final loss of the Messines ridge. The nature of the ground was entirely favourable to attack from the east and equally against attack from the west. Once the Germans had captured the top of the ridge at Wytschaete the occupation of the remainder was inevitable. The loss of Hill 75 during the afternoon was none the less a serious blow to the Allies. The effect was to drive in the junction of the French 9th corps and the British 1st cavalry division so that when the lines were eventually rejoined they formed an angle more acute than a right angle. This accentuated the weakness of the salient round the city, and it was highly desirable to straighten the line.

The natural defences of the ridge had been utilised by the Germans with great skill, and they had hidden their machine guns and placed their wire entanglements in such a manner that artillery fire was least effective against them. The French troops, who counter-attacked with the greatest gallantry, found themselves on ground that had been almost untouched by shell fire. In the end they were swept away by hundreds and, although they advanced time and time again, heroism alone was powerless to carry the position. In 1917 the ridge was eventually recaptured by the British, but only after months of mining preparations and an enormous expenditure of gun ammunition. In their victorious advance then the British troops came upon lines of skeletons so neatly arranged that it seemed as though they had been placed there by the hand of man. But to some of these gruesome relics tattered rags of red and blue cloth were still clinging, and thus, after almost three years, it was realized for the first time with what magnificent courage the French troops had attacked in 1914 and with what a terrible reception they had been met.

Apart from the capture of Hill 75 the Germans had not attempted to attack the Allied line elsewhere. Heavy shelling was directed on the trenches held by the British 1st division, and

the cannonade increased during the day. The heavy fire to which they were subjected compelled some of the battalions under Lord Cavan to retire to the shelter of the woods on the west face of the ridge.

During the night of November 5-6 a series of long needed reliefs was carried out. Ten battalions of the 2nd corps, which had come out of the line at La Bassée on October 31 and had been resting since that date, took over the section held by the remnants of the 7th division. The stirring story of this division has been recounted in the previous chapter; it had been engaged in continuous fighting for over four weeks on an extended front which its diminishing numbers were less able to defend. Almost without rest it had engaged refreshed and superior forces of the enemy and endured the strain of continual bombardment. Repeatedly it had flung back massed charges of the Germans. Once or twice its line had swayed under the appalling pressure, but never had it broken. Its morale had never been shattered, and although it had lost over 60 per cent of its effectives it remained to the end a perfectly disciplined and reliable unit of the British army. When at last its worn and haggard survivors marched painfully away from the trenches which the division had held so unflinchingly, its fighting powers were almost exhausted, but its fame was immortal.

The Allied line in front of Ypres on the night of November 5 ran as follows: To the north of Bixschoote the French 38th division supported the territorials originally in the line. Bixschoote itself was again in German hands, and General de Mitry, who was defending this angle of the salient, had had to be reinforced against the strenuous attacks the Germans continued to make at this point. East of the village the French 9th corps continued the line in a slight southward curve through Langemarck to a point east of Broodseinde. From there the British 2nd division held the eastern face of Polygon Wood, but after the loss of Reutel the south corner of the wood had fallen to the Germans. At this point there was a dent in the British line, which was continued southwards by the reformed battalions of the 2nd corps under generals Shaw, Gleichen, and McCracken. Between Zwartelen and Klein Zillebeke Lord Cavan's force and the remnants of the 3rd cavalry division in reserve filled the gap. South of Klein Zillebeke General Moussy and the French 32nd and 39th divisions of the 16th corps carried the line as far as

General Allenby's cavalry at Hill 75. Between Wulverghem and Frelinghien on the Lys the cavalry and the 4th division of the 3rd corps defended the face of Ploegsteert Wood. Beyond the river the remainder of the 3rd corps and the Indian troops under Sir James Wilcocks held the line in front of Armentières and round La Bassée, where contact was made with the wing of the French 10th army.

Opposing these formations were still the German 4th army to the north of Ypres and the 6th to the south, with Fabeck's army group between. Numerically the Germans had still an advantage, but their enormous superiority in artillery was more valuable than several army corps.

It is clear from this sketch that the position round Ypres had altered very little since the lines were first formed about October 20. The chief change was in the south, where Messines ridge had fallen to the Germans. In the centre the Allied line had been pushed back, the successive salients which had been formed at Kruseik and Gheluvelt having passed to the attackers. But the general effect of their loss had been materially to straighten the whole line and thus to get rid of the worst features of the southern re-entrant in the salient which, by November 5, had almost ceased to be apparent. In fact, with the falling back of the French line over Messines ridge, the dent which there had always been at Hollebeke became almost a bulge. To that extent the Allied line was the stronger. North of the Ypres-Menin road the Germans had gained some ground as far as Polygon, but beyond that the British and French, particularly at Broodseinde, had succeeded in securing a slight advance. To the west of that village the line was almost unchanged.

The two points of weakness now were Messines ridge and Bixschoote, the latter being the more dangerous. As always, a break through at that point would have meant that the troops east of the city would be taken in the rear. Upon the continued resistance of de Mitry's cavalry and territorials the successful defence of the Ypres salient depended.

By November 6 the Allied commanders appear to have reached the conclusion that the German offensive was ended. General Dubois was, in fact, notified that the Flanders area of operations had lost a great deal of its importance now that the lines had become stabilized and that it was proposed to withdraw troops from his 8th army for service on another front.

Luckily for the Allies the Germans showed their hand before the withdrawal began. With the failure of the attack on Arras and the flooding of the Yser front, the only point left through which they might hope to reach Calais was Ypres. Here, moreover, they had registered more success in the shape of ground won, small as it was, than anywhere, and as the salient still presented obvious weaknesses they were further persuaded that the initial endeavours had only to be persevered with in order to make a break. The continual artillery fire which they had directed on the Allied line since the cessation of serious infantry attacks on November 2 had been designed to keep up the pressure and allow the wearied French and British troops no rest. The occasional infantry attacks, particularly along the Hollebeke section, had also been made to further that end. Meanwhile, new concentrations had been planned. The Yser inundations had released considerable numbers of the 4th army for service elsewhere, and many of these were drafted as reinforcements to the Fabeck army group. A second group was rapidly formed from troops brought from the south, under General von Winckler, and in all, far from preparing to abandon their attacks, the Germans assembled six new divisions and considerable additional artillery strength for their continuance.

The attack on Messines ridge on the 5th was the prelude to the more serious affair that was to follow. The heavy artillery fire on the British centre was simply a preparation, the brunt of the attack falling once again along both sides of the Ypres-Comines canal. At this point, it will be remembered, the wing of the French under General Moussy made contact with Lord Cavan's force. A little to the south round St. Eloi, General Olleris and the 32nd division were stationed. Here it was that the German attack first got going, and in a thick fog the Germans pushed the French out of Hollebeke Woods. An inexplicable panic seized the French battalions, and before they were rallied and led back by Olleris in person almost a mile of ground had been lost. This retreat exposed the right wing of General Moussy, and in the result the attack upon him just afterwards was devastatingly successful. About 3 o'clock, after a severe bombardment under which the French had suffered heavily, their line was suddenly pierced in three places and attacked on the exposed flank. In great disorder they fell back on Zillebeke, leaving a wide gap in the Allied line, and although by magnificent coolness

the British troops on the French left swung back their flank and prevented the Germans from enfilading the whole of the British trenches, the gap still remained. The Germans poured through and reached Hill 60 within one and a half miles of Ypres, actually nearer the city than General Haig's headquarters at Hooge château.

The situation was critical, but was saved by the prompt action of Lord Cavan, who flung Kavanagh's brigade across the path of the oncoming Germans. The 1st and 2nd Life Guards, with the Blues in reserve, advanced on Zwartelen. General Moussy had by this time collected his few reserves, and, sword in hand, he led them to the charge on the right of the British cavalry. The village was carried and the French rallied, sweeping on into the woods beyond. A pause and the Frenchmen pushed on towards their old trenches. A terrible fire met them from the entrenched Germans, and once again they were forced back, closely pursued by the enemy. For several minutes there was a scene of wild confusion on the road, for the British Life Guards had been deployed across it. French, British and Germans were inextricably mixed up, and in the wild fighting that ensued there were many casualties. Lieutenant Colonel Wilson of the Royal Horse Guards and Major Hugh Dawnay of the 2nd Life Guards were killed, together with 17 other officers and 78 men.

General Haig had been seriously alarmed by the threat to his flank which the retreat of the French had occasioned, and had ordered up sections of his artillery with instructions to check the advance of the Germans on that front. The guns proved effective, and as the French rallied before Zwartelen was reached a second time, the position was saved.

Elsewhere during the 6th, except for an attack on a regiment of Zouaves in front of the British position to the north of Gheluvelt, which after an initial success was repulsed, the day had passed fairly quietly. But the wedge driven between the French and British along the canal was a serious threat to the safety of the whole line. A counter-attack was imperative, and the French offered Haig the assurance that their former line would be recovered. General Moussy's troops, reduced to half their numbers, were insufficient to hold the increased length of line which the dent made by the German attack had produced. But, for one reason or other, no reinforcements were sent him during the night.

The British wing had, however, been strengthened, and on the morning of the 7th made two splendid counter-attacks which, while they did not win much ground, diverted the attention of the Germans from the French and permitted the latter to move forward a considerable distance without opposition.

Lord Cavan had realized that the position required immediate remedy, and before daylight had attacked the German trenches south of his position. In this he was assisted by Kavanagh and the 7th cavalry brigade, and for a time the attack was successful. The Germans were speedily reinforced, and were found to be strongly entrenched. The failure of the French to cooperate prevented much more being done, and Kavanagh eventually retired to save useless loss of life. Farther east greater success had attended the spirited attack of Lawford's 22nd brigade, which rushed the first line of German trenches and succeeded in holding them all day. Their flanks were in the air, since no French support was forthcoming, and after nightfall the brigade retired. Captain Vallentin of the South Staffs was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross for his gallantry in leading this attack.

In spite of the disappointing failure of the French to reinforce Moussy and enable him to advance, much of the ground lost on the previous day was recovered. In the south the French materially atoned for their failure to move round the canal by pressing their attacks on Wytschaete and Messines and pushing their line forward more than a little. North of Le Gheer the Germans attacked in a heavy fog and succeeded in forcing their way into Ploegsteert Wood. Repeated counter-attacks failed to do more than hold up the advance, and it was not until evening that a charge of the Inniskilling Fusiliers and the East Lancashires robbed the Germans of most of the ground they had won. This was the first occasion since it had gone into this line that the 4th division had given way, and the men were correspondingly eager to restore their line to its original position. Desperate attempts were accordingly made to drive the enemy from the two or three houses in Le Gheer, which were all that were left to him of his earlier gains. These efforts, however, were unsuccessful, the Germans holding on with grim determination and great courage.

The only two other attacks during the day were delivered on the British 2nd division north of and round Polygon Wood. Both were beaten off, although in the earlier attack the sudden

rush of the Germans carried them into the British trenches, from which they were only expelled after a fierce hand-to-hand encounter.

A similar series of rather futile and disconnected attacks scarcely worthy of detailed mention was delivered throughout the 8th, 9th and 10th. Nothing was gained by these German sorties which, although conducted with great courage and enterprise by the troops, were seldom pushed home. Heavy shelling continued each day, the policy of the Germans apparently being to wear down the defenders of the salient by every possible means. Little change was recorded as the result of the three days' fighting. Le Gheer still remained in German hands, the dent along the French front by the canal was corrected; in the north Dixmude was lost on the 10th. A critical situation began to develop along the northern angle of the salient, for as well as Dixmude the Germans gained further ground all along the line to Bixschoote. It was learnt by the French on the 10th that several German divisions had been moved north, and it became clear that the Germans were about to try to achieve at Bixschoote what they had failed to achieve near Hollebeke. Fears were felt for the safety of the line, especially when it became known that the Prussian Guard was moving up from Arras. Its destination was thought to be the Bixschoote-Langemarck section, and General D'Urbal began to assemble all his available reserves behind the threatened point.

South of Langemarck nothing of any importance had happened to show that the position on the German side had radically altered. Actually, extensive changes had occurred, the most significant of which was the arrival of a composite corps of the Prussian Guard. This famous corps, which had suffered so terribly in the marshes of St. Gond and had elsewhere borne the brunt of most of the fighting in which von Kluck's 2nd army had been engaged, was still a magnificent body of men. Thirteen battalions from the 1st and 4th brigades were ordered from Arras to Ypres to lend that stiffening to the attack of the line troops which often achieves so much. Their destination was not Langemarck but Gheluvelt, and they were to be pitted not against the French but against the right wing of the British 1st corps, where the newly marshalled battalions from the 2nd corps under generals McCracken, Shaw, and Gleichen, which had been together put under the command of General Wing, were stationed.

The German strategy was simple. One more attack was to be delivered on the Ypres salient, and, while the 4th and 6th armies and Fabeck's army group pressed forward all along the line with their whole strength so as to pin the Allies in their trenches, the two new corps formed opposite Gheluvelt under generals Winckler and Plettenberg, stiffened by the Prussian Guards, were to strike with all their weight on the unsupported centre and seek at long last to smash through the resistance which had for so long delayed the German advance. In fact, the fierce attacks delivered in the north on November 10 were a premature expression of that attack. Originally timed for the 10th it was postponed until the 11th as preparations in the south were incomplete.

The night of the 10th-11th passed quietly, the Germans giving no hint of their intentions. The skill with which they had executed their preparations, massed their artillery and brought so many new units into line, all unsuspected by the Allies (except in the north), was truly remarkable. Certainly no special warnings of the likelihood of a heavy attack were issued to the divisional commanders along the Allied front. But just after daylight a hurricane of shells, more violent than any before experienced, smote the British trenches. Accustomed as they were to German methods, the troops found in this an adequate warning of the coming attack. Reserves were marshalled, artillery was brought up and the strong points were manned. For the troops in the front line there was nothing to do except to crouch in their inadequate trenches while the rain of shells beat upon them.

All along the line the fire was heavy ; but the attack itself was a failure. The exhaustion of the German troops was almost complete, and only in three places along the nine-mile front did they advance with any real determination. It would seem that the new troops alone possessed the spirit or the power to respond to the general order to attack. The danger point, as was to be expected, was the Menin road, the objective of the Prussian Guard; but a break was made in the line at the old weak spot, the canal at Hollebeke, which for a time threatened danger.

Here once again the Germans pushed in Moussy's weak centre, and the troops on either wing were exposed to flank attacks. The French line held stubbornly, although the Germans pushed to within less than 3,000 yards of the city, but Lord Cavan's force on the left had a hard struggle. At one moment they were

threatened with envelopment, but a fierce counter-attack relieved the pressure. By the end of the day the line was still secure and much of the ground lost earlier had been re-won.

Some heavy fighting occurred along the front of General Wing's force, but the steady fire of the British troops broke up the attacks before they became dangerous, and although they were renewed from time to time the danger only became serious when the Prussians broke in farther north. But the line held its trenches all day, and at night had not lost a yard of front. On the extreme left the Fusilier battalion of the German 2nd Guard Grenadier regiment forced their way across the line into Veldhoek Woods, but were brought up by the reserve trenches. The struggle was for a time very fierce, the Prussians, although disorganized and surrounded on three sides, holding their ground until they were practically annihilated. The remnants were driven from the woods at the point of the bayonet, and all but a few yards of front line trench recovered. Thus at one of the points at which the Guards pierced the Allied line they had only succeeded in winning a few yards of trench at the price of the almost total loss of one of their best battalions.

But it was farther north of the Menin road that the great attack came. The section of the Allied line behind Reutel had suffered rather more heavily from bombardment than any other. Not only was the gun fire more intense, but the sighting from Reutel spur had enabled the German gunners to direct their pieces with greater accuracy. To avoid loss, many of the British troops from the 1st division had been withdrawn from the front line trenches. In consequence, the speed at which the Prussians advanced carried them across the line in two places before the 1st division had time to man its positions once again.

The advance of the Prussian Guard was of that steady and quietly courageous type which always stamps the seasoned soldier and lifts him head and shoulders above the impetuous and nervous bravery of the recruit. The Guards advanced along the Menin road and across the country to the north of it in long lines, their officers, sword in hand, at their head, the men with their rifles at the port. At first they moved at a jog trot, but as the terrible fire with which they were met thinned their ranks with sickening speed, they steadied themselves and slowed into their famous parade march, the goose step. Here was no wild and enthusiastic rush followed by as sudden a halt. The advance

MEN OF THE INFLEXIBLE RESCUING SURVIVORS OF THE GNEISENAU. The German battle cruiser Gneisenau was sunk at the Falklands battle, and only 94 officers and men could be rescued from the icy water by the British battle cruiser Inflexible.

H.M.S. Canopus, the British battleship which fired the first shot in the battle of the Falkland Islands.

Cribb

The British armoured cruiser Monmouth sunk in the battle of Coronel, November 1, 1914.



The German armoured cruiser Scharnhorst sunk on the Falkland Islands, December 8, 1914.

SHIPS OF THE CORONEL AND FALKLANDS BATTLES

Friedrichshafen, an important Zeppelin depot during the war, seen from the harbour entrance on the Lake of Constance.

Count Zeppelin designed the airships named after him.

Admiral Tirpitz, head of the German navy 1903-16.

Bethman-Hollweg, German chancellor at outbreak of war.

Cribb

The British light cruiser Bristol which on August 23, 1914, engaged the German cruiser Karlsruhe, south of Bermuda, and took part in later fighting.

ZEPPELIN BASE, GERMAN LEADERS AND THE BRISTOL

Sir Arthur Barrett, opened the Mesopotamia campaign.

Sir John Cowans, quartermaster-general.

Sir David Henderson, head of the Royal Flying Corps.

Admiral Tyrwhitt, was in command of destroyer flotillas.

General Dobell, conquered Cameroons, September 1914.

Admiral Troubridge, figured in Goeben incident

Admiral Keyes, fought at Heligoland.

Commander Holbrook, first naval V.C.

Captain Max Horton sank cruiser Hela.

Sir Nevil Macready, adjutant-general to the forces.

Adolphe Max, burgomaster of Brussels, imprisoned by Germany.

Abbas II, khedive of Egypt during the period 1892–1914.

MEN OF RENOWN IN LAND, SEA AND AIR FORCES

Photos, Elliott & Fry, Lafayette and Russell

continued with the steadiness of a wave, broke inexorably over the British trenches, and swept evenly onwards towards Polygon Wood.

But the Guards were pitted against foemen worthy of their steel. Although the British 1st division had temporarily been swept back before the weight of numbers and the impetus of that disciplined advance, it rallied on its second line defences. Once again the speed with which they fired and their perfect marksmanship began to have their effect. Whole rows of the Guards fell as though cut down by a scythe, and although they still moved steadily on, closing up their ranks, the Prussians lost the perfect symmetry of their order. Bad leadership also contributed to their failure, no one apparently being quite clear as to what was to be done now that the British line was broken. They hesitated and turned left and right with the intention of enfilading the troops on their flanks. But these troops had thrown their wings back with admirable sang froid as the Guards advanced, and the latter found themselves practically surrounded. By this time the British artillery had got the range, and the Germans were rapidly being torn to pieces under the incessant rain of bullet and shrapnel.

Finally the barrage which was skilfully put up behind them paralysed the columns of infantry which should have supported them. Human endurance could stand no more, and that steady advance was halted. Well for the Allies that it was, for by then the Guards had thrust through all lines of defence and were actually engaging the field artillery almost hand to hand. There were no reserves available, and if they had won through those extra yards nothing lay between them and Ypres.

The tragedy of the situation from the German point of view was graphically portrayed by a wounded officer who was taken prisoner. He asked where the British reserves were, and disbelieving the answer, which had been a wave of the hand towards the guns, inquired what was behind them. He was told "divisional headquarters." Sinking his head on his knees he murmured simply, "God almighty!"

The farthest advance of the Germans had been achieved through the wood known as Nonne Boschen, south-west of Polygon Wood and just in front of the hamlet of Westhoek. In this wood the Prussians took shelter while the rain of lead continued. Their position was made worse by a miscalculation on

the part of the German artillery which was shelling the wood heavily. By this time the other points of the attack had been repulsed, the Germans in Nonne Boschen being the only enemy still behind the British lines. Their retreat was by now seriously threatened and the pressure on their front and flanks was increasing. When finally the Oxfordshire Light Infantry, supported by the Northamptonshires, rushed the wood, the famous Prussian Guard broke, the remnants that were left falling back to the trenches they had won. A blinding rain and hail storm and the intervention of nightfall prevented the British counter-attack from being driven home, and resting content with the ground that had been re-won the tired British troops dug themselves in where they stood.

The great attack had been beaten off, and the Prussian Guards had failed. That their failure was glorious cannot be doubted; but they had been pitted against men who were in every sense their equals. The characteristic coolness of the British regular no less than his brilliant marksmanship had worn down the iron discipline of Germany's finest troops. Nothing can prove the calm and self-possession of the British troops on that day of crisis more clearly than the following story. When the situation was at its blackest, the Prussian Guard being almost through, imperative orders were sent to the British troops on the right of the advance that at all costs they must hold on and on no account leave their trenches. This was the laconic reply: "No intention of quitting our trenches, but what about our rations?"

After the repulse of the Prussian Guards the Germans appeared to be exhausted. Spasmodic attacks were delivered on the 12th, particularly at the old danger point along the canal. Once again General Moussy's troops were forced back, once again Lord Cavan's position was threatened, once again British troops moved to the support, and once again the weary French line rallied magnificently. One memorable incident stands out on this day, Lieutenant J. H. S. Dimmer receiving the V.C. for conspicuous gallantry. In face of an overwhelming attack he continued to work his machine gun unaided, although he was three times wounded, and did not cease firing until the gun was destroyed.

After November 12 the southern part of the Ypres salient remained comparatively quiet for three days. On the 15th part of the Guards' division again advanced against Wing's units along the Menin road; but the sting had been taken from their attack,

and although they managed to get a machine gun through the British lines and penetrated some 500 yards, holding their position until daylight next morning, they were eventually dispossessed of all their gains except for some fifty yards of trench. The same day the 15th corps had again attacked General Moussy, but the weary troops had lost most of their initiative and failed to carry their attack home.

During these last days the German attacks against the French 9th corps had been much more serious affairs. With the loss of Dixmude on the 10th a slight dent was made in the French line, and the difficulties of holding the position to the south became correspondingly greater. Bixschoote was the centre round which the fighting raged most fiercely. From Dixmude to Bixchoote the line was held by Bidon's territorials and de Mitry's 2nd cavalry corps. Throughout the early stages of the great battle these troops had clung to their positions with fine courage, beating back attack after attack of the new German formations of the 4th army. No fewer than four divisions, the 22nd, 23rd, 26th and 27th tried to force the line near the village, and after the inundation of the Yser front had released the Württemberg troops, they, too, were flung upon the thin French line.

The village itself was defended by Zouaves from Dubois' 9th corps. The magnificent defence they made of that danger point —the defence the whole French corps made of the northern line of the salient—was the rock upon which the British in the south relied. Time and again Dubois was assailed, but his own difficulties never prevented him from helping his Allies on his right. Only by the intervention of Moussy and his battalions sent to the danger point round Hollebeke was the British line saved at the moment of supreme crisis on October 31. Dubois had unfailingly proved his willingness to help by lending battalions to the sorely pressed 7th division on numerous occasions. But his greatest service was in holding his line. Had the Germans been able to cut it at Bixschoote, whether they would have broken through to Calais or not, they could have cut off the British 1st and 4th corps in front of Ypres and annihilated them.

Thus for the French as for the English Ypres has become memorable. The defence which the Zouaves made of Bixschoote is worthy to rank with the stand of the 7th division. The village became an inferno in which were burned the bodies of French and foe alike. Neither side dared penetrate its confines, so

fiercely was it shelled; but the Germans never pushed beyond it. The crisis was reached between November 10-15, when the attacks of the Germans continued day and night. On one day alone three German regiments, that is 9,000 men, were exterminated, and 3,000 of their comrades the day after. At one time the struggle continued without intermission for two days, only point-blank rifle fire finally thrusting the Germans back.

After the 15th the fighting died down. Here, as elsewhere, the Germans were completely exhausted by their efforts. The Allied line seemed impregnable, and the winter conditions which had descended on the front made any new offensive impossible. The wearied troops were drafted eastwards, the luckier ones for rest, the unluckier ones for Russia, and the Germans began to dig themselves into the ground they had won at such cost.

On the Allies' side preparations were made for the winter warfare. For the first time there was opportunity for the construction of properly protected trenches, and the enormous line of intricate ditches which already reached from Switzerland almost to the North Sea was continued along the Ypres front. British and French reinforcements had arrived, and the valiant remnants of the Allied troops which for four weeks had held back the flood of German invasion were withdrawn from their stations and sent to seek sadly needed rest and refitment.

Sir John French summarized the action as follows:

> The value and significance of the rôle fulfilled since the commencement of hostilities by the Allied forces in the West lies in the fact that at the moment when the eastern provinces of Germany are in imminent danger of being overrun by the numerous and powerful armies of Russia, nearly the whole of the active army of Germany is tied down to a line of trenches extending from the fortress of Verdun on the Alsatian frontier round to the sea at Nieuport, east of Dunkirk (a distance of 260 miles), where they are held, much reduced in number and morale, by the successful action of our troops in the West.

CHAPTER 29

Coronel and the Falkland Islands

WHEN Admiral von Spee with the German Pacific squadron left Kiao-chau in August he sailed for the western coast of South America and established his coaling base in the Galapagos Islands. He detached two of his light cruisers, the Emden and the Karlsruhe, the former to become the terror of the Indian ocean, and the latter to the South Atlantic, while with him remained two armoured cruisers, Gneisenau and Scharnhorst, each of 11,000 tons and a speed of 23 knots. They each mounted eight 8.2 in. and six 5.9 in. guns with eighteen 21 pounders. The three light cruisers left with him were the Dresden of 3,600 tons, the Nürnberg of 3,400 tons and the Leipzig of 3,200 tons, each mounting ten 4.1 in. guns. Both the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau had a great reputation for good shooting.

The British squadron under Sir Christopher Cradock consisted of the armoured cruiser Good Hope of 14,000 tons, completed in 1902, carrying one old 9.2 in. gun forward, and a similar 9.2 in. gun aft, together with sixteen 6 in. guns of an old pattern; the lighter Monmouth of 9,800 tons, completed in 1903, whose main armament was fourteen 6 in. guns of an old pattern; and a light cruiser, the Glasgow, launched in 1909, and armed with two 6 in. and ten 4 in. guns of the new type. The auxiliary vessel Otranto was a liner of the Orient company that did not count as a fighting unit. Attached to his force was the old battleship Canopus, dating from 1897, and though her 12 in. guns were impressive, her speed—at best 15 knots—made her useless in an action against ships of 22 knots.

Thus the Germans had sixteen 8.2 in. modern guns, against which the British admiral had only two antiquated 9.2 in. guns. In a broadside action there would be eight German guns against two British, as eight of the German guns would be on the opposite side of the ships. Admiral Cradock seems to have put these facts before our Admiralty early in October, and to have asked for reinforcements. Early in October he had been ordered to search for the enemy, and he could see no prospect of doing this

without further strength in speed and guns. On October 31 a telegram was sent from the Admiralty telling him that the Defence was to join him, and that meantime he was not expected to act without the Canopus. The telegram arrived too late: he was already at sea.

While cruising round Cape Horn, Cradock learnt that the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were coming over from the Pacific islands to join up with the Leipzig, Dresden and Nürnberg, after escaping from the Australian squadron. The Glasgow went on ahead to Coronel on the Chilean coast, scouted there for the enemy's cruisers, and left about nine o'clock on the morning of Sunday, November 1, to rejoin the flagship, the Good Hope, the Monmouth and the Otranto. The order was then given for the squadron to spread out fanwise to a distance of about 15 miles, and to search for the enemy. At 20 minutes past four in the afternoon the Glasgow sighted smoke, and made out four cruisers steaming in line ahead, two big armoured cruisers leading and two three-funnelled cruisers following. Von Spee was concentrating for battle. The British light cruiser was chased, and informed her flagship by wireless of the presence of the enemy.

An hour or so afterwards the Good Hope came up with the Monmouth and Otranto, the Glasgow joined them, and the squadron formed in line ahead. At a quarter to six the German squadron, possessing the advantage in speed as well as in guns, came up along the coast at a distance of twelve miles from the British ships. The Scharnhorst led, followed by the Gneisenau, Leipzig, Dresden and Nürnberg. At 6.18 p.m. Admiral Cradock signalled the Canopus, some 250 miles away: "I am going to attack the enemy now." His last message to his squadron just after the action began was: "There is danger. Do your utmost."

The German ships were steaming along the coast with the light of the setting sun playing on them. The British ships were silhouetted upon the skyline, and as Admiral Cradock closed about 6 to 6.40 p.m., the sun sank, leaving the German ships in shadow against the coast, whilst the British vessels were still more clearly outlined upon the western afterglow. The German admiral waited till the light further failed upon the coast, making his ships half invisible; then at a range of about seven miles the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau opened fire with their heavy guns.

Their first salvo fell over the leading British ships, and with rapid and deadly shooting the Germans got home on the Good

Hope and Monmouth. The growing darkness and the heavy spray of a head-sea made the main-deck guns of the old British cruisers almost useless. In fact, the Monmouth with her 6 in. guns could not get close enough to the enemy to do any damage. At the third rapid salvo of the twelve 8.2 in. German guns, both the Monmouth and the Good Hope were on fire forward, and the forward 9.2 in. gun of the Good Hope was disabled.

As the British ships tried to bring their 6 in. guns into range the Germans bore away. Having a higher speed, they controlled the situation from beginning to end. In ten minutes after the action opened the Monmouth sheered out of the line to westward, still being hit heavily. Her foremost casemate was in flames, and she had a decided list. She came back again into line and swerved out again eastward, with her gunners still working heroically at their outranged guns. The fires were soon got under, but both ships were quickly flaming again. After the Good Hope caught fire a second time, she was seen to be unmanageable. She was evidently trying to steer towards the enemy by means of her propellers, so as to use her torpedoes. She fell more and more out of line to eastward, burning brightly forward, and thus making a clear target in the growing darkness and heavy sea. At 7.50 p.m. an explosion occurred amidships. Her funnels went up in the air, and the flames rose to a height of 200 feet. So near was she to the enemy that some men in the Glasgow thought it was the German flagship that had been blown up.

Sir Christopher Cradock and his crew were instantly killed. Cradock rushed upon destruction with the hope of getting a torpedo home even in the heavy sea. From the very beginning of the action he knew that his position was hopeless. In the meantime the Monmouth was badly down by the bow and reeling under the German salvos. She became unmanageable at the same time as the Good Hope, and gradually left the line of battle. At eight o'clock the Glasgow was the only ship left fighting in the British line, with the armoured cruisers and light cruisers directing their fire at her at a range of less than 5,000 yards in some cases. Over 600 shells were fired by the Germans at the light cruiser, which, being unarmoured, should not have been in battle line against armoured vessels. But by a miracle she escaped. Only five shells struck her at the water line, but on three of these occasions her coal bunkers saved her.

The Monmouth, no longer firing, steamed off to the north-west, but then fell off to the north-east. The Glasgow asked her if she could not steer north-west, but she replied, "I want to get stern to sea as I am making water badly forward." At 8.30 p.m. the enemy's ships were seen approaching under the rising moon, sweeping the horizon with their searchlights. They soon discerned the Monmouth astern of the Glasgow, and opened fire. For 15 minutes the Glasgow stood by with the enemy closing round at a distance of 6,000 yards, after which, seeing that nothing could be done, she steamed away to join the Canopus. At 8.50 the Glasgow lost sight of the German vessels, but half an hour afterwards her look-out observed the play of a searchlight and 75 flashes of gun fire. This was the final attack on the Monmouth. The Nürnberg, which hitherto had taken no part in the fight, came upon the helpless ship in the dark. The Monmouth had a list of ten degrees and so could not reply to the Nürnberg's withering fire. The Nürnberg actually ceased firing for three minutes to allow her to surrender, but the flags were still flying as she sank under the next salvos at point blank range. No attempt was made by the Germans to pick up survivors. The Otranto and the Bristol, realizing the futility of a further engagement, made off at full speed to the westward.

The situation in the southern Atlantic after the victory of von Spee was very serious. It was open to him to paralyse South American shipping, or even to cross the ocean and start operations around South Africa. Oddly enough, he made little use of his opportunities, and remained inactive; but his victory had stung the British Admiralty into action.

Lord Fisher settled in his own mind the point the Germans would make for. The next move was to obtain an admiral, and ships of higher speed and power than the Germans, without attracting attention of enemy spies. All unknown to the world, Vice-Admiral Sir Frederick Doveton Sturdee, the chief of staff,

left his desk in Whitehall, hoisted his flag on the battle cruiser Invincible, and accompanied by the sister ship the Inflexible, stole out of home waters.

Secrecy was the essence of the design. He had to take the two battle cruisers some 7,000 miles across the world at a high speed, cutting across trade routes without being observed. If once the presence was reported in the Atlantic of two modern British battle cruisers supposed to be working in the Mediterranean and the North Sea, the enemy's wireless system of communication would spread the news to the German operators in South America, and they would pass it on to the Scharnhorst. Orders were sent to the eastern coasts of Central and South America calling to the warships there—the Cornwall, Kent, Carnarvon and Bristol—to go south and concentrate on the Falkland Islands. There the remnant of Admiral Cradock's squadron, the Canopus and the Glasgow, had gathered to defend the wireless station and the coal and oil stores.

Possibly some of these movements were communicated by German spies to von Spee, who was coaling at an island off Chile. It may have been intended that the admiral should believe that if he went to the Falklands he would have to fight only the Carnarvon, Cornwall, Kent, Canopus and Glasgow. For except the Canopus, with her four old 12 in. guns, none of these ships had anything to match the guns of the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. The Kent and Cornwall were sister ships to the Monmouth, with only 6 in. guns. The Carnarvon had four 7½ in. guns, but of an old pattern and less range than those of the enemy.

As the Admiralty had foreseen, von Spee resolved to make for the Falkland Islands. The prospect was so inviting. First of all the British Admiralty, in spite of its general superiority of three to two in units of naval power, was—apparently—allowing him again to fight with all the odds on his side. In addition to the hope of winning another easy victory, the Falkland Islands themselves were a lure to the German admiral. A couple of thousand British settlers, mainly Scotsmen, rear sheep on the chill, windy pastures, and keep a store of coal for steamers plying round Cape Horn and through the Straits of Magellan. The Falklands are the southernmost outpost of the Empire, and its wireless station forms an important link.

The destruction of the wireless station would make it easier for the German admiral to prey upon British merchant shipping.

The coal would replenish his colliers and enable him to extend the fighting range of his cruisers, and the fact that an important British crown colony like the Falklands had been captured and plundered by German warships would be another severe blow to the prestige of the British empire.

In the early days of December the German squadron rounded Cape Horn, and on the morning of Tuesday, December 8, the hills of the Falklands were sighted on the skyline. Von Spee detached two cruisers to explore the islands and discover if any British warships were sheltering there. The cruisers steamed towards Port William and Port Stanley, in the great landlocked, hill-girdled bay on East Island, and discerned only the Canopus on guard, with an oldish cruiser—the Kent—coming out. This was what the admiral expected. Orders were given for the squadron to steam up towards the wireless station. As the five warships approached the Canopus opened fire. The Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau came on together, in advance of the Nürnberg, Leipzig and Dresden. These three light cruisers had to keep well out of range of the old battleship's 12 in. guns, their task being to tackle the Glasgow when she appeared, and to protect the two German colliers and the armed liner Prince Eitel Fritz lying farther out to sea.

The two heavy-gunned German ships arranged to mass their fire on the Canopus, but, as they were drawing up to reply to the first salvo of the Canopus, the Glasgow, Carnarvon and Cornwall came out of the bay. This did not alter the plan of the German admiral. He still manœuvred his two principal ships so as to concentrate their big guns on the old British battleship. At the same time he ordered the Leipzig to come into action and help to keep off any British light cruiser anxious to try torpedo tactics. Then at 9.20 in the morning he drew his ships up in a new battle-line about ten miles from the harbour. It was headed by the Gneisenau, with the Dresden next, then the Scharnhorst, Nürnberg and Leipzig. What the Germans were asking for was a running fight, in which the old slow Canopus and her consorts could be outmanœuvred by their speedier opponents.

All the while the two great modern British battle cruisers, the Invincible and Inflexible, were coaling behind the screening heights of the bay. Sir Frederick Sturdee had arrived the day before—just in time. At half-past seven on Tuesday

morning the crews began to fuel, and half an hour afterwards the approach of the enemy was reported from the signal station. The cruiser Bristol was also fuelling, but she could not raise steam in time. For two hours the German ships were lured on by a display of inferior power, and the fighting crews of the battle cruisers sat down to breakfast, while their stokers and engineers got up steam. Then, as the last ready British cruiser left the harbour, making as much smoke as possible, the Invincible and Inflexible came through the smoke. This happened at 9.45 a.m.

Von Spee at once saw that he had been trapped. He turned his ships about and went off at full speed. But everything was against him—even the weather. The Falklands are a rainy, misty spot. But on this tragic winter day the sea was calm and the air clear, and the fire-control officers in their fighting tops had an unusually clear view over the ocean. Only mist and stormy weather would have given the Germans a chance of escape. As it was, the British admiral had the faster ships, the longer range, and marksmanship weather.

At first he steamed out in his flagship the Invincible, with the Inflexible and Carnarvon in line behind him and the Kent, Glasgow and Cornwall in another line. These last three cruisers were, however, going under 24 knots, and the battle cruisers had to reduce speed to keep in touch with them. About 12.30 p.m. the British admiral increased the pace of his two chief ships to 28 knots, and leaving the Carnarvon, Kent and Cornwall behind, closed and opened fire on the rearmost German vessel from a distance of nine and three-quarter miles.

Von Spee then recognized that it was hopeless to attempt to run away; so his flagship, the Scharnhorst, turned broadside on and engaged the British flagship, the Invincible, and the Gneisenau turned broadside to the Inflexible. The three German light cruisers fell out of the battle-line and scattered for the nearest neutral port, pursued by the Kent, Cornwall and Glasgow. The Carnarvon followed the battle cruisers, to assist in case of difficulty. The two lines of ships steamed parallel to each other in a long curving course, the British vessels keeping the parallel very wide, and veering away when the enemy tried to narrow the distance. For, naturally, Sir Frederick Sturdee struck with his 12 in. guns at a range where the German 8.2 in. shells had no penetrative power and the enemy's torpedoes

failed to carry. He was using his superior speed and gunfire against Count von Spee as the latter had used his similar advantages against Sir Christopher Cradock. The range was only 13,500 yards at 1.30 p.m., but in half an hour it increased once more to 16,450 yards.

The Germans tried one manœuvre. A wind was getting up, and they steered their ships so as to get their line of fire clear, while the smoke was blown in the way of the British gunners. Sir Frederick Sturdee wheeled his flagship and consort round, and at a little loss of time came up on the other side of the

enemy. This occurred about half-past three in the afternoon, and the Scharnhorst was then on fire.

Sir Frederick Sturdee signalled von Spee, asking him if he would surrender. But the Germans died game. At 4.17 p.m., after a running fight of three hours, the Scharnhorst went down by the stern, with the admiral's flag at the maintruck and the crew in the bows. The Invincible went at once to the help of the Inflexible, and the 12 in. guns of the two battle cruisers were thus massed against the Gneisenau. The weather had now become thickish with a rainy mist, and as the short winter day was drawing in a quick result was needed. The Gneisenau fought on very gallantly in an absolutely hopeless condition till

she was battered into a ghastly wreck. About six o'clock she suddenly listed to port and slowly dived down.

The Inflexible, Invincible and Carnarvon went full speed towards the patch of discoloured water marking where the enemy had disappeared. On coming up close the British crews saw the floating wreckage with men clinging to it. All the boats were lowered as quickly as possible, and with the searchlights blazing round they picked up the swimmers. Sailors were also lowered down their ships' sides on bowlines to haul up the survivors as they drifted past. But the winter sea was deadly cold, and many of the Germans were drifting, dead or unconscious, in the water, 600 having been killed or wounded.

Of the 115 men picked up by the Invincible, 14 were already dead, and all were numb. The Inflexible saved about 70 and the Carnarvon a few more. The British casualties were very slight. On the Invincible, only the commander was slightly wounded. On the Inflexible one man was killed and three wounded.

There was more of the old romance of naval warfare in the single fights between the scattered light cruisers on both sides. When von Spee broke his line of battle, the Kent, the Cornwall and the Glasgow pursued the Dresden, Nürnberg and Leipzig. The duel between the Kent and the Nürnberg was long and exciting. For the German ship had at least one knot more speed than the older and more heavily armed British cruiser. The chase began at noon, and the action did not open until five o'clock in the afternoon. Captain Allen, of the Kent, appealed to his engineers and stokers, asking them to achieve the apparently impossible. It was the Nürnberg that had sunk the Monmouth by a torpedo, and then left her crew to drown. The Kent was sister-ship to the Monmouth, and all her men were eager to avenge their dead comrades. But their 14 6 in. guns could not come into play unless the slow Kent overhauled the lighter ship. By forcing her fires with everything inflammable they actually pushed the old Kent for a time to go a knot faster than she had ever done in the days of her prime.

At the end of five hours the Nürnberg came within reach of the Kent's 6 in. guns. A few salvos of common shell set her on fire, and then the lyddite shells began to fall thick and fast on her. In broad daylight the Kent, having guns of a longer range, would have been able to sink the Nürnberg without herself being

struck, for the Nürnberg had only 4 in. guns. But when the action opened darkness was setting in, and to get a quick finish the Kent closed with her opponent, shooting at the gun-flashes showing through the rain, mist and obscurity. The result was that the British ship was hit in twenty-one places. One shot nearly wrecked her in the moment of victory. The shell set a casemate on fire, and the flames went down into an ammunition passage where there was a heap of charges. But a Royal Marine rushed through the flames, flung out a charge of cordite, and, turning a hose on, put out the fire. If he had not at once flooded the charges the Kent would have been blown up.

At about half-past six the Nürnberg ceased firing. Flames were bursting out in the region of her conning-tower—a vital spot. But as the Kent came up quite close, thinking the action was over, and preparing to send a boat, it was seen that the German flag was still flying. A salvo from the Kent's starboard guns very quickly brought the flag down. The whole of the conning-tower and forebridge was flaming, with a strong wind fanning the roaring fire. Many of the crew jumped and swam towards the British ship, and at 27 minutes past seven the fiery wreck turned over and sank.

The boats that remained on the Kent were badly holed and splintered, and by the time they were patched and got in the icy water most of the Germans had become numbed and unconscious. To add to the horror of the scene, a large flock of albatrosses swooped down and attacked the men clinging to the wreckage and so tortured them that the pitiable creatures let go of the floating woodwork and sank. Only 12 men were picked up, and of these five died from exhaustion.

In the former battle off Coronel the light cruiser Glasgow seriously damaged the Dresden, and only hit the Leipzig once, while suffering badly from her fire. At the battle off the Falklands she singled out the Leipzig. The Glasgow had two 6 in. and ten 4 in. guns against the ten 4 in. guns of the Leipzig; and, having an account to settle with the German ship, she so worked her superior armament that at the end of a two-hours' running fight she had already given her old rival the death-blow. Then the slower Cornwall came up and joined in. The two ships raked the Leipzig fore and aft, till the upper deck was a shambles. After she burst into flame and stopped firing the two British ships steamed round and round her out of torpedo

range. For, as she still kept her flag flying, they thought she was waiting to put a torpedo into them, and there were several explosions that seemed like gun fire. So the Glasgow asked the Cornwall to sink the defiant enemy.

As a matter of fact, the 150 surviving crew had fallen in, waiting for the British ships to come and save them. The fire was so bad they could not get to their flag to haul it down. When the Cornwall opened fire she killed most of the crew. Then, at nine o'clock at night, the stricken ship gave three slight heaves to port and turned completely upside down, sinking with a hiss of steam and bubble. Only five officers and 13 men were picked up out of the 368 men that had begun the action.

Of the German warships, the Dresden escaped, which was the one regrettable incident in the affair. The Bristol could have caught and fought her, but she had no steam. She was, however, able to capture and sink the German colliers. The first shot was fired by the Canopus at 9.5 a.m., and the battle ended with the sinking of the Leipzig at 9.15 p.m. The British battle cruisers fought at last while going at a speed of 30 knots. As the old Canopus could barely do 16 knots she took no part in the fight that extended 300 miles beyond her moorings.

As it was, Vice-Admiral Sir Frederick Doveton Sturdee, who, as chief of staff at the Admiralty may have been partly responsible for the forces put at the disposal of Admiral Cradock, had at least the satisfaction of avenging the Good Hope and the Monmouth. Sturdee appears to have fought the Falkland Islands action rather more cautiously than might have been expected in the circumstances. On the other hand he had achieved his victory with inconsiderable damage to men or ships, so that the Invincible and Inflexible were sent back to the Grand Fleet unharmed, and ready for immediate action. The net result of the fight was that the command of the outer seas had definitely passed to the Allies, and Britain was free to throw practically the whole of her sea strength into the main theatre of war. This engagement off the Falkland Islands, admirably conducted, left the Germans with nothing but one or two stray light cruisers at large.

CHAPTER 30

V.C. Heroes of the War—(I)

DURING the Great War some 626 officers and men were awarded the Victoria Cross. As it is impossible to describe each individual act of bravery that won the coveted bronze cross, it has been decided to present our readers with a running narrative, beginning with the first Awards in August, 1914, and ending with the close of hostilities in November, 1918. For clearness the story of the V.C.'s is grouped according to the years of the war, and in consequence the present chapter somewhat outstrips the chronological sequence of the history as detailed in Volume One. Despite this it will be found that our account of the glorious deeds of British soldiers, sailors and airmen presents a continuous and connected story.

As is fitting in services which have behind them a long and terrible renown, there are many honours open to the men of the British navy, army and air force; but among these honours one stands out conspicuously as the most coveted distinction which soldiers and sailors, officers and men alike, can win. Needless to say, we refer to the Victoria Cross.

The Victoria Cross has not the value which comes with years—the kind of value, for instance, which makes the Order of the Garter so coveted a distinction—for it was only instituted in January, 1856, during the progress of the Crimean War. It is given, as the simple words inscribed on it say, "for valour," which must be shown by some signal act of heroism or devotion in the presence of the enemy. It is intended to reward, not ordinary courage, but the merit of conspicuous bravery, and the man who wins it has passed the supreme and final test to which heroes are subjected. Bacon must have anticipated it when he wrote "there is an honour, likewise, which may be ranked among the greatest, which happeneth rarely; that is, of such that sacrifice themselves to death or danger for the good of their country."

The value of the cross is increased by the fact that it is not given at all freely or indiscriminately. From 1856 to the

outbreak of the Great War, a period of 58 years, less than 550 men received it, and during that time our soldiers were fighting in every quarter of the world; for, more than any other service, our army is entitled to claim the Latin line which asks the rhetorical question on which lands has our blood not been shed, and which Sir John Fortescue has aptly chosen as the motto for his History of the British Army. There was first the Crimean War, then the Indian Mutiny, with its deeds of incredible heroism, and then fighting in China, Abyssinia, Canada and Ashanti. In 1879 there were wars against the Zulus and the Afghans, in 1881 against the Boers, and in 1882 there was the first of several campaigns in Egypt.

Add to these the struggles on the Indian frontier, the advances into tropical Africa, the expeditions into Burma, and finally the Boer War of 1899-1902. A long list of fights, thousands of brave deeds done, and yet less than 550 Victoria Crosses awarded. No wonder that we think a great deal of a V.C., for although many have deserved it, and have not received it, yet it is certain that those few who have won it have given ample proofs of their valour, and that no words can properly describe their deeds of daring. Rightly we recognize that the honour bestowed upon them is among the greatest given to mortal men. They are in spirit kinsmen of the 300 Spartans who fell at Thermopylæ, and of the Swiss who died at Morgarten.

The cross itself is a bronze Maltese one, an inch and a half across. In the centre is the royal crest, the lion and the crown, and below it a scroll on which are the words, "for valour." It is suspended from a bronze bar, on the back of which is engraved the name, rank and corps of the recipient. The ribbon, once red for the army and blue for the navy, is now crimson for all services. Money can add nothing to an honour of this kind, but every non-commissioned holder of the cross is entitled to a pension of £10 a year.

As we have already said, the cross, unlike some other distinctions—the Distinguished Service Order, for instance—can be won by soldiers and sailors, officers and privates alike. The official words are that it is open to "every grade and rank of all branches of his Majesty's forces, British and Colonial." Until 1911 Indian soldiers were not eligible for it, as they had their own Order of Merit; but since then they have been on an equality with their brothers-in-arms in this respect.

During the first year of the Great War, the period between August 4, 1914, and August 4, 1915, the Victoria Cross was given to 82 officers and men. It is not easy to say how many men were fighting at one time or other during the twelve months, but as our casualties for the year were something like 400,000 it cannot have been much less than 1,500,000. If so, it was gained by about one man in every 18,000 or 20,000. Really a few more crosses were won during the year, but as they were not announced until after August 4, 1915, they do not come within the scope of this chapter. Moreover, they do not affect the broad conclusion that extraordinary gallantry and devotion are necessary to win the honour, and that it is bestowed most sparingly.

It may be well, first of all, to examine the list of the 82 recipients of the cross in some detail. In the first place we should say that 76 went to the army, four to the navy, and two to the Royal Flying Corps, although many of us are inclined to agree with the private's remark that every one of our airmen deserved one. However, this may also be said about a great number of soldiers and sailors, and we may be quite sure that the 82 names under consideration are by no means the only ones who earned the Victoria Cross for valour "in the presence of the enemy" during the first year of the Great War.

The navy is the senior service, so we will first of all deal with the four naval officers who won the V.C. The first was Commander H. P. Ritchie, of H.M.S. Goliath, who was a member of the naval force which was operating off the coast of German East Africa in the autumn of 1914. In August Dar-es-Salaam, the German capital, had been bombarded, and later it was again visited by British warships. In November a landing party was sent ashore for the purpose of searching the place and demolishing certain buildings, a dangerous operation in view of the fact that Germans were lurking about. Commander Ritchie led this party, and while superintending the work of his men he was severely wounded, not once but several times. However, he kept to his duties, "inspiring all by his example," until in about 20 minutes he received his eighth wound and became unconscious. On April 10, 1915, he was awarded the V.C.

The other three naval V.C.'s were all won by the commanders of submarines in the Dardanelles and the Sea of Marmora. On December 13, 1914, before the land attack on the

Turkish positions was undertaken, Lieutenant N. D. Holbrook, in command of the B11, entered the Dardanelles, and, notwithstanding the very difficult current, dived his vessel under five rows of mines and torpedoed the Turkish battleship Messudiyeh. More difficult still, he brought back his boat in safety, although he was attacked by gun fire and torpedo boats, which compelled him on one occasion to remain submerged for the long period of nine hours.

Holbrook's feat was a pioneer one, and it found emulators after the British army had landed in Gallipoli. On April 27 Lieutenant Commander E. C. Boyle, in charge of the E14, took his submarine beneath the Turkish minefields in the Dardanelles and entered the Sea of Marmora. There, or in the strait, he sank two Turkish gunboats and one large military transport in spite of the difficulties arising from strong currents, and "of the continual neighbourhood of hostile patrols and of the hourly danger of attack from the enemy."

The third of these naval heroes was Lieutenant Commander Martin E. Nasmith, who, a little later, took a submarine into the Sea of Marmora. Like Boyle's, his bag was a big one, for he destroyed one large Turkish gunboat, two transports, one ammunition ship and three storeships, in addition to driving one storeship ashore. He did this " in the face of great danger; and, moreover, after he had safely passed the most difficult part of his homeward journey he returned again to torpedo a transport."

A mournful interest belongs to the two airmen who won the Victoria Cross during the year, for both Rhodes-Moorhouse and Warneford lost their lives, one at once and the other a little later. On April 26, 1915, Second Lieutenant W. B. Rhodes-Moorhouse flew to Courtrai and dropped bombs on the railway line there. In this there was nothing very exceptional, for other airmen had done the same; but on the return journey he was mortally wounded. In spite of his wounds he flew to his destination, 35 miles away, made a perfect landing, drew up and handed in his report, and then on the next day died in hospital. "Eye-Witness," in describing this deed, implied clearly that if he had thought more of himself and less of saving his machine and finishing his work, he might have descended earlier and saved his life. On May 22 the Victoria Cross was bestowed upon him—or rather upon his memory.

The second airman was Flight Sub.-Lieutenant R. A. J. Warneford, who, on June 7, 1915, performed the unparalleled feat of destroying single-handed one of Germany's raiding Zeppelins. It appears that Warneford was flying along when he sighted the monster, somewhere on the coast of Flanders, possibly returning from its heroic task of throwing bombs upon unprotected women and children. He pursued it to Ghent, and having risen above it he dropped his bombs, and, moreover, dropped them accurately. A violent explosion followed, and the Zeppelin was quickly blazing from end to end. The concussion was so great that Warneford's aeroplane was overturned and the engine stopped, but he managed to right it and dropped down to earth to take stock of the position. Although he was in the enemy's country he flew away unobserved and reached his base safely.

This was a wonderful feat, the most remarkable deed of bravery and skill accomplished in the first year of the war. The nerve required to drop bombs accurately at a height of 6,000 feet and to recover from the shock of the explosion is as wonderful as the courage which inspired one man in a tiny monoplane to attack a gigantic airship, and the skill which enabled him to avoid its fire, and finally to send it, one huge cinder, hurtling to the ground. By telegram the king congratulated Warneford and bestowed upon him the V.C., while General Joffre recommended him for the Cross of the Legion of Honour. On June 11 the former distinction was announced in The London Gazette, but six days later Warneford—the only living airman wearing the V.C.—was killed while on a practice flight in Paris. His body was brought to England, and thousands who a few weeks before had never heard the hero's name, paid their respects to it on its journey to the tomb.

A special place even among brave men belongs to the five who gained the Victoria Cross under the new conditions of modern warfare—in the air and in the sea. In a strange and unknown element, amid a loneliness quite as terrible as that of which Coleridge speaks in "The Ancient Mariner," in charge of vessels filled with all the new and awful mechanism of death, they went gaily forward, with the simple object of doing their duty to their country. They discharged their tasks, and more than that, they proved that Britons were equal to the demands of the new warfare, demands which tax brain and body, nerve and muscle, as they were never taxed before.

We must now turn to the deeds of the soldiers who won the Victoria Cross, and these 76 are, after all, the staple of the story. The six naval and flying men were all officers, but among the military ones, non-commissioned officers and men were in the majority, and almost every rank was represented. Of the 76 soldiers, 26 were officers and 50 non-commissioned officers and men. Among the officers the list is headed by a lieutenant colonel—the heroic Doughty-Wylie. Two majors—Alexander, of the artillery, and Yate, of the Yorkshire Light Infantry—are on this roll of honour, and so are nine captains. Ten lieutenants, three second lieutenants, and one jemadar complete the 26. In addition to the jemadar, two of the lieutenants belonged to the Indian Army. Among the 50 non-commissioned officers and men, three were sergeant majors, two sergeants, six corporals, 11 lance corporals, one colour sergeant, and 17 privates. The remaining ten consisted of a lance sergeant, a bombardier, a bandsman, two drivers in the artillery, two drummers—Kenny and Bent—and three Indian soldiers—a naik, a rifleman, and a sepoy.

The 76 may be divided in several ways, but perhaps the most interesting is to apportion them among the various corps and regiments. As one would expect, the largest number belonged to the infantry of the line, the officers and men upon whom the brunt of the fighting falls. Thirty-eight out of the 76, or exactly one-half, were in this class, and with the five Guardsmen, they made a total of 43 for the regular infantry. Of the remainder, eight belonged to the artillery, five to the engineers, and two—Grenfell, of the 9th Lancers, and Garforth, of the 15th Hussars—to the cavalry. Eighteen remain to be accounted for, and of these six belonged to the Indian Army, three to the Canadian, and one to the Australian contingent. The Canadians were Scrimger, Hall, and Fisher, and the Australian was Jacka. The remaining eight were two members of Sir Ian Hamilton's staff—Doughty-Wylie and Walford—two members of the medical corps, and last, but by no means the least noteworthy, four members of the Territorial Force. Of these, three—Woolley, Belcher, and Keyworth—belonged to the London Regiment, a fine record for a young unit.

Of the infantry, the Highland Light Infantry holds the proud record of having won three Victoria Crosses during the first year of the Great War, the three recipients being Lieutenant Brodie

and Private George Wilson of the 2nd Battalion, and Lance Corporal W. Angus of the 8th, a territorial one. Several famous regiments can claim two Victoria Crosses during the period. Among these are the Gordon Highlanders—Lieutenant Brooke and Drummer Kenny, both of the 2nd Battalion, and the Black Watch—Ripley of the 1st Battalion, and Finlay of the 2nd. The Royal Fusiliers—Lieutenant Dease and Private Godley of the 4th Battalion, and the East Surreys—Lieutenant Roupell and Lance Corporal Dwyer of the 1st Battalion, belonging to the metropolitan area, and the King's Royal Rifle Corps—Dimmer and Mariner, both of the 2nd Battalion, and the Rifle Brigade—Daniels and Noble, both of the 2nd Battalion, belonging to the south of England, show that the Scottish regiments have no monopoly of these honours. Other parts of the country are represented in the list by the Manchesters—Leach and Hogan of the 2nd Battalion; the Sherwood Foresters—Rivers and Upton of the 1st Battalion; the Yorkshire Light Infantry—Yates and Holmes of the 2nd Battalion; and the Border Regiment—Acton and Smith of the 2nd Battalion.

Sixteen other regiments had each one of the V.C.'s in their ranks. These included the Welsh Regiment, the Royal Welsh Fusiliers, the Royal Irish Fusiliers, the Cameron Highlanders, the Cameronians, and the Royal Scots. The remaining ten are English: Lancashire Fusiliers and East Lancashires, Leicesters and Lincolns, Hampshires and Bedfords, Liverpools and South Staffordshires, Yorkshires and Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry. Of the five Guardsmen who won the cross two—Barber and Fuller—belonged to the Grenadiers, and one each to the Coldstreams (Dobson), the Scots (Mackenzie), and the Irish Guards (O'Leary).

Of the eight artillerymen who won the cross three—Alexander, Bradbury, and Reynolds—were commissioned officers, and five were not. The famous L Battery of the Royal Horse Artillery had three of these heroes in its ranks—Captain Bradbury, Nelson, and Dorrell, and the remaining five belonged to the Royal Field Artillery—Captain Reynolds, Luke, and Drain to the 37th Battery, Major Alexander to the 119th, and Bombardier Harlock to the 113th. The five engineers were all officers, save one—Lance Corporal Jarvis. The four officers were Captains Theodore Wright and W. H. Johnston, and Lieutenants Philip Neave and C. G. Martin, D.S.O.

CROSSES WON AT MONS

Among the heroes of the field of battle doctors occupy no mean place, and during the year two members of the Royal Army Medical Corps, commonly known by its initials as the R.A.M.C., won the V.C., these being Captain H. S. Ranken and Lieutenant A. M. Leake. The latter deserves a very special mention, for he won the Victoria Cross on two occasions. During the Boer War, on February 8, 1902, Lieutenant Leake was shot while assisting a wounded officer, an action which was rewarded by the V.C., so when he won it again in 1914 he was granted a clasp to it. This honour was unique, at least during the first year of the Great War. In addition to these two, one of the three Canadian V.C.'s—Captain F. A. C. Scrimger—was a medical man, so this service should rightly count three. Of the 76 Victoria Crosses won by soldiers, 72 were gained in Flanders and the remaining four in Gallipoli.

"The British forces were engaged all day on Sunday and after dark with the enemy in the neighbourhood of Mons." This short but deeply interesting message, issued on the afternoon of Monday, August 24, 1914, showed that the British army, after an absence of 100 years, was again fighting over the scenes of many of its former glories, and it was not long before officers and men began to show their traditional valour. On the very first day of actual fighting four Victoria Crosses were won. On that August Sunday afternoon the Germans were advancing in great force against the canal which runs from Mons to Condé, and along which the British troops were stationed. To prevent them from crossing, the engineers were ordered to blow up the bridges, and while preparing one of these for destruction, Captain Theodore Wright was wounded in the head. However, he stuck to his task, and after the first fuse had failed to act, he prepared another, which was instrumental in bringing down the bridge.

Hard by, at Jemappes, Lance Corporal C. A. Jarvis was working at a similar task. For an hour and a half, in full view of the enemy and under heavy fire, he continued to prepare charges, and at last he was rewarded by seeing the bridge shattered. On November 17 the Victoria Cross was awarded to these two engineers, but by that time Wright was dead, killed while adding to his laurels. At Vailly, on September 14, he assisted a brigade of cavalry to cross the Aisne by a pontoon bridge, and was there mortally wounded while helping some wounded men into shelter.

To return to the fighting at Mons. About St. Ghislain, somewhat to the west of Mons, the 4th battalion of the Royal Fusiliers was posted, its duty, or part of it, being to hold the approaches to one of the bridges which cross the canal. At that spot were some machine guns in charge of Lieutenant M. J. Dease, who, although badly wounded two or three times, continued to direct their fire. He did this until all his men had been shot, and later he himself died from his injuries. Dease was assisted by Private S. F. Godley, who stuck to his work for two hours after he had been wounded, and in November the V.C. was awarded to the two.

On this same day a fifth cross was partly won. At Harmignies Corporal C. E. Garforth, of the 15th Hussars, volunteered to cut some wire under fire, and in this way he enabled his squadron to escape. His deed was noted, and so was the fact that a little later, at Dammartin, he carried a wounded man out of action. Finally, on September 3, Garforth saved the life of a sergeant whose horse had been shot, by his coolness in opening fire on the enemy, and so giving his comrade a chance to escape. For these gallant acts the king gave him the Victoria Cross on November 17, the day on which the first awards for valour during the Great War were made.

On Monday, the 24th, the British army was retreating from Mons, and high courage was more than ever necessary. Near Andregnies the 9th Lancers were ordered to charge the advancing German infantry in order to assist the 5th division, which was hard pressed by the enemy. The Lancers rode on, only to find themselves held up by barbed-wire and a target for the German guns. They lost heavily, and the remnant of the regiment found shelter under a railway embankment, Captain F. O. Grenfell being the senior officer left, and he somewhat severely wounded. In the same refuge were some gunners belonging to the 119th field battery, which had been put out of the action and abandoned. Grenfell determined to save the guns, and called upon the Lancers and the gunners to assist him, and after having at the greatest risk discovered for them a way into safety, he and his men rushed out. Under heavy fire they pushed the guns into safety, for the horses had all been shot, and for this act of daring Grenfell received the V.C. Some months later, on May 24, 1915, he was killed while his Lancers were doing duty as dismounted men in the trenches.

This same 119th field battery, which was commanded by Major E. W. Alexander, had already distinguished itself on the 24th. It was stationed near Elonges, and although attacked by an enormous force of Germans the guns were saved, being pulled out of danger by hand by the major and three of his men. The work of this battery greatly assisted the retirement of the 5th division, enabling it to be carried out without serious loss. Major Alexander, who had handled his battery against overwhelming odds with conspicuous success, somewhat later rescued a wounded man under heavy fire. He was given the V.C. on February 18, but before that date he had been made a lieutenant colonel.

The 25th passed away, and then came the 26th, which Sir John French described as "the most critical day of all," the day of Le Cateau and Landrecies. At 3.30 in the afternoon, to avoid complete annihilation, the 2nd army corps, under Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, commenced to retreat, after having fought a fierce rearguard action at Le Cateau in order to enable the 1st corps to get safely away. This movement was covered by the artillery, which held up the German advance as long as possible. On one occasion the enemy got to within 100 yards of two guns of the 37th field battery, but at enormous risk Captain Douglas Reynolds, aided by two volunteers—Drivers J. H. C. Drain and F. Luke—rushed up with two teams of horses, and although under heavy fire managed to drag one gun away. In November the three were awarded the V.C. It should be added that on September 9, at Pisseloup, Captain Reynolds performed another act of gallantry. There the men were advancing, although a hostile battery was keeping some of them back. Reynolds discovered its position by creeping near to it, and then turned his guns on the battery and silenced it.

Of the two divisions, the 3rd and the 5th, which composed Smith-Dorrien's corps, the 5th was the last to leave its position, and among its units was the 2nd battalion of the Yorkshire Light Infantry. Two companies of this battalion remained in the hastily dug trenches at Le Cateau on the 26th, when practically everyone else had got away, and at length all the officers save one had been killed or wounded, all the ammunition expended, and only 19 men were left. The single unwounded officer was Major C. A. L. Yate, and, forming up the 19 survivors, he led them against the enemy. It was a supreme act

of gallantry, but perfectly hopeless. Yate was severely wounded and was taken prisoner by the Germans. Happily, it was stated later that he had not died of wounds, as was at first reported. During this battle Lance Corporal F. W. Holmes, of the same regiment, carried a wounded man out of the trenches under heavy fire, and later assisted to drive a gun out of action by taking the place of a wounded driver. Like Major Yate, he received the V.C. on November 25.

After the 26th the first fury of the German attack had spent itself, but there was a good deal of hard fighting before the French and the British turned upon their pursuers and drove them back from the gates of Paris. On September 1, for instance, when the L battery of the Royal Horse Artillery was resting at Nery, it was surprised by a hostile force, and before the guns could be brought into action three of them had been destroyed. However, the other three opened fire upon the superior batteries of the enemy, but soon two of them had been silenced, and only 40 of the 200 remained.

Under the lead of Captain E. K. Bradbury the gunners continued to serve the one sound gun, and when he had been wounded Sergeant Major G. T. Dorrell and Sergeant D. Nelson kept up the fire until all the ammunition was gone, although only 600 yards away the Germans were pouring in a concentrated fire from guns and machine guns. In the nick of time a body of British cavalry and infantry arrived on the scene, and the battery, or what remained of it, was saved. Captain Bradbury, who died of his wounds, was given the V.C. on November 25 for his "gallantry and ability in organizing the defence of L battery against heavy odds," and the two non-commissioned officers received the same honour on the 17th, and were also promoted to commissioned rank. Like Captain Bradbury, Sergeant Nelson was severely wounded, but happily he recovered, although he had stuck to the guns after having been ordered to retire into safety.

On September 13 the Allies, having won the battle of the Marne, began the crossing of the Aisne in pursuit of the retiring Germans. At Missy two British brigades, the 11th and the 15th, had got across the river though their position was very precarious, and but for the exertions of one man they would have been compelled to retire. This man was Captain W. H. Johnston, R.E., who worked with his own hands two rafts across

the river, taking back thereon the wounded and returning with ammunition for the harassed brigades. He did this throughout the whole day, and was deservedly awarded the Victoria Cross on November 25. Some time later Johnston was killed.

This battle of the Aisne extended over a wide front, and on the 14th three more Victoria Crosses were won. On the right of the British line, forming part of the 1st division, was the 2nd battalion of the Welsh Regiment, and one of its captains, Mark Haggard, took a prominent part in leading the men forward. At length he fell mortally wounded, and, seeing this, Private William Fuller rushed forward for about 100 yards, and under a heavy fire carried Haggard into safety. Fuller, by then a lance corporal, received the V.C. on November 23.

Not far from the Welsh Regiment, in the same 1st division were the Cameron Highlanders, and a similar service was performed for an officer of this battalion by Private Ross Tollerton. The bravery and devotion of this soldier were, as the official announcement said, "most conspicuous." While carrying the wounded officer into safety Tollerton himself was wounded in the head and hand, but nevertheless returned to the firing-line and remained with the battalion until it retired. But this was not all. He then returned to the wounded officer, and stayed beside him for three days until the two were rescued.

The name of Ross Tollerton is not perhaps so well known to the general public of Britain as are the names of several other winners of the V.C., but there is hardly one who earned the honour more daringly or more fully. At Verneuil, a little to the left of the Welsh Regiment, the line was held by the 2nd battalion of the Highland Light Infantry, and in its ranks was a certain Private George Wilson. With a comrade Wilson crept forward to silence a hostile machine gun, and after the comrade had been killed he went on alone. He reached the gun, shot the officer and the six men working it, and then captured it.

On the 15th this engagement on the Aisne continued, and near Vendresse the 113th field battery was shelling the Germans, and was being heavily shelled in return. One of its bombardiers, E. G. Harlock, being injured, went away and had his wound dressed, and then returned to lay his gun. A second time the same thing happened, and a second time the bombardier went back from the dressing station to his work. He was made a sergeant, and received the V.C. on November 25.

The battle of the Aisne went on for four weeks, and after the first encounters the combatants betook themselves to trenches. At Hautvesnes, on September 19, Captain H. S. Ranken, of the R.A.M.C., showed conspicuous courage in attending to the wounded when under rifle and shrapnel fire, and on the following day his leg and thigh were shattered while at work. Even after this severe injury he kept to his task, but the strain was too much for him, and another V.C. hero died of his wounds without knowing of the honour conferred upon him on November 17. The last V.C. earned during the battle of the Aisne fell to Lance Corporal F. W. Dobson, of the 2nd battalion Coldstream Guards. At Chavanne, on September 28, Dobson distinguished himself by his "conspicuous gallantry" in bringing into cover on two occasions under heavy fire wounded men who were lying exposed in the open. He received the V.C. on December 9.

At length the battle of the Aisne came to an end, and the British army took up its position on the Yser, where it remained throughout the winter. On October 22 the first battle of Ypres was raging, and the Germans were making their great effort to hack their way through to Calais. Near La Boutillerie there was sharp fighting, and the Cameronians, also called the Scottish Rifles, were suffering severely. Private Henry May volunteered to go forward and save a wounded man: he made an attempt, but the heavy fire killed the injured soldier before his rescuer could reach him. Later in the day May carried a wounded officer into safety, traversing with his burden 300 yards under very severe fire.

The next day, October 23, William Kenny, a drummer in the 2nd battalion of the Gordon Highlanders, won his V.C. He was not a fighting man, so he was employed to carry urgent messages, and on numerous occasions he took these "under very dangerous circumstances over fire-swept ground." But this was not enough for the heroic drummer. Twice he saved the battalion's machine guns by carrying them out of action, and no less than five times, "under heavy fire and in the most fearless manner," did he rescue wounded men. When super V.C.'s are awarded to super-men, Kenny should figure in the list.

During this same battle of Ypres the Germans, on October 29, made a specially severe attack on Sir Douglas Haig's corps at Gheluvelt, and this was momentarily successful, some of our

trenches being lost. However, Lieutenant J. A. O. Brooke, an officer of the 2nd Gordons, kept cool and fearless, and under heavy fire, both from rifles and machine guns, led two attacks on the German position, regaining one of the lost trenches "at a very critical moment." The gallant officer was killed, but a fine memorial to him remains in the announcement which conferred upon him the Victoria Cross. "By his marked coolness and promptitude on this occasion," it says, "Lieutenant Brooke prevented the enemy from breaking through our line at a time when a general counter-attack could not have been organised." The two Gordons, lieutenant and drummer, one alive and the other dead, were among those who received the V.C. on February 18.

Away on the British right there was, on this same October day, heavy fighting around Festubert, where the 2nd corps was stationed. Here, as at Ypres, a strong German attack was successful in capturing some trenches held by the 5th division, and two attempts made by the British to recover them failed. Thereupon an officer, Second Lieutenant James Leach, and a sergeant, John Hogan, of the 2nd battalion of the Manchester Regiment, voluntarily decided in the afternoon to make an effort to recover their lost trench. Working steadily from traverse to traverse at length they reached it, and once there they killed eight of its German defenders, wounded two, and took 16 prisoners. Thus the trench again became British property, and on December 22 Leach and Hogan received the V.C.

Towards the end of October the Indian army corps took its place in the line of battle, and on the 31st the V.C. was won by one of its members—a sepoy called Khudadad, of the 129th Duke of Connaught's Own Baluchis. The Baluchis were at Hollebeke, and the sepoy was one of the men who were working the battalion's two machine guns. One of these was put out of action by a shell, and the British officer in charge of the detachment was wounded, but Khudadad, although wounded himself, worked away at his gun until the five men with him had all been killed. The first award of the V.C. to an Indian soldier for valour during the Great War was granted to Khudadad on December 7.

Near Hollebeke is Le Gheer, where the East Lancashires were making a desperate stand against the innumerable hordes of Germans who came day after day to the attack, and where Drummer Kenny found a rival. On the night of November 1,

perhaps the most critical time in this critical battle, a certain detachment of the East Lancashires lost all its officers. Realising the situation, Drummer Spencer John Bent took command, and, as we are told, "with great presence of mind and coolness succeeded in holding the position." But, like Kenny, Bent was not satisfied with one act of heroism. Previously, on October 22 and 24, he had distinguished himself by bringing up ammunition under a heavy shell and rifle fire, and later, on November 3, he carried into cover some wounded men who were lying exposed in the open. Drums may not be necessary in a modern army, but no army can have too many drummers like Bent and Kenny. Bent's V.C. was dated December 9, 1914.

It was at the same time and in the same neighbourhood that Lieutenant A. M. Leake, of the R.A.M.C., won the V.C. for the second time. Here we may be allowed to quote the official words. He won it for "most conspicuous bravery and devotion to duty throughout the campaign, especially during the period October 29 to November 8, 1914, near Zonnebeke, in rescuing, while exposed to constant fire, a large number of the wounded who were lying close to the enemy's trenches." As the cross could not be given twice to the same man, Lieutenant Leake was granted a clasp to it on February 18, 1915.

We have not yet done with the battle of Ypres. On November 7 it was still raging, and on that day, at Zillebeke, the 1st battalion of the South Staffordshires did splendid service in capturing a German trench. The attack, or at least one attack, was led by Captain J. F. Vallentin, who was shot down, and on rising to continue on his forward way was immediately killed. But his gallantry was not thrown away, because "the capture of the enemy's trenches, which followed, was in a great measure due to the confidence which the men had in their captain, arising from his many previous acts of great bravery and ability." On February 18 Vallentin's memory was honoured by the grant of the V.C.

On November 11 the German emperor made a supreme effort to break the British line. The Prussian Guard, the corps d'élite of his army, was ordered up and sent forward to perform a feat which its comrades had failed to do. In one or two places it succeeded, but, as a whole, the attack was a failure, and this was due, among others, to Lieutenant W. L. Brodie, of the 2nd battalion of the Highland Light Infantry. Heading a charge,

Brodie and his men bayoneted several of the enemy who had occupied a portion of our trenches and recovered some lost ground. A dangerous situation was relieved, and, as a result of Brodie's promptitude, 80 of the enemy were killed and 51 taken prisoners. The two V.C.'s in this fine battalion—Brodie and George Wilson—were fitting comrades.

In the neighbourhood of Ypres the Germans continued their assault, although not perhaps with the fury of the one on the 11th. On the 12th they attacked the British position at Klein Zillebeke, where Lieutenant J. H. S. Dimmer, of the 2nd battalion King's Royal Rifle Corps, was working a machine gun. Although he was hit no less than five times, Dimmer stuck to his post until his gun was destroyed. Very quickly, on November 19, he was awarded the V.C., the last of the eleven earned during the great battle of Ypres. A finer eleven never fought or played upon any field.

During the trench warfare which followed the first battle of Ypres the V.C. was won by a bandsman, T. E. Rendle, of the 1st battalion of the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry. Serving, as bandsmen usually do on the field of battle, as a stretcher bearer, Rendle, on November 20, showed conspicuous bravery near Wulverghem in attending to the wounded under very heavy shell and rifle fire. In addition, he rescued some men from trenches in which they had been buried by the fire from the German heavy howitzers having blown the parapet upon them. Rendle was awarded the cross on January 11.

On November 23 the Germans made a determined attack upon some trenches near Festubert held by the Indian corps. A counter-attack was organised during the night of the 23rd, and in this the 39th Garhwal riflemen, from the northern hills, took a leading part. They cleared the enemy from some of their trenches, and in this work a naik, Darwan Sing Negi, was prominent. Although wounded in two places in the head, and also in the arm, he was one of the first to push round each successive traverse, and he did this in the face of severe fire from bombs and rifles at the closest range. On December 7, the same day as the sepoy Khudadad, he was awarded the V.C.

On the 24th the Indians and the Germans continued their struggle for the trenches, and Lieutenant F. A. de Pass, of the 34th (Prince Albert Victor's Own) Poona Horse, entered a German sap and, in spite of the enemy's bombs, managed to

destroy a traverse. He then rescued, under heavy fire, a wounded man who was lying exposed in the open, and still later on the same day he made a second attempt to take the sap, which had been recaptured by the Germans. While engaged in this deed he was killed, and his name appeared in the "London Gazette" of February 18 among the recipients of the Cross.

On December 14 the 2nd battalion of the Royal Scots assisted some French troops in attacking a German position, and was successful in getting on to the edge of a hill called Petit Bois. Here Private Henry H. Robson of this regiment showed "most conspicuous bravery" in leaving his trench under a very heavy fire and rescuing a wounded non-commissioned officer. Subsequently he tried to save another wounded man, persevering in his attempts until two wounds had rendered him helpless. Five days later, on December 19, there was more fierce fighting in the neighbourhood of Neuve Chapelle and Festubert. Near the former place Lieutenant Philip Neame, of the Royal Engineers, was helping to rescue the wounded. He managed to keep back the enemy, who were firing their rifles and throwing bombs, until he had carried into safety all the wounded who could be moved.

Not far away, at Rouges Bancs, Private J. Mackenzie, of the 2nd battalion of the Scots Guards, was doing similar work. On one occasion a party of stretcher bearers attempted in vain to reach a wounded man. Seeing this, Mackenzie went forward under a heavy fire and carried him back from the very front of the German trenches. A second time on that same day he attempted to perform a like act of gallantry, but on this occasion he was unfortunately killed. The names of Robson, Neame, and Mackenzie were among those upon whom the V.C. was bestowed on February 18.

At Rouges Bancs, two days later (December 21), there were other gallant rescues, and the V.C. was won by two privates—Abraham Acton and James Smith—of the 2nd battalion of the Border Regiment. First of all, the two went voluntarily from their trench and rescued a wounded man who had been lying exposed near the German trenches for three whole days, and later they went out a second time and brought another wounded man into safety. The pair were under fire for an hour, but both returned safely. Their honour was dated February 18, 1915.

The first V.C. won during 1915 was gained by Lance Corporal Michael O'Leary, of the Irish Guards, for one of the most remark-

The British cruiser Cressy sunk by German submarine off the Hook of Holland, September 22, 1914.



H.M.A.S. Sydney, Australian light cruiser which destroyed the Emden, and later served under Admiral Beatty.

The Ariadne, British protected cruiser of 11,000 tons, took part in the battle of Heligoland Bight, August 28 1914, and was torpedoed on July 13, 1917.

THREE NOTABLE BRITISH CRUISERS

THE EMDEN ENDS HER ADVENTUROUS CAREER. The German light cruiser Emden inflicted considerable damage upon British and Allied commerce during the early months of the war. The Emden was driven ashore at North Keeling Island on November 9, 1914, after an action fought with the Australian cruiser Sydney, to which she surrendered.

View of the Menin Road, the famous Belgian highway, showing the devastation caused by the fighting in the Ypres–Menin sector.

Reims figured prominently in the early months of the war, and great damage was caused by German bombardments. The illustration shows the cathedral from the south-west. In the foreground are houses in the Rue de Chanzy, which suffered from German guns.

HAVOC OF WAR IN FRANCE AND FLANDERS



DAMAGED DIXMUDE AND DINANT. These two Belgian towns experienced to the full the ravages of war. Our illustration shows the ruined church of Notre Dame, Dinant, and the bridge blown up by the French in their retreat before the Germans. Seen above is the same view before the outbreak of war. The illustration on the top right of the page is that of the Church of S. Nicholas, Dixmude, after bombardment by the Germans in 1914.

able feats performed during the whole war. It was at Cuinchy, on February 1, when O'Leary was one of a party moving forward to storm the German barricades. When near the enemy he rushed to the front and himself killed five Germans who were holding the first barricade, and then went forward to the second one, which was about 60 yards distant. There he killed three of the enemy and took two other prisoners. This is what the official announcement said on February 18: "Lance-Corporal O'Leary thus practically captured the enemy's position by himself, and prevented the rest of the attacking party from being fired upon." In September O'Leary was given a commission in the Northumberland Fusiliers.

One of the great battles of the war was fought at Neuve Chapelle on March 10, 11, and 12, 1915, and there nine Victoria Crosses were gained. The first was won by an Indian, Rifleman Gobar Sing Negi, like his namesake, a soldier in the ranks of the 39th Garhwal Rifles. During the attack on the German position which opened the battle on the 10th, Negi was one of a party which, armed with bayonets and bombs, entered the enemy's main trench. He was the first man to go round each traverse, and was instrumental in driving back the Germans until they were forced to surrender. During the battle he was unfortunately killed, but on April 28 he received a posthumous V.C.

So much for the 10th, but the fighting on the 12th was fiercer still, and nowhere more so than around Pietre Mill, where were the 1st Grenadier Guards. There Lance Corporal W. D. Fuller and Private Edward Barber of that regiment showed "most conspicuous bravery." In one place Fuller, seeing a party of the enemy trying to escape along a communication trench, ran towards them and, although quite alone, killed the leading man by throwing a bomb. After this the remainder, some 50 in number, finding it impossible to escape, surrendered to him. Barber performed a similar feat in another part of the field. He ran quickly in front of the company to which he belonged and threw his bombs upon the enemy so successfully that "a very great number" of them lost no time in surrendering to him. When the rest of the party came up to Barber they found him quite alone and unsupported with the Germans surrendering all around him.

The throwing of bombs was a feature of this battle at Neuve Chapelle, and Private Jacob Rivers, of the 1st battalion of the

Sherwood Foresters, was one who used them to some purpose on March 12. On the flank of an advanced company of his battalion a large number of the enemy were massed, and seeing this, Rivers, on his own initiative, crept to within a few yards of them and hurled bombs on them. This action compelled them to retire, and consequently relieved the situation. A second time on the same day Rivers went out to perform the feat, and a second time he forced the enemy to withdraw, but on this occasion he was himself killed.

On the same day Corporal William Anderson, of the 2nd battalion the Yorkshire Regiment, prevented "by his prompt and determined action" what might otherwise have become a serious situation. He did this by leading three men with bombs against a large party of the enemy who had entered our trenches. First throwing his own bombs, Anderson then seized and hurled those in the possession of his three companions who had all been wounded. He followed up this attack by firing his rifle with the utmost rapidity at the invading Germans, who, although he was quite alone, did not wait to dispute with him.

Something similar was the exploit by which Lieutenant Cyril G. Martin, D.S.O., of the Royal Engineers, won his V.C. He was in command of six men who formed a party for throwing bombs, and early in the action he had been wounded. In spite of this, however, he led his little detachment into the German trenches and remained there, holding back the enemy's reinforcements, until he was ordered to abandon the captured trench. He had been in it for two and a half hours.

On the afternoon of March 12 the 2nd battalion of the Rifle Brigade was sent forward against some German trenches. Unflinchingly they advanced until they found themselves stopped by wire entanglements and shot down by machine guns. At this moment two volunteers, Sergeant Major Harry Daniels and Corporal Cecil R. Noble, rushed forward and cut the wire, thus allowing the battalion to make further progress. Both were wounded while engaged in this hazardous occupation, and later Noble died of his wounds. The following September Sergeant Major Daniels received a commission. The ninth of the crosses won at Neuve Chapelle was gained by Private William Buckingham, of the 2nd battalion Leicestershire Regiment. The words in which the award was made on April 28 are few but fine. "For conspicuous acts of bravery and devotion to duty in

rescuing and rendering aid to the wounded while exposed to heavy fire, especially at Neuve Chapelle on March 10 and 12, 1915."

The chief incidents on the western front during April were the fight for Hill 60 and the first use of asphyxiating gases by the Germans against the Canadian lines. Before these events, however, Private Robert Morrow, of the 1st battalion Royal Irish Fusiliers, won the Victoria Cross for "most conspicuous bravery." Near Messines on April 12 he rescued and carried to comparative safety several men who had been buried under the debris of trenches wrecked by shell fire. He did this, we were told when the award was made on May 22, "on his own initiative and under very heavy fire."

On Hill 60 three Victoria Crosses were won, two of them by members of the 1st battalion of the East Surreys. In a front trench on the hill, Lieutenant G. R. P. Roupell was in command of a company which was under severe fire during the whole day (April 20). He was wounded in several places, but he remained at his post, and led forward his men to beat back a strong German attack. This success gave the company a brief respite, so Roupell went away and had his wounds hurriedly dressed, but insisted on returning to the front where he and his company were again under heavy fire. As evening drew on the men became fewer and fewer, and the possibility of being driven out became greater, so the lieutenant went back to the battalion headquarters to explain the position, and then brought up reinforcements, "passing backwards and forwards over ground swept by heavy fire." With the assistance of these new men he held the position during the night, and in the morning his company was replaced by another. His heroic deed was thus described: "This young officer was one of the few survivors of his company, and showed a magnificent example of courage, devotion, and tenacity, which undoubtedly inspired his men to hold out to the end."

During the same encounter one of the East Surrey trenches was heavily attacked by bomb throwers. In this predicament Lance Corporal Edward Dwyer climbed out on to the parapet, and although met with a hail of bombs at close quarters, managed to drive away the attackers by the effective use of his own weapons of the same kind. This deed alone was sufficient to win for him the V.C., but earlier in the same day Dwyer had

displayed great gallantry in leaving his trench under heavy shell fire in order to bandage his wounded comrades. In September he received a commission in the Northumberland Fusiliers.

The third V.C. won on Hill 60 was a memorable one, for it was the first ever won by a territorial. The recipient was Second Lieutenant G. H. Woolley, of the 9th battalion of the London Regiment, the one better known as Queen Victoria's Rifles. During the night of the 20th Woolley was the only officer on a certain part of the hill, and of those under him very few were left. Nevertheless, he and they resisted all attacks made on their trench, the lieutenant throwing bombs and encouraging his men through the darkness of that terrible night until they were relieved. During all this time a regular hail of bombs, shells, and shot from machine guns fell upon the trench.

It was three days later, on the 23rd, that the Canadians were attacked near Ypres, and here they won three V.C.'s. Near St. Julien a battery was retreating and was in danger of capture when Lance Corporal Frederick Fisher, realising the gravity of the situation, hurried forward with his machine gun and under heavy fire made it possible for the battery to get safely away. In doing this he lost four of his men, but having obtained four more he went again into the firing line to perform another action of great gallantry. This was to take his machine gun forward in order to cover the advance of a supporting force, but in doing so the brave lance corporal was killed. On the following day, the 24th, a wounded man was lying about 15 yards from a trench in the neighbourhood of Ypres. He was heard calling aloud for help, and a Canadian colour sergeant, Frederick William Hall, tried, with the help of two comrades, to reach him. The enemy, however, was pouring in a heavy enfilading fire, and the attempt failed, the two assistants being wounded. Undeterred, however, Hall tried a second time to rescue the wounded man, and was in the very act of lifting him up when he himself fell mortally wounded in the head. In very truth he gave his life for another.

During this heavy fighting, a Canadian doctor, Captain Francis A. C. Scrimger, the medical officer attached to the 14th battalion of the Royal Montreal Regiment, was conspicuous in rendering services to the wounded, as between April 22 and 25, so we were told, he "displayed continuously day and night the greatest devotion to his duty among the wounded at the front." But this was not all. On the afternoon of the 25th he was in

charge of an advanced dressing station in some farm buildings near Ypres. The buildings were being heavily shelled, and it was necessary to remove the wounded therefrom. This was directed by Captain Scrimger, who himself carried a severely wounded officer out of a stable. Unable to reach a place of safety, he remained with him, both being under fire, until help arrived. The three Canadians were awarded the V.C. on June 23, but Scrimger alone was alive to wear it.

During this same spell of fighting around Ypres the V.C. was won by an Indian native officer, Jemadar Mir Dast, who was attached to the 57th Wilde's Rifles. On April 26 he led his platoon with great gallantry during a German attack, and afterwards, when all the British officers had been put out of action, he collected various parties of the regiment and kept them together under his command until they were ordered to retire. Later in the day the jemadar displayed remarkable courage in helping to carry eight British and Indian officers into safety, while exposed to very heavy fire.

The knowledge that the Germans were using poisonous gases only spurred the British, if possible, to greater heroism, and at the beginning of May two V.C.'s were won by Englishmen in the face of this new and barbarous weapon of war. On the 1st a trench near Hill 60 had just been vacated by the British as a consequence of a gas attack, when Private Edward Warner, of the 1st battalion of the Bedfordshires, entered it alone in order to prevent the enemy from seizing it. Reinforcements were sent forward to help him, but owing to the gas they could not reach the trench, so Warner himself came out to them, and under his guidance they managed to reach it. By this time the hero was completely exhausted, and shortly afterwards he died from the effects of gas poisoning. However, his bravery had saved the trench, for it was held until the German attack ceased.

On the next day Private John Lynn, of the 2nd battalion of the Lancashire Fusiliers, won for himself an immortal name for "most conspicuous bravery" near Ypres. When the Germans were advancing behind their waves of poisonous gas, Lynn, although almost overcome by the awful fumes, worked his machine gun with very great effect against them. At length he was unable to see them, owing to the nearing clouds of gas, so he moved his gun to a higher place on the parapet, and poured a still more effective fire upon them. This heroic action

eventually checked the enemy's advance, and, as we were officially told, "the great courage displayed by this soldier had a fine effect on his comrades in the very trying circumstances." Lynn's superhuman courage cost him his life, for next day he died from the effects of gas poisoning. Over his tomb Napier's immortal words might well be inscribed: "No man died that night with more glory—yet many died and there was much glory."

On May 9 the British forces delivered a successful attack on the German position near Fromelles, and on that day four Victoria Crosses were won. A prominent place in the assault was assigned to a regiment which has a record second to none in the British army—the famous Black Watch, or Royal Highlanders. The Black Watch attacked the enemy near Rue du Bois, and there Corporal John Ripley was leading a section on the right of a platoon. Of the whole battalion he was the first man to mount the German parapet, and, standing there exposed to fire, he pointed out to the others the ways through the gaps made by our artillery in the wire entanglements. This done, Ripley led his section through a breach in the parapet to the second line of trenches, and having reached his objective he set to work to make the position secure. Aided by a few men, seven or eight, he blocked up both flanks, arranged a good position for firing, and continued to defend the captured trench until all his men had fallen and he himself had been badly wounded in the head. About the same time Lance Corporal David Finlay of the same regiment was leading forward a bombing party of 12 men, and he did this with the greatest gallantry until ten of them had fallen. Then Finlay showed the stuff of which he was made. He ordered the two survivors to crawl back into safety, but he himself went forward to the assistance of a wounded man, and carried him for 100 yards under heavy fire, eventually placing him under cover.

Near Rouges Bancs the 2nd battalion of the Lincolnshire Regiment was playing a part in this attack, and there Corporal Charles Sharpe was—unknowingly, of course—emulating Ripley. Being in charge of a party sent forward to capture a portion of a German trench, he was the first to reach it. Once there he threw his bombs with great determination and effect, and in a short time he had cleared all the Germans from a trench 50 yards long. In the end all his men had fallen, but four others came forward to assist Sharpe, and the five made another successful

attack on the enemy, using their bombs with such vigour that they captured this time a trench, not 50 but 250 yards long.

In the same neighbourhood, near Rouges Bancs, was the 1st battalion of the Sherwood Foresters, and there Corporal James Upton of that regiment spent the day in attending to the wounded. As the official account says: "During the whole of this day Corporal Upton displayed the greatest courage in rescuing the wounded while exposed to very heavy rifle and artillery fire, going close to the enemy's parapet regardless of his own personal safety." One man was killed by a shell while in his arms. Moreover, when Upton was not actually engaged in this hazardous duty, he was bandaging and dressing the serious cases in front of the parapet, exposed to the enemy's fire.

The next V.C. was earned by a territorial, like Woolley, a member of the London Regiment, but not in the same battalion, for Lance Sergeant Douglas W. Belcher belonged to the 5th—the London Rifle Brigade. On the morning of May 13 Belcher was in charge of an advanced breastwork near St. Julien. This was bombarded fiercely and continuously by the Germans, and was frequently blown in. Near by some troops had been withdrawn owing to the heavy fire, but Belcher and a few men decided that they would remain and hold the position. This they did, Belcher's "skill and great gallantry" being the soul of the defence, for whenever he saw the enemy, who were only about 200 yards away, collecting for an attack, he opened a rapid fire upon him. This was a very valuable piece of work, for it is practically certain that the bold front shown by Belcher "prevented the enemy breaking through on the Wieltje road, and averted an attack on the flank of one of our divisions."

On May 15 the British had a success near Festubert, and on the 16th several battalions, among them the 1st Royal Welsh Fusiliers, were holding some captured trenches and portions of trenches. In one of these portions was Sergeant Major Frederick Barter, of the Fusiliers, and he called for volunteers from among his company to enable him to extend the line. Eight men responded, and under Barter's lead they attacked the German position with bombs, and captured three German officers and 102 men, as well as 500 yards of their trenches. After this feat Barter found and cut 11 of the enemy's mine leads, situated about 20 yards from each other.

Two days later a lieutenant in the Indian army won the V.C.

near the same place. Some bombs were badly needed at a spot within 20 yards of the German position, and two parties attempted to carry them thither, but failed. Whereupon Lieutenant John G. Smyth, of the 15th Ludhiana Sikhs, with a bombing party of ten men, volunteered for this duty. The ground over which they had to go was "exceptionally dangerous," and on the way eight of the ten were either killed or wounded. However, Smyth and the remaining two struggled on, exposed to the fire of howitzers, machine guns, and rifles, and at length, having swum a stream, they brought 96 bombs to those who needed them.

On May 22 there occurred the gallant deed by which Private William Mariner, of the 2nd battalion the King's Royal Rifle Corps, won the Victoria Cross. A German machine gun had been damaging the parapets and hindering the working parties, and Mariner decided to put an end to the annoyance. Accordingly, at night, while a violent thunderstorm was raging, he crept out of his trench, through the German wire entanglements, and at length reached the emplacement of the gun. He then climbed on to the top of the German parapet, and threw a bomb under the roof of the gun emplacement. Some groaning and running away followed, while Mariner waited in silence.

About 15 minutes later some of the Germans returned, and were greeted with another bomb, thrown into the other side of the emplacement, for Mariner had climbed over there and had thrown the bomb with his left hand. While the Germans fired into the darkness, Mariner lay quite still; but at length, after an hour had elapsed, the excitement died down, and he was able to crawl back to his trench, having been out alone on this work for an hour and a half. As showing his total indifference to danger, Mariner had requested a sergeant to open fire on the enemy's trenches as soon as ever he had thrown his bombs. On June 23 Mariner received the V.C.

Mariner's feat deserves to rank with those of O'Leary and George Wilson as one of the outstanding deeds of the Great War, and so does the next on the list. On the night of May 25 the 24th battalion of the London Regiment, the Queen's, made a successful attack on the German position at Givenchy, and there one of its lance corporals, Leonard James Keyworth, won for that regiment, and for the Territorial Force in general, a third Victoria Cross. It was in this wise. After the assault, 75 men

of the battalion attempted to follow up their success by a bomb attack, and a very fierce encounter took place between them and the Germans, who were only a few yards away. The nature of the fight is shown by the fact that 58 of the 75 Londoners were either killed or wounded. Now for a simple statement of fact: "During this very fierce encounter Lance Corporal Keyworth stood fully exposed for two hours on the top of the enemy's parapet, and threw about 150 bombs among the Germans, who were only a few yards away."

Two more Victoria Crosses complete the 72 won in Flanders, and both these were gained for saving life. On June 12, 1915, Lance Corporal William Angus, of the 8th battalion of the Highland Light Infantry, one composed of territorials from Lanarkshire, was, like Keyworth, at Givenchy. Seeing a wounded officer lying within a few yards of the enemy's position, he voluntarily left his trench and rescued him in spite of very heavy fire from bombs and rifles. He had no chance whatever, we were told, of escaping the enemy's fire when undertaking this very gallant action, and while rescuing the officer he sustained about 40 wounds from bombs, some of them being very serious.

On June 16 another lance corporal, Joseph Tombs, of the 1st battalion the Liverpool Regiment, called also the King's, was near Rue du Bois, where Britons have performed so many gallant deeds. On his own initiative he crawled out of his trench repeatedly, and under a very severe fire from heavy guns and machine guns, he rescued four wounded men who were lying about 100 yards from his trenches. One of these rescues was especially noteworthy, for Tombs dragged the man back to safety by means of a rifle-sling placed round his own neck and the man's body. This heroism and devotion undoubtedly saved his life.

Towards the end of April, 1915, Great Britain and France became involved in a second great campaign, the attack on the Gallipoli Peninsula, and before August 4, 1915, four Victoria Crosses had been awarded for gallantry there, and this was merely a beginning. The first two were gained on that terrible and unforgettable day, April 26, 1915, when the British troops made good their landing on the almost impregnable Gallipoli Peninsula; for, as was truly said, by all the precepts of war they ought never to have got ashore at all. On one of the beaches were a few survivors of the Royal Dublin Fusiliers, Royal Munster Fusiliers, and Hampshires, who had got ashore,

but at a frightful cost. Nearly all the senior officers had been killed and wounded, including the general, but with the remnants of the brigade were Lieutenant Colonel C. H. M. Doughty-Wylie, C.M.G., C.B., of the headquarters staff, and Captain G. N. Walford, a brigade major of the Royal Artillery, and these two realized that something must be done. Accordingly, they organized and led an attack on the hill above the beach, whereon was the village of Seddul Bahr. The Turkish position was very strongly held, was entrenched, and was defended by concealed guns. Nevertheless, the attack succeeded completely, for not only was the village taken, but so were the Old Castle and Hill 141 beyond it. This was mainly due to the initiative, skill, and great gallantry of these two officers, both of whom were killed in the moment of victory.

In this Gallipoli campaign the Australians took no small part, and it is not surprising that one of them, Lance Corporal Albert Jacka, of the 14th battalion of infantry, early gained there a Victoria Cross. It was for most conspicuous bravery on the night of May 19-20, at Courtney's Post. It seems that Jacka and four other men were holding a portion of a trench when they were heavily attacked and the four were either killed or wounded. Seven Turks then rushed into the trench, but they had not reckoned on Jacka. At once he attacked them and killed the whole seven, shooting down five with his rifle and finishing off the remaining two with the bayonet. On July 24 the gallant Australian received the V.C.

In the force which invaded the Gallipoli Peninsula was the 3rd (Special Reserve) battalion of the Hampshire Regiment, and in this was a young officer, Second Lieutenant G. R. Dallas Moor, who had only joined the army in October, 1914. On June 5, 1915, he was in some fighting to the south of Krithia, when he noticed that a detachment on his left, having lost all its officers, was falling back before a heavy Turkish attack, and so was endangering the safety of the whole line. Promptly realizing this, Moor dashed after the retiring men, pulled them up, and then led them forward and recaptured the lost trench.

PERSONALIA OF THE WAR

In each volume we provide concise and authoritative biographical information concerning the outstanding personalities of the war. For clearness and ready reference they are grouped according to nationality. The most suitable section in which to include these biographies is that wherein the subjects figure most prominently. Accordingly, those contained in the present volume have been selected as associated particularly with the narrative of events from the outbreak of hostilities to the end of 1914. Other biographies, for example, Foch, Beatty, Lloyd George, Allenby, and Ludendorff, appear more appropriately in later volumes.

BRITISH

Earl Jellicoe

JOHN RUSHWORTH JELLICOE, first Earl Jellicoe, was born at Southampton, December 5, 1859, the son of Captain J. H. Jellicoe, who was for many years in the service of the R.M.S.P. Co. He was educated at Rottingdean, and entered the navy in 1872. He became a lieutenant in 1880, securing a "triple first" certificate, and served in the Egyptian War of 1882. In 1883 Jellicoe won the special £80 prize for gunnery lieutenants at the R.N.C., Greenwich. Three years later, while serving on board the Monarch, he gained the silver medal of the Board of Trade for gallantry in saving life at sea. On June 30, 1891, he was promoted to commander. He was on board the Victoria when that vessel was rammed and sank, June 22, 1893. Jellicoe commanded a mixed naval brigade in the expedition to relieve the legations at Peking in 1900, being severely wounded.

From 1902-10 he was almost continuously serving at the Admiralty on shore, except for a short term afloat as second-in-command of the Atlantic fleet, 1907-8. He was created a K.C.V.O. in 1907, in which year he reached flag rank. From 1908-10 he was third sea lord and controller. When war became inevitable he was second sea lord and vice admiral in rank; ordered to Scapa, he there received his appointment as commander-in-chief of the Grand Fleet (August 4, 1914) which it had been arranged should be given to him in the event of war. He held that post until November, 1916, when he became first sea lord, having been promoted admiral, March 5, 1915.

On October 30, 1914, Jellicoe drew up for the Admiralty a memorandum, outlining the tactics which he would adopt to defeat the German employment of mines, submarines, and torpedoes. He would aim at fighting in the north portion of the North Sea, and would assume, if the enemy battle fleet turned away, that its intention was to lead him over mines and submarines, when he would refuse to be so drawn. He felt that such tactics, if not understood, "may bring odium upon me, and might be deemed a refusal of battle." This plan was approved by the Admiralty and carried out at the battle of Jutland.

On November 28, 1916, he handed over the command of the Grand Fleet to Sir D. Beatty, and proceeded to London to take up the office of first sea lord, and to organize measures against the German U-boat campaign. In December, 1917, he retired, being succeeded by Sir R. Wemyss, and in January, 1918, he was raised to the peerage as Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa. On August 5, 1919, he received the thanks of the nation and a grant of £50,000 for his war service. Promoted admiral of the fleet in

1919, he made a tour of the empire in that year in connexion with naval defence. Having been governor general of New Zealand, 1920-24, he was created an earl in 1925.

Jellicoe married, in 1902, a daughter of Sir Charles Cayzer, Bart., and had four daughters and a son, the latter born April, 1918. He received the O.M. and the G.C.V.O. after Jutland, and held many foreign orders. In 1919 he published "The Grand Fleet, 1914-16," an account of its work under his command, and in 1920, "The Crisis of the Naval War," a record of the measures taken by him to defeat the submarines and other cognate matters.

A man slightly under middle height, clean-shaven, with alert, grey eyes, strongly shaped lower jaw, high, thoughtful forehead, easy, unaffected, and decisive in speech, Jellicoe was typical of the British naval officer, who is trained seaman and scientific fighter, and devoted body, brain, and soul to the great service to which he belongs.

Lord Fisher

JOHN ARBUTHNOT FISHER, first Baron Fisher of Kilverstone, was born January 25, 1841, at Rambodde, in Ceylon, where his father, Captain William Fisher, of the 78th Highlanders, on retiring from the army, had taken up the life of a coffee planter. He entered the navy on June 12, 1854, on board the Victory at Portsmouth, being the last midshipman to be received into the Service by Admiral Sir William Parker, the last of Nelson's sea captains. He was nominated for this distinction by a niece of Nelson. He saw active service in the Calcutta with the Baltic Fleet during the Crimean war and later in China.

Promoted captain in 1874, he commanded the Inflexible at the bombardment of Alexandria, 1882. He landed there with the naval brigade, and was the adaptor of the armoured train, which he commanded in several engagements, receiving the C.B. for his services. In February, 1892, he was appointed to the board of Admiralty as controller of the navy, a post which he held until August, 1897, when he took command of the squadron on the North America station. Fisher returned to Europe in 1899 to represent British naval interests at the Hague peace conference. From July, 1899, until May, 1902, he was commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean, and on his return was appointed second sea lord of the Admiralty.

He was largely responsible for the scheme of entry and training for naval officers which abolished the Britannia, substituting the colleges at Osborne and Dartmouth, and trained executive officers, engineers, and marines together up to the rank of lieutenants, after which they specialised into the various branches. From August, 1903, to October, 1904, he was commander-in-chief at Portsmouth, and served as a member of Lord

Esher's committee on national defence. He was appointed first sea lord on October 21, 1904, and held that office until his resignation in 1910.

Remarkable changes in naval organization and material were carried out in this period, due mainly to the rapid rise in strength of the German navy and to the development of naval ordnance and the science of gunnery. The British fleets on foreign stations were drastically reduced, and in 1907 a Home Fleet was formed which, two years later, absorbed all of the commissioned naval forces in home waters.

Lord Fisher, who was knighted in 1894 and created a baron in 1909, was the creator of the Dreadnought and battle cruiser type, and the introducer of oil fuel and submarines into the British navy. His work in improving the shooting of the navy was of the utmost importance. He was specially promoted to admiral of the fleet, and was appointed in 1912 chairman of a royal commission on oil fuel in relation to the navy. He was recalled to be first sea lord on the resignation of the marquess of Milford Haven, October 29, 1914. He took steps to lay down 612 new ships of various types, many of which were designed for special work in the Baltic. He also ordered a large number of aircraft, including the small airships often known as blimps, which proved of great value for reconnaissance in the early stages of the war at sea. He advocated the introduction of much heavier guns. Fisher strongly opposed the Dardanelles expedition, and was with difficulty prevented from resigning when it was ordered, early in 1915, by the Cabinet. He finally resigned on May 15, 1915, on the ground that ships required by the Grand Fleet in the North Sea were being imperilled at the Dardanelles.

In the general conduct of the war he was successful; the decisive result of the battle of the Falkland Islands, December 8, 1914, was entirely due to his action in sending two battle cruisers secretly from the North Sea to the coast of South America. In July, 1915, he was appointed president of the board of invention and research. He died July 10, 1920, retaining to the last his vigour of mind and speech. His letters to "The Times" in 1919-20 were memorable for the refrain "sack the lot," and he always spoke of himself as "ruthless and relentless."

Sir Doveton Sturdee

Sir Frederick Charles Doveton Sturdee was born June 9, 1859. He entered the navy in 1871, and served in the Egyptian War, 1882, being present at the bombardment of Alexandria as a lieutenant in the Hecla. He was assistant to the director of naval ordnance, 1893-97, and assistant director of naval intelligence, 1900-2. Chief of staff of the Mediterranean Fleet, 1905-7, he was rear admiral of the first battle squadron, 1910, and commanded the second cruiser squadron, 1912-13.

Sturdee was chief of the war staff, 1914-15, and it was while thus employed that Lord Fisher sent him to the Pacific to find and defeat von Spee. The crushing defeat of the German squadron off the Falkland Islands followed on December 8, 1914. In the battle of Jutland Sturdee was in command of the fourth battle squadron. He was commander-in-chief at the Nore, 1918-21. Promoted rear admiral, 1910, and admiral, 1917, he was made admiral of the fleet, 1921. Knighted in 1913, he was created a baronet, January 1, 1916. In 1919 he received a grant of £10,000 for his services during the Great War. He died on May 7, 1925.

Sir Christopher Cradock

Sir Christopher George Francis Maurice Cradock was born July 2, 1862, son of Christopher Cradock, of Hartforth, Richmond, Yorkshire. He entered the navy, and served with distinction in the Sudan, 1891; in China, 1900, being promoted captain for gallantry at Taku. He attained rear admiral's rank in 1910, was given command of the Atlantic Fleet in 1911, and was knighted in 1912. In October, 1914, Sir C. Cradock, with a small squadron consisting of the old armoured cruisers Good Hope and Monmouth, the light cruiser Glasgow, and armed ship Otranto, was sent to South American waters in search of a German squadron, commanded by Rear Admiral von Spee, which was then causing much damage to Allied shipping. The old battleship Canopus was sent to support Cradock, but was nearly 200 miles astern when, on November 1, 1914, off Coronel, on the Chilean coast, he sighted Spee's ships.

Both squadrons were steaming south, in a heavy sea and strong wind; the Germans were east of the British, in line. At 7.3 p.m. both sides opened fire at 12,000 yards, steering converging courses. The Germans quickly got the range of the Good Hope and Monmouth. At 7.50 a violent explosion amidships damaged the Good Hope, but she continued in action and did not sink till later. Cradock was lost with her.

Sir Ernest Troubridge

Sir Ernest Charles Thomas Troubridge was born July 15, 1862. He entered the navy in 1878, and was naval attaché at Vienna, Madrid, and Tokyo, 1901-4; captain and chief of staff, Mediterranean, 1907-8; chief of the war staff at the Admiralty, 1911-12, and in the latter year commanded the Mediterranean cruiser squadron. When the Great War broke out he was second in command to Admiral Sir Berkeley Milne in the Mediterranean, and he was much criticised for the escape of the Goeben. This led to his trial by court-martial, but he was fully and honourably acquitted. In 1915 he was head of the

British naval mission to Serbia, and in November, 1918, was appointed president of the International Danube Commission, resigning in 1921. Having been made rear admiral in 1911 and vice admiral in 1916, he became a full admiral in 1919, and was knighted in that year. He retired in 1921, and died January 28, 1926.

Commander Holbrook

NORMAN DOUGLAS HOLBROOK was born in 1884. In the submarine branch he served in the Mediterranean in the early days of the Great War, holding the rank of lieutenant commander, and on December 13, 1914, commanding submarine B11, he set out with the object of reconnoitring the interior of the Dardanelles. In the course of this extremely perilous operation he dived beneath five rows of mines in the strait and torpedoed the Turkish battleship Messudiyeh. Pursued by heavy gunfire and chased by torpedo boats, he returned safely, having on one occasion been submerged nine hours. For this action he was awarded the Victoria Cross. He retired with the rank of commander.

Captain Max Horton

MAX KENNEDY HORTON entered the navy in 1900, and as lieutenant of the Duke of Edinburgh distinguished himself at the wreck of the P. and O. liner Delhi, off Cape Spartel, in 1911, receiving the Board of Trade medal for gallantry in saving life. On the outbreak of the Great War he was in the submarine service, and in command of E 9, on September 13, 1914, he torpedoed and sank the German light cruiser Hela, six miles south of Heligoland. On October 6 he torpedoed and sank the destroyer S 116, being awarded the D.S.O. for these services, and promoted to commander. On July 2, 1915, he sank the German cruiser Prinz Adalbert, in the Baltic, for which the tsar Nicholas awarded him the Order of St. George. Horton was promoted captain in 1920, and was assistant director of mobilization at the Admiralty, 1926-28.

Earl Kitchener

HORATIO HERBERT KITCHENER, first Earl Kitchener, of Khartum and Aspall, was born at Crotter House, Ballylongford, co. Kerry, Ireland, June 24, 1850, the second son of Lieutenant Colonel Henry H. Kitchener, of Cossington, Leicester. He passed out of Woolwich in 1870 and joined the Royal Engineers. He volunteered for service with the French army in the Franco-Prussian War, but owing to an attack of pneumonia was never under fire. In 1874-78, on the staff of the Palestine Exploration Fund, he surveyed in Palestine and Cyprus.

In 1882 Kitchener was present at the bombardment of Alexandria by the British fleet, and at the close of that year he entered the Egyptian army, and saw almost continuous service in the unsuccessful Sudan expedition of 1884-85 for the rescue of Gordon, the Suakin operations of 1888, and the Toski campaign of 1889. Appointed sirdar, or commander of the Egyptian army in 1892, he completed its reorganization and carried through the Dongola operations of 1896 and the Khartum campaign of 1898. He handled with great tact the difficult issues raised by the appearance of Marchand at Fashoda, and on his return to England was raised to the peerage with the rank of baron, receiving the thanks of Parliament and a grant of £30,000.

After the disasters in South Africa, he was appointed chief of staff to Lord Roberts, who took over command there in December, 1899. Instructed by Lord Roberts to act as his delegate, he directed the attack on the Boers at Paardeberg. After the capture of Pretoria and Lord Roberts' return to England, Lord Kitchener succeeded as commander-in-chief. In 1902 he brought the long guerrilla war to a close by the peace of Pretoria (May 31), and received the thanks of Parliament, a grant of £50,000, a viscounty, and the Order of Merit. From 1902-9 he served in India as commander-in-chief, and after resigning the appointment of commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean, which he held for a few weeks, was appointed British agent in Egypt in 1911. He was created an earl in 1914.

On the outbreak of the Great War he was in England, and was appointed secretary of state for war under pressure from the public on August 5, 1914. He at once took steps to raise a large army, foreseeing that the war would be long, and he endeavoured to impress the French staff with the need of precautions against a great German turning movement through Belgium, such as was actually carried out. He organized a British army of 70 divisions (1,400,000 men), but he hesitated to introduce compulsory service, nor did he at first recognize the importance of high explosive shells. He was in large part responsible for the failure of the operations at Antwerp and at the Dardanelles, partly because of his habit of working without a staff. The duty of providing munitions was taken from him and placed under a separate minister, in May, 1915, and in December, 1915, his powers were further limited by the appointment of Sir William Robertson to be chief of the imperial general staff.

On June 5, 1916, Kitchener left Scapa Flow for Russia in the cruiser Hampshire, in a violent storm; that evening she struck a mine laid by a U-boat near the Brough of Birsay, and all on board perished except 12 men. Kitchener was last seen on deck, calm and courageous, as the vessel went down. His work was done; he had made his country one of the greatest military Powers. His body was never found.

Earl of Ypres

JOHN DENTON PINKSTONE FRENCH, first Earl of Ypres (better known as Sir John French) was born at Ripple, Kent, September 28, 1852, the only son of Captain French, R.N., member of a well-known Irish family, and of Margaret, daughter of William Eccles. At the age of 14 he entered the Britannia, but the navy did not appeal to him, and after four years as cadet and midshipman he left to join the militia; and in 1874 obtained a commission in the 8th Hussars, but soon transferred to the 19th. He became captain in 1880, in which year he married Eleanora Anna Selby-Lowndes. He received his majority in 1883.

In 1884 French saw active service for the first time. Proceeding to Egypt, he was attached to the force that was to relieve Gordon, started with the desert column in December, 1884, fought at Abu Klea, pushed through the Dervish army at Metemma; and after the death of Gordon endured the painful retreat across the Bayuda desert, Feb.-Mar., 1885. Promotion came steadily. He was lieutenant colonel in 1885, and in 1889 obtained command of the 19th Hussars, which he left after four years to take up duties as assistant adjutant general of cavalry. In 1897 he was given command of the 2nd cavalry brigade at Aldershot and was transferred in 1899 as temporary major general to the command of the first cavalry brigade.

In the South African War French was given the command of the cavalry division in Natal with the full rank of major general, and was one of the few officers who made a name in the war. In one of the earliest actions he drove the Boers from the station at Elandslaagte and fought the successful battle of that name. After several cavalry actions he saw that Ladysmith would be surrounded, and escaped by the last train. Through a great part of the war he kept the Orange Free State troops at bay in their attempt to invade Cape Colony, and did wonders with a handful of troops and a few guns. As soon as Lord Roberts came out he gave French 5,000 men for the relief of Kimberley, which the force entered, after perhaps the most romantic gallop of the war. From Kimberley he galloped again with a tired remnant to cut off Cronje as he escaped from Paardeberg. He commanded the cavalry in the operations that ended in the capture of Bloemfontein and Pretoria.

French received a K.C.B. and K.C.M.G., and in Sept., 1902, was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general with the Aldershot command, which he retained till 1907. He became known as a worker who spared neither himself nor his men. At the age of 55 he became full general, and in December, 1907, succeeded the duke of Connaught as inspector general. He became A.D.C. to the king in 1911, and in March, 1912, succeeded Sir

William Nicholson as chief of the imperial general staff. In 1913 he was made field marshal.

French's career seemed to end in 1914, when he resigned, in consequence of the government's action over the resignation of British officers at the Curragh Camp in connexion with the trouble in Ulster. On the first hint of the German threat, however, he was selected to lead the expeditionary force. Embarking with his staff on August 14, he reached his own H.Q. at Le Cateau on August 17. On August 23 he was in contact with the enemy, the battle of Mons was fought, and the retreat began.

On September 16 French deliberately came to the decision that frontal attack was hopeless, and began to urge the march to Belgium, as he wanted to prevent the Germans from capturing the Channel ports. His views slowly prevailed, though not in their entirety, and the terrible battle of Ypres opened on October 19, ending successfully on November 21, when the British troops defeated the German attempt to capture the salient. All this time and up to the close of the battle of Festubert in May, 1915, French had urged the supply of more and more ammunition, especially high-explosive shells. He recorded the facts in his rather controversial autobiographical book entitled "1914". He saw the battle from a ruined tower, and was so overwhelmed by the contrast of ammunition supply of the contending armies that he told the whole story to Colonel Repington, military correspondent of "The Times," whose dispatch caused in the sequel the fall of Asquith's government, and, in French's words, "the organization of the nation's industrial resources upon a stupendous scale."

French's military career had now reached its climax. He surrendered his command to Haig on December 15, and in 1916 a viscounty was conferred on him. He became Viscount French of Ypres and High Lake, Roscommon, the residence of his ancestors since the opening of the 17th century. He took command of the forces in Britain until, in 1918, he was appointed viceroy of Ireland. He remained there until his retirement in 1921, when he was made earl of Ypres. He died May 22, 1925.

Earl Haig

DOUGLAS HAIG, first Earl Haig of Bemersyde, a son of John Haig of Cameronbridge, Fifeshire, was born in Edinburgh June 19, 1861. He was educated at Clifton and Brasenose College, Oxford, whence he went to Sandhurst, and was gazetted in 1885 to the 7th Hussars. He was distinguished both as polo player and as a serious student of his profession. He was a good linguist, and passed through the staff college at Camberley.

Haig served in the Khartum campaign of 1898 and in the South African War, where his work attracted attention. He

acted as chief of staff at Colesberg in 1900 to Sir John French, and in 1901-2 he commanded a group of columns under Lord Kitchener. After the South African War he served (1903-6) in India, first as inspector general of cavalry, and then, after some years at home, during which he was director of military training (1906-7), and director of staff duties at headquarters (1907-9), as chief of staff to the Indian Army (1909-12). On his return to Europe he was appointed to the Aldershot command, which he held till the outbreak of the Great War. He went to France in August, 1914, with the expeditionary force, in command of the 1st corps, and took part in all the earlier battles, passing in January, 1915, to the command of the 1st army. In December, 1915, he succeeded Sir John French as commander-in-chief of the British forces in France, holding this position till 1918.

After Haig received the command in France, he had to prepare, in conjunction with Joffre, the plans for a great offensive in 1916 on the Somme front. The policy contemplated was attrition, as at that date there were no means of delivering a surprise attack or of turning the enemy's position. The plan as adopted was not Haig's; he had wished to attack the formidable Beaumont-Hamel ridge from the N. and from Arras, but, owing to difficulties of cooperation, the French were against this. Haig's thoroughness of organization was seen in the admirable completeness of the preparations for this attack, which involved enormous engineering work.

Haig in 1917 was required to act under Nivelle's directions, which hampered his operations, but he gained the two brilliant victories of Arras and Messines, though all his arrangements were upset by the necessity of prolonging his attack at Arras, in order to take the pressure off Nivelle, whose offensive had failed. Thus the third battle of Ypres did not open till July 31, when the good weather had gone; it involved fearful suffering and sacrifices for the troops, but it came very near being a complete victory.

Early in 1918 Haig was convinced of the imminence of a great German offensive, but could not persuade the British government of the soundness of his view. He was left with infantry effectives 114,000 below strength, nor could he induce the home authorities to send him reinforcements from Palestine and the secondary fields. With his weak force, his front was extended 28 miles in January, to the Oise; and owing to his lack of men he was compelled to station his reserves north of the Somme. When the German offensive was opened (March 21, 1918), he could not throw in these reserves quickly, but, though disastrous loss was inflicted by the rapid German advance, his dispositions were generally justified and the attack was not fatal.

When Haig took the offensive on August 8, 1918, notwithstanding the loss of 464,000 men which the British army had

suffered during the German offensives, he handled his troops, now heavily but tardily reinforced from home and from subsidiary fields, with brilliant skill. From that hour he pressed the Germans fiercely and unrelentingly, and won such a series of victories as no general had gained in the war. His assault on the Hindenburg line (September 27-October 1) was the greatest feat in his career, undertaken as it was against the judgement of the British War Cabinet, which dreaded a repulse and heavy casualties, when Foch himself was reluctant to order it.

He was not a showy commander and he had minor defects, but Sir F. Maurice states the truth when he says that this "great leader's calm judgement, coolness in adversity, unselfish patience when unsupported at home, and bold decisions when the time came to be bold, were vital factors in our triumph."

On January 1, 1917, Haig was promoted field marshal; and in 1919 he was created earl and received a grant of £100,000. He died January 29, 1928, leaving an only son who succeeded to his titles. Earl Haig received many honours during and after the war. He was made a Knight of the Thistle in 1917, and awarded the Order of Merit in 1919, while later Bemersyde, the ancient home of the Haigs, was presented to him.

Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien

Sir Horace Lockwood Smith-Dorrien was born May 26, 1858, the son of Col. A. R. Smith-Dorrien. He was educated at Harrow and Sandhurst, and entered the Sherwood Foresters in 1876, and in 1879 served in the Zulu war. Between 1882 and 1886 he was in all the campaigns in Egypt and the Sudan, the latter part of the time attached to the Egyptian army; and he was there again in 1898, having in the meantime been in the Chitral and Tirah campaigns. He went to South Africa in 1899 at the head of his battalion, but was soon promoted to a brigade, and later to a division. Adjutant general in India, 1901-3, he commanded the Quetta division there, 1903-7, and then, returning to England, was commander-in-chief at Aldershot, 1907-12, and from 1912-14 held the southern command.

Smith-Dorrien was in that post when the Great War broke out, but almost at once was sent to France to take command of the 2nd corps after the sudden death of Sir James Grierson. He led his corps in the Mons retreat, and through the winter, until he returned home in May, 1915, having just previously been put at the head of the 2nd army. Later in 1915 he went to take charge of the operations in East Africa, but ill-health compelled an early return. In 1918 he was made governor of Gibraltar. Knighted in 1904, he was promoted general in 1912. He died as the result of a motor-car accident, August 12, 1930.

Smith-Dorrien was responsible for the battle of Le Cateau, fought August 26, 1914, and for this he has been severely criticised. Lord French, who in his dispatch praised his masterly handling of a difficult situation, stated later that there was no need for this engagement, which was against his orders and imperilled the safety of the whole army.

Sir Nevil Macready

SIR CECIL FREDERICK NEVIL MACREADY was born May 7, 1862, a son of the actor, W. C. Macready. He was educated at Marlborough and Cheltenham. In 1881 he entered the Gordon Highlanders, and in 1882 served in Egypt. He went through the South African War, and was afterwards assistant adjutant general in Cape Colony. In 1907 he was appointed to a like position at the War Office, and in 1909 was given command of a brigade. From 1910-14 he was director of personal services at the War Office, and in 1912 he was knighted.

In August, 1914, Macready went to France as adjutant general to the Expeditionary Force, remaining there until 1916, when he was made adjutant general in London and a member of the army council. In 1918 he was selected as commissioner of the metropolitan police, for which post he had gained experience as an officer of the military police in Cairo and an assistant provost marshal in South Africa. Macready reached the army rank of full general in 1918, and in 1920 was appointed commander-in-chief in Ireland. He retired in 1923, and was made a baronet. In 1924 he published "Annals of an Active Life."

Sir John Cowans

SIR JOHN STEVEN COWANS was born March 11, 1862. He entered the Rifle Brigade in 1881, and in 1893 he became a staff captain at headquarters. In 1906 he went to India, where he was director general of military education, and from 1908-10 he commanded a brigade. From 1910-12 he was director general of the Territorial Forces, and in 1912 he was appointed quartermaster general and member of the Army Council. In March, 1919, Sir John, who had been knighted in 1913, left the army to take up a business appointment. He died April 16, 1921.

Sir Arthur Barrett

SIR ARTHUR ARNOLD BARRETT was born June 3, 1857, the son of a clergyman. He entered the army, Essex Regiment, in 1875. After his first active service, in the Afghan War of 1878, he joined the Indian Staff Corps and was almost constantly employed in frontier and other operations. He served with the Hazara expedition in 1888 and twenty years later was given the K.C.B. for services in the Mohmand

campaign ; he was also in the Tirah campaign. On the outbreak of the Great War he was selected to command a division in Mesopotamia and was responsible for the earlier operations at Basra. On his return to India in 1916 he took over the northern army, and in this command conducted the campaign against the Mahsuds, March-August, 1917, and dealt with the Afghan invasion in May, 1919. He was made a general in 1917, G.C.B. in 1918, and in 1921 he was created a field marshal. He died October 20, 1926.

Sir David Henderson

SIR DAVID HENDERSON was born in Glasgow, August 11, 1862. He joined the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders in 1883. He saw service in the Sudan, 1898, and in South Africa, becoming director of the intelligence dept., 1900. He graduated as an air pilot in August, 1911. In July, 1912, he was appointed director of military training, and in 1913 became director general of military aeronautics. The efficiency of the three or four squadrons which went to France on the outbreak of the Great War, and the subsequent development of the air arm, were largely due to Henderson. In October, 1917, he vacated his seat on the army council to undertake special work, and resigned the vice-presidency of the air council in the spring of 1918. He became director general of the league of Red Cross Societies, Geneva, in 1919, and died at Geneva, August 17, 1921. He had received his knighthood in 1914. He published "The Art of Reconnaissance," in 1907.

Earl of Oxford and Asquith

HERBERT HENRY ASQUITH, Earl of Oxford and Asquith, younger son of Joseph Dixon Asquith, woollen manufacturer, was born September 12, 1852, at Morley, Yorkshire. His father died in 1860, and the three fatherless children, two boys and a girl, were cared for by their maternal uncles. The boys received their earliest education at the Moravian school, Pudsey, and went afterwards to the City of London school.

Having won a classical scholarship at Balliol College, Oxford, he entered into residence in 1870. He did brilliantly at Oxford, and was made a fellow of Balliol. Called to the bar at Lincoln's Inn in 1876, in 1877 he married Helen, daughter of Dr. F. Melland, of Manchester. She died in 1891, leaving four sons and one daughter. The eldest son Raymond, one of the most brilliant men of his generation, was killed while serving with the Guards on September 15, 1916. He left a son Julian who succeeded to his grandfather's titles. In 1894 Asquith married Emma Alice Margaret, daughter of Sir Charles Tennant, Bart. There were two children of the second marriage.

In 1886 Asquith, contesting East Fife as a Gladstonian Liberal, won the seat and held it until December, 1918, but success at the bar came to him slowly. His reputation was made during the long sittings of the Parnell Commission in 1889, by his work as junior to Sir C. Russell, counsel for the Irish Nationalist party. On the return of the Liberals to power in 1892, Asquith was appointed home secretary by Gladstone, and from 1895 to 1905 he was one of the leaders of the Liberal opposition, being especially associated with Lord Rosebery and the imperialist section of the party. When Campbell-Bannerman, after the resignation of Balfour, formed his government in December, 1905, Asquith was appointed chancellor of the exchequer. He succeeded Campbell-Bannerman as prime minister in April, 1908, and held that office until 1916. The Curragh incident of 1914 induced Asquith himself to assume responsibilities at the War Office ; and he was secretary for war, as well as prime minister, when war was declared against Germany.

Despite dissensions in the Cabinet, Asquith never wavered during the critical fortnight that preceded the German invasion of Belgium ; when the conflict began, his speeches did much to win respect abroad for British policy and aims. On May 25, 1915, his government became a coalition, this transformation being forced upon Asquith by the logic of events. He remained at the head of this until he resigned, December 5, 1916. Several causes contributed to his resignation—the disappointing results of the war so far ; delay in reaching decisions owing to the unwieldy size of the Cabinet, and the strong feeling of the Conservatives that they did not have a proper share of the more important offices. He lost his seat in Fifeshire in 1918. In 1920 he was returned M.P. for Paisley, retaining the seat until October 5, 1924, when he was defeated. In 1925 he was created Earl of Oxford and Asquith. He resigned the leadership of the Liberal party in 1926, and died February 15, 1928. His book " Memories and Reflexions " was published in the same year.

Viscount Grey

EDWARD GREY, first Viscount Grey of Fallodon, was born April 25, 1862. He belonged to the family of which Earl Grey was the head. He was educated at Winchester and Balliol College, Oxford, and in 1882, having lost his father, Lieutenant Colonel G. H. Grey, he succeeded his grandfather, Sir George Grey, the Liberal politician, in the family baronetcy and estates. In 1885 he was returned as Liberal M.P. for Berwick-on-Tweed, and his connexions brought him to the notice of Gladstone. In 1892 he was made under-secretary for foreign affairs, an office he held for three years. In 1905 Campbell-Bannerman chose Grey as foreign minister, and in that office he remained for 11 years.

It fell to Grey to conduct the last negotiations with Germany, and those with France, in July and August, 1914, and to explain the British position to the House of Commons and the country. Certainly in those days he strove hard for peace, and his case at the moment was so convincing that he had no difficulty in committing Britain to the struggle with the full assent of the people. He remained in office, quietly discharging his duties, during the earlier part of the war, and also after the Coalition government was formed; but in December, 1916, he resigned with Asquith. Already a K.G., he was made a viscount in July, 1916. In 1919 it was stated that his eyesight was so impaired that reading was impossible for him, but later there was some recovery. In early life Grey was a fine tennis player, and throughout, fly-fishing, on which he wrote a book, was his main hobby. His memoirs, "Twenty-Five Years," appeared in 1925, "Fallodon Papers" in the next year, and "The Charm of Birds" in 1927. In 1928 he was made chancellor of the university of Oxford. Grey was twice married, his second wife being Pamela, widow of the first Lord Glenconner, but there were no children of either marriage. He died September 7, 1933.

Grey had many of the characteristics of his lifelong friend, Asquith. Personally of the most scrupulous honour, he was yet rather inclined, in the face of difficulties, to take the line of least resistance. His strong position with the Liberals was due to an appearance of strength, to a certain dignity and reserve, especially in speech, and still more to an obvious indifference to office.

Winston Churchill

WINSTON LEONARD SPENCER CHURCHILL was born November 30, 1874, the elder son of Lord Randolph Churchill. He was educated at Harrow, and passed through Sandhurst into the army, 4th Hussars. In 1895 he went to Cuba, and was attached to the Spanish army during the rising in that island, where he acted as a war correspondent. In 1897 and 1898 he served on the Indian frontier, and in the latter year was attached to the 21st Lancers, in the campaign that led to the fall of Khartum. When the South African War broke out, Churchill at once went thither as correspondent for "The Morning Post." On November 15, 1899, he was taken prisoner by the Boers, but he soon escaped, and as a lieutenant of the South African Light Horse saw a good deal of fighting, being at the battle of Spion Kop and the capture of Pretoria.

As a politician Churchill first appeared in 1899, when he stood in the Conservative interest for Oldham. He was beaten, but in 1900, at the general election, he came back from South Africa to be member for that borough. Forsaking Oldham, he contested North-west Manchester as a Liberal, and for that seat he was

returned in January, 1906. When Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman had formed his ministry, just before the election, he had made Churchill under-secretary for the Colonies.

When the government was reconstructed by Asquith in 1908, Churchill entered the Cabinet as president of the board of trade. In 1910 he was transferred to the Home Office, and in 1911 went to the Admiralty. He was first lord when the Great War began, and was thus responsible for directing the early activities of the fleet. On entering the Cabinet he had to seek re-election in north-west Manchester, but he was defeated. However, a seat was soon found for him at Dundee.

In 1915 the coalition ministry was formed, and Churchill, whose disagreements with Lord Fisher had just reached an acute stage, was relegated to the chancellorship of the duchy of Lancaster. The decision of the prime minister to form an inner council to direct the operations of the war, from which he was excluded, induced him to resign office in November. He announced his decision to take his place in the trenches, and for a while was in command of a battalion in France, but in a short time he was again in England. He remained out of office until July, 1917, when Mr. Lloyd George appointed him minister of munitions. In January, 1919, he was transferred to be secretary for war, and there he was responsible for demobilization, and for equipping a force for Russia. He was secretary for the Colonies, 1921-22. Defeated at Dundee in 1922, he was returned for Epping in 1924. He joined the Conservatives, and became chancellor of the exchequer, November, 1924, retaining this office until 1929, when he parted company with the official Unionists.

As an author, Churchill has written on the campaigns in which he has shared, especially The River War. He has also written the standard biography of his father, 1906. His Great War memories, "The World Crisis" in six volumes, appeared in 1923-29, and "Thoughts and Adventures" in 1932. In 1933 his life of the duke of Marlborough was published.

Sir Samuel Hughes

Sir Samuel Hughes was born at Darlington, Ontario, January, 8, 1853, and was educated at Toronto University. He began his career as a lecturer in English at a Toronto college, after which he edited a paper for 12 years. All this time he had been in the Canadian militia, and in 1870 had seen active service against the Fenians. He rose to command a battalion, visited London to attend the Jubilee of 1897, and then visited Australia and New Zealand, advocating closer imperial defence. With the Canadians he served in the South African War, being made an assistant adjutant general.

Since 1892 Hughes had been a representative of Ontario in the Dominion Parliament, and he came to the front as an active

member of the Conservative party, chiefly devoting his attention to military matters. From 1911 he was minister of defence in the Borden government, until the Great War broke out.

Hughes had taken upon himself the task of making Canada ready for the European war which he foresaw. In 1913 he conducted a number of his commanding officers over the Belgian, French, and German frontiers, covering the ground soon to be the field of war. On the outbreak of hostilities he set to work to organize the Canadian forces, and himself crossed to Europe. Canada's prompt and ready response to the Motherland's call was made possible largely by Hughes' work. Her expeditionary force was at first one division, numbering 33,000 men. By the middle of 1916 her army had increased almost tenfold. In November, 1916, Hughes resigned owing to differences with his colleagues. He remained in Parliament, and criticised the abandonment by the Canadians of the Ross rifle. In 1915 he was knighted, and he died August 24, 1921.

Louis Botha

Louis Botha was born at Greytown, Natal, September 27, 1862, the son of a Boer farmer. He passed much of his early life in the Transvaal, fighting for Dinizulu against his Zulu enemies, and serving as a native commissioner in 1884. In 1896 he was elected to the Transvaal Volksraad and, as an opponent of Kruger, endeavoured to prevent war with Great Britain. But on the outbreak of the South African War in 1899, he at once left his farm at Vryheid and joined in the invasion of Natal. His abilities soon brought him to the front; he commanded the Boers who defended the passage of the Tugela, and after Joubert's death was commander-in-chief until the end of hostilities. He was influential in persuading the Boers to accept the peace terms at Vereeniging, and was subsequently received by King Edward in London.

Botha worked for the prosperity of the Transvaal, and on the granting of self-government became its premier in 1907. In 1910 he was selected as the first premier of the new Union of South Africa—a union he had worked hard to establish. In 1914, on the outbreak of the Great War, Botha unhesitatingly declared for participation, in spite of the opposition of Hertzog and his group, and although he had to face a somewhat formidable rebellion, crushed this and conducted the model campaign that deprived the Germans of South-West Africa.

This done, he plunged into the strife caused by the pending general election. Botha's programme was one of seeing the war through, but his party lost some seats and their majority in the House of Assembly. He remained in power, however, relying on the support of the Unionist party, and during the next four years was responsible for sending a contingent to fight in Europe

and for a policy of loyalty to the empire. In 1907 he was made a privy councillor, the only title he would accept, and in 1919 he attended the peace conference in Paris, and signed the treaty with Germany. Returning to South Africa, he died at Pretoria, August 27, 1919.

Sir Pertab Singh

SIR PERTAB SINGH, Indian ruler and soldier, was born in 1845. Early in his career he was put at the head of the administration of Jodhpur by his brother the maharajah. In this capacity he introduced reforms, constructed railways, etc. In 1878 he was a member of the mission to Kabul, and took part in the Mohmand expedition, 1897, and the Tirah campaign, 1898. He led Jodhpur imperial troops in China, 1900, and two years later became ruling chief of Idar State in Gujarat, but abdicated in favour of his son. An hon. commandant of the Imperial Cadet Corps, he served in the Great War, 1914-15, and was promoted lieutenant general. Created K.C.B. in 1901, he was made G.C.B. in 1918. He died September 3, 1922.

Maharajah of Bikaner

THE MAHARAJAH OF BIKANER, Indian ruler and soldier, was born in 1880, succeeded in 1887, and took over the rule of his state in 1898. He commanded the Bikaner camel corps in China, 1901. The maharajah served with the Indian Expeditionary Force in France, 1914-15, being made a major general. He attended the meetings of the Imperial War Cabinet in London in 1917, and was one of India's representatives at the Peace Conference, Paris, 1919.

FRENCH

Raymond Poincaré

RAYMOND NICOLAS LANDRY POINCARÉ was born at Bar-le-Duc in the department of Meuse on August 20, 1860. He was educated at Nancy and Paris, and called to the Paris bar. For some time he contributed law court reports to "Le Voltaire." In 1886, while secretary to the minister of agriculture, he was elected councillor-general for Pierrefitte-sur-Aire, and in 1887, deputy for the Commercy division of the Meuse department. He was re-elected time after time until 1903, when he became senator for the Meuse, encountering no opposition in 1893 and 1898, and defeating a nationalist coalition in 1902.

In 1890 Poincaré was elected a member of the budget committee, becoming its chairman in 1892. In 1893 he was

appointed minister of finance in the first Dupuy cabinet, and in the second Dupuy cabinet (May, 1894-January, 1895), his term of office being characterized by a policy of rigid economy. When the Dupuy cabinet fell, he remained in the ensuing Ribot cabinet as minister of public instruction and in that capacity frequently debated in the assembly with Jean Jaurès. During this period Poincaré delivered many speeches which made his name popular among the public, and prepared the bill on university reform, which became law in January, 1896. On leaving office he was chosen as vice-president of the chamber, November, 1895, being re-elected during the two following years. During the same period he resumed his legal practice. After his election to the senate he became president of its Budget committee. In March, 1906, he was minister of finance under Sarrien.

On the fall of the Caillaux cabinet in January, 1912, Poincaré became prime minister and, with the premiership, took the ministry of foreign affairs. He was still premier when elected president of the republic on January 17, 1913, his chief opponent being Jules Pams, and his elevation to the highest office was undoubtedly due to the qualities he manifested as premier. In his inaugural message to parliament he dwelt on the urgency of social reforms and the necessity of strengthening the army and navy. Shortly afterwards the law ordaining three years' military service was passed. In June, 1913, he visited King George, the purpose of his visit being to consolidate the Franco-British entente. Returning hastily from a visit to Russia with René Viviani, the premier, when the war clouds were thickening, Poincaré, on August 1, 1914, issued his proclamation to the French nation, dwelling on the gravity of the international situation and emphasizing the fact that France had always affirmed her pacific intentions.

Poincaré retired from the presidency in January, 1920, being succeeded by Paul Deschanel. He was re-elected senator for the Meuse, and was president of the reparations commission for a short time, but resigned in May, 1920, owing to lack of sympathy with the general Allied policy on that question. In February, 1921, he was elected president of the foreign affairs commission of the senate. In that capacity and as foreign editor of "La Revue des Deux Mondes," to which post he was appointed on retiring from the presidency of the republic, Poincaré stood for a strongly nationalist policy, and for the fullest possible amends by Germany for damage caused in the war. In 1922 he returned to office as premier and minister for foreign affairs. He resigned in 1924, but he was again premier in 1926-29, and for two years was also finance minister, being responsible for the stabilization of the franc. Poincaré became a member of the French Academy in 1909, and has written his memoirs, which have been translated into English.

Marshal Joffre

CÉSAIRE JOSEPH JACQUES JOFFRE was born on January 12, 1852, at Rivesaltes, in the Pyrenees. His father, Gilles Joffre, was the proprietor of a small wine business, and Césaire Joffre was the eldest of eleven children. The birthplace of the future marshal was a small house in the Rue des Religieuses, afterwards renamed Rue des Orangers. Joffre was first educated at a local school and afterwards went to the college at Perpignan, at which he particularly distinguished himself in mathematics.

In 1867 Joseph was taken to Paris by his father and placed in a private school, where he studied for two years, when he entered the famous Ecole Polytechnique. He served as a subaltern in the Franco-Prussian War. Till then he had a marked dislike of the German language. The war proved to him that he was wrong, and it was not long before he had mastered it. When peace came he was engaged as a young lieutenant of engineers on plans for the new fortifications of Paris, Versailles, and Montpellier.

Joffre was next sent to organize the defences of Pontarlier, in the department of the Doubs. For a time he was engaged only in a round of garrison duties, and promotion seemed far off. The latter part of this period was marked by a great sorrow. He married in 1884, and was a widower within a year. There followed a fairly long spell of foreign service, first of all in Formosa, where he was employed in trench and fortress work. From Formosa he was drafted to Indo-China, notably at Hanoi, Kelung, and Vietri, where he fought successfully against the plague, by methods very similar to those which rendered the construction of the Panama Canal possible. In Indo-China he won the marked approval of Admiral Courbet, who was in charge of the French operations.

After three years in the Far East, Captain Joffre returned to France in 1888, received his majority in 1889, being gazetted a commandant and given a staff appointment which enabled him to gain a valuable insight into the military organization of the French railways. In 1891, owing, it is conjectured, to the favourable reports of General Galliéni, he was appointed lecturer on fortifications at the famous finishing school for artillery officers at Fontainebleau. In the autumn of 1892 Major Joffre went out to Senegal, and was instrumental in laying the foundations of the Senegal-Niger railway. A year later he was in charge of a supply column sent to the assistance of Colonel Bonnier, who was attacking the old Tuareg stronghold of Timbuctoo. Bonnier and many of his men were massacred by the tribes, and it fell to Major Joffre to avenge them. He did this on his own initiative and with marked success.

Attaining the rank of colonel in 1897 he went out to Madagascar two years later to superintend the fortifications of the French naval base at Diego Suarez. The satisfactory completion of this work was marked in 1901 by his promotion to the rank of brigadier general and his appointment to the command of the 19th Artillery Brigade. Honours and advancement now began to follow one another with gratifying rapidity. In 1903 the general was made a Commander of the Legion of Honour; in 1904 he was given the chief command of the Corps of Engineers; in 1905 he became a general of division; in 1906 he was appointed to the command of the 6th infantry division; in 1908 he was chief of the second army corps; and in 1909 he received the insignia of a Grand Officer of the Legion of Honour. Soon after he was admitted a member of the French general staff; and, partly because he was one of the few men who had been absolutely clear of any connexion with the notorious Dreyfus case, partly because of the chivalrous support of General Pau, and more especially on account of his proved ability as a strategist and an organizer, it befell that, on the reorganization of the French War Office in 1911, General Joffre was placed in supreme command of the French army.

In 1913 General Joffre was present at the Russian military manœuvres, when the tsar bestowed upon him the Order of Alexander Nevski. In April, 1914, he drew up the mobilization plan which answered so well in the hour of trial three months later. On May 25, 1914, King George bestowed upon him the G.C.V.O. But to the world at large, and even to many in his own land, General Joffre was comparatively unknown.

He was in supreme command of the French armies until December, 1916, when he was succeeded by General Nivelle and was made a marshal of France. When the United States entered the war in 1917, Joffre went to America with the French mission, and after that lived in retirement until his death on January 3, 1931.

General de Castelnau

Marie Joseph Edouard de Curières de Castelnau was born at Saint-Affrique, Aveyron, on December 24, 1851. He received his early training at the Jesuit College of Saint-Gabriel, and at the military school of St. Cyr. At the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War he was among the 250 cadets at St. Cyr who were given commissions. In October, 1870, he was promoted to the rank of captain for gallant conduct in the field. He saw active service in Cochin-China, during the trouble with Siam, and in Algeria.

After passing with distinction through the Ecole Supérieure de Guerre, he took up a staff appointment as colonel in the 17th army corps. Joining the general staff in 1896, he made

Carl Lody, the first German spy to be shot in Great Britain

General Friedrich Bernhardi, exponent of German militarism.

Herr Jägow, prominent in events just before the war.

Crown Prince of Germany commanded a group of armies on west front.

Archduke Francis Ferdinand whose assassination precipitated the war.

Prince Rupert of Bavaria fought on west front throughout the war.



The town hall of the ancient city of Cracow which was the objective of the Russians in 1914. By December 1 they were within four miles of the city.

SOME GERMAN PERSONALITIES AND THE OLD POLISH CAPITAL

The real beginning of the Mesopotamia operations was when the expeditionary force left India in October, 1914, to rendezvous at Bahrein. The illustration shows the foreshore at Bahrein, a centre of the pearl-fishing industry.

Basra, standing in the Shatt-el-Arab, 60 miles from the Persian Gulf, was taken on November 21. Indian transport is seen entering the town by the riverside road.

BEGINNINGS OF THE MESOPOTAMIA CAMPAIGN

his mark as head of the mobilization department of the war office. His next appointment was at Nancy, where he commanded the 37th infantry regiment. In 1906 he was made a brigadier, and commanded at Belfort and Sedan. Three years later he assumed command of the 13th division at Chaumont.

Called to Paris in 1913 by General Joffre, he became chief of the general staff. When Germany broke the peace in 1914, Castelnau was placed in command of the 2nd army of Lorraine. He subsequently commanded the new 7th army, and in 1915 he was given, under General Joffre, immediate direction of the French forces in France, as chief of the general staff. In December, 1915, he went to Salonica to examine the position there, and in 1917 he was in command of a group of French armies at Verdun. In 1918 he commanded an army in Lorraine which was prepared to invest Metz and march to the Rhine just before the armistice. In 1919 he was elected to the Chamber of Deputies.

General Galliéni

JOSEPH SIMON GALLIÉNI was born at St. Béat, Haute Garonne, on April 24, 1849, and entered the French army in 1870 as lieutenant of marines, taking part in the Franco-Prussian War, and later seeing active service in the Sudan and Indo-China. He was governor of Madagascar from 1896-1905, organized the island as a French colony, and published an account of this work in "Neuf ans à Madagascar," 1908. In 1908 he became a member of the Conseil Supérieur de Guerre. During the Great War he was appointed military governor of Paris, August 26, 1914, saw to its fortifications, and rendered substantial assistance to the French 6th army under General Maunoury. In October, 1915, he was minister of war in the cabinet of M. Briand, but compelled to resign by ill-health in March, 1916, he died on May 27. His family published memoirs of him in 1920.

General Pau

PAUL MARIE CÉSAR GERALD PAU was born at Montélimar, on November 29, 1848, and educated at St. Cyr. Entering the French army as a lieutenant of infantry, he served in the Franco-Prussian War, 1870-71, where he lost an arm. He reached the rank of general in 1897, and commanded a division in 1903. Later he was in command of the 16th army corps, and then of the 20th army corps. Shortly after the outbreak of the Great War he was given general direction of the French offensive in Alsace. In 1918 he was a member of the French trade mission to Australia, visiting also New Zealand and Canada. General Pau died on January 2, 1932.

General Lanrezac

CHARLES LOUIS MARIE LANREZAC was born at La Pointe à Pitre, Guadeloupe, on July 30, 1852. He entered the military college of St. Cyr in 1869, and the French army as lieutenant of the 13th Infantry Regiment in August, 1870. After fighting through the Franco-Prussian War, 1870-71, he was on active service in Tunisia, 1886-92. Promoted colonel in 1901, he was brigadier general in 1906, governor of Reims in 1909, and general of division in 1911. At the outbreak of the Great War he was in command of the 5th army. In October, 1914, Lanrezac was relieved of his command, being appointed inspector of military schools, and in 1917 was inspector general. He was placed in the reserve, April 12, 1917. He died on January 17, 1925.

General Franchet d'Esperey

LOUIS FRANCHET D'ESPEREY was born at Mostaganem, Algeria, in 1856, and educated privately and at St. Cyr. He entered the army in October, 1876. He took part in the Tunis operations, 1881-82, in the Tongking expedition, 1885-87, and served in China, 1900-1. He next saw active service in Morocco, 1912-13, and in 1914 was in command of the 1st army corps at Lille. During the Great War he was at the head of the French 5th army, succeeding Lanrezac after the battle of Charleroi, August, 1914. He fought on the right of the British in the 1st battle of the Marne, and gained a victory at Montmirail, September, 1914. Later he succeeded in holding the Aisne bridgeheads. In April, 1916, he was placed in command of a group of the armies of the East in France, and in January, 1917, of the group of the armies of the North, which he held till June, 1918, when he was given supreme command of the Allied armies of the Orient, receiving the surrender of Bulgaria, September, 1918. He commanded the Allied forces in Turkey-in-Europe until November, 1920.

General Ruffey

PIERRE XAVIER EMMANUEL RUFFEY was born at Dijon, on March 19, 1851. He entered the French army as lieutenant of artillery in 1873, and became colonel in 1901, meanwhile seeing service in the Madagascar expedition of 1895, and acting as assistant professor of artillery in the Ecole de Guerre. He was general of division in 1905, and afterwards commander of the 13th army corps. In 1913 he became a member of the superior council of war, and on the outbreak of the Great War was in command of the French 3rd army, which held the line of the Allies from Montmédy by Sedan to Rocroi. Towards the end of August, 1914, this army was driven

back by the Germans after very severe fighting, and Ruffey was obliged to retreat to the Argonne. In the beginning of September of the same year he was replaced by General Sarrail.

General Dubail

AUGUSTIN YVON EDMOND DUBAIL was born at Belfort on April 15, 1851. He became a lieutenant of infantry in the French army in 1870, and served in the Franco-Prussian War. For ten years he was chief of staff of the Algerian Division and colonel of the 1st Zouave Regiment in Algeria. On his return to France, after holding various appointments, he became chief of staff of the French army, commander of the 9th army corps, and a member of the superior council of war. On the outbreak of the Great War Dubail was given the command of the French 1st army operating in Alsace and Lorraine, successfully defended Nancy, and afterwards held up the Germans on the Heights of the Meuse. In April, 1916, he was appointed military governor of Paris, and held that position till June, 1918.

General Maud'huy

LOUIS ERNEST DE MAUD'HUY, son of Pierre Adrien de Maud'huy, an officer who was killed in the battle of Magenta, 1859, was born at Metz on February 17, 1857, and educated there and at St. Cyr. In 1879 he entered the army as a lieutenant of light infantry, and after studying at the École Supérieure de Guerre from 1882-84, became a professor on the general staff, lecturing on strategy, military history, and general tactics. He became colonel in 1910 and general two years later. When the Great War broke out, Maud'huy was in command of the 80th brigade at St. Mihiel, and took part in several battles, including 1st battle of the Marne, in which he commanded the 18th army corps, and was decorated on the field with the cross of commander of the Legion of Honour. From October 1-31 he commanded the French 10th army in the region between Arras and Lens. In 1916 he was fighting at Verdun in command of the 15th army corps, and in 1917, as commander of the 11th army corps, was in action in the Chemin des Dames battles. In the following year he was engaged again in the battles of the Chemin des Dames, and on the Aisne. In November, 1918, he was appointed governor of Metz. He died on July 16, 1921.

General Maunoury

MICHEL JOSEPH MAUNOURY was born at Maintenon on December 17, 1847, and educated at the École Polytechnique, from which he entered the French army as a lieutenant of artillery. He took part in the Franco-Prussian War; severely wounded at Champigny, he won promotion and

the Legion of Honour. In 1897 he was a colonel, and 10 years later became director of the Ecole Supérieure de Guerre. General since 1901, he was in command of the artillery defending Paris in 1910, and at the close of the same year became a member of the war council. He had retired from the army before the outbreak of the Great War, but was recalled by General Joffre and placed in command of the French 6th army, the new force which suddenly appeared on the left of von Kluck in the first battle of the Marne, 1914. In 1915 he was appointed military governor of Paris. He died on March 28, 1923.

General Du bois

Pierre Joseph Louis Dubois was born at Sedan on November 21, 1852. He joined the French army as a lieutenant of the 24th Dragoon regiment in October, 1874. He saw active service in Algeria and Tunisia (1882), and again in Algeria, 1885-86. Promoted brigadier general in March, 1905, he was made director of cavalry under the minister of war in the following August. In April, 1913, he was appointed commander of the 9th army corps, and when the Great War broke out this corps, forming part of the second army, under Castelnau, was heavily engaged in the region of Nancy. Later the corps formed part of the army of Belgium, incessantly fighting from October 21 to November 13, 1914. Dubois was made G.C.M.G. in December, 1914. He was put at the head of the French 6th army in 1915, and in 1916 was in command at Verdun. He was placed on the reserve in 1917.

General Langle de Cary

Fernand Louis Armand Marie de Langle de Cary was born at Lorient, Morbihan, on July 4, 1849, and educated at Vannes, at the Ecole Ste. Geneviève, Paris, and at St. Cyr. He entered the French army as a lieutenant of the Chasseurs d'Afrique in October, 1869, later studying at the general staff school. In the Franco-Prussian War he was seriously wounded. He became colonel of the 127th Infantry in 1895, and general of a brigade of Algerian cavalry in 1900.

At the outbreak of the Great War he commanded the 4th army, and in August, 1914, took part in the fighting on the Meuse, and in September in the first battle of the Marne. In February, 1915, he began an offensive against the Germans which resulted in an important advance, and in September he was heavily engaged in the second Champagne offensive. In December, 1915, he was put in command of the group of armies forming the army of the centre, and in February, 1916, was fighting before Verdun. In March, 1916, he reached the prescribed age-limit and retired.

BELGIAN

Albert, King of the Belgians

ALBERT, king of the Belgians, was born at Brussels, April 8, 1875, the only son of Philip, count of Flanders, a younger brother of the Belgian king, Leopold II. He was educated for the throne and after his father's death in 1905 was known as the count of Flanders. He passed some time in travelling, visiting the U.S.A. and the Belgian Congo, as well as regions nearer home. In December, 1909, he became king of the Belgians on the death of Leopold.

It was generally thought, when King Albert came to the throne, that Belgium had got just an amiable figurehead that could be easily steered along the path marked out by her great financiers and captains of commerce. So King Albert's first act was something like a revolution in Belgium. Everybody who had been in King Leopold's service was dismissed, with, of course, proper rewards. Then representative men were drawn from each class and party and attached to the royal household.

Albert had ruled his country successfully for nearly five years when he and his government were presented, in August, 1914, with Germany's ultimatum. They decided to maintain the neutrality of Belgium, and at once their country was invaded, Antwerp and Brussels being quickly taken. The king bore these misfortunes with a dignity that won for him the respect of Europe. Both his sons were sent to England to be educated, his government was removed to Le Havre, and he himself took his place as commander of his army in the field. In September, 1918, he took command of an Allied army—containing Belgian, British, and French troops—which conducted an offensive in Flanders that resulted in the capture of the entire Belgian coast by October 20.

Albert had married in 1900 Elizabeth, a princess of Bavaria, and their elder son, the duke of Brabant, was born in the following year. Two other children, a son and a daughter, were born in 1903 and 1906 respectively.

General Leman

GERART MATHIEU JOSEPH GEORGES LEMAN was born January 8, 1851. He studied at the Belgian military school, and entered the army as a lieutenant of engineers, March 29, 1872. He was appointed assistant to the commandant of the engineers in the entrenched camp at Antwerp in April, 1874, and in the following year was attached to the ministry of war. At the end of 1880 he was made a professor in the military school. In 1892 he was transferred to the staff of the engineers. He became director of studies in the military school, December 20,

1899, and its commandant in 1905. When the Great War broke out he was a lieutenant general, in charge of the fortress of Liége, the defence of which he directed against the Germans. When, after heavy fighting, the Germans were completing the conquest of Liége, Leman was found unconscious in Fort Loncin, and he was taken prisoner, August 15, 1914. To his captors he said: "Put in your dispatches that I was unconscious." Leman was taken prisoner to Germany, but in 1917 he was interned in Switzerland, and repatriated in January, 1918. He died October 17, 1920.

Adolphe Max

ADOLPHE MAX, Belgian administrator, was born in 1869. He began his career as a journalist, and was dramatic critic for the "Petit Bleu." He then became a lawyer, and made a special study of municipal government. Burgomaster of Brussels at the outbreak of the Great War, he actively participated in the military preparations of Belgium, and at first proposed to defend Brussels against the German advance. During the early part of the German occupation he publicly urged resistance to the Germans' demands, and on the non-payment by Brussels of the fine of £8,000,000 imposed on the city was arrested and imprisoned in Germany, where he remained until the end of the war. He escaped during the confusion of the German revolution and on November 17, 1918, was reinstated in his office of burgomaster.

Cardinal Mercier

DESIRÉ JOSEPH MERCIER was born in 1851, at Braine-l'Alleud, Belgium. He was educated at Malines, Paris, and Leipzig. In 1874 he became a priest, taught philosophy at a seminary in Malines, 1877-82, and in the latter year was appointed to the chair in Aquinas' philosophy founded at Rome by Leo XIII. Consecrated archbishop of Malines and primate of Belgium in 1906, he was made a cardinal in 1907. After the German occupation of Belgium Mercier incurred the displeasure of the German governor by his uncompromising opposition to the foreign rule. His pastoral letter of Christmas, 1914, urging the Belgian people to continue their allegiance to King Albert, expounding the national rights of Belgium, and summing up her losses, resulted in his being imprisoned in the episcopal residence.

In 1894 Mercier founded, and edited till 1906, the "Revue Néoscolastique." Among his works on philosophy and metaphysics were "Les Origines de la Psychologie Contemporaine," 1897; "Métaphysique Générale," 1905. He published his "War Memories," 1920. He died January 23, 1926.

RUSSIAN

Nicholas II, Tsar of Russia

NICHOLAS II, tsar of Russia, was born May 18, 1868, the eldest son of Alexander III and the Danish princess, Dagmar (Maria Feodorovna), a sister of Queen Alexandra. After an education in modern languages and science, he became, in 1889, a lieutenant in a guards regiment. Succeeding to the tsardom, November 1, 1894, he, on November 26, married Princess Alix of Hesse, a granddaughter of Queen Victoria, who embraced the Orthodox church and took the name of Alexandra Feodorovna. Nicholas was crowned at Moscow, May, 1896.

When the revolution broke out in Russia, early in 1917, Nicholas was forced to abdicate, March 15, 1917. He then retired to his estate in the Crimea, but was later arrested and imprisoned at Tsarskoye, at Tobolsk, and finally at Ekaterinburg in the Urals, where, after some months of acute privation and distress, he was ruthlessly assassinated, with the tsaritsa, the tsarevitch, and other members of the imperial family, July 16, 1918, by the Bolshevist commissary Yurovsky.

Grand Duke Nicholas

NICHOLAS, Russian grand duke and soldier, was the son of the grand duke Nicholas, and second cousin of Tsar Nicholas II. He was born at St. Petersburg, November 6, 1856. Educated at the Nikolaieffsky academy, he entered the army as an officer of cavalry. On the outbreak of the Great War Nicholas II made him commander-in-chief of the Russian armies, and it was under him that the operations against the Austro-Germans were conducted until September, 1915. The grand duke was made viceroy of Caucasia, and then appointed to the command in the Caucasus. His campaign resulted in the conquest of Turkish Armenia. During the Russian revolution he was deprived of his command and sent to Yalta, in the Crimea, on March 28, 1917, where he was virtually a prisoner, but in April, 1919, was able to go to Italy. He died at Cap d'Antibes, January 5, 1929.

General Brusiloff

ALEXEI ALEXEIEVITCH BRUSILOFF was born in 1861, of a Russian noble family. He entered the Russian army as a dragoon. He saw service in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, and in 1906 was appointed to the command of the 2nd cavalry division of the Guard. Later he was military assistant to General Skalon, governor general of Warsaw. When the Great War broke out, he was commander-in-chief of the 8th army.

Brusiloff played a distinguished part in the conquest of Galicia under General Ivanoff in 1914. He followed Ivanoff in 1916 as commander-in-chief of the Russian armies between the Pripet and the Pruth, and during the summer conquered a considerable area in East Galicia and the whole of the Bukovina. In June, 1917, he replaced General Alexeieff as commander-in-chief of the Russian army, but within three months he was superseded by Korniloff. After the accession to power of the Bolshevist government he was arrested in September, 1918. Mystery surrounded his later movements.

General Russky

Nicholas Vladimirovitch Russky was born in 1855 at Kiev. He was educated at the Staff College, St. Petersburg, and entered the army as a lieutenant of infantry in 1874. In the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-5, he held the rank of general, and was chief of staff to the Russian 2nd army, under General Kaulbars. On his return to St. Petersburg, he acted as assistant minister of war.

On the outbreak of the Great War he commanded the Russian 2nd army on the south-west front, and greatly distinguished himself by his victories over the Austrians in Galicia, and the capture of Lemberg. Shortly afterwards, in command of the army of the Niemen, he forced the Germans to retreat into East Prussia. In 1916 his health became impaired, and he went to the Caucasus to recuperate. At the beginning of 1917 he was again in command of the Russian northern armies. On the formation of the provisional government under Prince Lvoff, Russky gave his adhesion to it, and with General Alexeieff assisted in securing the abdication of Nicholas II. Later he incurred the displeasure of the Councils of Workmen and Soldiers' Deputies, and was dismissed. In January, 1919, he was murdered by the Bolshevists.

General Alexeieff

Michail Vassilievitch Alexeieff was born in 1855, the son of a private soldier. He entered the infantry and fought in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-8. He afterwards entered the Nikolaieffsky military academy in St. Petersburg, gradually rising in rank by sheer merit. He was quartermaster general in Manchuria during the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-5, and became chief of staff to the 3rd army after the battle of Mukden.

At the beginning of the Great War Alexeieff was chief of staff to General Ivanoff, who then commanded the Russian armies on the south-west of the eastern front. When in 1915 the tsar superseded the grand duke Nicholas as commander-in-chief, he became chief of staff and the real generalissimo. Through overwork he

fell ill in the autumn of 1916, and was succeeded temporarily by General Gourko. Recovering, he resumed his position shortly before the outbreak of the Russian revolution in March, 1917, and continued to hold it for some time afterwards, but having lost favour he was replaced by General Brusiloff in June. He was largely responsible for the abdication of the tsar, March 15, 1917. During the quarrel between Kerensky and Korniloff he acted as mediator. In September he was again commander-in-chief, though nominally chief of staff to Kerensky; but after Lenin and Trotsky seized the government in November, he retired to the Kuban with Korniloff and other generals who were opposed to Bolshevism, and there with them organized the Volunteer army to fight the Bolshevists. On September 25, 1918, he died of pneumonia at Ekaterinodar, in North Caucasia.

General Dmitrieff

RADKO DMITRIEFF was born at Grodez, in Bulgaria, in 1859. He entered the Russian army, returned to Bulgaria with the rank of captain, and took part in the Serbian war of 1885. Implicated in the political movement which resulted in the abdication of Alexander, prince of Bulgaria, in 1886 Dmitrieff fled to Russia and served some years in the Russian army before again returning to Bulgaria. Having distinguished himself in the first and second Balkan Wars, in the latter as commander-in-chief, after the treaty of Bukarest he again went to Russia, and became a general in the Russian army. In the Great War he was given command of an army corps on the S.W. of the eastern front, taking part in the conquest of Galicia in August-September, 1914. In 1914-15 he led the Russian third army. In October, 1915, he repudiated his Bulgarian nationality. He was reported to have been murdered by the Bolshevists in 1919.

General Rennenkampf

PAUL KARLOVITCH RENNENKAMPF was born April 17, 1854, of a good Russo-German family. He was educated at the Staff Academy, St. Petersburg, and entered the Russian army as a lieutenant in a cavalry regiment. He became a colonel, 1896, and a general, 1905, having meanwhile seen active service in China in 1900, and in the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-5. He subsequently published "The Battle of Mukden," of which there is a French translation. On the outbreak of the Great War he was in charge of the Vilna military district.

At the head of the army of the Niemen he invaded East Prussia in August, 1914, and after some successes was compelled to retreat owing to the defeat of Samsonoff at Tannenberg, but being reinforced he drove the Germans back from the Niemen, and again invaded East Prussia. In October, 1914, he

was transferred to the Warsaw front, where he defeated the first German attempt on that city. In November, 1914, when the Germans made their second attempt, he failed to cooperate effectively with General Russky, and was retired. He was murdered by the Bolshevists in 1918.

General Samsonoff

ALEXANDER VASSILIEVITCH SAMSONOFF was born February 2, 1859. He entered the Russian cavalry in 1875, took part in the Russo-Turkish War, 1877-78, and became a general in 1902. In the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-5, he commanded a Siberian Cossack brigade. On the outbreak of the Great War he was placed in command of the army of the Nareff which invaded East Prussia, August, 1914. After winning the battle of Frankenau he suffered a disastrous defeat at Tannenberg, and shot himself, August 31, 1914.

SERBIAN

King Peter of Serbia

PETER KARAGEORGEVITCH, king of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, son of Alexander I, prince of Serbia, 1842-58, was born at Belgrade, July 11, 1844. Exiled with the rest of the family, he received a military education at St. Cyr, and fought with distinction in the foreign legion during the Franco-Prussian War, and in 1875 as a leader of the Herzegovinian insurgents. He married, in 1883, Zorka, daughter of Nicholas I of Montenegro. On the extinction of the Obrenovitch dynasty by the assassination of Alexander, June 10, 1903, Peter was elected king by the National Assembly on June 15. In June, 1914, he committed the regency of the kingdom to the crown prince Alexander, his second son, but was with the army during the first part of the Great War, accompanying it in the retreat of 1915-16 to Greece, where he spent his second exile. On the reconquest of Serbia and its extension into the kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, known as Yugo-Slavia, Peter returned to Belgrade, where he died, August 16, 1921. He was succeeded by his son Alexander.

General Putnik

RADOMIR PUTNIK, Serbian soldier, was born in 1847. The son of a Serb of the banat of Temesvar, Hungary, who emigrated into Serbia and became a schoolmaster at Kragujevatz, he was born in that town and educated at the military academy, Belgrade. With the rank of lieutenant colonel he took part in the Serbo-Bulgar War of 1885, and at

the same time was chief of staff of the Danube division. From 1886-92 he was professor in the Serbian military academy.

Putnik's sympathy with the radical party in Serbia made him obnoxious to King Milan, and he lost his position, but he increased his reputation by the power of his military writings. When King Peter ascended the throne in 1903 he made him a general, and gave him command of a division. Putnik also acted for some time as minister of war. He was commander in chief of the Serbs during the First and Second Balkan Wars, 1912-13, and was appointed voivode, the Serbian equivalent for field marshal. Putnik was the real generalissimo of the Serbians during the Great War, from its outset until the overrunning of Serbia in October-November, 1915, when he retreated with the remnants of the army across the mountains of Montenegro and Albania. At that time his health was so infirm that he had to be carried in a litter. He died May 17, 1917.

General Yankovitch

BOSA YANKOVITCH took a prominent part in the Balkan Wars, 1912-13, commanding the 3rd Serbian army in the latter year. When the Great War broke out he held high command, distinguishing himself in repelling the Austrian invasion of 1914, and in the retreat in the autumn of 1915. When the Allies landed at Salonica he was put at the head of a united Serbian and Montenegrin army, which he led in the subsequent campaign.

GERMAN

William II

WILLIAM II, German emperor and king of Prussia, 1888-1918, was born in Berlin, January 27, 1859, the eldest son of Frederick, afterwards German emperor, and his wife Victoria, daughter of Queen Victoria. He was baptized Friedrich Wilhelm Victor Albrecht, and after a spell of private tuition was sent to Cassel and then to Bonn. In 1881 he married Augusta Victoria, daughter of Frederick, duke of Augustenburg.

On June 15, 1888, William succeeded his father as king and emperor, and for 30 years was one of the foremost figures in Europe, especially after 1890, when he dismissed Bismarck and became himself the director of Germany's policy. His restless energy led him to make spectacular tours, such as the one to the Holy Land in 1898, to rush to London and other capitals and discuss affairs of state with sovereigns and statesmen, and to make himself noticeable by martial speeches to his troops. At one time he seemed sincerely anxious to keep the peace; at

others, as when he telegraphed to Kruger in 1896, determined to cause trouble. He was consistent, however, in his efforts to give Germany a "place in the sun," to maintain her army, extend her colonial empire, foster her trade, and make her heard, if not always respected, on all questions of international politics. He supported the idea of a great German navy, but above all, with the army as the main support of his throne, believed that he ruled by divine right.

In July, 1914, convinced that he possessed an invincible army, the kaiser decided on war. During its course, as nominal commander-in-chief, he flitted from place to place in the battle areas. Believing that Germany would yet triumph, he refused to read the signs pointing to her downfall in the autumn of 1918, and when told that his cause was hopeless he reluctantly abdicated on November 9, and on November 10 fled into Holland, where the castle of Amerongen was granted to him for his residence.

The treaty of peace declared the ex-kaiser a criminal, and arrangements were made for his trial in London. On January 16, 1920, his extradition was formally demanded, but it was refused by the Dutch government, and he continued to live in Holland. His wife died April 11, 1920, having borne her husband six sons and a daughter. In 1922 he married Princess Hermine von Reuss. The ex-kaiser's defence of his career and policy was translated into English as "Comparative Historical Tabulations from 1878 to the Outbreak of War in 1914."

Frederick William

FREDERICK WILLIAM, eldest son of William II, was born May 6, 1882, and in 1888, on his father's accession, became crown prince. He was educated for the throne, served in the army, and was loaded with honours. When the Great War broke out he was given a high command and was nominally the head of a group of armies on the west front. He did not in any way distinguish himself, although from time to time his name was mentioned in official accounts of victories. On the collapse of Germany in 1918 the crown prince associated himself with his father's abdication and took refuge in Holland. In 1903 he married Cecile, duchess of Mecklenburg; they had a family of four sons and a daughter. He published his "Memoirs" in 1922.

Field Marshal von Hindenburg

PAUL VON HINDENBURG, a member of a Prussian Junker family, was born October 1, 1847, in Posen. Educated at the military college, he joined the Prussian army in 1865, and served throughout the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, being present at the battles of St. Privat and Sedan and the siege of Paris. Later he

was on the staff of the 1st army corps at Königsberg, and devoted himself to the study of the military problems presented by the district of the Masurian Lakes (Mazurenland).

Rising in rank till Hindenburg became general of infantry and commander of an army corps, he retired from the army in 1911, and was living at Hanover when the Great War broke out. On the Russian invasion of East Prussia in August, 1914, he was appointed to the command of the German forces in that province, and on August 23 established his headquarters at Marienburg. Before the month closed he defeated the Russians disastrously in the battle of Tannenberg, largly owing to his special knowledge of the terrain. He pursued the Russians to the Niemen, but was compelled to retire into East Prussia.

On September 25 Hindenburg was put in chief command of the Austro-German forces which invaded Poland and made the first attack on Warsaw in the following October, but without success. In his second attack on Warsaw he defeated the Russians at Kutno on November 15-16, and for this victory was made a field marshal. During the rest of 1914, throughout 1915, and during the greater part of 1916 he was German generalissimo on the eastern front. On August 30, 1916, it was announced that Falkenhayn had been removed from the position of chief of the central general staff, and that Hindenburg had been appointed chief of the general staff of the field army. From that time to the signing of the armistice by Germany on November 11, 1918, Hindenburg was the German generalissimo, Ludendorff being his chief of staff. After the German revolution he remained in command of the German army, but retired into private life in June, 1919. His memoirs, "Out of My Life," appeared in 1920. In 1925 Hindenburg was elected president of the republic, and he was re-elected in 1932, when he was called upon to deal with the difficulties created by the activities of Adolf Hitler and his followers.

General Falkenhayn

Erich von Falkenhayn was born at Burg Belchau, September 11, 1861, and entered the German army in 1880. After leaving the Academy of War in Berlin in 1890 he joined the general staff. He served on Count Waldersee's staff in the China expedition in 1900. In 1911 he commanded the 4th regiment of Guards, and in 1912 was chief of the staff of the 4th army corps. In 1913 he became minister of war, which post he held at the outbreak of the Great War; but in December, 1914, he was definitely appointed chief of the general staff, and was its responsible head till removed in August, 1916.

In September, 1916, he was appointed commander-in-chief of the 9th army, composed of German and Austrian divisions, and

after driving the Rumanians from the north side of the Transylvanian Alps, he forced the passes, and descended into the plains of Wallachia, the first step in the overthrow of Rumania. He returned to Germany in 1917 on Mackensen's taking entire control of the Austro-German forces in Rumania, and later went to the Middle East to direct the Turkish operations against the British in Palestine and Mesopotamia, but not being successful was recalled and replaced by Liman von Sanders in March, 1918. He died April 8, 1922. In 1919 he published "General Headquarters, 1914-16, and its Critical Decisions," English translation, 1919.

General von Moltke

HELMUTH JOHANNES LUDWIG VON MOLTKE, who was the son of Adolf von Moltke, administrator of Rantzau, and nephew of the great von Moltke, was born at Gersdorff, Mecklenberg-Schwerin, May 23, 1848. He entered the German army as a lieutenant of infantry, and served through the Franco-Prussian War. He was for a time a lecturer in the Military Academy, Berlin. In 1891 he was appointed A.D.C. to William II, and in 1906 became general of infantry and chief of the general staff, in succession to Count von Schlieffen. As chief of the general staff he was the real generalissimo of the German army when the Great War broke out, and held that position till October, 1914, when, owing to the failure to capture Paris, he was superseded by Falkenhayn. He died on June 18, 1916.

General von Kluck

ALEXANDER VON KLUCK was born at Münster, May 20, 1846, and entered the Prussian army in 1865. He served in the Austro-Prussian (1866) and Franco-Prussian (1870-71) Wars, being wounded twice at Metz. In 1906 he was promoted general of infantry, and in 1913 he was inspector general of the eighth inspection, including the 2nd, 5th, and 6th army corps, with headquarters at Berlin. When the Great War broke out he was placed in command of the German 1st army, which invaded and overran Belgium early in August, 1914, and thereupon advanced west.

After receiving the surrender of Brussels and masking Antwerp, he moved south on Mons. Kluck drove the British thence, took Tournai, and captured Maubeuge, the Allies falling back towards Paris, and resting on the Marne and the Seine. Early in September Kluck, whose line of advance from Mons had been south-west to the outworks of Paris, turned south-east and exposed his flank, which was attacked by the French and the British. This brought about his defeat in the battle of the Marne, accompanied by the general retreat of the German armies. Kluck stood on the Aisne,

and early in 1915 was fighting at Soissons with success, but failed to take Soissons itself, and retired in 1916. In 1920 he published "The March on Paris."

General Hausen

MAX A. W. VON HAUSEN was born at Dresden, December 17, 1846, the son of a Saxon nobleman. He entered the Saxon army as an ensign in a Jäger regiment, rising gradually to the rank of general. He was war minister of Saxony in 1902. When the Great War broke out he was associated in command with Duke Albert of Württemberg in the operations in the Belgian Ardennes of the German 3rd army, August-September, 1914, and took part in the battle of the Marne, being repulsed at Vitry-le-François on September 11. He died March 19, 1922.

General Beseler

HANS VON BESELER, son of George Beseler, a judge, was born April 27, 1850, at Greifswald, and educated at the Wilhelm Gymnasium, Berlin. Having entered the German army in a pioneer battalion in 1868, he was a major on the staff in 1888, lieutenant general in 1903, and in 1904 was appointed chief of the Pioneer corps. He became general of infantry in 1907. During the Great War he commanded the German forces attacking Antwerp, which he captured, October 9, 1914. In 1915, on the Russian front, he assailed Osoviec and Georgievsk with a train of heavy siege artillery, and later in that year he was made governor of Warsaw, and afterwards governor-general of Poland.

General Bülow

KARL VON BÜLOW, son of Paul von Bülow, an army officer, was born at Berlin, March 24, 1846. Educated at Hanover and Berlin, he entered the 2nd regiment of the Guard in 1864, and was a captain on the staff in the Franco-German War of 1870-71. When the Great War broke out he was in command of the German 2nd army, and, invading Belgium, took Charleroi and Namur, afterwards advancing into France to and beyond the Marne. In the battle of the Marne, in which he was directly opposed to Foch, he was heavily defeated on September 8-10, 1914, and compelled to retreat to the line of the Vesle, later taking up a line on the Aisne. His account of these operations was published in book form in 1919. Bülow's attack on Reims in the same month was a failure. In a redistribution of the German commands Bülow was transferred to the north, and in 1916 he was replaced by General Otto von Below.

General Heeringen

JOSIAS VON HEERINGEN, son of Josias von Heeringen, court president of Hesse, was born March 9, 1850, and entered the Prussian army in 1867. In 1906 he was a general of infantry and in command of the 2nd army corps. Two years afterwards he was minister of war. In 1913 he was inspector general of the Prussian Guard, the 12th and the 19th army corps at Berlin. When the Great War broke out he was commander-in-chief of the 7th army, which advanced through the North Vosges in August, 1914. In August, 1916, Heeringen was put in charge of the coast defences. In September, 1918, he was placed in retirement, and died in Berlin, October 9, 1926.

General Emmich

OTTO VON EMMICH was born at Minden, September 4, 1848, the son of a Prussian officer. He entered the Prussian army in 1866 and served in the Franco-Prussian War, 1870-71, and in 1909 he was general of infantry, and commander of the 10th army corps. On the outbreak of the Great War, he was in command of the army of the Meuse that invaded Belgium and attacked Liége, which he captured on August 7, 1914. In April-May, 1915, he took part in Mackensen's drive in Galicia. He died December, 1915.

Admiral von Spee

COUNT MAXIMILIAN VON SPEE, German sailor, was born at Copenhagen in 1861. He had a distinguished career in the German navy, of which he was one of the creators. In 1914 he was in command of the Far Eastern squadron, and on the outbreak of the Great War escaped from China waters. On November 1 he defeated Admiral Cradock's squadron at Coronel, but on December 8 was decisively beaten by Admiral Sturdee at the battle of the Falkland Islands, he himself going down with his flagship, the Scharnhorst.

Herr von Bethmann Hollweg

THEOBALD VON BETHMANN HOLLWEG, the noted German statesman, was born at Hohenfinow, Eberswalde, September 29, 1856. Educated at Strasbourg, Leipzig and Berlin, he took degrees in law and philosophy, and entered the Civil Service, 1879. He was made president of Brandenburg in 1901 and vice-president of the Prussian ministry in 1907. In succession to Prince Bülow he was appointed by William II in 1909 imperial chancellor and minister president of Prussia, and he held those important positions when the Great War broke out.

In numerous speeches in the Reichstag Bethmann Hollweg defended the action of Germany. On August 4, 1914, he attempted to justify the invasion of Belgium on the plea that "necessity knows no law," and he set forth the German aims. During the latter part of 1916 he coquetted with a movement in Germany towards democracy, but the German military party would not countenance him, and their opposition led to his fall. On July 13, 1917, William II accepted his resignation. In 1919 Bethmann Hollweg published a book justifying his conduct in the war. He died January 2, 1921.

AUSTRIAN

Francis Joseph

FRANCIS JOSEPH I, emperor of Austria, was the eldest son of the archduke Francis and a grandson of the emperor Francis I. He was born at Vienna, August 18, 1830, was educated carefully but narrowly, as all the Hapsburgs, and owed much to the strong character of his mother, Sophia, daughter of Maximilian I of Bavaria. In 1848 the shaking throne was occupied by Ferdinand, a childless imbecile. The hopes of the Hapsburgs, therefore, centred on Francis Joseph, his nephew, and it was decided that he should be placed upon the throne.

Francis Joseph reigned from December 2, 1848, until November 21, 1916, one of the longest reigns in the world's history. He saw Austria lose her possessions in Italy, 1859, and, defeated by Prussia, 1866, driven from the German confederation. He saw the results of a hated rule in continuous discontent in Hungary and Bohemia. The acquisition of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1908, hardly compensated for endless difficulties with the Balkan states.

His private life was even more tragic. His wife Elizabeth, daughter of Maximilian Joseph, duke of Bavaria, was assassinated at Geneva in 1897; his only son, Rudolph, committed suicide, or was killed, in 1889; his nephew and heir, the archduke Francis Ferdinand, was murdered at Serajevo, June 28, 1914, with the most momentous consequences.

The emperor took a real part in ruling his empire with its warring races and inherited difficulties, and but for him it is probable that it would have fallen to pieces before it did. He was diligent and up to a point capable, but his outlook was narrow. He died November 21, 1916, and was succeeded by his grand-nephew, the archduke Charles, who abdicated in November, 1918.

Archduke Francis Ferdinand

FRANCIS FERDINAND, a son of the archduke Charles Louis and a nephew of the emperor Francis Joseph, was born at Graz, December 18, 1863. After inheriting, in 1875, the great

wealth of the house of Hapsburg-Este, formerly dukes of Modena, he became, by the death of his cousin, the crown prince Rudolph, in 1889, heir-apparent to the crown of Austria-Hungary. On his morganatic marriage in 1900 to the Countess Sophia Chotek, who was created Princess of Hohenberg, he renounced for the children the right of succession, but his own position remained, and for the next 14 years he was one of the directors of the policy of Austria-Hungary. He was on a tour in Bosnia when he was assassinated at Serajevo, June 28, 1914.

General Dankl

VICTOR DANKL was born at Udine, September 18, 1854, and entered the Austrian army as a lieutenant of cavalry in 1874. Major on the general staff in 1891, and one of the sub-chiefs of the staff in 1899, he became general of cavalry in 1912. On the outbreak of the Great War he was placed in command of the Austrian 1st army, which invaded south-east Poland in August, 1914, and was heavily defeated in the Rava Russka battles. In 1915 he was transferred to the Italian front, and till the defeat of Austria by Italy in October, 1918, he was in command of Austrian troops in Northern Italy.

General Auffenberg

MORITZ VON AUFFENBERG was born at Troppau, in Austrian Silesia, May 22, 1852. He was educated at Hamburg and Vienna, and entered the Austrian army in 1871. In 1909 he was a general in command of the 15th army corps. He became minister of war for Austria-Hungary in 1911. When the Great War broke out he was commander-in-chief of the Austrian 2nd army, which operated in East Galicia, August-September, 1914. He was defeated in the battles for Lemberg and was soon replaced by von Boehm-Ermolli.

Count Berchtold

COUNT LEOPOLD ANTHONY JOHANN BERCHTOLD, son of Count Sigismund Berchtold, was born at Vienna, April 18, 1863, and entered the Austrian diplomatic service in 1900. He occupied various official positions in the Austrian embassies in Paris, London, and St. Petersburg. When the Great War broke out he was Austro-Hungarian minister for foreign affairs, and as such had much to do with the diplomatic exchanges of July and August, 1914. Regarded as one of the chief authors of the world war, his part in bringing it about is revealed in two Austrian red books, published in 1919. In January, 1915, he was dismissed.

DIARY OF EVENTS
1914

DIARY OF EVENTS

From the Eve of Hostilities to Close of 1914

1914

JUNE 28.—Assassination of archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife at Serajevo.

JULY 23.—Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia, demanding a reply within 48 hours.

JULY 24.—The Russian cabinet considers Austrian action a challenge to Russia.

JULY 27.—Sir E. Grey proposes conference, to which France and Italy agree.

JULY 28.—Austria-Hungary declares war against Serbia.

JULY 29.—Austrians bombard Belgrade. Tsar appeals to kaiser to restrain Austria.

JULY 30.—Russia mobilizes 16 army corps.

JULY 31.—State of war declared in Germany. General mobilization ordered in Russia. London Stock Exchange closed.

AUG. 1.—Germany sends 12 hours' ultimatum to Russia to stop mobilizing, declares war, and invades Luxemburg.

King George telegraphs to tsar.

Mobilization in France and Belgium.

Italy declares neutrality.

Sir John French appointed inspector general of the forces.

British naval reserves called up.

Bank rate 10 per cent.

Montenegro identifies herself with Serbia.

AUG. 2.—German ultimatum to Belgium. German cruisers bombard Bona (Algeria). British ships seized at Kiel.

Outpost fighting on Russian and French frontiers.

Rumania declares neutrality.

AUG. 3.—Germany declares war against France.

Belgium refuses to allow passage of German troops through her territory, and King Albert sends "supreme appeal" to King George.

British government demands from Germany the assurance that the latter country will respect the neutrality of Belgium.

German troops envelop Visé, and their advance guard approaches Liége.

Sir E. Grey's speech in the Commons.

British naval mobilization completed.

Moratorium Bill passed, and Bank Holiday extended to August 7.

AUG. 4.—Germany declares war on Belgium, and her troops, under General von Emmich, attack Liége. Belgian defence conducted by General Leman.

German Reichstag authorizes an extraordinary expenditure of £265,000,000.

Great Britain declares war on Germany.

British army mobilization begins, and reserves and territorials are called up.

Mr. Asquith's speech in the Commons.

Australia offers to send 20,000 men.

Admiral Sir John Jellicoe appointed to supreme command of the Home fleets.

The British government takes control of the railways.

AUG. 5.—Fierce fighting at Liége.

Lord Kitchener appointed war minister.

Königin Luise, German minelayer, sunk off Harwich.

AUG. 6.—H.M.S. Amphion sunk in North Sea by floating mine; 131 lives lost.

Lord Kitchener asks for 500,000 recruits, 100,000 to be raised forthwith.

Vote of credit for £100,000,000 agreed to by the British House of Commons without dissent.

AUG. 7.—Germans refused armistice at Liége.

Prince of Wales's National Relief Fund opened.

New £1 and 10s. banknotes issued, and postal-orders made legal tender.

AUG. 8.—French troops occupy Altkirch and Mulhouse.

Port of Lome (German Togoland) taken.

French and Belgian troops cooperating in Belgian territory.

AUG. 9.—German submarine U15 sunk by H.M.S. Birmingham.

AUG. 10.—Diplomatic relations between France and Austria broken off, and war declared.

French fall back from Mulhouse.

Enrolment of first batch of 30,000 special constables for London area.

Canada offers 20,000 men and 98,000,000 lb. of flour.

Official Press bureau opened in London.

German cruisers Goeben and Breslau enter Dardanelles, and are purchased by Turkey.

AUG. 11.—German concentration on Metz—Liége line.

Germans enter the town of Liége.

AUG. 12.—Great Britain and Austria at war.

AUG. 13.—Battle of Haelen, between Liége and Brussels.

German "official" news first sent out by wireless.

AUG. 14.—French war credit of £40,000,000 authorized.

AUG. 15.—The Prince of Wales's National Relief Fund reaches £1,000,000.

AUG. 16.—French drive Germans back at Dinant.

Tsar promises Home Rule to a re-united Poland.

AUG. 17.—Reported officially that the British Expeditionary Force landed in France.

Belgian government removes from Brussels to Antwerp.

Japan asks Germany to remove her warships from

Japanese and Chinese waters, and to evacuate Kiao-chau; reply to be received by August 23.

AUG. 18.—Serbian victory over the Austrians at Shabatz.
French advance in Alsace-Lorraine.

AUG. 19.—Germans occupy Louvain.
Russian forces defeat 1st German army corps near Eydtkuhnen.

AUG. 20.—Brussels entered by the Germans.
The French retake Mulhouse.

AUG. 21.—British concentration in France practically complete.
German war levies of £8,000,000 on Brussels (£11 per head of the inhabitants), and £2,400,000 on province of Liége.
Battle of Charleroi begins.
Franco-British loan of £20,000,000 to Belgium announced.
Partial investment of Namur.
Russians rout three German army corps in East Prussia, after two days' battle.
German troops invade British South Africa.

AUG. 22.—British troops extended from Condé through Mons and Binche.
Battle of Charleroi ends; French compelled to withdraw.

AUG. 23.—Battle of Mons.
Japan declares war on Germany.
British army engaged at Mons.
Three of Namur forts fall; town evacuated by the Allies.
French withdraw from Lorraine.

AUG. 24.—Fall of Namur.
Allies abandon line of the Sambre.
Germans try to drive British into Maubeuge.

AUG. 25.—Louvain destroyed by Germans.
Allies retire, fighting rearguard actions, towards the Cambrai—Le Cateau line.
Zeppelin drops bombs on Antwerp.

AUG. 26.—British forces engaged at Tournai and Guignies; and hold line Cambrai—Le Cateau—Landrecies.
Surrender of Togoland by the Germans to a British force.
Austria declares war on Japan.
Battle of Tannenberg.

AUG. 27.—Allies retire towards line of the Somme.
British marines occupy Ostend.
German cruiser Magdeburg blown up off the Russian coast.
German armed liner Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse sunk by H.M.S. Highflyer.

AUG. 28.—Battle of Heligoland.
Malines bombarded by the Germans.
Enlistment of second 100,000 new British army begins.
Lord Crewe announces that, in response to native wishes, Indian troops are to take part in the war in Europe.

AUG. 29.—French army drives back the enemy near Guise.
Germans bomb Paris.
Russians invest Königsberg, in Eastern Prussia.

AUG. 30.—Surrender of Apia (German Samoa) to New Zealand force.
German aeroplanes bomb Paris.

AUG. 31.—Allies retire to line between Amiens and Verdun.
Announcement of British casualties, August 23-26: Killed, 163; wounded, 686; missing, 4,278.
Hindenburg, the German commander in East Prussia, assumes a strong offensive against the Russians.

SEPT. 1.—1st British cavalry brigade and 4th Guards brigade sharply engaged with enemy near Compiègne.
Russians, after seven days' fighting, rout five Austrian army corps (over 250,000 men), at Lemberg, in Galicia, take 70,000 prisoners, and capture 200 guns.

SEPT. 2.—Allies hold line of the Seine, the Marne, and the Meuse above Verdun.
Name of Russian capital altered from St. Petersburg to Petrograd.
National Relief Fund, £2,000,000.

SEPT. 3.—Russians occupy Lemberg.
Germans at Guippes, Ville-sur-Tourbe, and Chateau Thierry, and preparing to cross the Marne at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre.
French government withdraw from Paris to Bordeaux; General Galliéni appointed military governor of Paris.
Further list of British casualties in France issued: Killed, 70; wounded, 390; missing, 4,758.
H.M.S. Speedy, gunboat, mined.
Trade Union congress issues a manifesto calling on trade unionists to join the British army.

SEPT. 4.—Mr. Asquith, in speech at Guildhall, says that since the opening of the war between 250,000 and 300,000 men have answered Lord Kitchener's appeal.

SEPT. 5.—Belgians attacked at Termonde.
British Admiralty announces formation of naval brigades (15,000 men) for service on sea or land.

SEPT. 6.—Battle of the Marne begins.
Desperate struggle in progress for possession of Maubeuge.
British scout Pathfinder and Wilson liner Runo sunk in North Sea.
British, French, and Russian governments mutually engage not to conclude peace separately.

SEPT. 7.—Fall of Maubeuge.

SEPT. 8.—Serbians invade Bosnia, and achieve a victory near Racha.
Termonde sacked by Germans.

SEPT. 9.—Prime minister announces a vote for a further 500,000 men for the British army, bringing up its strength to 1,186,400, exclusive of territorials.

General French reports the enemy has been driven back all along the line; British troops cross the Marne.

The king's message to Overseas Dominions and to the princes and peoples of India issued.

Offers of service from Indian rulers read in the Commons.

Announcement that 70,000 Indian troops are to be employed in Europe; six maharajahs with cadets of other noble families to go on active service.

SEPT. 10.—General French's first dispatch, August 23-September 7, published in "London Gazette."

Belgian army again take offensive outside Antwerp.

Japan identifies herself with Russia, France, and Great Britain in deciding not to make peace independently.

Governor of Nyasaland announces repulse of the Germans.

SEPT. 10-14.—German cruiser Emden captures six British ships in bay of Bengal.

SEPT. 11.—Australian Expeditionary Force captures the German headquarters in New Guinea.

SEPT. 12.—Enemy found to be occupying very formidable position on north of the Aisne, and holding both sides of the river at Soissons.

Hamburg-Amerika liner Spreewald captured by H.M.S. Berwick.

Russians defeat the Austrians under General von Auffenberg in Galicia.

SEPT. 13.—First battle of the Aisne begins.

German cruiser Hela sunk by British submarine E 9.

SEPT. 14.—British auxiliary cruiser Carmania sinks the Cap Trafalgar.

H.M. gunboat Dwarf attacked by German steamer on Cameroons river; steamer captured.

Resignation of General Beyers, commandant general of South African Defence Force.

SEPT. 15.—China allows Japanese to land near Kiao-chau.

SEPT. 16.—Bombs from Japanese aeroplanes dropped on German ships in Kiao-chau Bay.

H.M. gunboat Dwarf rammed by German merchant ship Nichtingull, which was wrecked.

Commander Samson, with force attached to Naval Flying Corps, scatters a Uhlan patrol near Doullens.

SEPT. 17.—Lord Kitchener announces that rather more than six regular divisions (each 18,600 strong) and two cavalry divisions (each 10,000 strong) of British troops are in the fighting-line; and expresses the hope that the new army of 500,000 men will be ready to take the field in the spring of 1915.

In Tavarovo district Russians capture transport columns of two army corps, 30 guns, 5,000 prisoners, and enormous quantities of war material.

German force attacks Nakob (South Africa).

SEPT. 18.—Parliament prorogued. National Anthem sung in the House of Commons.

Russians occupy Sandomir.

SEPT. 19.—Reims cathedral shelled by German artillery.

SEPT. 20.—Loss of submarine AE1 reported from Melbourne.

H.M.S. Pegasus attacked and disabled by the German cruiser Königsberg whilst refitting in Zanzibar harbour.

SEPT. 21.—Recall of Rear Admiral Troubridge from the Mediterranean naval command.

Russians carry Jaroslav by assault.

SEPT. 22.—British cruisers Aboukir, Hogue, and Cressy torpedoed by submarines in North Sea.

German cruiser Emden shells oil tanks at Madras.

General Botha takes the field as commander-in-chief of British forces in South Africa.

SEPT. 23.—British naval airmen fly over Cologne and Düsseldorf. Bombs dropped on Zeppelin shed at Düsseldorf.

SEPT. 24.—The French occupy Peronne.

SEPT. 25.—Australian forces announce their occupation of seat of government of Kaiser Wilhelm's Land (German New Guinea).

Battle of Augustovo begins.

SEPT. 26.—Russians establish their position on the railway to Cracow.

German raid on Walfish Bay.

Indian troops at Marseilles.

SEPT. 27.—Initial success of South African force under Botha.

Germans occupy Malines.

SEPT. 28.—British Admiralty statement of losses in shipping since outbreak of war: German, 1,140,000 tons (387 ships); British, 229,000 tons (86 ships).

SEPT. 29.—Germans bombard Antwerp's first line of defence.

Emden reported to have sunk four more British steamships and captured a collier in the Indian Ocean.

SEPT. 30.—Antwerp waterworks destroyed.

OCT. 1.—Bombardment of Antwerp forts resumed.

Admiralty reports that H.M.S. Cumberland captured nine German merchant vessels (total tonnage, 30,915) and the gunboat Soden off the Cameroons river (West Africa).

OCT. 2.—British Admiralty announces counter measures to the German policy of mine-laying in the North Sea.

German sortie from Tsingtau repulsed.

OCT. 3.—Battle of Augustovo ends in defeat of Germans by Russians.

British troops arrive in Antwerp.

Oct. 5 and 6.—President Poincaré visits the headquarters of the Allied armies.

Oct. 5.—British naval and marine forces in Antwerp.

The Prince of Wales's Fund reaches £3,000,000.

Oct. 6.—Police notice published regarding the more effective masking of the lights of London.

Canadian government announce decision to raise a second overseas contingent of 22,000 men.

Oct. 7.—Japanese occupy the island of Jahuit, in the Marshall Islands, and seize Shantung railway as far as Tsi-nan-fu.

Oct. 7.—Submarine E 9 returns safely after sinking German torpedo-boat destroyer off the Ems river.

Belgian government leave Antwerp for Ostend.

Oct. 8.—Commonwealth of Australia announce a gift of £100,000 to Belgium.

Mutiny of Lieutenant Colonel S. G. Maritz in South Africa.

Oct. 9.—Fall of Antwerp.

Heavy fighting at Arras ; German forces driven back with heavy losses.

Oct. 10.—British Red Cross nurses expelled from Brussels.

Russian cruiser Pallada torpedoed by German submarines in the Baltic ; two of the submarines sunk.

Death of the king of Rumania.

Oct. 11.—Twenty bombs from German aircraft dropped on Paris ; Notre Dame damaged.

Oct. 12.—Goeben and Breslau reported in Black Sea.

Oct. 13.—Germans occupy Lille.

Belgian government remove from Ostend to Havre.

Oct. 14.—Germans occupy Bruges. Anglo-French forces occupy Ypres.

Fighting along the Vistula and the San to Przemysl, and south to the Dniester.

Oct. 15.—Admiralty announces sinking of Hamburg-Amerika liner Markomannia and capture of Greek steamer Pontoporos (the Emden's colliers), near Sumatra, by H.M.S. Yarmouth.

Canadian Expeditionary Force arrives at Plymouth.

H.M.S. Hawke sunk by submarines in North Sea.

Oct. 16.—H.M. cruiser Undaunted, accompanied by the destroyers Lance, Lennox, Legion, and Loyal, sinks four German destroyers (S115, S117, S118, and S119) off the Dutch coast.

Battle of Yser opens.

Oct. 17.—First Lord of the Admiralty issues message to the royal naval division on its return from Antwerp.

Distinguished Service Medal for navy instituted.

Germans mine the Scheldt.

Anglo-Japanese bombardment of Tsingtau.

Japanese cruiser Takachico sunk in Kiao-chau Bay.

Oct. 17 and 18.—Anti-German riots at Deptford.

Oct. 18.—Armed liner Caronia brings oil-tank steamer Brendilla into Halifax, Nova Scotia.

Oct. 19.—Two long dispatches from Sir John French published describing the fighting on the Marne and Aisne between August 28 and September 28. British casualties, September 12-28: Officers, 561; men, 12,980.

The monitors Severn, Humber, and Mersey take part in operations on Belgian coast.

Heavy fighting between Nieuport and Dixmude; Belgian army successfully repulses German attacks.

Officially announced that the Germans have been driven back 30 miles in the western area of hostilities.

Sale of absinthe prohibited by Paris police.

Oct. 20.—German submarine sinks British steamer Glitra off Karmoe.

Three officers and 70 men of rebel Lieutenant Colonel Maritz's commando captured; 40 others surrender.

Tsar prohibits government sale of vodka in Russia.

Oct. 21.—First battle of Ypres.

It is announced that the expenditure on the war, which in the first ten weeks averaged about 5½ millions per week, has risen to about 8¼ millions.

Oct. 22.—Emden reported to have sunk the British steamers Chilkana, Troilus, Ben Mohr, and Clan Grant, and captured the collier Exford and the St. Egbert 150 miles south-west of Cochin.

Wholesale arrests of unnaturalized aliens in the United Kingdom.

Publication of official dispatches relative to Heligoland Bight engagement of August 28.

"The Times" fund for the British Red Cross Society and St. John Ambulance Association reaches £500,000.

Oct. 23.—Belgians cooperating with Franco-British troops against the Germans between Ostend and Nieuport; British and French warships cooperating. Dykes cut along the line of the Yser.

Oct. 22-24.—Russians capture 17 officers and 4,150 men, 11 machine guns, 22 guns, 23 caissons, and other war material, following Prussian evacuation of Garbatka.

Oct. 24.—German submarine rammed off Dutch coast by H.M. destroyer Badger.

Fierce fighting in Galicia, from Sandomir to Przemysl. Two thousand Austrians taken prisoners.

Lord Kitchener appeals to public to refrain from treating soldiers to drink.

Revolt of Beyers and De Wet.

Oct. 25.—Allies occupy Melzicourt.

Portugal naval reserves called up.

Oct. 26.—Russian cavalry occupy Lodz.

French steamer Amiral Gauteaume, with Belgian refugees on board, damaged by explosion between Boulogne and Folkestone ; 30 lives lost in panic.

British merchantman Manchester Commerce sunk by mine off northern coast of Ireland.

German troops cross the Yser between Nieuport and Dixmude.

Oct. 27.—Germans thrust back between Ypres and Roulers, and driven out of French Lorraine.

Colonel Maritz and his forces routed by Colonel Brits ; Maritz wounded, having fled to German South-West Africa. General Botha routs General Beyers' commando.

Oct. 28.—Lord Kitchener announces that a further 100,000 men are needed to complete the requirements of the army.

Oct. 29.—Resignation of Prince Louis of Battenberg, first sea lord. Lord Fisher appointed to succeed him.

Oct. 30.—Government hospital ship Rohilla runs on rocks off Whitby ; over 70 lives lost.

Germans forced to recross the Yser.

H.M.S. Hermes sunk in Dover Straits by German submarine ; 3 killed and 20 missing.

Oct. 31.—London Scottish Territorial Regiment distinguish themselves near Ypres.

Turks bombard Odessa.

Nov. 1.—Battle of Coronel.

Nov. 2.—Egypt declared under martial law.

Nov. 3.—British cruiser Minerva shells fortress and barracks at Akabah, in the Red Sea ; and a combined British and French force bombards the Dardanelles forts.

Imperial Viceroy of Caucasus announces he has been ordered by the tsar to cross the frontier and attack the Turks.

Nov. 4.—German cruiser Yorck sunk (by mine, or submarine) at entrance to Jahde Bay.

Nov. 5.—State of war exists between Great Britain and Turkey, Cyprus annexed. Turkish ambassador leaves London.

From this date the whole of the North Sea declared "a military area."

Nov. 6.—British male subjects between the ages of 17 and 55 arrested in Germany and sent to concentration camps.

Carl Lody, German spy, shot at the Tower of London.

Nov. 7.—Capture of Tsingtau by the Japanese.

Nov. 8.—British-Indian force occupies Fao, on Persian Gulf.

Nov. 9.—German cruiser Emden driven ashore at Keeling (Cocos) Island and burnt by H.M.A.S. Sydney. Captain von Müller

and prince Francis Joseph of Hohenzollern prisoners, unwounded.

Pension scale increased.

Nov. 10.—Germans take Dixmude.

German steamer Königsberg found hiding in a river in German East Africa ; channel is blocked to bottle her in.

Nov. 11.—The 100th day of the war. King opens Parliament. Parliamentary recruiting committee scheme announced.

H.M.S. Niger torpedoed by a submarine off Deal.

Repulse of the Prussian guard near Ypres.

Austrians capture Valievo.

Nov. 12.—Defeat of De Wet by Botha.

Nov. 13.—Prime minister states British casualties up to October 31 to be 57,000, all ranks. Supplementary estimate for additional 1,000,000 men for British army.

Nov. 14.—Lord Roberts dies of pneumonia in France.

Nov. 16.—Vote of credit for £225,000,000 for war purposes passed by House of Commons. British war expenditure stated to be almost £1,000,000 per day.

Capture of Turkish forts at Sheik Seyd by H.M.S. Edinburgh and Indian troops.

Use of carrier pigeons by the British government announced.

Nov. 17.—First battle of Ypres ends.

War budget introduced in British House of Commons. Chancellor of the exchequer announces War Loan of £350,000,000. Extra duties on tea and beer, and increase of income tax.

Prince of Wales appointed aide-de-camp to Sir John French.

British-Indian success against the Turks on the Shat-el-Arab river, in the Persian Gulf.

Nov. 18.—Russian Black Sea fleet engages Goeben and Breslau.

British naval losses to date in killed, wounded, and missing: 3,884 (exclusive of R.N. division and crew of Good Hope).

Nov. 19.—Funeral of Lord Roberts at St. Paul's Cathedral.

Admiralty reports escape of Ortega in Strait of Magellan.

Nov. 20.—British Admiralty announces the extension of the mine defences of the North Sea and makes pilotage compulsory.

Defeat of Turks 30 miles from Port Said by Bikanir Camel corps.

Nov. 21.—British-Indian force occupies Basra, on Persian Gulf.

British air-raid on Friedrichshafen workshops.

Nov. 23.—Ypres in flames ; cathedral and belfry damaged.

British bombardment of Zeebrugge.

Nov. 24.—Royal warrant increasing army officers' pay.

Nov. 25.—M. Radoslavoff, the Bulgarian premier, reaffirms Bulgaria's neutrality.

American "Santa Claus" ship, the Jason, arrives at Plymouth with gifts for European children made orphans through the war.

Nov. 26.—H.M.S. Bulwark blown up in Sheerness harbour; of the officers and crew only 12 men saved.

Bristol steamer Primo sunk near Havre by U21.

Nov. 27.—Reims Cathedral shelled.

British War Loan over-subscribed.

Nov. 28.—Kaiser makes General von Hindenburg a field marshal.

Nov. 29.—King George leaves London for France.

Nov. 30.—French carry chateau and park of Vermelles.

Dec. 1.—Allies advance between Bethune and Lens.

King George visits the British field headquarters and the fighting-line.

Surrender of De Wet.

Dec. 2.—Belgrade occupied by the Austrians.

Dec. 3.—King invests Sir John French with the Order of Merit.

National Relief Fund, £4,000,000.

Signor Salandra, the Italian premier, announces the adhesion of his government to the policy of neutrality.

Expeditionary forces from Australia and New Zealand announced as having landed in Egypt.

Dec. 4.—King George confers the Order of the Garter upon King Albert.

Dec. 5.—King George returns to London.

Dec. 5-9.—British success in the Persian Gulf region.

Dec. 6.—British foreign office publishes answer to Germany's allegation that Great Britain intended to violate Belgian neutrality.

Dec. 7.—General Beyers shot while trying to cross the Vaal river.

Dec. 8.—British naval victory off the Falkland Islands.

Serbians retake Valievo.

Collapse of the South African rebellion.

Dec. 9.—M. Poincaré returns from Bordeaux to Paris.

Dec. 10.—Progress of Allies near Quesnoy in the Argonne and in the Bois de Pretre in the extreme north-east.

Dec. 11.—French capture railway station of Aspach, south of Thann, in Alsace.

Dec. 12.—West bank of Yser canal, north of Ferryman's House, evacuated by Germans.

Dec. 13.—Montenegrins capture Vishnigrad and throw the Austrians beyond the Drina.

Dec. 14.—Turkish battleship torpedoed by British submarine. Submarine B11, under Lieutenant Commander Holbrook, enters Dardanelles and torpedoes the Turkish battleship Messudiyeh.

DEC. 15.—Serbians re-enter Belgrade.

DEC. 16.—Bombardment of Hartlepool, Scarborough, and Whitby by German warships; 671 killed and wounded.

DEC. 17.—British fleet, from a position off Nieuport, subjects German positions to a severe bombardment.

German cruiser Friedrich Karl sunk by Russians in Baltic.

Egypt becomes a British protectorate, and suzerainty of Turkey terminated.

DEC. 18.—Prince Hussein Kamel Pasha declared sultan of Egypt.

DEC. 19.—Announced that vigorous offensive in the Arras district makes Allies masters of several trenches in front of Auchy-les-La Bassée, Loos, St. Laurent, and Blangy.

DEC. 20.—Lieutenant Holbrook awarded the V.C.

DEC. 21.—King George sends message to new sultan of Egypt conveying expression of his Majesty's most sincere friendship, and assurance of his unfailing support in safeguarding integrity of Egypt.

DEC. 22.—Germans, driven back from Mlawa, retire behind East Prussian frontier.

DEC. 23.—M. Viviani, French premier, declares that the only policy for the Allies is merciless war until Europe is liberated.

DEC. 24.—Bomb dropped on Dover by German aviator.

Admiral von Tirpitz threatens to torpedo British and Allied shipping.

DEC. 25.—Allies seize part of village of Boisselle, north-east of Albert; also make progress north of Roye.

Futile German air-raid over Sheerness.

British air-raid on Cuxhaven. Seven British naval airmen, assisted by the Arethusa and Undaunted and submarines, attack enemy warships off Cuxhaven.

DEC. 26.—Report of Sir E. Hatch's committee states that about 1,000,000 refugees have abandoned Belgian soil, of whom about 110,000 are in England, 500,000 or more in Holland, and the rest in France.

DEC. 27.—National Theatre Company, under direction of Mr. Seymour Hicks, and including Miss Ellaline Terriss, Miss Gladys Cooper, Mr. Ben Davies, and others, give entertainment to troops in field and wounded in hospitals.

DEC. 29.—U.S. note to Great Britain on treatment of American commerce.

DEC. 30.—Allies take village of St. Georges, near Nieuport.

German air-raid on Dunkirk; 15 killed, 32 wounded.

DEC. 31.—Announced that Princess Patricia's Light Infantry from Canada now at the front.

Bougainville (Solomon Islands) taken by Australian forces.

New decoration (the Military Cross) instituted.

German consent to exchange incapacitated prisoners.

END OF VOLUME ONE